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Abstract
This thesis seeks to understand the role of religion in the discourse of Western Europe’s
populist radical right parties. Populist radical right parties have made extraordinary electoral
gains in a number of Western European nations. Many of these parties call for a return to
Christian and/or Judeo-Christian values, and for the Christian and/or Judeo-Christian identity
of their respective nations to be respected and preserved. Muslims, in particular, are singled
out by the populist radical right as a threat to Western Christian values and identity. Yet these
populist radical right parties do not appear to be advocates of a religious doctrine or way of
life; rather, they most often frame themselves as defenders of secularism. This is curious: if
populist radical right parties in Western Europe are secular, when then has Christian or
Judeo-Christian identity become such an important aspect of their discourse?
Building on sociologist Rogers Brubaker’s observation that populist radical right parties in
Western Europe are not genuinely religious, but rather Christian identitarian in orientation,
this thesis contends that populist radical right parties use religion in their discourse in order to
exclude Muslims from European society, and to protect their respective secular nationalisms.
Therefore the primary question asked in this thesis is: why is religion used as a tool to
differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the populist radical right in
Western Europe?
The thesis proposes a hypothesis: Western Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has
(1) revealed the non-universal nature of Western European secularism to Europeans, and (2)
demonstrated the secularisation of Christianity into Western European ‘culture.’ This
recognition that Christianity has been secularised into ‘culture’ has allowed secular
Europeans to identify themselves – and their nation and ultimately Western civilisation – as
Christian or Judeo-Christian. These effects have precipitated the formation of Christianist
secularism, a type of Christian identitarian politics which perceives contemporary European
culture to be ‘Christianity secularised.’ A group of populist radical right parties in Western
Europe, then, have embraced Christianist secularism, which they use to define their
respective national identities in religio-civilisational terms, i.e. as (Judeo-)Christian. In doing
so, they are able to exclude Muslims from their society, on the grounds that Islam is an alien
religion which – unlike Christianity and possibly Judaism – has not and cannot be secularised
into ‘culture.’
v
To test this hypothesis, the thesis analyses the discourse of two populist radical right parties
in Western Europe: The National Front (now known as National Rally) of France, and the
Party for Freedom of the Netherlands. This analysis has two parts: The first tests part of my
hypothesis: that Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has (1) revealed the non-
universal nature of European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the
secularisation of Christianity into ‘culture.’ The second consists of Critical Discourse
Analysis of three selected texts produced by the respective leaders of the National Front and
Party for Freedom, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, produced during the 2012-2017 period.
The Critical Discourse Analysis seeks answers in the selected to the following questions: (1)
does the discourse display the key elements of Christianist secularism? (2)  How is Islam
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Religion and the Populist Radical Right in Western Europe: An Introduction
Has religion returned to Western European politics?1 Throughout the continent, populist
radical right politicians are calling for a return to Christian or Judeo-Christian values, and for
the Christian identity of their respective nations to be respected and preserved.2 Muslims, in
particular, are singled out by the populist radical right as a threat to Western Christian values
and identity.3 And populist radical right parties are, increasingly, winning a greater share of
the vote while spreading this message.
At first glance it may appear the rise of the populist radical right indicates that, after decades
of secularisation, Western Europeans are returning to the religion of their parents and
grandparents. Yet this does not appear to be occurring. There are no indications that
Europeans are, by and large, becoming more religious. Fewer and fewer Western Europeans
are attending church, and disbelief in the Christian God and traditional Christian sexual
morality is growing year by year. Western Europeans, rather, appear to be increasingly
irreligious.4 Moreover, the parties of the Western European populist radical right do not tell
their supporters to go to church, believe in God, or practice traditional Christian values.
Instead, they do something rather strange: they claim that their respective national identities
and cultures are the product of a Christian or Judeo-Christian tradition which either
encompasses – or has produced – secularism.
For example, in an interview conducted by Cecile Alduy, French National Front leader
Marine Le Pen remarked upon the challenge posed to French culture by Muslim immigrants.5
Having lauded Laïcité as a necessary form of protection for homosexuals, women, and
secular Muslims against religious law, Le Pen opined that Muslim immigrants had been
making “increasing demands that collide with the mores, the codes, the ways of life, the
1 Elements of this thesis were previously published in Nicholas Morieson, “Are contemporary populist
movements hijacking religion?” Journal of Religious and Political Practice, 3(1-2), pp.88-95, 2017.
https://doi.org/10.1080/20566093.2017.1292171.
2 Nadia Marzouki and Duncan McDonnell, “Populism and Religion,” in Saving the People: How Populists
Hijack Religion, , McDonnell, Roy (eds), C. Hurst and Co: London, 8, 2016.
3 Ibid, 5-6.
4 A Pew survey indicates that Europeans are remarkably irreligious. See “How Religious commitment varies by
country among people of all ages,” Pew Research Centre, June 13, 2018.
http://www.pewforum.org/2018/06/13/how-religious-commitment-varies-by-country-among-people-of-all-
ages/. Church attendance remains very low in most Western European countries. See “Being Christian in
Western Europe,” Pew Research Centre, May 29, 2018. http://www.pewforum.org/2018/05/29/being-christian-
in-western-europe/.
5 Throughout this thesis I refer to the French political party now known as National Rally by their previous
name, National Front (Front National). I do this because during the period surveyed in my case studies – 2012-
2017 – Marine Le Pen had not yet changed the party’s name. Thus I prevent any confusion by using the name
with which the party referred to itself during 2012-2017 (and indeed from the party’s conception until 2018).
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habits, of a country very anciently founded on Judeo-Christian values.”6 These are interesting
and telling remarks. Laïcité was devised in opposition to the political and cultural domination
of the Catholic Church, and the secular values it extols in contemporary France – equality
under the law for homosexuals, women, and non-Christians – differ in important ways from
traditional Christian values.7 Indeed, some Christians and non-Christians would find Laïcité
and Judeo-Christian values as almost antithetical. How, then, is it possible to reconcile Len
Pen’s desire to protect France’s Judeo-Christian values from Muslim immigrants with her
belief in Laïcité and a public sphere absent of religion?
Le Pen is not alone in holding that Judeo-Christian values and secularism8 must be defended
from the growing threat of Islam. Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 a number
of populist right-wing9 anti-immigration, anti-Muslim political parties have achieved a
significant measure of electoral success across Europe and inside European Union (hereafter
EU) parliament. The hallmark of these populist parties is the fusion of xenophobia,
particularly a fear of Muslim immigrants and their culture, with anti-establishment feeling
largely directed at ‘elites,’ centrist parties, and the European Union. Yet while each of these
populist parties must be considered unique, they nonetheless share a common belief that the
‘Judeo-Christian’ and/or Christian identity and values of Europe must be protected from
globalisation and Islamisation. This, then, is the puzzle which this thesis explores: Why is
religion used as a tool with which to differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the
discourse of the populist radical right in Western Europe?
Almost all the electorally successful populist right-wing parties of Western Europe have
made the alleged imminent Islamisation of Europe the central issue around which they
6Marine Le Pen, quoted by Alduy, Cecile in “Has Marine Le Pen Already Won the Battle for the Soul of
France?”The Nation, March 5 2014. https://www.thenation.com/article/has-marine-le-pen-already-won-battle-
soul-france/.
7 On Laïcité and French politics and society see Talal Asad, “Reflections on Laïcité and the Public Sphere,”
Social Science Research Council: Items and Issues, 5:3, 2005.
http://www.ssrc.org/workspace/images/crm/new_publication_3/%7Ba11f41f4-3160-de11-bd80-
001cc477ec70%7D.pdf
8 Laïcité can be distinguished from secularism. Laïcité is a French state based arrangement, and not a
widespread sociological phenomenon. See Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, George Holoch (Trans.)
New York: Columbia Press, 2007.
9 See Anton Pelinka “Right-wing populism: Concept and typology,” in Right-wing populism in Europe: Politics
and Discourse, Wodak, KhosraviNik, Mral, London:Bloomsbury, 2013 pp.3-23 for a discussion of the nature of
right-wing populism.  For a critical view of the possibility of defining populism, see Margaret
Canovan, Populism, London: Junction Books, 1981. My own understanding of right-wing populism is informed
byPelinka.
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mobilize support.10 For example, the Dutch Party for Freedom appears to have built its
support partly upon the claim that unless Muslim immigration is halted, the Islamisation of
the Netherlands will become inevitable. Party for Freedom leader Geert Wilders demands
that “Judeo-Christianity and Humanism” be made the “leading culture” of the Netherlands in
order to protect the country’s “Judeo-Christian and Humanist” identity and heritage.11 In a
parallel development, the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which has claimed that Muslim
immigrants threaten Britain’s ‘Judeo-Christian values,’12 won the largest share of seats in
European Parliament at the 2014 European Union elections in Britain.13 Such was UKIP’s
significance in Britain that the mainstream Conservative Party has, for fear of losing much of
its traditional constituency to UKIP, adopted some of UKIP’s Euroscepticism and rhetoric of
protecting ‘Christian’ values.14 Elsewhere in Western Europe the electoral shift to the
populist right has been more dramatic. The anti-immigrant and deeply anti-Muslim Swiss
People’s Party, which successfully campaigned in 2009 to ban the construction of new
Minarets in Switzerland, now holds the largest number of seats in Swiss parliament.15 A
similar effect can be detected across Scandinavia, where the parties of the populist radical
right have become the second or third largest parties in Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.16
The newfound electoral success of the populist right is significant, because it has been driven
by a transformation of radical right politics. Traditionally, radical right politics has been
driven by a concern with ‘race’ and ethnicity, and a commitment to preserving traditional
values and hierarchies. The contemporary populist radical right denies being racist, condemns
anti-Semitism, and claims itself to be a protector of secular, liberal values, and of the working
classes from ‘elites.’17 In the place of the politics of ‘race,’ the populist radical right concerns
itself with the alleged cultural and religious threat posed by religious immigrants to national
cohesion and European Judeo-Christian civilisation.
10 Hans-Georg Betz and Susi Meret, “Right-wing populist parties and the working class vote: what have you
done for us lately?” in Class Politics and the Radical Right, Jens Rydgren (Ed.) London and New York:
Routledge, 2013, 116.
11 See Wilders quoted in Teun Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the
Netherlands, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, 114.
12 Nigel Farage, quoted in Kiran Moodley, “Nigel Farage says Britain needs to stand up for its ‘Judeo-Christian
values’ to combat home-grown militants,” Independent, September 4 2014.
13 “UK election results,” BBC News, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/events/vote2014/eu-uk-results
14 Steven Swinford, “David Cameron says Christians should be ‘more evangelical’”,The Telegraph, 16 April
2014.
15 “Switzerland swings to the right, as anti-immigration party wins election,” Reuters, 2015.
16 Mark Leonard, “Why even Scandinavia is moving to the right,” The New Statesman, July 2 2015.
17 For a full discussion of the transformation of the European far-right see Chetan Bhatt, “The New Xenologies
of Europe: Civil Tensions and Mythic Pasts,” Journal of Civil Society, 8:3, (September 2012) pp. 307-326.
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That religion has become a central element of populist right ideology is an especially
significant development. After all, religion appeared to have declined as a significant issue in
Western European politics during the 20th century. Why has it returned to prominence? In the
1960s and 1970s it was widely believed that the process of modernization – industrialization,
urbanization, and scientific education – would precipitate secularisation,18the privatization of
religion, and religion’s separation from politics and public life.19 This set of assumptions
were core aspects of Peter Berger’s secularisation thesis.20 Yet by the 1980s it was becoming
clear that the secularisation of the world had not come to pass. One of the architects of
secularisation theory, sociologist Peter Berger, subsequently amended secularization theory
to show how modernisation need not entail secularisation, and that religion can thrive in a
globalised modern world.21
However, Berger argued as recently as 2014 that Western Europe has remained largely
secularised and that religion has little influence over public life and political decision making
in a Western European context,22 a view shared by a number of other prominent
sociologists.23 Yet if Western European politics is secular, why should populist radical right
parties in Western Europe experience electoral success while praising Christian and/or Judeo-
Christian values, and calling for the religious heritage of Western Civilisation to be
preserved? Moreover, why has religion become a central element in populist radical right
discourse?
The question is especially pertinent because the populist radical right has grown highly
influential and powerful in Western Europe since the 2000s. Indeed, the populist radical right
18 Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview,” in TheDesecularization of the
World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, Peter L. Berger (ed.) Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999, 3-5.
19 See Peter L. Berger The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Anchor
Books, 1967; Bryan R. Wilson, Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment, London: Watts, 1966,
and Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society, New York:
Macmillan, 1967, on the original secularisation thesis.
20 Peter L. Berger The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Anchor
Books, 1967.
21 See Berger, 1999.
22 Peter L. Berger, “Peter Berger on Resurgence of Religion and Decline of Secularization Theory”. YouTube. 2
March 2015.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DHlDyR102G8.
23 This view is not Berger’s alone, but is echoed in Bryan Wilson, “The secularization thesis: criticisms and
rebuttals,” in Secularization and Social Integration, Laermans, Wilson, Billiet, Leuven: Leuven University
Press, 1998 pp. 44-66; Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell,
2002; Steve Bruce, “The curious case of an unnecessary recantation: Peter Berger and Secularization,” in Peter
Berger and the Study of Religion, Heelas, Martin, Woodhead (eds), London and New York: Routledge, 2011 pp.
87-100; Bryan S Turner, Religion and Modern Society: Citizenship, Secularisation and the state,
Cambridge:Cambridge University Publishing, 2011, 11.
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is no longer a spectre haunting Europe; it is a powerful player in mainstream European
politics, able to shape the foreign and domestic policies of numerous Western and Eastern
European nations, and a powerful bloc inside European parliament.  In Austria, the
Netherlands, France, Poland, Switzerland, Italy, and Hungary, populists have dismantled the
comfortable centrist consensus on the efficacy of neoliberalism and mass immigration of
Europe’s traditional governing parties. Indeed, populism’s growth has come primarily at the
expense of Europe’s mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties, some of which
experienced a dramatic loss in support in a remarkably short period.24
During the 2012-2017 period, populist radical right parties experienced rapid growth and
unprecedented electoral success. In 2017, the Marine Le Pen led populist radical right
National Front achieved its best ever result at a French election, winning more than 33% of
the vote in a Presidential run-off election, and emerging as the second most popular party in
France.25 Significantly, the 2017 French Presidential elections saw the traditional governing
parties of the centre-right and centre-left eclipsed by the National Front and a new
technocratic neoliberal movement – En Marche! – led by investment banker turned politician
Emmanuel Macron.
Dutch parliamentary elections in 2017 saw not only the populist radical right Party for
Freedom win its highest share of the vote, and emerge as the second largest party in the
Netherlands, but also saw the emergence of a new and increasingly popular populist radical
right party, the ‘Forum for Democracy.’ In 2015 the populist radical right Law and Justice
party won elections in Poland. Hungarian politics became increasingly dominated throughout
the period by radical right populism, in particular by President Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party,
and the more extreme Jobbik party.26 The third largest party in Germany, despite the
country’s post-war aversion to radical right politics, is a populist radical right party – the
24 In the 2018 Italian elections the centre-left Democratic Party and centre-right Forza Italia suffered a 6% and
7% loss of support respectively. See “Italian Elections2018: Full Results,” The Guardian, March 5, 2018.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2018/mar/05/italian-elections-2018-full-results-renzi-
berlusconi. At the 2017 French Presidential elections the centre-left Socialist Party and centre-right Les
Republicains candidates both failed to make the second round of voting. After parliamentary elections in 2017,
the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) retained just 9 of the 38 seats it held after the 2012 parliamentary elections. See
“Dutch Election Results,” The Economist, March 16, 2017. https://www.economist.com/graphic-
detail/2017/03/16/dutch-election-results.
25 See the official results from the French interior ministry as reported  in The Guardian, Sean Clarke and Josh
Holder, “French Presidential election May 2017 – full second round results and analysis,” The Guardian, 26
May, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/may/07/french-presidential-election-
results-latest.
26 Zoltan Adam and Adndras Bozoki note the ‘takeover’ of Hungary by right wing populists in “The God of
Hungarians: Religion and Right-Wing Populism in Hungary” in Saving the People: How Populists Hijack
Religion, C. Hurst and Co:London, 2016, 130-132.
7
Alternative for Germany.27 The rise of the populist radical right is thus a Europe wide
phenomenon, affecting the majority of – though not all – European nations.
What is the populist radical right?
It can be somewhat difficult to define the boundaries of the populist radical right. I use the
term to describe parties which are – to use Cas Mudde’s categorisation – nativist,
authoritarian, and populist. Mudde argues that populist radical right parties are nativist
insofar as they claim “that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native
group ...and that non-native elements ...are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous
nation-state.” They are ‘authoritarian’ – insofar as they show “a general disposition to glorify,
to be subservient to and remain uncritical toward authoritative figures of the ingroup and to
take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some moral authority”.28
Equally, they are populist insofar as they hold to “a thin-centered ideology that considers
society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure
people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that politics should be an expression of
the volonte generale (general will) of the people.29
This categorisation, while fitting, tells us little about what populist radical right parties in
Western Europe are actually like. In the discourse of the populist radical right in Western
Europe, nativism, authoritarianism, and populism all play important roles, but what is
interesting is how religion and religious identity intersects with each of them. For example,
the populist radical right’s nativism is influenced by its conception of ‘the people’ and the
culture of their respective nation-states as (Judeo-)Christian and secular. Thus they may argue
people who share a Judeo-Christian heritage and secular worldview form the native
‘ingroup,’ and furthermore that people who do not share this heritage and worldview are a
threat to the culture and identity of ‘the people.’ Equally, despite claiming to be defenders of
freedom, the parties of the populist radical right believe that as representatives of ‘the
people,’ they have the right to exclude non-native (i.e. non-Christian and secular) people
27 See Sean Clarke, “German Elections 2017:Full Results,” The Guardian, September 25, 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/sep/24/german-elections-2017-latest-results-live-
merkel-bundestag-afd.
28 Adorno et al quoted by Mudde in Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe,
Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2007, 22.
29 Cas Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition, 39(4), 2004, pp. 542– 563, 543.
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from their societies, and to give a privileged place to Judeo-Christian and secular culture and
identity.
Populist radical right parties in Western Europe frequently frame themselves as defenders of
a Judeo-Christian and Humanist, or Christian and secular, tradition, and claim Islam is
inimical to this tradition because it cannot secularise.30 This framing has become an important
element in their conception of ‘the people,’ as well as their conception of the outgroups they
allege are threats to ‘the people’ and their nation-state. As a result, discourse is vital to
populist radical right parties, insofar as they see politics “in terms of a  ‘metapolitical’
contestation  of  the  power  to  define  concepts  and  shape  discourse.31 Expressions of
Christian and Judeo-Christian identity are thus a significant part of the discourse of the
populist radical right. They play an important role in constructing ‘the people,’ and
determining who can be counted among the ingroup and who must be excluded. How, then,
can the populist radical right’s discursive use of religion be explained?
Making sense of religion’s role in Western European populist radical right discourse
Religion’s role in populist ideology and discourse has been noted by several scholars, but
formal studies of the use of religion by populists are rare. Moreover, studies analysing and
categorising the different ways in which religion is used by various populist parties are
extremely rare. Because the purpose of this thesis is to understand how populist radical right
parties use religion in their discourse, it is necessary to define the boundaries of ‘religion’ and
‘the secular’ in order to understand the role each plays in the discourse of the parties
examined in this thesis. Defining these terms, however, is difficult. For example, in his
influential essay “Religion as a cultural system,” anthropologist Clifford Geertz described
religion as “(1) a system of symbols which act to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-
30 See for example the following speeches by Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen, in which their respective
national cultures are described as secular and Christian, or Judeo-Christian and Humanist, while Islam is
demonized as antithetical to this jointly secular and religious culture and intellectual tradition. See Geert
Wilders, “Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation,” Geert Wilders Blog, November 8, 2016.
https://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-de-media-mainmenu-74/94-english/2015-wilders-plan-time-for-
liberation.; Marine Le Pen, Presidential Campaign Launch Speech, Gates Institute Online, February 5, 2017.
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/9900/le-pen-speech.  See also RFI, “Le Pen: Islam not compatible with
secular society,” RFI, January 28, 2011; Marine Le Pen, “Has Marine Le Pen Already Won the Battle for the
Soul of France?” 2014.
31 Hans Georg Betz & Carol Johnson (2004) Against the current—stemming the tide: the nostalgic ideology of
the contemporary radical populist right, Journal of Political Ideologies, 9:3, 311-327, 324.
DOI:10.1080/1356931042000263546 https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931042000263546.
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lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of
existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the
moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.”32 This may at first appear to be a sensible,
coherent definition of religion. Yet as Talal Asad pointed out, religion cannot – and should
not – be essentialised and reduced to a set of signs and symbols expressed in a visibly
uniform fashion across all cultures and in all times.33
For Asad, Geertz’s definition of religion mistakenly separates a phenomenon called ‘religion’
from other phenomena such as politics, economics, science, and so on. Only by observing
this false separation, as Asad points out, is it possible to argue that “religion has the same
essence today as it had in the Middle Ages, although its social extension and function were
different in the two epochs.”34 Asad challenges Geertz’s influential conception of religion by
arguing that the “separation of religion from power is a modern Western norm, the product of
a unique post-Reformation history.”35 He argues that it is a mistake to presume that
Christians in earlier times and places shared the West’s contemporary understanding of
religion. Pre-modern Christian Europeans, according to Asad, did not merely differ from
today’s Europeans insofar as they believed that religion ought to inform political debate.
They differed from contemporary Europeans inasmuch as they saw no separation between the
political and the religious. As Charles Taylor has noted, in the European Middle Ages belief
in Christianity was not a matter of personal faith, it was axiomatic.36 Religion, as most
Westerners understand it today, did not exist. Thus Asad argues that “there cannot be a
universal definition of religion, not only because its constituent elements and relationships
are historically specific, but because that definition is itself the historical product of
discursive processes.”37
Asad’s argument about religion and the secular being the products of discursive processes
points the way to a different way of understanding religion and the secular. As José Casanova
has noted, “’the religious’ and ‘the secular’ are always and everywhere mutually constituted.”
32 Clifford Geertz, “Religion as a cultural system,” The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, London:
Fontana Press, 1993, 90.
33 Talal Asad, “The Construction of religion as an anthropological category,” in Genealogies of Religion:
Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993,
121-122.
34 Asad. “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category,” 115-116.
35 Ibid.
36 Charles Tayor, A Secular Age, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2007, 1-3.
37 Asad, “The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category,” 116. Fitzgerald goes further, and calls
for the abandonment of the concept of religion by scholars. See
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In other words, it is not possible to understand one without understanding the other, for the
concepts have evolved together. Religion and secular are thus in this thesis understood not as
solid, unchanging, Platonic notions existing forever, but in accordance with Casanova’s
understanding of a shifting secular-religious binary, in which the secular has increasingly
defined the boundaries of the religion, so much so that religion now occupies a relatively
small and private place in Western European life. What, then, is the relationship between
religion and the secular? ‘Secular,’ Casanova writes, “emerged first as a theological category
of Western Christendom that has no equivalent in other religious traditions or even in Eastern
Christianity.” He notes that “the Latin world saeculum ...meant an indefinite period of time”
but “became one of the terms of a dyad, religious/secular, that served to structure the entire
spatial and temporal reality of medieval Christendom into a binary system of classification
separating two worlds, the religious-spiritual-sacred world of salvation and the secular-
temporal-profane world.”
Thus ‘the secular’ began as a “particular Western Christian theological category,” which
“served to organize the particular social formation of Western Christendom.”38 Of course, as
Taylor points out, the mere fact that secularisation has its roots in a specifically Western
context need not mean that only in the West do we find a distinction between the sacred and
secular.39 Moreover, as Casanova points out, the “secular is by no means profane in our
secular age.”40 Nonetheless, secularism as a worldview remains, as Elizabeth Shakman Hurd
has noted, a peculiarly Western and Christian method of differentiating between things,
people, and places, sacred and profane.41 In time, secular differentiation increased, with a
greater number of concepts, structures, places, and things becoming classified as ‘secular.’
Today, as Casanova observes, “‘the secular’ has become the dominant category that serves to
structure and delimit, legally, philosophically, scientifically, and politically, the nature and
the boundaries of ‘religion’.”42 So powerful has the secular become, that secular governments
may distinguish ‘good religion’ from ‘bad religion,’ on the basis that religion must always be
38 Jose Casanova, “The secular and secularisms,” Social Research, 76(4), 2009, 1063.
39 Charles Taylor, “Western Secularity” in Rethinking Secularism, ed. Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer,
Johnathan Van Antwerpen, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 33.
40 Jose Casanova, “The secular and secularisms,” Social Research, 76(4), 2009, 1064. Casanova points to
“sacralized secular phenomena as nation, citizenship, and human rights.” Ibid.
41 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Secularism and International Relations Theory,” in Religion and International
Relations Theory, (ed. Jack Snyder) New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, 60-90. See also Jose
Casanova, “Re-thinking public religions,” in Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred Stepan, Monica Duffy Toft
(editors), Rethinking Religion and World Affairs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 27-28.
42 Casanova, “The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms,” in Craig Calhoun, Mark Juergensmeyer, Jonathan
Van Antwerpen (editors) Rethinking Secularism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 72.
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private and non-political. Political religion, then, can be labelled illegitimate, and a danger to
the public sphere due to religion’s innate irrationality.43 In other words, secularism
increasingly defines the boundaries of religion, relegating it to the private realm and to
personal belief.
To be secular is not merely, then, to lack belief in God or to refuse to practice a religion,
although this is how many secularists might describe their condition. Rather, the secular “is a
historical condition that requires the perfect tense,” and “a condition of ‘having overcome’
the irrationality of belief.”44 Thus secularism understands the increasingly anthropocentric
nature of Western culture as “as a process of maturation and growth, as a “coming of age,”
and as progressive emancipation.” Secularism, then, is not the absence of religion, but
something in itself. Thus Casanova observes that
“The function of secularism as a philosophy of history, and thus as ideology, is to turn
the particular Western Christian historical process of secularization into a universal
teleological process of human development from belief to unbelief, from primitive
irrational or metaphysical religion to modern rational postmetaphysical secular
consciousness. Even when the particular role of internal Christian developments in the
general process of secularization is acknowledged, it is in order to stress the universal
significance of the uniqueness of Christianity as, in Marcel Gauchet’s expressive
formulation, ‘the religion to exit from religion.’”
The power of secularism, and its ability to delineate the boundaries of religion, has come
under criticism in recent decades, marking a change from an earlier period in which
secularism was treated as if it were merely the absence of religion. Saba Mahmood, for
example, has critiqued the secularism practiced in the state of Egypt. According to Mahmood,
the secular Egyptian state has taken upon itself to delineate the boundaries of religion, and
has done this in order to create a secular public space and thereby engender ‘religious
freedom’ for all, especially for minority religious groups such as the Coptic Christians.45 This
43 See Erin Wilson, & Luca Mavelli, ‘Good Muslim/ bad Muslim’ and ‘good refugee/bad refugee’ narratives are




44 Jose Casanova, “The secular and secularisms,” Social Research, 76(4), 2009, 1054.
45 Mahmood writes “While Islamic concepts and practices are crucial to the production of this inequality, I
argue that the modern state and its political rationality have played a far more decisive role in transforming
preexisting religious differences, producing new forms of communal polarization, and making religion more
rather than less salient to minority and majority identities alike. Furthermore, I suggest that insomuch as
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attempt has backfired, however, she argues, because by doing so the state has marked the
Copts out as fundamentally different.46 In doing so, she argues, the state has driven the Copts
into an uneasy alliance with the authoritarian secular state, which they must do for their own
protection from the hostile Muslim majority, which recognises the Copts as an ‘other’ in their
own country. In a similar way, and bringing these ideas into the discipline of International
Relations, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd has shown how secular states the world over have
created ‘religious freedom’ laws which, far from bringing religious harmony to their nations,
have by strictly defining the boundary between the religious and secular, and between
different religions, increased disharmony and sometimes created violence.47
Secularism, then, has been labelled by a number of scholars as problematic, and in a number
of different ways. In the European context, secularism has come under criticism for pushing
valuable ideas drawn from religious people and religious sources from the public sphere.48
Therefore there has been a movement among scholars towards finding a post-secular political
arrangement, whereby religion is no longer excluded from the public sphere, and the
beneficial aspects of religion may be enjoyed by all. The condition of post-secularity is
perhaps peculiar to Western Europe, where the ability of secular governments to define and
regulate religion has come under pressure more recently, particularly due to increasing
Muslim immigration, beginning in the 1970s and continuing until today. The growing
presence of Muslims, and their greater religiosity compared to white Europeans, has led to
much debate about whether Muslims have a place in ‘secular’ Europe. A large Muslim
population appears to many Europeans to mark a challenge to the primacy of secularism, and
indeed to the Judeo-Christian-secular tradition. This challenge stems in part, it appears, from
the belief that reason and critique – the hallmarks of the Western intellectual tradition – are
absent in Islam.49 This is not to deny that simple racism and xenophobia are sometimes
behind fear and hatred of Muslims and Islam. Nor do I mean to disregard the impact that
secularism is characterized by a globally shared form of national-political structuration, the regulation of
religious difference takes a modular form across geographical boundaries.” Saba Mahmood, Religious
Difference in a Secular Age: A Minority Report, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016, 2.
46 Ibid.
47 See Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, “Expert Religion: The Politics of Religious Difference in an Age of Freedom
and Terror (December 2015).” Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS
2015/97. SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2707180 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2707180
48 Habermas was perhaps the first major secularist thinker to critique secularism’s intolerance of religion and
religious people, and the deleterious nature of this intolerance. See Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on post-secular
society.” New Perspectives Quarterly. 25 (4), 2008 pp.17-29.
49 Engaging with this notion, Irfan Ahmad has argued that critique is not merely secular, but is contained within
the Islamic tradition. See Irfan Ahmad, Religion as Critique: Islamic Critical Thinking from Mecca to the
Marketplace, The University of North Carolina, 2017.
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Islamist terrorism has had upon Europeans’ attitude towards Islam and European Muslims.
Indeed, a mixture of racism and fear or terrorism may have engendered, among some
Europeans, a racialising of Muslims.50 Indeed, the narratives established by the so-called
Global War on Terror have helped create an image of Muslims as an angry, violent,
irrational, and dangerous people. Right-wing and far-right parties in the West, then, might be
understood as using this stereotypical image of Muslims to their advantage, arguing that
Muslims are simply too dangerous to be allow to migrate to Western nations due to their
alleged propensity for violence.
Yet the religious element seems curiously important in Western Europe, due to Europe’s
secularisation, and the manner in which secular differentiation and hostility to public religion
has become a vital element in post-war European politics and culture. Islam seems to
challenge certain basic elements of post-war European life, and is therefore viewed by some
Europeans as a dangerous and alien force come to irrevocably change their culture. Indeed,
the rise of the populist radical right in Europe, which is uniformly hostile to Islam, may be
understood as evidence of Europeans’ inability to tolerate religion in public life. Yet populist
radical right parties in Western Europe do not merely attempt to suppress Islam and exclude
Muslims from the public sphere; they frequently portray themselves as defenders of
Christianity, and/or Judeo-Christianity.
To understand Western European populist radical right parties’ relationship with religion it is
helpful to look to the ways in which they use religion in their discourse. Specifically, it is
helpful to ask whether their discourse secular in the sense that it uses Christianity – the
religion that overcame religion and secularised – to buttress secularism and keep religion in
the private sphere. Or whether it marks further evidence of emerging post-secularism in
Western Europe. More broadly, it is useful to ask whether populist radical right parties use
Christianity and/or Judeo-Christianity in their discourse to advance the secularist project of
differentiation between the religious and secular, or to bring Christianity/Judeo-Christianity
inside the public sphere?
50 See Nadia Fadil, “Taming the Muslim Woman,” The Immanent Frame, May 24, 2018.
https://tif.ssrc.org/2018/05/24/taming-the-muslim-woman/; Nadia Fadil, “Are we all Secular/ized yet?:
reflections on David Goldberg’s ‘Are we all post-racial yet?” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2261-2268, 39 (13),
2016 https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1202424; Guhin, J. (2018). Colorblind Islam: The racial hinges of
immigrant Muslims in the United States. Social Inclusion, 6(2), 87–97 DOI 10.17645/si.v6i2.1422.
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It is perhaps not possible to decisively answer the question, ‘are populist radical right parties
secular?’ There will always be a blurred boundary between the religious and secular.
Moreover, even religious parties in Europe, simply due to existing within a secular space, are
in some ways secular. For Casanova, Western Europeans are secular, in this narrow sense.
However, he writes, there is a “secular secularity” quite apart from this everyday secularism,
a “phenomenological experience not only of being passively free but also actually of having
been liberated from religion as a condition for human autonomy and human flourishing.” It is
possible, then, to ask whether populist radical right parties are secular in this narrow sense,
and thereby determine whether their use of religion is signed to buttress secular
differentiation, or in some sense a genuine expression of a desire to return religion to public
life.
This thesis draws heavily upon the observation made by Rogers Brubaker on the use of
religion by a particular group of Western/Northern European populist parties. Noting that
these parties are – to varying degrees – ostensibly secular and liberal, civilisationalist, philo-
Semitic, and yet on the other hand dedicated to preserving their nation’s and civilisation’s
Christian or Judeo-Christian identity, Brubaker labels their worldview  “Christianist
secularism.” This characteristic blending of Christian identity and secularism, he observes, is
common only to a certain group of parties located in Western – and particularly Northern –
Europe.  Brubaker observes this most visibly in the Netherlands, and in particular in the
discourse of Dutch ‘Party for Freedom’ leader Geert Wilders. Wilders, Brubaker notes, is the
most prominent exponent of the Christianist secular worldview, and describes in his rhetoric
a world in which ‘Judeo-Christian and Humanist’ societies must battle retrograde and
barbaric Islam for their survival.51
Brubaker’s explanation for populist radical right parties’ paradoxical blending of Christian
identity with secularism, is that it is the result of increasing civilisation based identification
among Europeans. The “partial shift” towards civilisation based indentification, he writes,
has occurred due to a perceived “civilizational” threat posed to Europe by Islam.52 This
perception has given rise to an “identitarian Christianism” which is devoid of any spiritual or
‘religious’ content, but rather defined by “a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an
51 Ibid, 1197.
52 Rogers Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40:8, 1191-1226, 1193, 2017. DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700
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ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech.”53This
position accords well with other scholars observations of the development of a religion based
civilisational identity among Western Europeans. Obviously, there are echoes of Samuel P.
Huntington’s clash of civilisations thesis in Brubaker’s arguments. However, observations
such as Luca Mavelli’s, who argues in Europe’s Encounter with Islam that “vindication of
Europe’s Christian roots has increasingly emerged as a response to the fear engendered by the
Muslim other,” tell us more about the rise of Christianism in Europe than Huntington’s
broader theoretical framework of the supposed inevitability of clashing civilisations.54
Rather than the result of naturally clashing civilisations, the rise of secular Christianism
appears to be related to the end of religious faith, but persistence of ‘cultural Christianity’ in
Western Europe. Thus Oliver Roy observes that “even if the identity of Europe is Christian, it
is no longer a religious identity because the faith has left.”55 Rather, precisely because
Christianity has itself been secularised as European ‘culture,’ “staunch secularists can now
defend a Christian identity.”56 A similar observation is made by Christian Joppke, who argues
that Western secularism incorporates and secularises Christianity and Christian symbols,
transforming them into ‘culture,’ while rejecting other religions and their symbols as
‘religious’ and therefore an affront to secularism.57 This secularising of Christianity into
culture, then, makes it possible for Europeans’ to defend ‘Christian identity’ while
disavowing Christian teachings and affirming liberal secular values in their place. These
observations are also somewhat in accordance with Jürgen Habermas’ observation that that
the increasing visibility of Islam in Europe is making Europeans more aware of the existence
of public religion, and helping to reshape European religious self-identity and perceptions of
religion.58
Brubaker’s observation of a growing secular Christianism appears particularly salient when
placed against other scholars’ observations of the paradoxical discursive use of religion by
secular Western European populist radical right parties. His arguments, however, have not
53 Ibid.
54 Luca Mavelli, Europe’s Encounter with Islam, London and New York: Routledge, 6, 2012.
55Ibid, 19.
56 Olivier Roy, “Secularism and Islam: The Theological Predicament,” The International Spectator, 48:1, 2011,
11-12.
57 Christian Joppke, The Secular State Under Siege: Religion and Politics I n Europe and America, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2015,  4.
58 Jürgen Habermas, “Opening up fortress Europe,” Sign and Sight, November 16, 2006,
http://www.signandsight.com/features/1048.html; Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society.” New
Perspectives Quarterly. 25 (4) 2008, pp.17-29, 20.
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been tested. This thesis, then, synthesises the arguments of Brubaker and a number of other
scholars into a hypothesis which is tested over the course of two case studies of prominent
Western European populist radical right parties.
Thesis Question and Hypothesis
The primary question asked in this thesis is: Why is religion used as a tool with which to
differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the populist radical right in
Western Europe? My hypothesis – based on my reading of the literature on the topic – is that
Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has (1) revealed the non-universal nature of
European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the secularisation of Christianity
into European ‘culture.’ This recognition that Christianity has been secularised into ‘culture’
has allowed secular Europeans to identify themselves – and their nation and ultimately
Western civilisation – as Christian or Judeo-Christian. It has thus created Christianist
secularism, a type of Christian identitarian politics which perceives contemporary European
culture to be ‘Christianity secularised.’ A group of populist radical right parties in Western
Europe have embraced Christianist secularism, which they use to define their respective
national identities in religio-civilisational terms, i.e. as (Judeo-)Christian. In doing so, they
are able to exclude Muslims from their society, on the grounds that Islam is an alien religion
which – unlike Christianity and possibly Judaism – has not and cannot be secularised into
‘culture.’
The thesis examines the Western European populist radical right’s use of (Judeo-)Christianity
in their discourse. The primary use of this discourse is to separate the ingroup ‘the people’
from outgroups consisting of Muslims and ‘elites.’ The questions that remain are ‘how?’ and
‘why?’ Asking why is important, because it is difficult to comprehend how parties expressing
a desire to return to Judeo-Christian values or to preserve their nation’s or civilisation’s
Christian identity, could win elections in deeply secular – even irreligious – parts of Europe.
The thesis thus analyses the discourse of populist radical right parties in the Christianist
group in order to understand how Christianity is used, and why parties using Christianist
secular discourse are increasingly electorally successful. The decision to ask these questions
is premised by the notion that analysing the use of Christianity in the discourse of the populist




This thesis uses two major research methods: case studies59 and critical discourse analysis.60
The primary method is case studies of the French National Front and Dutch Party for
Freedom in the 2012-2017 period. I choose the 2012-2017 period for two major reasons.
First, because the period coincides with the greatest electoral success of populist radical right
parties in Europe.61 Second, because the National Front and Party for Freedom faced
elections in 2012 and 2017, and responded to the 2015 immigration crisis, during this period.
2012-2017 is an especially useful period to study when trying to understand the rise of
populist radical right parties in Western Europe. Populist radical right parties broke through
from the fringes and into mainstream politics in a number of European nations during this
period. Equally, the period coincided with an ‘immigration crisis’ which saw more than one
million (mostly Muslim) refugees enter Europe.
The National Front and Party for Freedom are especially comparable in the 2012-2017
period. Both faced elections in 2012, both rejected mainstream Dutch and French approaches
to the 2015 immigration crisis and opposed allowing Muslim refugees to settle in Europe,
and both enjoyed increased popularity 2016-2017, culminating in electoral success in 2017.
In these ways the two parties’ political trajectories are strikingly similar, though there are also
a number of important differences.
The Party for Freedom and National Front are two of the most powerful populist radical right
parties, with influence within their respective nations and inside the European Union
Parliament. They are ideal for comparison for several reasons. While products of unique
historical forces, both parties are representative of wider Western European populist radical
right secular Christianist parties, and display in their discourse, to varying degrees,
“identitarian Christianism, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly
59 See Mabry, Linda, “Case Study in Social Research,” The SAGE Handbook of Social Research Methods,
PerttiAlasuutari, Leonard Bickman and Julia Brannen (eds), London: SAGE, 2008,214-28
60 See Norman Fairlough and Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis” in T.A. Van Dijk (ed.) Discourse
Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction, vol. 2, London: Sage, 1997.
61 See Pippa Norris, “It’s not just Trump. Authoritarian populism is rising across the West. Here’s why.” The
Washington Post, March 11, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-
just-trump-authoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres-why/?utm_term=.dbe9847566fa;Ronald F.
Inglehard and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural
Backlash, Paper for the roundtable on “Rage against the Machine: Populist Politics in the U.S., Europe and
Latin America”, 10.00-11.30 on Friday 2 September 2016, annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Philadelphia, 2. https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1401.
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liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech.”62 Moreover, both
speak of the values of their respective societies, and of their collective civilisation, as a
secularised form of ‘(Judeo-)Christianity. At the same time, the two parties differ in
important respects – particular in their histories and ideological trajectories – allowing for a
useful comparison between them.
For example, the National Front is an example of a neo-fascist and conservative Catholic
party which has transitioned to become a populist radical right Christianist secular party.63
The Party for Freedom, however, lacks the National Front’s historical links to fascist and
integralist movements. Rather, its founder, Geert Wilders, broke away from the ruling liberal-
conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy and formed his own populist
movement, modelled in part on the personal style and ideology of slain anti-Islam populist
politician Pim Fortuyn and the religion based identity politics of former People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy leader Frits Bolkestein.64
Case studies of these two parties will serve to explicate the relationship between (Judeo-
)Christianity and secularism among populist radical right parties and in the wider politics of
Western Europe, and help provide a solution to the question asked in this thesis: Why do
populist radical right parties in Western Europe use religion in their discourse as a tool for
ingroup and outgroup formation?  Thus studies of the National Front and Party for Freedom
enable me to test my hypothesis under different cultural and political conditions in Western
Europe, thereby improving the accuracy of my analysis and conclusions.
The case studies each comprise two chapters. The first provides the political, social, and
historical context for the discourse analysis which forms of majority of the second chapter,
and tests part of my hypothesis: that Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has (1)
revealed the non-universal nature of European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated
the secularisation of Christianity into ‘culture:’ two factors which have in turned made it
possible for non-religious Europeans to identify as ‘Christian,’ and thus allowed populist
radical right parties to claim a Christian identity and exclude Muslims from ‘Christian’
Europe. In order to understand the historical context in which the two parties operate I draw
62 Ibid.
63 See Olivier Roy, “The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laïcité,” in Saving the People: How
Populists Hijack Religion, London: C. Hurst & Co. 2016, 79-87.
64 For details of Bolkestein’s relationship with Wilders see Willem Mass, “The Netherlands,” In James
Hollifield, Philip Martin, Pia Orrenius, Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Third Edition, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 271.
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upon scholarship examining the history of religion, and indeed of secularism, in France and
the Netherlands respectively.65
The second part of the case studies consists of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of three
selected texts produced by the respective leaders of the National Front and Party for
Freedom. CDA approaches language as a social practice, and thus as socially (and politically)
consequential language practices which “may have major ideological effects” that “can help
produce and reproduce unequal power relations between ...social classes, women and men,
and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things
and position people.”66 Thus “language and other social practices are always in unity,”
making certain that language influences and expresses the social power of groups and
individuals.67
Following CDA techniques developed by Norman Fairclough these two chapters examine the
discourse on religion of the Party for Freedom and National Front, not only as statements of
their own beliefs, but as they are related to broader French and Dutch social practice and
politics.68 Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis involves analysing both the text itself, the
methods by and for which the text was produced, and the relationship between the text and
wider society. Therefore I analyse both the language of the texts produced by the two parties
and their respective leaders, but consider the reasons the texts were produced and their
relationship to French and Dutch politics respectively. Fairclough’s CDA is a type of
“discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of
causality and determination between (a) discursive practice, events and texts, and (b) wider
social and cultural structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices,
events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles
65 See for example Olivier Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007;
Koen Vossen The Power of Populism: Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, New York:
Routledge, 2016; James Shields, The Extreme Right in France: From Pétain to Le Pen, New York: Routledge,
2007; Peter J. Davies, The National Front in France: Ideology, Discourse, and Power, London:Routledge,
1999.
66 Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis, London:Sage 2009, 6.
67Ibid, 10.
68 See Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. See also See Norman
Fairlough and Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis” in T.A. Van Dijk (ed.) Discourse Studies: A
Multidisciplinary Introduction, vol. 2, London: Sage, 1997.
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over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and
society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony.”69
The CDA based case study chapters borrow this broad framework, and are structured to
include, first, a summary of the text being examined, in which the major themes and structure
of the text is described. Second, and building on the summary of the text, analysis of the
language used in the text. Third, and building on the summary and language analysis, an
ideological analysis. The purpose of this is to uncover the meaning of text and to situate the
text within a wider political/social discourse which it may reproduce or help to produce. This
segment attempts to understand and/or uncover the link between the discourse evident in the
selected texts and the wider populist radical right discourse on religious identity. It thus
draws on the context provided in earlier chapters on religion and populist radical right parties,
and tests whether Christianist-secular politics has been made possible by Europeans’
encounter with Islam in Europe, which has made explicit the secularisation of Christianity
into ‘culture,’ and therefore allowed Christian identity to be used to define ‘the people’
exclude Muslims from (Judeo-)Christian Western civilisation.
The purpose of the CDA is to seek answers in selected texts produced by Marine Le Pen and
Geert Wilders respectively to the following questions: (1) does the discourse display the key
elements of Christianist secularism: “identitarian Christianism, a secularist posture, a
philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and
freedom of speech?”70 (2)  How is Islam constructed in the discourse? (3) How is Christian
identity used to exclude Muslims from European society? The CDA thus pays special
attention to the manner in which conceptions such as “the people,’ ‘Islam,’ and ‘Christianity,’
are constructed in the texts, how they are used to create an exclusive nationalist identity, and
their role within the party’s ideology. A methods chapter (chapter 3) is included in this thesis
which explicates my methods and methodology in detail. Here I provide a four step
explanation of my method.
1. Select three texts produced by Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders respectively, and at three
points: during the 2012 election campaign, during the 2015 immigration crisis, during the
2017 election campaign. Texts are selected according to certain criteria. They must be in
69 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language, Second Edition, Oxford
and New York: Routledge, 2013, 93.
70 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.
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English, have content related to national identity, and be broadly representative of the
political positions of the leader and their respective party. Texts produced by Wilders are
sourced from his personal website; texts produced by Marine Le Pen are sourced from Time
Magazine, and translations of Le Pen’s speeches on the Gates of Vienna weblog and Media
Research Centre TV website.71
2. Subject each text to Fairclough’s process of Critical Discourse Analysis. First, analyse the
language of the text to comprehend how Marine Le Pen and Geert Widlers construct national
and civilisation identity, and the manner in which religion is or is not invoked as part of this
construction. Second, interpret the text as a product of party ideology and discourse. Third,
interpret the text within a wider National and Western European political and social context.
To do this the text is compared with and contrasted against data from other sources (party
manifestos, other statements by party members and the leader, other politicians, and most of
all the information gathered in the preceding chapter) to build a picture of what is being
communicated in the texts, and its wider political and social significance.
3. Following these steps, determine whether the data produced supports my hypothesis by
inquiring of it the following questions: (1) does the discourse display the key elements of
Christianist secularism: “identitarian Christianism, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance,
and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech?”72
(2)  How is Islam constructed in the discourse? (3) How is Christian identity used to exclude
Muslims from European society?
4. In a separate chapter, compare and contrast the data produced in the case studies, and
consider what it means in a wider European political and social context. Was the hypothesis
correct? In what ways was it correct and incorrect? What was missing? Most importantly,
answer the thesis question: Why is religion used as a tool with which to differentiate ‘the
people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the populist radical right in Western Europe? In a
final chapter, compare and contrast the data produced in the case studies, and consider what it
means in a wider European political and social context. Was the hypothesis correct? In what
ways was it correct and incorrect? What was missing? Most importantly, answer the thesis
71 It must be admitted that, being translations, these texts cannot be considered as authoritative as the original




question: Why is religion used as a tool with which to differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the
other’ in the discourse of the populist radical right in Western Europe?
It may be objected that this thesis errs in not analysing the possibility that racism, or fear of
terrorism, is behind the rise of anti-Muslim feeling and ultimately behind the rise of populist
radical right movements across Western Europe. This thesis does not deny the influence of
xenophobia, nor the partial racialisation of Islam and Muslims in Europe. There is much
scholarly literature on these topics, particularly intersectional literature examining the
intersection of religion and race as experienced by Muslims in the West.73 The thesis,
however, is concerned with the often overlooked influence of religious prejudice on Western
European politics. The complexities of the relationship between race and religion, then, are
beyond the scope of this thesis. That being said, the thesis advances the contention that
populist radical right parties have become more focused on religious difference, rather than
skin colour or racial difference, and that their dominant conception of the West as a Christian
or Judeo-Christian civilisation draws primarily on differences in religious heritage between
the West and Islam. In a similar way, there is much literature on terrorism in Europe, and the
manner in which terrorist attacks have affected Europeans’ attitude towards Islam and
European Muslims.74 This thesis does not much engage with this literature, for the reason that
while there is no doubt that terrorism has exacerbated Europeans’ fears of Islam, the study of
the discourse of the National Front and Party for Freedom contained herein finds that the two
parties respectively complain surprisingly little about terrorism, but are clearly more afraid of
demographic change leading to Muslim domination and its hypothetical effect on European
culture, religion, secularity, and civilisation. Therefore, while not ignoring the salient issue of
terrorism, the thesis concentrates mostly on the issues related to Islam, secularism, and
Christianity brought up in the texts analysed herein.
Chapter synopsis
73 See in particular Nadia Fadil, “Taming the Muslim Woman,” The Immanent Frame, May 24, 2018.
https://tif.ssrc.org/2018/05/24/taming-the-muslim-woman/; Nadia Fadil, “Are we all Secular/ized yet?:
reflections on David Goldberg’s ‘Are we all post-racial yet?” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2261-2268, 39 (13),
2016 https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1202424; Guhin, J. (2018). Colorblind Islam: The racial hinges of
immigrant Muslims in the United States. Social Inclusion, 6(2), 87–97 DOI 10.17645/si.v6i2.1422.
74 Nadia Fadil, “Taming the Muslim Woman,” The Immanent Frame, May 24, 2018.
https://tif.ssrc.org/2018/05/24/taming-the-muslim-woman/; Peter Mandaville, “Designating Muslims: Islam in
the Western Policy Imagination,” Cambridge Institute on Religion & International Studies, 2017.
http://religionanddiplomacy.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/TPNRD-Designating-Muslims.pdf.
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This thesis contains eight chapters. Chapter one defines ‘populism’ and examines its
characteristic elements, describes the most common definitions and methods of analysing
populism, and explains my decision to define populism as a “thin centred ideology” which
divides society into “two homogenous and antagonistic groups: the ‘pure’ people and the
‘corrupt elite.”75 The chapter discusses how populism’s ‘thin ideology’ allows it to be grafted
on to more substantive political ideologies to form left-wing and right-wing populism, as well
as other forms which do not exactly correspond to the traditional left-right political
dichotomy.
The chapter defines ‘populist radical right’ ideology as the thin ideology of populism grafted
onto a radical right programme. Drawing on Mudde’s definition of radical right populism as
having three core aspects – nativism, authoritarianism, and populism – it examines the history
of the family of populist radical right parties, and charts their growth from the 1970s into the
2010s.76 Finally, the chapter describes the place of religion in the discourse of Western
European populist radical right parties, and demonstrates its unique importance among
populist radical right parties. It examines populist radical right parties’ discourse on religion,
and locates a puzzle in their use of religion: Why is religion – in supposedly secular Western
Europe – used as a method of differentiating ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of
the populist radical right?
Chapter two examines the use of religion by populist radical right parties to ascertain, first,
whether it is religious or secular in nature, and second, the relationship of this discourse with
the increasing Muslim population of Europe and European reaction to the growth of Islam.
The section compares the discourse used by populist radical right parties on religion with the
at least superficially similar discourse used by Christians and post-secularists who wish to de-
secularise Europe in order to test the religiosity/post-secularity of populist radical right
discourse. Drawing on the observations of Jürgen Habermas on the effects Muslim
immigration have had on European self-identification and understanding of the place of
religion in contemporary society, it contends  that Europeans’ encounter with Islam and
Europe have produced two significant and different reactions among Europeans.77 First, a
desire to accommodate Islam and Christianity within the public sphere, so as to integrate
Muslims into European society, and facilitate a dialogue of mutual learning between religious
75 Cas Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition, 39(4), 2004, pp. 542– 563, 543.
76 Cas Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for
Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 2.
77 Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society.” New Perspectives Quarterly. 25 (4), 2008 pp.17-29
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and non-religious Europeans. Second, a closer identification between Christianity and
contemporary secular European culture, which perceives European culture and values as
Christianity secularised, and perceives Muslims as a religious threat to secularised Christian
culture.
Second, the chapter examines the literature on religion and populism, focusing on scholarship
on religion and populist radical right parties in Western Europe, and drawing on the work of
Olivier Roy and Rogers Brubaker in order to understand how secular political parties are able
to use religion to exclude certain religious identity groups from European society.78 It
examines the notion that populist radical right parties in Western Europe are best described as
‘Christian identitarians’ who view European culture and politics through a secular
Christianist worldview. The chapter thus examines Roy and Brubaker’s categorisation of
populist radical right parties’ discourse on religion as wholly secular, and draws on
scholarship which finds concepts of the sacred – in the form of a worship of the state and the
‘will of the people ’ – embedded within populism.79
The chapter also draws on my review of scholarship on religion and populist radical right
parties, and forms a hypothesis in answer to my thesis question Why is religion used as a tool
with which to differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the populist
radical right in Western Europe? The chapter thus argues that populist radical right parties in
Western Europe use religion to differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in their discourse
because they have embraced what Rogers Brubaker terms ‘Christianist-secularism.’80
‘Christianist secularism’ has itself come about as a result of Muslim immigration to Europe,
which has made secular Europeans more aware of public religion, and cognizant of the
particular – and especially Christian – nature of the their own secular culture. Furthermore,
the chapter argues that the arrival of Muslims in great numbers in Europe appears to have
highlighted to Europeans the manner in which Christianity has been secularised into culture,
demonstrating cultural continuity between Europe’s religious past and its secular present
which may not have been as obvious before the arrival of Muslims.
78 See for example Olivier Roy, “Secularism and Islam: The Theological Predicament,” The International
Spectator, 48:1, 5-19, 2013. DOI: 10.1080/03932729.2013.759365. Brubaker, “Between nationalism and
civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective,” pp.1191-1226, 2017.
79 Daniel Nilsson DeHanas & Marat Shterin, “Religion and the rise of populism, Religion,” State & Society,
46:3, 177-185,  2018.  DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2018.1502911.
80 See Brubaker, “A new ‘Christianist’ secularism in Europe,” 2016. The term ‘Christianism’ Brubaker has
adopted from British-American writer and intellectual Andrew Sullivan, who Brubaker notes used it to describe
the ideology of the Christian right in the United States. See Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism:
the European populist moment in comparative perspective,” 1214, 2017.
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The third chapter describes in detail my thesis questions, hypothesis, rationale for case
studies, and my methods for testing my hypothesis. Chapter four is the first part of my two
chapter case study of the Party for Freedom of the Netherlands. The Chapter provides, first,
the historical and political context for the discourse analysis chapter that follows, and,
second, tests part of my hypothesis: that Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has (1)
revealed the non-universal nature of European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated
the secularisation of Christianity into European ‘culture.’ By testing this it is possible to
establish whether recognition that Christianity has been secularised into ‘culture’ has allowed
for non-practicing Christian Dutch – such as Party for Freedom leader Geert Wilders and
many of his supporters – to identify themselves as Christian or Judeo-Christian.
The chapter tests this part of my hypothesis by examining national identity in the Netherlands
before and after secularisation, the impact of Muslim immigration on Dutch identity, and
most importantly populist right-wing and radical right politicians and parties’ response to
Muslim immigration to the Netherlands. The chapter contends that the entrance of Muslim
immigrants into the heavily secularized post-war Netherlands, which no longer divided
people into ‘pillars’ based upon religious identification but sought to solidify a single secular-
nationalist identity, played a vital role in creating the conditions required for Christianist
secularism to emerge. The chapter then presents an example of the political effects
engendered by the emergence of Christianist secularism in the Netherlands, itself a product of
the entrance of Muslims into a secularised and de-pillarised Dutch society. This section
examines the formation and development of the Party for Freedom, and considers the reasons
behind the party’s rapid rise in 2010-2012. The chapter contends that the Party for Freedom’s
use of religion in its discourse can be situated within a particular Christianist secular Dutch
discourse on religion, which emerged in the 1990s and is associated with murdered populist
politician Pim Fortuyn, and Party for Freedom leader Geert Wilders’ political mentor Frits
Bolkestein.
Finally, chapter four attempts to explain the ‘return’ of religion to Dutch politics in the 1990s
and 2000s. It examines the rise of the Party for Freedom, and explores the reasons it has
experienced electoral success while using religion to separate ‘the people’ from ‘others,’
thereby linking contemporary secular Dutch culture with Judaism and Christianity, and
demonizing Islam as incompatible with Dutch culture. The chapter thus examines whether
the party’s Christianist secular discourse is the product of Muslim immigration (and Muslim
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difference) demonstrating to Europeans the secularised Christianity embedded in their
culture.
Chapter five consists of a Critical Discourse Analysis of three texts produced by Geert
Wilders, and by examining his language attempts to understand the underlying messages,
purposes, and ideology of the texts, as well as understanding the political and social practices
to which they are related. This chapter consists of two elements. First, a Critical Discourse
Analysis of three texts written by Geert Wilders, one during the 2012 election campaign, one
during the 2015 immigration crisis, and another during the 2017 election campaign.
Following this is a discussion of the data produced by the CDA, in which my hypothesis is
tested against the findings produced by the CDA and my discussion of its results.
Chapter six is the first part of my two chapter case study of the National Front. It provides,
first, the historical and political context for the discourse analysis chapter that follows, and,
second, tests part of my hypothesis: that Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has (1)
revealed the non-universal nature of European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated
the secularisation of Christianity into European ‘culture.’ The chapter demonstrates how the
party’s use of religion and sense of France’s religious identity has changed over time, and
been received differently by the French public throughout the past four decades. It describes
how as France became more secular, and as the party’s supporters became more secular, the
National Front retained its strong religious identity and use of Catholic symbolism. It also
shows how under Marine Le Pen’s leadership the party began to position itself as both a
defender of laïcité and secular republican values, but also of Christianity and France’s
Catholic heritage.
The chapter describes, first, the religious and political context in which the National Front
came into being, and contends that the National Front began as part of a long tradition in
right-wing French politics which explicitly links French culture to Catholicism and opposes
laícité. Second, it examines the National Front under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen
(1972-2011.) It contends that under Jean-Marie Le Pen the National Front remained a radical
right, anti-Semitic, Catholic identity political party, though one which over time became
focused on the threat of Islam to the “Judeo-Christian” French state.
Third, the chapter examines the Marine Le Pen led National Front (2011--), and demonstrates
how the party’s rhetoric on religion shifted during this period, as Marine Le Pen moved the
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party away from the anti-Semitic radical right and towards the populist radical right. The
section contends that under Marine Le Pen the party moved away from its traditional Catholic
identity politics, and reconceptualised laïcité as an integral part of France’s Judeo-Christian
heritage. Finally, the chapter argues that Marine Le Pen’s use of religion in her discourse
should be understood in the context of a broader re-conceptualising of French identity and
religion after large scale Muslim immigration to France, and as an expression of the
Christianist secularism prevalent among a number of populist radical right parties in Western
Europe.
Chapter seven consists of a Critical Discourse Analysis of three texts produced by Marine Le
Pen, and by examining her language attempts to understand the underlying messages,
purposes, and ideology of the texts, as well as understanding the political and social practices
to which they are related. This chapter consists of two elements. First, a Critical Discourse
Analysis of three texts written by Marine Le Pen, one during the 2012 election campaign, one
during the 2015 immigration crisis, and another during the 2017 election campaign.
Following this is a discussion of the data produced by the CDA, in which my hypothesis is
tested against the findings produced by the CDA and my discussion of its results.
Chapter eight collates and compares the data produced in the case study chapters in which
this hypothesis was tested. I make five major findings. The first two relate to my hypothesis
that Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe (1) revealed the non-universal nature of
European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the secularisation of Christianity
into European ‘culture.’ The chapter contends, first, that Muslim immigration engendered a
sense that secularism is non-universal, and a product of Europe’s (Judeo-)Christian heritage
and values, among a significant number of French and Dutch.
Second, it contends that exposure to Islam and Muslim difference has made visible the
secularised Christianity embedded in French and Dutch culture respectively. Together, these
effects have made it possible for French and Dutch to identify as secular and – in a
civilisational sense – Christian. In other words, the development of Christianist secularism
stems from these two factors.  Third, it contends that the respective discourses of Dutch Party
for Freedom and National Front of France in the 2012-2017 suggest that the two parties are
examples of ‘Christian identitarianism’ and ‘Christianist secularism’ in Western European
politics. For both parties, Christianity or Judeo-Christianity is a tool used to differentiate an
ingroup from outgroups. The outgroups, Muslims and ‘globalist elites,’ are categorised as a
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threat to the secularised Christian culture the parties’ claim defines and sustains their culture
and civilisation.
Fourth, the chapter contends that in the 2012-2017 period Islam is constructed in the
discourse of both the National Front and Party for Freedom as a monolithic force dominating
the lives of its adherents, making Muslim immigrants unique insofar as they alone cannot
secularise by privatising their religious beliefs and practices. This being so, Islam is
constructed as a threat to secular differentiation of religion and politics, church and state, and
moreover to the ‘cultural Christianity’ which defines contemporary French and Dutch culture,
values, and heritage.
Fifth, the chapter contends that Christian identity – grafted onto a secular worldview – is used
by the National Front and Party for Freedom throughout 2012-2017 to create a Judeo-
Christian and Humanist or Christian and secular ingroup, which they designate as ‘the
people,’ and to create two outgroups based upon people excluded from ‘the people:’
‘globalists/elites and Muslims/Islamic fundamentalists.’
Based on these findings the chapter argues that because the same forces have engendered the
rise of Christianist secular populist radical right movements in the Netherlands and France, it
is very likely that these forces are also behind the Christianism of other Western European
populist radical right movements. Thus Western Europe’s Christianist secularism can be
understood as stemming primarily from the effects of Muslims immigrating into secular,
post-Christian societies. Equally, it contends that Christianist secularism can be contrasted
with another form of Christian identity: ‘traditionalist Christianism.’ Neither is a religious
movement, but rather both are motivated by political and social concerns. The difference
between the two Christianisms lies in their attitude towards the efficacy of secularism and
liberalism. While Christianist secularists defend secularism and are ostensibly liberal,
traditionalist Christianists are openly illiberal and view secular modernity as a threat to
traditional ‘Christian’ values.
Finally, the chapter contends that Christianism – in its two primarily forms – is likely to
remain an important element in European politics. The forces that gave rise to Christianism –
Muslim immigration, globalisation in its cultural and economic forms, and the incoherence of
mainstream centrist parties policies on immigration, multiculturalism, and economics, remain
powerful throughout Europe. As long as this remains the case, populist radical right parties
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will be able to exploit anger towards elites, fear of Islam, and a growing sense of a common
European ‘Christian’ identity.
Thesis Contribution
Religion is important to populist radical right parties, yet its use is not often examined.81
Political scientists have noted that religion appears to play a role in populists’ ingroup and
outgroup construction, but studies on how and why religion and religious identity have
become so important to populist radical right parties are rare.82 Yet an examination of the use
of religion by populist radical right parties can offer important insight into the rise of
populism in Europe. Political scientists studying the economic and social causes of the rise of
populism would benefit from studies showing how and why religion is wielded as a tool to
exclude and scapegoat certain groups – especially Muslims – from European society. These
studies may also help political scientists understand the populist radical right’s
civilisationalism – a curious element in their otherwise nativist and nationalistic ideology –
which is often based on notions of European nations’ belonging to a wider and older ‘Judeo-
Christian’ civilisation. Moreover, studies of populists’ use of religion in their discourse can
contribute to a wider understanding of the surprising persistence of religion as an influence of
Western European identity and politics, despite decades of secularism privatising religious
belief and practice.
Studies of the populist radical right’s use of religion can also teach us about an important
development occurring in Western Europe: Europeans’ mixing of religion and secularism
into a ‘(Judeo-)Christian tradition’ which encompasses both Christianity and contemporary
irreligious secularism. By studying the use of religion in discourse of the populist radical
right, we can gain insight into how contemporary culture is merged with Christianity, and
thus how (Judeo-)Christianity is secularised into ‘culture,’ and secularism sacralised.
Moreover, we can begin to understand why this might be occurring, and what the merging of
(Judeo-)Christianity and secularism into a single ‘cultural’ tradition and identity means for
Western European politics.
This thesis contributes to the literature on religion and populism in four primary ways. First,
it demonstrates the salience of Brubaker’s categorisation of a cluster of Western European
81 See Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 296, 2007. See also DeHanas & Shterin, “Religion and
the rise of populism, Religion,” 177-185, 2018.
82 In chapters one and two of this thesis I discuss the extant literature on this important topic in detail.
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populist radical right parties as Christian identitarian parties, whose Christianism is ultimately
secular and not religious in nature. This thesis shows how and why the Party for Freedom and
National Front belong to this group, insofar as their discourse conforms to the categorisation
set out by Brubaker. In placing the two parties within this broader category, my thesis
contributes to greater understanding and knowledge of the Party for Freedom and National
Front, particularly the two parties’ respective use of religion in their discourse.
Second, the thesis confirms scholarly contention that the increasing visibility of Islam in
Western Europe has altered Europeans’ religious self-perception, and engendered a growing
civilisational identity in Western Europe based upon religious heritage. The thesis confirms
this by showing how populist radical right parties’ adoption of secular Christian
identitarianism has increasingly helped them achieve electoral success and political
significance.
Third, the thesis further contributes to scholarly understanding of Christian identitarian
populist radical right parties in Western Europe, by demonstrating that Christian identity is
not wielded by populist radical right parties simply because they wish to ‘other’ Muslims.
Rather, it is also deployed in order to exclude ‘elites,’ ‘globalists,’ and to defend national
sovereignty and the nation-state.
Fourth, the thesis posits a connection between the failure and incoherence of centre-left and
centre-right Western European politics and the rise of populist radical right Christian identity
parties. The thesis finds that the populist radical right in Western Europe capitalises on the
failure of the centre-left to balance its commitment to open borders and multiculturalism with
its desire to increase workers’ wages and protect the working classes from capitalist
disruption. Equally, the populist radical right has been able to capitalise on the failure of the
centre-right to balance its commitment to allowing the market to function uninhibited by
government with its desire to maintain hierarchies and cultural norms. In place of these
contradictory policies the Western European populist radical right offers an apparently
coherent platform based upon opposition to all aspects of globalisation: economic and
cultural. Having recognised that the neoliberal policies of the centre-right have not only
disrupted economies, but has worked in tandem with the multiculturalist policies of the
centre-left to bring about massive social change through mass immigration, the populist
radical right seeks to diminish the power of business and markets by using state power to
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defend the secular state and the secularised Christianity they call ‘Christian’ and/or ‘Judeo-
Christian’ culture and identity.
Chapter One: The Populist Radical Right in Western Europe
This thesis seeks to understand why populist radical right parties in Western Europe use
religion as a tool to differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘others’ in their discourse.
In this chapter I begin my discussion of populist radical right discourse on religion. The
chapter is divided into three sections. The first section defines ‘populism’ and examines its
characteristic elements. It discusses the most common definitions and methods of analysing
populism, and explains my decision to define populism as what Mudde calls a “thin centred
ideology” which divides society into “two homogenous and antagonistic groups: the ‘pure’
people and the ‘corrupt elite.”83 The chapter further describes how populism’s ‘thin ideology’
allows it to be grafted on to more substantive political ideologies to form left-wing and right-
wing populism, as well as other forms which do not exactly correspond to the traditional left-
right political dichotomy.
The second section defines ‘populist radical right’ ideology as the thin ideology of populism
grafted onto a radical right programme. Drawing on Mudde’s definition of populist radical
right as having three core aspects – nativism, authoritarianism, and populism – it examines
the history of the family of populist radical right parties, and charts their growth from the
1970s into the 2010s.84
The third section describes the place of religion in the discourse of Western European
populist radical right parties, and demonstrates its unique importance among populist radical
right parties. It examines populist radical right parties’ discourse on religion, and locates a
puzzle in their use of religion: Why is religion – in supposedly secular Western Europe –
used as a method of differentiating ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the
populist radical right?
Defining Populism
83 Cas Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, Government and Opposition, 39(4), 2004, pp. 542– 563, 543.
84 Cas Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for
Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 2.
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Populism is a troublesome concept which is sometimes used in a purely pejorative sense.85 It
is tempting to think, then, that populism is little more than a term of abuse, a word used to
accuse one’s opponents of engaging in the most base forms of politics; of making simplistic
yet deceiving arguments, telling people what they want to hear rather than telling the truth,
and casting blame for all society’s ills upon a single group. Yet there is good reason to think
that populism is a coherent concept and one which, though it contains no ‘thick’ ideology and
is remarkably malleable, possesses features which make it identifiable among other political
ideologies.
Before the 1950s populism was a term primarily used by historians to describe two agrarian
19th century political movements: the agrarian People’s Party in the United States, and the
Russian Narodniks.86 Since the 1950s, however, political scientists and sociologists have used
the term to describe a global phenomenon involving a diverse range of political regimes
brought together either by a similar political ideology, strategy, or rhetorical style.87 The large
number of different politicians and parties described as populist has made the term somewhat
problematic, and the concept has eluded a universally agreed upon definition.
Defining populism is made more difficult due to its frequent use as a pejorative rather than
self-descriptive term.  Equally, because groups and individuals described as populist are
found on the left, right, and centre of the political spectrum, no ‘thick’ ideology of populism
can be discerned.88 In the United States historian John D. Hicks’ 1931 book The Populist
Revolt, which described populism in its 19th century American forms in favourable terms and
as a progressive movement, largely defined the subject until well into the 1950s.89 In the
1950s, and responding to the rise of authoritarianism in the preceding two decades, a group of
sociologists and historians – including Edward Shils, Seymour M. Lipset, Talcott Parsons –
began to challenge Hick’s favourable view of populism.90 This group of scholars viewed
85Ben Stanley, “The thin ideology of populism,” Journal of Political Ideologies, 13:1, pp. 95-110,  2008, 101.
86 Benjamin Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism : Performance, Political Style, and Representation, Stanford:




88 Michael Freeden, “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?” Political Studies, 46(4),  1998, 748-765.
89 Niels Bjerre-Poulsen, “Populism – A Brief Introduction to a Baffling Notion,” American Studies in
Scandinavia, 18, 1986, 27-36, 28.
90 Ibid.
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populism as an element of authoritarianism, evident not only in mass movements such as
Italian fascism and Nazism, but also in the McCarthyist hysteria present in 1950s America.91
Shils was among the first scholars to advocate the idea that populism was a “widespread
phenomenon” existing “wherever there is an ideology of popular resentment against the order
imposed on society by a long-established, differentiated ruling class which is believed to have
a monopoly of power, property, breeding and culture”.92 According to Shils populism is an
ideology which claims that "the will of the people as such is supreme over every other
standard, over the standards of traditional institutions, over the autonomy of institutions and
over the will of other strata. Populism identifies the will of the people with justice and
morality.”93
Scholars who accept the term ‘populism’ have thus most often subsequently agreed that
appeals to the will of the people, resentment of ‘elites,’ and a belief in the desirability of a
direct connection between ‘the people’ and their leaders, are essential  elements of populism.
However, there has been great disagreement over whether these elements can be said to form
a coherent ideology, or whether they constitute a type of political strategy, style, or
discourse.94 By the end of the 1960s so problematic had populism become that one scholar
remarked “to each his own definition of populism, according to the academic axe he
grinds.”95
In the 1980s and 1990s Margaret Canovan, observing emerging populism in Europe, and
described it as emerging out of a perceived democratic deficit within democratic societies,
and therefore as a kind of shadow democratic self arising from within the contradictions of
contemporary democratic ideology and practice.96 This idea was echoed by Hayward, who
noted how a perceived democratic deficit was driving support for populist parties within the
91 Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism : Performance, Political Style, and Representation, 13.
92 Ibid.
93 Edward Shils, The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies,
Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1996, 98.
94 For a discussion of the disagreements between scholars see Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, “Varieties of
Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda,” Weatherland Working Paper Series, No. 13-0004, 2013.
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/gidron_bonikowski_populismlitreview_2013.pdf, and Benjamin Moffitt, The
Global Rise of Populism : Performance, Political Style, and Representation, Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2016.
95 Peter Wiles, quoted in Ghita Ionescu, and Ernst Gellner, (eds.) Populism: Its Meanings and National
Characteristics, New York: Macmillan, 1969, 166.
96 Margeret Canovan, “Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy,” Political Studies, XLVII,
1999, pp. 2-16.
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European Union in the 1990s. 97 In the 2000s the ideological approach emerged as dominant,
particularly among scholars addressing forms of right-wing populism in Europe.98 The
ideological approach claims that populism is a group of ideas – not merely a strategy or
discourse – which together “considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the
people.”99
Borrowing from Michael Freeden’s notion of ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ ideologies, this approach
describes populism as a type of ‘thin’ ideology.100 According this position, ideologies are less
comprehensive than they may at first appear, but are “interpretive frameworks that emerge as
a result of the practice of putting ideas to work in language as concepts.”101 A thin-centered
ideology, then, is one which does “not provide answers to all the major socio-political
questions, and could therefore be compatible with other, more extensively developed political
belief systems, such as socialism or liberalism.”102 Mudde and Kaltwasser note that because
“populism is a ‘thin-centred ideology,’ …it can be attached to other ideologies be they thick
(e.g. liberalism, socialism) or thin (e.g. ecologism, nationalism).”103 Thus we find that there
are forms of populism compatible with left-wing and right-wing ideologies. Scholars who
take this ideological approach most often analyse populist parties and leaders, and attempt to
understand their nature often by examining the partisan literature they produce.104
This thesis defines populism as an ideology, and accepts Mudde and Kaltwasser’s minimal
definition of populism as a “thin centred ideology” which divides society into “two
97 Jack Hayward, “The Populist Challenge to Elitist Democracy in Europe,” in Elitism, Populism, and
European Politics, (ed. Jack Hayward), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.10-33.
98 See Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda,”
Weatherland Working Paper Series, No. 13-0004, 2013.
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/gidron_bonikowski_populismlitreview_2013.pdf, and is also informed by
Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism : Performance, Political Style, and Representation, 2016.  Moffitt has a
different position from the three major categories, arguing for a definition of politics based upon a populist
‘style.’
99 Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist,’ 543.
100 See Michael Freeden, “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?” Political Studies, 46(4),  1998, 748-765.
101 Ben Stanley, “The thin ideology of populism,” Journal of Political Ideologies, 13:1, pp. 95-110, 98, 2008.
See also Freeden on the application of his ideas to populism, Michael Freeden, “After the Brexit Referendum:
revisiting populism as an ideology,” Journal of Political Ideologies, 22(1), 1-11, 2017.
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13569317.2016.1260813
102 Noam Gidron and Bart Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda,”
Weatherland Working Paper Series, No. 13-0004, 2013, 6.
103 Mudde and Kaltwasser, Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy, 9.
104 Gidron and Bonikowski, “Varieties of Populism: Literature Review and Research Agenda,” 17.
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homogenous and antagonistic groups: the ‘pure’ people and the ‘corrupt elite.’”105 This
position is not without its faults, most significant among them doubts that a coherent albeit
‘thin’ ideology of populism can be discerned.106 However, the ideological approach is most
suitable for this thesis. This thesis accepts that there are ideological similarities between a
number of Western European populist radical right parties, and therefore requires a
framework which allows for this type of analysis. The ideological approach provides a
minimal definition of populism and allows for a comparison of the ideologies of two different
populist parties, while not ignoring the importance of language and discourse. The other
perspectives do not readily allow or encourage this kind of comparison of ideologies of two
different populist parties, and may reject the notion that populist parties exist.
Understanding the Populist Radical Right
Many parties have been associated with the populist radical right, or with other terms given to
this family of parties such as right-wing populist, extreme populist right, anti-immigrant
parties, and radical right populist. But what brings the French National Front, Belgium’s
Vlaams Belaang, the Alternative for Germany, and the Danish People’s Party together into a
single group under the banner of the populist radical right? It certainly is not a self-applied
name. None of these parties describes themselves as radical. Former National Front leader
Jean-Marie Le Pen embraced, at times, the name ‘populist,’ but he preferred to style his party
as nationalist and ‘neither-left nor right.’ How then should we understand the ideology
common to the populist radical right which binds these groups together?
Viewed from within the ideological approach to populism, radical right-wing populism might
be understood as the thin ideology of populism grafted onto a radical right-wing political
programme. This definition, however, does not tell us much about the nature of populist
radical right parties.107 Right-wing politics is, generally speaking, based upon a desire to
maintain existing hierarchies within a society, opposed to enforcing income and social
105 Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, 543.
106 See Moffitt, The Global Rise of Populism : Performance, Political Style, and Representation, 19-20.
107 Right-wing populist parties have elements which are drawn from left-wing, welfare state principles; see Gijs
Schumacher and Kees van Kersbergen, “Do mainstream parties adapt to the welfare chauvinism of populist
parties?,” Party Politics, 22(3) 2016, pp.300-312;  Laurenz Ennser-Jedenastik, “Welfare Chauvinism in Populist
Radical Right Platforms: The Role of Redistributive Justice Principles,” Social Policy Administration, 52(1),
2018, pp.293-314.
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equality, and is therefore of a generally inegalitarian disposition.108 However, many populist
radical right parties promote loathing of the elite and attempt to speak on behalf of ‘the
people.’ Is categorising populist radical right parties as right-wing then mistaken?
There is good reason for this broad characterisation. Despite the anti-elitist rhetoric espoused
by populist radical rights politicians there is, as political scientist Anton Pelinka points out,
little of the strong internationalist dimension one often sees among left wing movements.109
Instead, populist radical right parties are focused on protecting the nations’ ‘people’ from
their ‘elite’ and foreign enemies.110 This being so, “any kind of populism directed against an
ethnically and/or nationally and/or religiously defined ‘other’ can be seen as ‘right wing’.”111
Moreover, many right-wing populist parties have roots in fascist and other far-right
movements; others were created by disillusioned members of centre-right parties.112 Most
importantly, while right-wing populists direct some animosity towards “economic élites
and/or intellectuals …the most important populist energy today is directed against the enemy
who is considered to be foreign – ethnically, culturally and religiously foreign.”113 However,
it is important to recognise that radical right parties which embrace populism will often
incorporate some progressive or left-wing economic (and occasionally social) policies into
their platforms.
It is difficult to identify specifically and consistently populist radical right parties before the
1970s. In the first half of the 20th century, Fascist and Catholic integralist parties used
populist language, and claimed to speak in the name of ‘the people.’ Supporters of these
movements argued that the anti-democratic politics of fascism and Nazism “more efficiently
and more truthfully” represented the will of the people than liberal democratic systems.114
108 Norberto Bobbio, Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction, translated by Allan Cameron,
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, 62-63.
109 Anton Pelinka, “Right-wing populism: Concept and Typology,” in Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics
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However, the Nazis and Italian Fascists belong to the anti-democratic extreme right, and are
in important ways different to the parties we today call ‘right-wing populist,’ even in cases
where the contemporary right-wing populist party is directly descended from an earlier fascist
movement. Rather, the right-wing populism that attained great popularity and political
influence in the 2000s, and particularly after 2008, has its origins in 1970s Europe.
European fascist and far-right parties and movements of the first half of the 20th century made
race a central platform of their politics, and moreover held that the ‘white race’ – however
that term was defined – was superior to all other ‘races.’115 During the 1970s and 1980s
several far-right parties transformed into populist radical right parties. This transformation
involved embracing democracy, and replacing the belief in the superiority of the white race
with a belief in the superiority of their respective national – and/or
Western/European/Christian – culture.116 This last change, as we shall see, was in many ways
the most crucial element in the transformation of the far-right into the populist right. Indeed,
the move from anti-democratic and racist politics, to populist ideology and anti-immigration
policies based on cultural incompatibility, was instrumental in moving populist radical right
parties from the fringe of European politics in the 1970s to the centre by mid 2010s.
The political trajectories of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the French National Front
(FN) demonstrate the nature and significance of the transformation of the radical right into
the populist radical right. The FN, for example, while it was founded in 1972, came out of a
long French tradition of Catholic identity politics, fascism, and integralism. Party founder
Jean-Marie Le Pen – leader from 1972 to 2011 – had originally been a supporter of Action
Francaise, a far-right Catholic integralist and racist party which became discredited after the
Second World War due to its association with Nazism and the Vichy regime.117 Throughout
its first five years, the FN shared much of Action Francaise’s ideology; anti-communism,
anti-Semitism and racism, Catholic identity, social conservatism.118 Perhaps due to its close
115 For a discussion of the historical and contemporary importance of ‘whiteness’ to fascist and far-right parties
and movements, see Jean Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, Far-Right Politics in Europe, translated by Jane
Marie Todd, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknapp Press of Harvard University Press, 2017, 98-120.
116 Roy notes the rise of the National Front began when the party, around 1980, ceased its exclusionary racist
rhetoric and replaced it with ‘culture’ and sometimes ‘ethnicity.’ Rather than speak of the superiority of the
‘white race,’ the National Front spoke of there being merely different yet incompatible cultures. See Olivier
Roy, “The French National Front” in Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion, London: Hurst & Co.,
2016, 83.
117 Ibid, 79-81.
118 Ibid. Roy notes that in the beginning the National Front was not a populist party, but essentially neo-fascist.
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relationship with the discredited Action Francaise and Vichy Regime, the FN failed to win a
significant number of votes during elections in the early to mid-1970s.119
The FN’s political orientation changed in the late 1970s when the party made opposition to
immigration its central policy platform. Le Pen attacked immigration from North Africa not
because Arabs and Africans were biologically inferior, but because people of such different
cultures could apparently not live together in peace.120 Immigration from mostly Muslim
North Africa was, according to Le Pen, a threat to French culture and the Catholic religious
faith which sustained France.121 The National Front’s characteristic blend of left-wing
economics, social conservatism, anti-immigration policies, religious identity politics, and a
populist appeal to ‘the will of the people’ appears to have brought the party increased
popularity throughout the 1980s and 1990s, culminating in Le Pen’s second place result at the
2002 Presidential elections.122
A similar political trajectory is evident in the Austrian Freedom Party, which also began its
life as a radical right party with fascist links on the fringe of politics, but which oriented itself
towards populism in the 1980s and subsequently enjoyed vastly increased power, electoral
significance, and respectability. Indeed, like many other populist radical right parties in the
1980s, the FPÖ moved away from the politics of explicit racism and towards a “post-racist
policy of ethnopluralism, which aims at the protection and preservation of one’s own society,
culture, and way of life, rather than the disparagement, subjugation and extension of other
cultures.”123 The FPO was created in 1956 as the heir to a long tradition of pan-Germanism
dating back to the revolutions of 1848.124 Due to the discrediting of Nazism and extreme
German nationalism – a result more than anything else of the Nazi defeat in the Second
119 Jean-Marie Le Pen won 0.76% of votes at the 1974 French Presidential elections. See Jonathan Marcus, The
National Front and French Politics: The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen, New York: New York
University Press, 1995, 52.
120 Jean-Marie Le Pen once stated that he loved North Africans, “but their place is in the Maghreb.” See Hans
Georg-Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, Hampshire and London: MacMillan, 1994, 183.
121 Le Pen described Muslim immigration in 2002 as “a grave phenomenon” which threatened France’s Judeo-
Christian culture with annihilation. See Adar Primor, “The Veil? It protects us from ugly women,” The
Guardian, April 25 2002. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/25/france.features11.
122 For a detailed account of the 2002 French Presidential Election results, and a discussion of the rise of the
National Front during the 1990s and early 2000s, see Collette Ysmal, “The Presidential and Legislative
Elections of 2002: An Analysis of the Results,” in The French Presidential and Legislative Elections of 2002,
edited by John Gaffney, Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004, 57-83.
123 Hans Georg-Betz, “The Growing Threat of the Radical Right,”  in Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First
Century, edited by Peter H. Merkl and Leonard Weinberg, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, 84.
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Understanding Populist Party Organisation: The Radical Right in Western Europe, edited by Reinhard
Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016, 20.
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World War – the FPO existed on the fringe of Austrian politics throughout the first 15 years
of its existence.125 In the 1970s, however, the party began to move towards the centre and
adopt a liberal ideology.126 While this increased the FPO’s popularity within the electorate, it
was not a popular move with all party members.127 Fractures within the FPO developed, and
by the mid-80s the party found itself with a new leader – Jorg Haider – and a different
ideology: populism.128
Haider appears to have married the nationalism of the 1950s FPO with the 1970s FPO
reverence for democracy. To this he added the ideology of populism, and with it a nativism
based upon anti-immigration and anti-multicultural policies based on alleged cultural and
religious – not racial – difference. For example, Haider alleged that Islam was not compatible
with Western culture, but was on the contrary opposed to Western concepts such as human
rights, democracy, individualism, and equality between men and women, and opposed
immigration to Austria by Muslims on these grounds.129
Under Haider, as one scholar notes, the “FPÖ became known for breaking new ground in
campaigning and political communication. Haider was an effective debater on television,
imported highly choreographed US-style public appearances, and introduced permanent
campaigning in Austria. He was especially successful in appealing to segments of voters that
had previously paid little attention to politics.”130 The combination of populist ideology and
radical right nativism and authoritarianism under Haider introduced to the FPO appears to
have been instrumental in increasing the party’s power and electoral success.131
The FPÖ and National Front were part of a wave of populist radical right parties which came
to prominence in Europe throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Yet the populist radical right has
not remained ideologically stagnant since the 1980s. It is possible to identify important
changes to right-wing populist ideology that have occurred in the 2000s and 2010s. One
cannot draw a sharp line, of course, at a particular year. However, public disillusionment with
mainstream political parties, the European Union, and perhaps representative democracy in
the aftermath of the 2008 financial crash, brought right-wing populist parties greater notoriety
and support than they had previously received. This newfound popularity helped to crystallise
125 Ibid, 20-21.
126 Ibid, 21.
127Ibid,22. Heinisch describes the growth of the FPO as the party moved towards the centre in a helpful graph.
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the ideology with which right-wing populist parties have become synonymous. The post-
2008 environment also helped to highlight important and increasing differences between
right-wing populist movements in different parts of the world.
Populist radical right parties across Europe drew increased support from voters throughout
the 2000s and 2010s, capitalising on post-economic 2008 financial crash anger and growing
disillusionment towards governing parties.132 Populist radical right parties in Europe have
experienced a period of growth from the 1980s to the mid-2010s, increasing their percentage
of votes in national and European parliamentary elections from on average 5.1% to an
average of 13.2%, and increased their percentage of seats from an average of 3.8% to an
average 12.8%.133 Yet the period since 2008 has seen the greatest success for these parties,
winning government in Poland,134 Italy,135 and Switzerland,136 and increasing their share of
the vote so as to enjoy second party status in France,137 Denmark,138 and the Netherlands.139
What exactly, then, are populist radical right parties, and do they share a common ideology?
Is ‘populist radical right’ the correct term to use to describe this diverse group? This thesis
follows Mudde’s terminology, and uses the term ‘populist radical right’ to describe the
parties examined herein. The reason for using Mudde’s terminology is partly because it is an
extension of the ideological approach with which he is associated and which this thesis
adopts; Mudde groups these parties together and defines them according to their ideology.
Equally, this thesis describes the discourse of radical right parties in Western Europe which
132 See Pippa Norris, “It’s not just Trump. Authoritarian populism is rising across the West. Here’s why.” The
Washington Post, March 11, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-
just-trump-authoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres-why/?utm_term=.dbe9847566fa.
133 Ronald F. Inglehard and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and
Cultural Backlash, Paper for the roundtable on “Rage against the Machine: Populist Politics in the U.S., Europe
and Latin America”, 10.00-11.30 on Friday 2 September 2016, annual meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Philadelphia, 2. https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1401.
134 “Rightwing Law and Justice Party wins overall majority in Polish election,” The Guardian, 27 October,
2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/27/poland-law-justice-party-wins-235-seats-can-govern-
alone
135 “Italian Elections 2018 – Full Results,” The Guardian, 6 March, 2018.
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136 “Anti-immigration party wins election in slide to the right,” The Telegraph, 19 October, 2015.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/switzerland/11939953/Anti-immigration-party-wins-
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137 Angelique Chrisafis, “Emmanuel Macron vows unity after winning French Presidential election,” The
Guardian, 8 May, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/07/emmanuel-macron-wins-french-
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are also populist, or to put it another way, parties which might be described as the populist
form of the radical right. As the examples of the National Front and Austrian Freedom Party
show, some populist radical right parties began as radical right parties but later adopted the
thin ideology of populism. The thesis thus does not analyse the discourse of left-wing or
centre-right or radical right parties which use a similar discourse on religion. Therefore
Mudde’s terminology and ideological grouping is extremely useful for the purposes of this
thesis, because it provides a coherent description of the party family herein analysed.
The parties Mudde describes as existing within the populist radical right family include the
French National Front, the Austrian FPO, the Danish People’s Party, the Belgian National
Front, Vlaams Belang, Alternative for Germany, and the Dutch Party for Freedom, among
others. Betz and Johnson find radicalism in the “aggressive  discourse” used by these parties,
“that directly aims at weakening and undermining the values and institutional arrangements
and  procedures  central  to  liberal  democracy  and  replacing  them  with  a fundamentally
different system.”140 They find that “radical right-wing parties are thus radical both with
respect to the language they employ in confronting their political opponents and the political
project they promote and defend.”141 Mudde, however, criticises this position as “too
relativistic,” and contends that these parties should be described as ‘radical’ insofar as they
are opposed to important aspects of liberal democracy, especially “political pluralism and the
constitutional protection of minorities.”142 Mudde’s position is, however, in agreement with
Betz and Cameron’s observation that populist radical right parties have in common an ability
to reconcile radical anti-liberal ideas with support for democracy.143
Populist radical right parties can be grouped together, Mudde argues, because they share a
combination of three core ideological features: nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.144
By nativism Muddle refers to the ideology which combines nationalism and xenophobia, and
“holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ...and that
non-native elements ...are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state.”
Nativism – as opposed to a less threatening form of nationalism which may merely assert the
importance of inviolable national borders – is a common feature of the parties examined in
140 Hans Georg Betz & Carol Johnson, “Against the current—stemming the  tide: the nostalgic ideology of the
contemporary radical populist right,” Journal of Political Ideologies, 9:3, 311-327, 2004, 312.
DOI:10.1080/1356931042000263546 https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931042000263546.
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this thesis, which often use religious identity to distinguish between ‘the people’ and
‘others.’145
‘Authoritarianism’ Mudde describes in terms borrowed from Adorno as “a general
disposition to glorify, to be subservient to and remain uncritical toward authoritative figures
of the ingroup and to take an attitude of punishing outgroup figures in the name of some
moral authority”.146 It is possible to see this authoritarianism even in the supposedly freedom
loving Dutch Party for Freedom – in some respects one of the more ‘liberal’ members of the
populist radical right family. Therefore despite having “freedom” in the name of the party,
the Party for Freedom practices leader worship, demonising of the ‘other,’ and calls for an
unquestioning acceptance of Judeo-Christian and Humanism as the leading-culture of the
Netherlands. The party lauds freedom of expression, but demands that it be given only to ‘the
people,’ but denied to the threatening Muslim ‘other.’ For the populist radical right, freedom
is for ‘us,’ not ‘them.’
The third ideological feature described by Mudde is populism, here “understood as a thin-
centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that
politics should be an expression of the volonte generale (general will) of the people.147
Moreover, populist ideology places the common sense of ‘the people’ above the ideas of the
educated elite, above even “human rights or constitutional guarantees.”148
Populism is obviously an important feature of the parties examined in this thesis. For
example, the National Front and Party for Freedom – and in particular their respective leaders
– can be identified as populist radical right parties. This grouping does not mean that populist
radical right parties share identical social and economic policies. Importantly, populist radical
right parties across Europe have made opposition to Islam a central element of their political
platforms.149 Yet while Eastern European populists portray themselves as defenders of
conservative, Christian values and heritage against the Islamic threat, Western European
145 Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 19.
146 Adorno et al quoted by Mudde in Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe,
Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2007, 22.
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populists right-wing parties do something different and intriguing.150 They frame themselves
as defenders of a Judeo-Christian and Humanist, or Christian and secular, tradition, and claim
Islam is inimical to this tradition because it cannot secularise.151 This framing has become an
important element in their conception of ‘the people,’ as well as their conception of the
outgroups they allege are threats to ‘the people’ and their nation-state. As a result, discourse
is very important to populist radical right parties, insofar as they see politics “in terms of a
‘metapolitical’  contestation  of  the  power  to  define  concepts  and  shape  discourse.152
In their discourse populist radical right politicians claim that the increasing presence of Islam
in Europe is an existential threat to European culture.153 Perhaps lurking behind this fear is
Europe’s demographic problem: non-Muslim Europeans have very few children, while
Muslims have children at above the replacement rate. Thus the non-Muslim population of
Europe will decline by the tens of millions by 2050, while the number of Muslims will
increase by millions in the same timeframe.154 Most interesting, however, is the manner in
which many populist radical right politicians categorise European culture. Rather than simply
describe their respective national cultures, and the wider European culture, as ‘secular,’ they
describe it as simultaneously Christian and secular.155 The use of this discourse is common to
Western Europe but uncommon in the East. In Eastern Europe – for example in Hungry and
Poland – one does not see a similar trend towards social liberalism or a conflation of
150 See for example the way in which Poland’s governing Law and Justice Party describe themselves as
defenders of conservative Catholicism against Islam and secularism; Ben Stanley, “Defenders of the Cross:
Populist Politics and Religion in Post-Communist Poland,” in Saving the People: How Populists Hijack
Religion, London: C. Hurst & Co. 2016, 119–120. See also Anna Gwiazda, Democracy in Poland:
Representation, participation, competition, and accountability since 1989, New York and London: Routledge,
2016, 63.
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Christianity with secularism among populist radical right parties. Rather, there is a complex
conflation of ethno-nationalism conservative values, and Christian values and identity.156
This divergence was consolidated by the 2015 European immigration crisis, which saw more
than one million people – mostly Muslim – leave their homes in the Middle East and Africa
to seek asylum in Europe.157 Right-wing populist parties across Europe portrayed the
migrants as an existential threat to their respective national cultures, if not to European
civilisation.158 Yet, importantly, Western European right-wing populists were far more likely,
than Eastern European right-wing populists, to present Muslim immigrants as a threat to
secularism, women’s rights, and the Judeo-Christian tradition.159 This shift from ethnic and
racial categorisation of the ingroup and outgroup, or ‘the people’ and ‘others,’ to a religio-
cultural categorisation has not gone without notice by scholars. A number of scholars noticed
the important role religion played in populist radical right parties’ categorisation of people
and the conception of who belongs within the nation-state. However, and perhaps due to
perceptions of Western Europe as a particularly secularised region in which religion plays
little meaningful role in public life, surprisingly little scholarship has been produced on the
role of religion in the discourse of populist radical right parties in Western Europe.
The populist radical right and religion
In Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Mudde calls attention to the scant scholarship on
“the relationship between religion and populist radical right parties.”160 He further notes that
156 See Stanley, “Defenders of the Cross: Populist Politics and Religion in Post-Communist Poland, 109–128;
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while religion has always been important for Eastern European populists, a greater emphasis
has been placed – post 9/11 – on Christianity “within populist radical right parties in the
West.”161 Since Mudde wrote these words there has been an increasing – though still
relatively small – body of literature on religion and the populist radical right. A significant
amount of this scholarship has focused on the use of religion by populist radical right parties
in Europe.162
That Muslims have become a central outgroup in Western European populist radical right
ideology is perhaps a commonplace observation of contemporary European politics.163 Yet
many populist radical right parties do not simply seek to suppress Islam, but in their discourse
frequently define the ‘in’ culture as Christian or partly Christian-derived. This does not
merely designate Muslims as the outgroup which must be excluded, but it defines ‘the
people’ and the nation-state, and moreover their enemies, according to their religious identity
and religion derived values. In other words, the type of nativism practiced by Western
European populist radical rights parties has become increasingly based upon religious
identification. Populist radical right parties often claim Western Civilisation and thus their
respective national cultures to be based on Christian or Judeo-Christian values.164 Muslims,
on the other hand, are claimed to be uniquely unable to live within this Judeo-Christian
environment, chiefly because they cannot perform the necessary divorcing of their religious
faith from their behaviour in the public sphere.165 Therefore Muslims’ inability to separate
religion from politics – a supposed hallmark of Judeo-Christian societies – is considered a
direct threat to secular societies.
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The notion that secularism is a product of Europe’s Judeo-Christian heritage, and that Muslim
immigration threatens secular differentiation of religion from politics due to the inherent
inability of Islam to distinguish between the two, appears to have become significant first in
the politics of the Netherlands. Dutch politicians’ use of “Judeo-Christian” as a description of
Western Civilisation can be dated back to Dutch Liberal Party leader Frits Bolkestein, who in
1991 stated that Dutch culture had been shaped by “Rationalism, humanism and
Christianity.”166 These three values, for Bolkenstein, are intrinsic only to Western culture.
Other cultures, particularly Islamic culture, do not possess these values. Therefore Muslims,
according to Bolkenstein, cannot be easily integrated into open, liberal, tolerant Dutch
society.167 Indeed, it appears that for Bolkensten the only way for the Netherlands to remain
tolerant, open, and liberal is for it to adopt a kind of muscular liberalism and exclude
intolerant migrants from cultures which lack the humanist and rationalist values that came out
of Christianity.
Bolkestein’s protégé and leader of the influential populist radical right Party For Freedom,
Geert Wilders, repeats many of Bolkestein’s claims. Wilders, an agnostic168 with liberal
views on women’s and gay rights,169 has praised Christianity and Judaism as the foundation
of Western humanistic civilisation.170 Islam, on the other hand, he claims has not the ability
to transform itself into a humanistic system, but is by nature a “totalitarian political ideology”
which masquerades as a religion.171 It is interesting to note that Wilders defines Islam as a
political ideology rather than a religion.172 Indeed, it appears that he sees Islam’s allegedly
political nature as a fundamental difference between Islam and Christianity, and uses this
166 Ibid, 53-54.
167Ibid.
168 Wilders says “Zelf ben ik agnost,” or ‘I am myself agnostic’, see Geert Wilders, “Moslims, bevrijd uzelf en u
kunt alles,“ NRC, July 19, 2010. http://vorige.nrc.nl//opinie/article2584468.ece.
169 Koen Vossen, “Populism in the Netherlands after Fortuyn: Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders,” Perspectives
on European Politics and Society, 11(1) 2010,pp.22-38, 27.
170 See Geert Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders Melbourne, Australia, February 19 2013.
http://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-press/in-
the-press/1822-speech-geert-wilders-melbourne-australia-tuesday-february-19-2013.
171 Geert Wilders, “Geert Wilders: Stopping of Islamic immigration is a matter of survival,” Breitbart, February
9, 2016. https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2016/02/09/stopping-islamic-immigration-is-a-matter-of-
survival/.
172 An idea echoed in Australian politics by populist right leader Pauline Hanson, who has called for a Royal
Commission to determine whether Islam is a religion or a political movement. See “Islam” on the One Nation
Party’s Website: http://www.onenation.com.au/policies/islam.
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supposed difference to justify his ban on possession of the Qu’ran173 and wider opposition to
Islam and Muslim migration to the Netherlands.
Wilders is hardly the only populist radical right politician making these claims, though he is
perhaps the most prominent. Since becoming National Front leader in 2011, Marine Le Pen
has echoed Wilders’ anti-Islam and pro-Judeo-Christian rhetoric, claiming France to be a
nation with a Christian past and a secular present, and home to a culture which reflects this
heritage.174 Islam, she says, may be incompatible with France’s secular-Christian heritage,
and thus Muslim migration to France ought to be curtailed.175 Similarly, in Denmark, the
right-wing populist Danish People’s Party has described Islam as a dangerous force which
opposes freedom, democracy, and the separation of the “temporal world and the world of
faith,” two ideals which they claim to be enshrined in Christianity.176
The broader idea of European identity being Christian or Judeo-Christian appears to play a
powerful role in Western European attitudes towards Turkey, and especially the possibility of
Turkish entry into the European Union. During a campaign which ultimately saw Britain vote
to leave the EU, the ‘Leave’ campaign unveiled two controversial posters. One simply read,
“TURKEY (population 76 million) IS JOINING THE EU.”177 Leader of the populist radical
right UK Independence Party and prominent ‘Leave’ activist Nigel Farage himself unveiled
an even more dramatic poster, this time showing untold numbers of Arab-Muslim refugees
walking towards the viewer. The caption read “BREAKING POINT: The EU has failed us
all.”178 The poster was described as racist, which it may well be; however, it is not so much
the colour of the refugees skin that Farage and his supporters object to, but their religion.
After all, Farage has called for non-white Christian refugees to be given asylum in Britain
173 Amanda Kluveld, “Secular, Superior, and Desperately Searching for its Soul: The Confusing Political-
Cultural References to a Judeo-Christian Europe in the Twenty-First Century,” in Is there a Judeo-Christian
Tradition? A European Perspective, Emmanuel Nathan and Anya Topolski (eds.), Berlin: Gruyter, 2016, 255.
174 “These principles for which we are fighting are affirmed in our national motto ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,’
which itself proceeds from a secularization of principles stemming from our Christian heritage.” Marine Le Pen,
Presidential Campaign Launch Speech, 2017. https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/9900/le-pen-speech.
175 RFI, “Le Pen: Islam not compatible with secular society,” RFI, January 28, 2011.
http://en.rfi.fr/france/20110128-le-pen-says-islam-not-compatible-secular-society.
176 “The Party Program of the Danish People’s Party.” Danish People’s Party Website.
https://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/The_Party_Program_of_the_Danish_Peoples_Party.
177 For poster image see Alistair Darling, “Brexit’s big idea is a total Turkey says Alistair Darling,” Daily Mail,
May 22, 2016. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/debate/article-3602672/Brexit-s-big-idea-total-Turkey-says-former-
chancellor-ALISTAIR-DARLING.html.




ahead of Muslims.179 Moreover, Farage’s UK Independence Party published a “Christian
manifesto” which outlined Christianity’s historical and contemporary importance to Britain
and British culture.180
The Austrian Freedom Party has similarly referenced Christianity and Judaism in their
discourse, bringing the religions together with the Enlightenment to create a “cultural
Christianity ...which is based on the separation of the church and the state.”181 Europe,
according to the party, “was decisively shaped by Christianity, influenced by Judaism and
other non-Christian religious communities, while humanism and the Enlightenment marked
its continued fundamental development.”182 The FPÖ, however, argues that Islam is not
among the influences on Austria’s “cultural Christianity,” but an alien culture which must be
excluded to prevent Islamization.183
The demonization of Islam as anti-secular by nature, and the categorisation of secularism as a
product of the West’s Judeo-Christian heritage, became especially prominent during the 2015
immigration crisis. During this period more than one million mostly Muslim people from
North Africa, the Middle East, and West Asia sought asylum in Europe.184 Prominent
populist radical right parties the Dutch Party for Freedom, the Alternative for Germany, and
the French National Front campaigned against allowing Muslim immigration, often on the
grounds that Islam was not compatible with Western culture.185 Moreover, new populist
radical right parties appeared. Alternative for Germany grew quickly from its founding in
179 Rowena Mason, “Nigel Farage rows back on call to grand asylum to Syrian refugees,” 30 December, 2013.
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/dec/30/nigel-farage-asylum-syrian-refugees-christians.
180 See “UKIP Policies for Christians: An Overview,” UK Independence Party Website, 2015.
http://www.election2015.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/UKIPChristian_Manifesto-1.pdf.
181 Bernhard Weidinger Equal before God, and God Alone: Cultural Fundamentalism, (Anti-)Egalitarianism,
and Christian Rhetoric in Nativist Discourse from Austria and the United States Journal of Austrian-American
History, 1(1) 2017, pp. 40-68, 58-59 https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jaustamerhist.1.1.0040.
182 Ibid.
183 Leila Hadj-Abdou, “The Religious Conversion of the Austrian Freedom Party,” in , in Saving the People:
How Populists Hijack Religion, Marzouki, McDonnell, Roy (eds), London: C. Hurst & Co. 2016, 37-38.
184 Rougly 890,000 refugees settled in Germany in 2015 alone. See “Refugee numbers in Germany dropped
dramatically in 2017,” DW, January 16, 2018. https://www.dw.com/en/refugee-numbers-in-germany-dropped-
dramatically-in-2017/a-42162223.
185See for example  Tina Bellon, “Anti-immigrant AfD says Muslims are not welcome in Gemany,” The
Independent, 2 May, 2016. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/alternative-for-germany-anti-
immigrant-afd-says-muslims-are-not-welcome-in-germany-a7009531.html. See Geert Wilders’ remarks about
banning Muslim immigration in Geert Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,”
Geert Wilders Weblog,June 13, 2015.    See also Marine Le pen’s remarks about preventing further Muslim
immigration to France in Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen: How France will Conquer the Enemies of Liberty,”
Time, November 18, 2015.
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2013, and received strong support in elections in 2016 and 2017 after opposing Muslim
immigration and defending Christian heritage and also secularism.186
Populist radical right parties were not content with merely opposing Muslim immigration to
Europe, but they sometimes voiced support for Christian and Jewish people outside of
Europe. For example, France’s National Front leader Marine Le Pen visited Lebanon shortly
before French presidential elections in 2017, and called on France to protect Christianity in
the country, suggesting it was France’s special duty to protect Christians in the Middle
East.187 Equally, both Le Pen and Dutch Party for Freedom leader Geert Wilders have
demonstrated the same kind of philo-Semitism common to a number of populist radical right
parties in Western Europe, declaring their support and admiration for the state of Israel.188
The newfound electoral success of the populist radical right is interesting for two reasons.
First, because this success had been driven by a transformation of radical right politics; in the
past, radical right politics has been driven by a concern with ‘race’ and ethnicity, and a
commitment to preserving traditional national values. The contemporary populist radical
right denounces racism, particularly anti-Semitism, and claims itself to be a protector of
secular, liberal values.189 In the place of the politics of ‘race’ and ethnicity, the populist
radical right concerns itself with the alleged cultural and religious threat posed by immigrants
to national cohesion and European Judeo-Christian civilisation.
The electoral success of the populist radical right is also particularly interesting because it
suggests that religion may play a complex and in some ways unexpected role in
contemporary European politics. In the 1960s and 1970s it was widely believed that the
process of modernization – industrialization, urbanization, and scientific education – would
precipitate secularisation,190 the privatization of religion, and religion’s separation from
186 The AfD emerged from the 2017 German federal elections as the third largest party. See Sean Clarke,
“Germany Elections 2017: Full Results,” The Guardian, 25 September, 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/sep/24/german-elections-2017-latest-results-live-
merkel-bundestag-afd.
187 See Chloé Domat, “Marine Le Pen plays the Lebanon card in French presidential race,” Middle East Eye,
February 21, 2017. http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/french-presidential-election-marine-le-pen-plays-
lebanese-card-431691057.
188 Brubaker among others has noted the curious philo-semitism of the populist radical right. See Brubaker,
“Between Nationalism and Civilizationalism: the European populist movement in comparative perspective.”
189 For a full discussion of the transformation of the European far-right see Chetan Bhatt, “The New Xenologies
of Europe: Civil Tensions and Mythic Pasts,” Journal of Civil Society, 8:3, (September 2012) pp. 307-326.
190 Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview,” in TheDesecularization of the
World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, Peter L. Berger (ed.) Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999, 3-5.
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politics and public life.191 This set of assumptions, of course, were core aspects of the
secularisation thesis. Yet by the 1980s it was becoming clear that the secularisation of the
world had not come to pass.
One of the architects of secularisation theory, sociologist Peter Berger, subsequently
amended the theory to show how modernisation need not entail secularisation, and that
religion can thrive in a globalised modern world.192 However, Berger argued as recently as
2014 that Western Europe has remained largely secularised and that religion has little
influence over public life and political decision making in a Western European context,193 a
view shared by a number of other prominent sociologists.194 Yet there is reason to suggest
this may not be the case, and that secular Europe’s encounter with Islam has revealed the
continuing role that Christianity has upon European culture and public life despite
secularization.
Populist radical right parties’ preference for Christianity and Judaism over Islam may then
indicate a rethinking of the relationship between secularism and Christianity, which has itself
been engendered by Europe’s encounter with Islam. German political philosopher Jürgen
Habermas, as early as 2008, observed the encounter with Islam reshaping Europeans’
conception of their own religious and secular identities. In “Notes on Post-secular society”
Habermas observed that “the visibility and vibrancy of foreign religious communities also
spur the attention to the familiar churches and congregations.”195 Having Muslims
neighbours, he continued, “force the Christian citizens to face up to the practice of a rival
faith. And they also give the secular citizens a keener consciousness of the phenomenon of
the public presence of religion.”196 For Habermas, the new public presence of Islam in
191 See Peter L. Berger The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. New York: Anchor
Books, 1967, Bryan R. Wilson, Religion in Secular Society: A Sociological Comment, London: Watts, 1966, and
Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society, New York: Macmillan,
1967, on the original secularisation thesis.
192 Peter L. Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview,” in The Desecularization of the
World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, Peter L. Berger (ed.) Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999, 3-5.
193 Peter L. Berger, “Peter Berger on Resurgence of Religion and Decline of Secularization Theory”.
YouTube. 2 March 2015.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DHlDyR102G8.
194 This view is not Berger’s alone, but is echoed in Bryan Wilson, “The secularization thesis: criticisms and
rebuttals,” in Secularization and Social Integration, Laermans, Wilson, Billiet, Leuven: Leuven University
Press, 1998 pp. 44-66; Steve Bruce, God is Dead: Secularization in the West, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell,
2002; Steve Bruce, “The curious case of an unnecessary recantation: Peter Berger and Secularization,” in Peter
Berger and the Study of Religion, Heelas, Martin, Woodhead (eds), London and New York: Routledge, 2011 pp.
87-100; Bryan S Turner, Religion and Modern Society: Citizenship, Secularisation and the state,
Cambridge:Cambridge University Publishing, 2011, 11.
195 Jügen Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society,” New Perspectives Quarterly, 25:4, pp.17-29, 20, 2008.
196 Ibid.
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Europe has demonstrated to Europeans’ the non-universality of their own secularism, and the
failure of secularism to triumph over religion.197
This notion of the non-universality, but rather the very particular, nature of secularism,
appears to be reflected in the discourse of populist radical right parties. For example, Geert
Wilders has described Dutch culture – and its freedoms and democracy – as the unique
product of its Judeo-Christian and Humanist heritage.198 In a similar way, Marine Le Pen has
claimed that French culture is based upon Christian principles secularized,199 and attacked
“globalists” for allowing Islam to take root in France and threaten its secular society.200
The popularity of populist radical right parties in Western Europe indicates that their
discourse has significant power within certain Western European electorates. Yet elements of
this discourse are puzzling. Why is religious identity – in presumably secular Western Europe
– used as a method of differentiating ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the
populist radical right? Moreover, is there anything genuinely religious about the populist
radical right, or are they secularist parties which co-opt religion in order to manipulate
voters? In the following chapter these questions are explored through an examination of the
literature on populists’ use of religion, and the literature discussing the impact of Islam on
European politics and society.
Chapter Two: Understanding populist radical right parties’ use of religion
This chapter begins to answer the question, ‘Why is religion used as a tool with which to
differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the populist radical right in
Western Europe?’ To answer this question, the chapter examines the literature on populism –
and especially populist radical right parties – and religion.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section examines the use of religion by
populist radical right parties in their discourse to ascertain, first, whether it is religious or
secular in nature, and second, the relationship of this discourse with the increasing Muslim
population of Europe and European reaction to the growth of Islam. The section compares the
197 Ibid.
198 See Wilders, “Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation,” 2016.




discourse used by populist radical right parties on religion with the at least superficially
similar discourse used by Christians and post-secularists who wish to de-secularise Europe in
order to test the religiosity/post-secularity of populist radical right discourse. Drawing on the
observations of Jürgen Habermas on the effects Muslim immigration has had on European
self-identification and understanding of the place of religion in contemporary society, it
contends  that Europeans’ encounter with Islam and Europe have produced two significant
and different reactions among Europeans.201 First, a desire to accommodate Islam and
Christianity within the public sphere, so as to integrate Muslims into European society, and
facilitate a dialogue of mutual learning between religious and non-religious Europeans.
Second, a closer identification between Christianity and contemporary secular European
culture, which perceives European culture and values as Christianity secularised, and
perceives Muslims as a religious threat to secularised Christian culture.
The second section examines the literature on religion and populism, with a particular focus
on the scholarship on religion and populist radical right parties in Western Europe. The
section draws on the work of Olivier Roy and Rogers Brubaker in order to understand how
secular political parties are able to use religion to exclude certain religious identity groups
from European society.202 In particular, it examines the idea that populist radical right parties
in Western Europe are best described as ‘Christian identitarians’ who view European culture
and politics through ‘Christianist-secularism.’ This section also queries Roy and Brubaker’s
categorisation of populist radical right parties’ discourse on religion as wholly secular, and
draws on scholarship which finds concepts of the sacred embedded within populism.203
The final section draws on my review of scholarship on religion and populist radical right
parties, and forms a hypothesis in answer to my thesis question, ‘Why is religion used as a
method of differentiating ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the populist radical
right in presumably secular Western Europe?’ This section argues that populist radical right
parties in Western Europe use religion to differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in their
discourse because they have embraced what Rogers Brubaker terms ‘Christianist-
secularism.’204 ‘Christianist secularism’ has itself come about as a result of Muslim
201 Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society,” 2008.
202 See Roy, “Secularism and Islam: The Theological Predicament,” 5-19, 2013; Brubaker, “Between
nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective,” 2017.
203 Daniel Nilsson DeHanas & Marat Shterin, “Religion and the rise of populism, Religion,” State & Society,
46:3, 177-185,  2018.  DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2018.1502911.
204 See Rogers Brubaker, “A new ‘Christianist’ secularism in Europe,” The Imminent Frame, October 11, 2016.
https://tif.ssrc.org/2016/10/11/a-new-christianist-secularism-in-europe/. The term ‘Christianism’ Brubaker has
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immigration to Europe, which has made secular Europeans more aware of public religion,
and cognizant of the particular – and especially Christian – nature of the their own secular
culture. Furthermore, the chapter argues that the arrival of Muslims in great numbers in
Europe appears to have highlighted to Europeans the manner in which Christianity has been
secularised into culture, demonstrating cultural continuity between Europe’s religious past
and its secular present which may not have been as obvious before the arrival of Muslims.
Is there anything religious about the populist radical right in Western Europe?
While all populist parties share an antipathy toward ‘elites,’ who populists frequently charge
with ignoring 'the ‘will of the people,’ populist radical right parties share a xenophobic
nativism which casts certain ‘outgroups’ as enemies of ‘the people.’205 In contemporary
Western Europe the ‘outgroup’ singled out by many populist radical right parties is Muslims,
and particularly religious Muslim immigrants.206 This is not entirely surprising. Muslims are
a highly visible minority group who have arrived in large numbers in Europe only since the
1970s. Europe’s Muslims are largely non-European people who may look different to
Europeans, and who practice an alien religion.207
It is significant that it is ‘Muslims’ who constitute this outgroup, and not ‘Arabs’ or ‘non-
whites’ or a group identified according to some ethnic or racial marker. There are
conceivably two reasons for this. First, the taboo around racial and ethnic abuse. While some
European nations have strict laws policing ‘hate speech,’ throughout Western Europe blatant
racism is considered socially unacceptable.208 A politician calling for people of a particular
ethnic group to be excluded from a particular European state may face criminal
adopted from British-American writer and intellectual Andrew Sullivan, who Brubaker notes used it to describe
the ideology of the Christian right in the United States. See Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism:
the European populist moment in comparative perspective,” 1214, 2017.
205 Pelinka, “Right-wing populism: Concept and Typology,” 7, 2013.
206 Marine Le Pen, for example, differentiates ‘good’ secular Muslims from ‘bad’ religious Muslim immigrants
who do not belong in France. See Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen: How France will Conquer the Enemies of
Liberty,” 2015.
207 In Orientalism, Said famously argued that there are unexamined biases against Islam in European discourse,
which have essentially constructed a false ‘Islam.’ See Edward Said, Orientalism, (6th edition) London: Penguin,
2003. See also Massad, who notes how liberalism constructs a version of Islam for itself; Joseph Andoni
Massad, Islam in Liberalism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015, 12.
208 See Erik Bleich (2011) The Rise of Hate Speech and Hate Crime Laws in Liberal Democracies, Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 37:6, 917-934, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2011.576195.
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prosecution.209 Calling for Muslims to be denied entry to a particular European nation,
however, cannot easily be described as a form of racism. Therefore religion and religious
identity may be used by politicians as a proxy for racial exclusion.210
This explanation for the populist radical right’s use of religion in their discourse is not
entirely satisfactory. For example, Muslims themselves have increasingly identified
according to their religious heritage, and not exclusively according to their ethnic, national, or
racial heritage.211 There are many reasons why this may have occurred, including as a product
of the global Islamic revival, which has seen an overall increase in religiosity and self-
identification as ‘Muslims.’ More simply, Muslims’ increasing emphasis on their religious
identity in Europe may also be a product of an intrinsic difference between the majority of
Europeans and Muslim immigrants to Europe: Muslims’ greater religiosity than their largely
secular European counterparts. Identity is produced in part by who ‘we’ imagine ourselves to
be, but also in part by who we consider ourselves not to be. Therefore a Muslim person may
feel more Muslim in a mostly non-Muslim society than within the overwhelmingly Islamic
Middle East and North Africa.
Therefore it is likely that populist radical right parties are not simply using religion as a proxy
for race. Instead, they may in fact see ‘Muslims’ as a dangerous and foreign outgroup which
threatens European culture, because ‘Muslims’ perceive themselves – to varying degrees
depending on the individual and place – as ‘Muslim.’ Another reason behind the populist
209 Party for Freedom leader Geert Wilders was successfully prosecuted for hate speech against Moroccans. See
Sheena McKenzie, “Geert Wilders guilty of insulting a group’ after hate speech trial,” CNN, December 8, 2016.
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/09/europe/geert-wilders-hate-speech-trial-verdict/index.html.
210 The notion that Muslims have become a racial group, or a racialised category, is explored in Nadia Fadil,
“Taming the Muslim Woman,” The Immanent Frame, May 24, 2018. https://tif.ssrc.org/2018/05/24/taming-the-
muslim-woman/; Nadia Fadil, “Are we all Secular/ized yet?: reflections on David Goldberg’s ‘Are we all post-
racial yet?” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2261-2268, 39 (13), 2016
https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1202424; Guhin, J. (2018). Colorblind Islam: The racial hinges of
immigrant Muslims in the United States. Social Inclusion, 6(2), 87–97 DOI 10.17645/si.v6i2.1422. This thesis
does not refute the ideas of Fadil and Guhin, but rather attempts to understand the role of religion the discourse
of populist radical right parties, which typically make a distinction between race and religion, and do not blur
the line between the two. In their discourse, discussed in the following chapters, the National Front and Party for
Freedom rarely speak of ‘race,’ but attribute to culture and religion qualities which might once have been
racialised. Thus the ideas of Fadil, for example, and the question of the complex intersection of religion and
race, while important, are somewhat beyond the scope of this thesis which tries to show how fears of de-
secularisation and the decline of European culture – as opposed to racial animosity – motivate much of the
populist radical right’s anti-Islam rhetoric.
211 See for example the data collected by Aspinalla and Song on the growth of Muslim identity in Britain. Peter
J.Aspinalla and Miri Song, “Is race a ‘salient...’ or ‘dominant identity’ in the early 21st century: The evidence of
UK survey data on respondents’ sense of who they are,” Social Science Research, 42(2) 2013, Pages 547-561.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.10.007. See also Jodie T. Allen and Richard Wike, “How Europe and
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right’s antipathy towards Muslims might be related to the social problems Muslims suffer in
many parts of Europe, and which have perhaps exacerbated some Europeans’ negative
attitudes towards the group. For example, Muslims in France are vastly more likely to be
unemployed or imprisoned than the average British or French citizen.212 In Germany, Muslim
men have been accused of sexual harassment and molesting women in Cologne.213
The perception that Muslims are an undesirable group within Europe has no doubt been
exacerbated by these social problems, which the populist radical right have seized upon as
proof of the inherent impossibility of introducing Islam into the European environment.214 In
a similar way, the rise of Islamist terror groups have also undoubtedly contributed to
Europeans’ negative views of Muslims and Islam. Islamist attacks in Britain and France have
encouraged some Europeans to view many or all Muslims as potential terrorists or terror
supporters, perhaps lending weight to populist radical right claims that Muslims are a violent
people inclined towards terrorism.215
The oppressive nature of the governments of many Islamic and Muslim majority countries
appears to colour the views of some Europeans of Europe’s Muslims. Dutch Party for
Freedom leader Geert Wilders contrasts the freedoms of the West with the authoritarianism
of the Islamic world, and attributes this difference to the inherently secular and freedom
loving nature of Judeo-Christian Western civilisation, and the inherently “totalitarian” nature
of Islam.216 Civil wars in Iraq, Syria, and Libya have plausibly further affected European
perceptions of Islam and Europe’s Muslims in a negative manner.
212 See No official figures are kept, but it is likely that at least 27% of all inmates in French prisons are Muslims,
with a figure of 40-50% more likely, and probably no more than 60%. Whichever number is correct, it is clear
that Muslims – who are 8-10% of the population – are overrepresented in the prison population. See Sam
Bowman, “Are 70% of France’s Prison Inmates Muslim?” Adam Smith Institute, March 29, 2017.
https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/are-70-of-frances-prison-inmates-muslims. See also “Caged Fervour: Should
jails segregate Jihadists?” The Economist, September 17, 2016.
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214 See for example the Alternative for Germany party’s seizing on the Cologne incident, Spiegel Staff, “How
New Year’s Eve in Cologne has changed Germany,” Spiegel Online, 8 January, 2016.
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1071175.html.
215 See for example Marne Le Pen’s comments on Islamist terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015, See Marine Le Pen,
“Marine Le Pen: How France will Conquer the Enemies of Liberty,” 2015.
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The singling out of Muslims as a dangerous ‘outgroup’ by populist radical right parties is,
when considered against these factors, unsurprising. However, the nature of populist radical
right parties’ discourse remains curious insofar as it not only defines ‘Muslims’ as the
‘outgroup,’ but also defines the ‘ingroup’ or ‘the people’ according to their supposed
religious identity as Christians or Judeo-Christians. Europeans are thus not defined in terms
of their ethnic or racial origin, but according to their religious heritage. This in itself is
understandable, insofar as European identity is produced in part by what it may be defined
against (i.e. Muslims). On the other hand it is curious that the populist radical right not
merely defines ‘the people’ themselves according to their religious identity, but also the
‘values’ of ‘the people,’ their “mores” and “culture” and indeed their secular worldview.217
This is unexpected insofar as populist radical right parties and most of their supporters across
Europe are secularists who practice no religion. Why, then, are they recasting Christianity in
the role of progenitor of European culture, including its secularism?
At the heart of populist radical right parties’ use of religion is their perception of Islam as a
threat to European culture, and to Europe as a Christian or Judeo-Christian continent insofar
as its ‘people’ are Judeo-Christian. Therefore there appears to be a direct connection between
Muslim immigration and the populist radical right’s particular use of religion in their
discourse.  The encounter with Islam appears to have had a powerful effect on European self-
perception, and led to some Europeans placing greater emphasis – in the face of Muslim
difference – on their (Judeo-)Christian roots. This phenomenon has been noted by German
political philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who observed the manner in which Muslim
immigrants to Europe have altered European self-perception, conception of the importance of
religion, and the universality of the secular worldview.218
In a 2006 speech on the need for greater European integration, Habermas remarked that
Muslim immigrants to Europe confront “Christian citizens with competing religious truths”
and make “secular citizens conscious of the phenomenon of public religion.”219 Before the
coming of Islam to Europe, it was possible for Europeans to perceive their own secularism as
universal, neutral, and normal. Yet as Habermas notes, once Muslims arrived in Europe in
large numbers and, rather than assimilate into secular society, continued to practice their
217 Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen: Why I am running for President of France,” Gates of Vienna Blog, March
16, 2012. www.gatesofvienna.blogspot.com.au/2012/03/marine-le-pen-why-i-am-running-for.html.
218 See Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society,” pp.17-29, 2008.
219 Jürgen Habermas, “Opening up fortress Europe,” Sign and Sight, November 16, 2006,
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religion, it was no longer possible for Europeans to understand secularisation as inevitable,
and their own secularism as a universal worldview and set of values.220 Before the arrival of
Muslims in great numbers, Western Europeans in nations such as France, the UK, and the
Netherlands, had largely secularised their societies and privatised religious belief. Religion
remained acceptable in public life if it was Christian and secularised as ‘culture’.221
On the other hand, religion was not accepted inside the realm of politics, and was regarded as
particularly dangerous when an influence on a nation’s foreign relations.222 Moreover
secularisation appeared, to secular Western Europeans, to be the end point to which all
societies were travelling.223 Thus it would only be a matter of time before the entire world
privatised religious belief. At any rate, it was assumed that, once inside the secular liberal
Western European state the religious immigrant would see the benefits of the secular lifestyle
and worldview, and privatise – if not give up entirely – their religious beliefs and practices.
After the arrival of Muslims, it was more difficult for Europeans to keep the public sphere
free of religion without causing social harm. Muslim immigrants arriving after the 1970s –
many of them ‘guest-workers’ who were supposed to return ‘home’ after a certain period of
employment – largely did not entirely adopt Western secular beliefs and practices; they did
not always privatise their religious beliefs.224 One must guard, of course, against imagining
that European Muslims have become a wholly insular community politically at odds with
secular and Christian white European society. Muslims in Europe have rarely created their
own ‘Muslim,’ let alone ‘Islamist,’ political parties.225
For Habermas, then, the growth in popularity of Islamic fundamentalism among some
European Muslims is in part a response to the difficulty of Muslims’ integration inside the
European secular state.226 It is not that most Europeans are wholly against immigration,
Islam, a multi-ethnic society, or the presence of non-European, non-Christians inside the
220 Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society,” 20, 2008.
221 See Roy, “Secularism and Islam: The Theological Predicament,” 11-12, 2011.
222 See Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relation, Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2007, 1.
223 For a description of secularization theory and its problems, see Berger, “The Desecularization of the World:
A Global Overview,” pp.1-19, 1999.
224 For a description of the behaviour of Muslims in Europe and the emergence of a European Islam, see Mark
Sedgwick, Introduction: Families, Governments, Schools, Alternative Spaces and the Making of European
Muslims, in Making European Muslims, Mark Sedgwick (ed.) New York: Routledge, 2015, 1-21.
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public sphere. Rather, as Habermas notes, the problem is that while secular and Christian
Europeans largely want Muslims to integrate into their societies and play a role in public life,
they demand that Muslims privatise their faith before their admittance into the public
sphere.227 Habermas is critical of secularists’ efforts to secularise Muslim immigrants who, he
writes, cannot be integrated into European society in defiance of their religion, but only with
their religion intact.228 Rejected from the public sphere, a small yet significant number of
European Muslims – many of whom were in fact born in Europe – have responded to their
exclusion by adopting an extreme form of Islam which at times violently opposes secularism
and the European state.
Habermas’ alternative to oppressive secularism is a post-secular society in which religion is –
under certain circumstances – permitted in the public sphere, and a dialogue of mutual
learning encouraged between secular and religious Europeans.229 A large body of literature
has explored these ideas and their ramifications.230 Petito and Mavelli, for example, draw on
Habermas’ observations and show how the secular may not be the optimal site for peace,
democracy, and equality. Rather, they argue, the exclusion of religion from the public sphere
at times causes violence, inequality, and the oppression of religious groups and individuals.231
Building on these notions Hurd shows how secularist notions of ‘religious freedom’ solidify
227 Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society,” 24-25, 2008.
228 Ibid, 25.
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religious divisions, and categorise in a manner which sometimes causes friction and violence
between communities, thereby creating or exacerbating divisions between ‘religious’
groups.232
The discussion initiated by Habermas has grown far beyond his own writings. A number of
scholars, indeed, find that Habermas’ post-secularism does not do enough to address these
problems inherent in secularism. Indeed, the most significant criticism of Habermas’ post-
secularism has come from scholars who have argued that it moves insufficiently far beyond
the secular, and may even mark a continuation of secularisation. For example, Casanova,
Fitzgerald, Spohn, and Pabst have criticised Habermas for failing to escape his own secularist
differentiation, even as he attempts to transcend it.
These scholars attempt to either dissolve the (allegedly) false boundary between religion and
the secular (Fitzgerald), or show how Habermas’ post-secularism – which they argue
continues to give the secular state supremacy – will fail to prevent the oppression of religious
people and groups from occurring. These debates are no doubt likely to continue, because
they are part of a wider discussion occurring over the place of religion in the public sphere,
both in Western Europe and the United States, but also in Turkey, India, Australia, and
Indonesia. In each of these nations religion – in different ways – challenges the secular state
and secularisation, sometimes in ways which are perceived to be frightening or disrupting.
Whether one wishes for secularism to remain dominant, or one wishes to see a post-secular
re-arrangement of society, few doubt that religion’s role in the political and social life of
nations remains important.
One part of the literature on post-secularism which may help us understand populist radical
right parties’ use of religion describes the manner in which religion is wielded as a weapon in
a post-secular age. In “Religious Globalisms in the Post-Secular Age,” Wilson and Steger
argue that the emergence of post-secularism – which they find occurring in parts of Europe,
India, and the Middle East – is a product of “the crisis of secular rationalism, brought about
in many ways by an overemphasis on economic rationalism and neoliberalism.”233 They
“suggest that in a post-secular age, non-belief is no longer the default position and is itself
232 See Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
233 Erin K. Wilson & Manfred B. Steger, “Religious Globalisms in the Post-Secular Age,” Globalizations, 10(3),
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considered one option amongst many others. Religion is rehabilitated into the public sphere,
becoming a legitimate option for challenging dominant political ideological paradigms.”234
Among the reactions to emerging post-secular societies they find ‘Neotraditional Religious
Globalisms.’ Wilson and Steger use this term to refer to a group of disparate political
movements which “also reacts to neoliberal crisis by opposing the ideological imperatives of
market globalism,” though not in order to promote global justice (or at least not as global
justice oriented religious groups would understand the notion.235 Rather, neotraditionalist
religious movements “oppose neoliberal globalisation” in a “reactionary” manner, espousing
exclusivist notions of justice, culture, good and evil, and interpretations of scripture. 236 They
observe that Anders Breivik, the Norwegian terrorist who murdered dozens of Labour party
activists in a rampage inspired by opposition to Islam, could be understood as being part of a
neotraditional religious globalist movement. “Breivik’s thought,” they note, “was heavily
influenced by conservative, reactionary, Christian globalist ideology, seeing ‘European
Christendom’ as under threat from Islam.”237
Wilson and Steger note that the English Defence League, among numerous other European
far-right groups, espouse similar views to those of Breivik, insofar as they oppose both
elements of the secularist project, make Christianity identity a core element of their
worldview, and oppose neoliberalism. Thus they identify such far-right European movements
as the English Defence League as, in certain respects, religious, but moreover products of the
post-secular transition Europe is experiencing. The post-secular age has helped create, then,
not merely the justice seeking and pluralistic religion of the World Council of Churches, but
the religion of Neotraditional Religious Globalisms such as al Qaeda and the Christianity
identity movement which spawned Anders Breivik.
Populist radical right parties in Western Europe bear a resemblance to the Neotraditional
Religious Globalisms described by Wilson and Steger. While parties such as the UK
Independence Party, the French National Front, and Dutch Party for Freedom tend not to use
terms such as ‘Christendom’ to describe Europe, they often appeal to a Europe’s Christian or
Judeo-Christian heritage and values in their efforts to defend Europe from Islam and the






the emergence of the post-secular, and be welding religion as a weapon in much the same
way as the Neotraditional Religious Globalisms?
The similarities between the post-secularists who are interested in returning religion to the
public sphere, and the populist radical right, are somewhat instructive in certain respects.
Both recognise the persistence and importance of public religion. Equally, both perceive in
Europe’s Christian or Judeo-Christian heritage something which may in various ways benefit
– or even save – secular Europe from its worst impulses. For example, Pope Benedict XVI
and Britain’s Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks endorse the idea of the Judeo-Christian tradition.238
For Benedict and Sacks, behind Europe’s seemingly secular traditions of art, literature,
music, politics, and economics lies the Judeo-Christian tradition, without which they could
not exist. 239 In a similar way, in their book The Politics of Virtue Adrian Pabst and John
Millbank argue that liberalism is in crisis throughout the West because it is “parasitic of the
legacy of … the Judeo-Christian tradition,” a tradition which it has in their view devoured
and left hollowed out.240 Interestingly, Pabst and Millbank do not argue for a theocratic state
or for any kind of religious rule in Britain. Rather, they praise secular differentiation of
church and state, which they suggest is an idea inherent in Judeo-Christianity, a positive
aspect it has lent to contemporary secular culture.
For Pabst, not merely British culture, nor European, but the entire international political order
reflects Europe’s Christian heritage, and the survival of this order he links to the health of
European Christian culture.241 “Without embracing its Christian heritage,” Pabst writes, “the
future of Europe seems uncertain and bleak.”242 Pabst does not argue for the embracing of
Christian belief itself, but only for the embracing of Europe’s Christian heritage. Milbank, in
an extraordinary outburst, condemned Irish singer and former nun Sinéad O’Connor’s
conversion to Islam, describing her as a “civilisational traitor.”243 Even Habermas has linked
the ongoing health of European society to Christianity and Judaism, claiming that “egalitarian
universalism, from which sprang the ideas of freedom and social solidarity, of an autonomous
238Anya Topolski, “A Genealogy of the ‘Judeo-Christian’ Signifier: A Tale of Europe’s Identity Crisis,” In Is
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conduct of life and emancipation, of the individual morality of conscience, human rights and
democracy, is the direct heir of the Judaic ethic of justice and the Christian ethic of love.”244
The populist radical right uses a similar kind of civilisationist rhetoric. Wilders, Farage, and
Marine Le Pen, for example, link positive aspects of their respective societies – and Western
civilisation – to Christianity.245 One can perhaps imagine Wilders’ calling a convert to Islam
a ‘civilisational traitor.’ Equally, the ‘(Judeo-)Christian’ rhetoric of populist radical right
parties is similar to the “Christendom” rhetoric of movements labelled Neotraditional
Religious Globalisms by Wilson and Steger. There appears to be some connection between
post-secular movements, then, and the populist radical right.
This connection, however, is limited to one aspect: a conception of Europe and/or the West as
in some way Christian or Judeo-Christian. The difference between the post-secularists and
populist radical right parties lies in the meaning behind their use of these terms. While post-
secularists differ widely in their normative post-secularism, they share a determination to
return religion – in some form and perhaps under certain conditions – to the public sphere.
This they do because they see in Christianity and Judaism language and/or ideas which
largely secularised Europe lost. Thus Habermas notes when ‘sin’ became ‘guilt’ some
important meaning was lost, and from which secular Europe may yet benefit. 246 Christians
such as Pope Benedict XVI and theologian John Millbank may also see the post-secular
transition as an opportunity to re-Christianise Europe. Post-secularism is thus at heart critical
of secular modernity, neoliberalism and consumerism.
Populist radical right parties, however, do not appear to be critical of modernity. In their
discourse the French National Front and Dutch Party for Freedom express criticism of
neoliberalism, but not on ethical grounds, but only insofar as neoliberal ideology advocates
244 See Matthew T. Eggemeier, “A Post-secular Modernity? Jurgen Habermas, Jospeh Ratzinger, and Johann
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the easy movement of people across borders, and may even call for the erasing of borders.247
While populist radical right parties in Eastern Europe call for a return to traditional Christian
values, and express at times anti-secular sentiments, there appears to be little if any religious
content in the ideology of the populist radical right in Western Europe.248 Where the religious
parties and post-secularists wish to return religion to the public sphere, the populist radical
right mostly opposes the presence of religion in politics and public life. Curiously, this does
not appear to stop them from embracing the term ‘Judeo-Christian’ as a description of
Western Civilisation. It is therefore doubtful that populist radical right parties could be
considered post-secular in any respect, despite their praise for the Judeo-Christian tradition,
and apparent desire to ‘save’ Europe’s Christian derived culture and heritage. Despite
superficial similarities, populist radical right parties are neither trying to return Christianity to
prominence, or encourage belief in the Jewish or Christian God, or worship of any deity. Nor
do Western Europe’s populist radical right parties appear to be attempting to resurrect
traditional Christian values. In other words, there appears to be no actual religious content in
their discourse, expect insofar as their use of the terms “Judeo-Christian” and “Christian
heritage” might be understood as mixing religion and politics.249
If populist radical right parties in Western Europe are not religious in any meaningful sense,
why then should they use religious heritage as a means of differentiating between ‘the
people’ and ‘others?’ The answer must be connected with the coming of Muslims in large
numbers to Western Europe, because the increasing references to Europe’s Christian or
Judeo-Christian roots have occurred only after Muslims established a visible presence in
Europe as ‘Muslims.’ Moreover, the Christian or Judeo-Christian identity appears to have
formed partly in opposition to Muslims’ religious identity, and thus as a reaction to
Europeans’ encounter with Muslims in Europe.
Habermas’ observation that Muslim immigrants have made their Christian neighbours feel
more Christian, and their secular neighbours more cognizant of public religion and the non-
247 See for example Wilders’ largely nationalist economic programme described in Geert Wilders, “Wilders
Plan: Time for Liberation,”, 2016. See also Le Pen’s attacks on “globalism” in Marine Le Pen, Presidential
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universality of European secularism, is an important insight which can help us understand the
roots of populist radical right parties’ use of religion in their discourse.250 It points to the twin
responses to large scale Muslim immigration to Europe. On the one hand post-secular
thinkers have responded by finding secularism wanting, including insofar as it requires
Muslims to privatise their religious beliefs and practices in order to ‘integrate’ into Europe’s
secular society, which Habermas and other scholars consider to be an unwelcome barrier
preventing Muslims from becoming accepted by Europeans. The parties of the populist
radical right in Western Europe, however, appear to have responded to Muslim immigration
by emphasising the intrinsically secular and modern nature of Western civilisation and
Europe, and contrasting against religious ‘backward’ Islamic civilisation. At the same time,
however, these parties continue to define Western civilisation and their respective nations,
and especially ‘the people’ they claim to speak for within them, in terms of their religious
heritage. Why, then, if the populist radical right is not religious in a meaningful sense, but
rather defends secularism, should they attach such importance to Europe’s Judeo-Christian
heritage?
Populist radical right parties and Christian identity
The importance of religion to the populist radical right has been noted by a number of
scholars, but scholarly examination of populists’ discourse on religion has occurred rarely,
mostly in the post-2010 period and following the electoral success of a number of populist
parties across Europe.251 A significant portion of the scholarship on religion and populism
focuses on the use of religion by populist radical right parties as a way of creating an identity
for Europe which excludes Muslims. The work of Olivier Roy has perhaps been most
influential in this regard. Roy notes the growing numbers of Western Europeans identifying
their culture as ‘Christian,’ and calling for the exclusion of Muslims from Western society on
the basis that Islam in incompatible with Europe’s Christian values.252 Roy is aware, of
course, of the strangeness of secular Europeans choosing to identify as ‘Christian’ as a means
of defending their secular culture against an alleged Muslim threat. Traditional Christian
250 Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society,” 20, 2008.
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values do not much resemble the secular liberal values increasingly defended by the populist
radical right in Western Europe, particularly on issues such as abortion, homosexuality,
gender equality, and sexual freedom.253 Moreover, traditional Christian teachings may be
more closely aligned with the Islamic values adhered to by many Muslims within Europe.
From this observation Roy surmises that “even if the identity of Europe is Christian, it is no
longer a religious identity because the faith has left.”254 Rather, he argues, in contemporary
Europe, precisely because Christianity has itself been secularised as ‘culture,’ “staunch
secularists can now defend a Christian identity.”255 A similar argument is made by Christian
Joppke, who argues that Western secularism incorporates and secularises Christianity and
Christian symbols, transforming them into ‘culture,’ while rejecting other religions and their
symbols as ‘religious’ and therefore an affront to secularism.256 Therefore it is possible for
Europeans’ to defend “Christianity” while disavowing Christian teachings and affirming
liberal secular values in their place.
In the edited volume Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion, a number of
contributors examine the use of religion and religious identity by populist parties across the
world, but in particular populist radical right parties in Europe. They argue that despite
populists’ frequent invoking of the (Judeo-)Christian tradition, populist parties such as the
Swiss People’s Party, the Front National in France, and the Italian Northern League, are not
genuinely religious.257 The contributors to Saving the People demonstrate that the populist
movements examined in their volume, most of which might be categorised as populist radical
right parties, use religious identity to differentiate between ‘the people’ and the enemies of
the people.258 The volume’s contributors do not argue that racial and ethnic identity markers
have no meaning for populists; rather, they suggest that populists often blend existing ethno-
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nationalism with identification with a particular Christian denomination or with the larger
(Judeo-)Christian tradition.259
In his chapter on the French National Front, Roy describes the importance the party has
places upon religious identity. The National Front, Roy writes, has undergone a number of
ideological changes throughout its history, developing from a group that defined French
identity in racial terms, then in cultural terms, and finally in terms of religious identity.260
Beginning as an anti-Semitic “neo-fascist” movement under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le
Pen, Roy writes, the National Front changed course under the leadership of his daughter,
Marine Le Pen, who moved the party towards the political centre and populism after 2011.261
Marine Le Pen downplayed, Roy writes, the Party’s earlier history, especially its anti-
Semitism, and began a new program based on populist anti-establishment feeling,
Islamophobia, and hostility towards pan-Europeanism.262
According to Roy, the National Front has, at least since the late 1970s, practiced a kind of
identity politics. The kind of identity the party describes as French, however, has changed
over the decades. A common theme has been that of “the people” against foreigners.263 Yet
just as important has been Catholic identity. This sense of Catholic identity grew after
Catholic fundamentalists began to join the party in large numbers in the 1980s.264 Yet despite
the entry of Catholic fundamentalists, Roy writes, the National Front never became a
religious party.265 This was, he suggests, partly because the fundamentalists never gained
enough power inside the party, but also because they were more interested in pushing for a
Catholic identity than for traditional Catholic values.266 Indeed, the Church itself has made it
clear, according to Roy, that the Front National’s xenophobia precludes it from ever being a
genuinely Christian party. On the other hand, Roy admits, some elements within the Church
are sympathetic towards the party’s promotion of Christian and Catholic identity in France.267
Yet Roy notes that since becoming party leader Marine Le Pen has moved the party away
259 Ibid. A point also made in Jonas Lindberg, “The Uses of Christianity in Nordic Nationalist Parties’
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from Christianity and towards a strictly secular identity.268 Moving further away from
traditional Catholic values, Marine Le Pen has moderated the party’s social conservatism, no
longer campaigning for family values or against abortion.269 The only vestiges of the party’s
early emphasis on Catholic heritage are in Marine Le Pen’s declaration that France is at once
Christian and laïque, and that this mixture of a secular present with a Christian past forms the
basis of contemporary French identity.270 Islam and Muslims are now the National Front’s
chosen enemy, Roy suggests, because they lack the core religious heritage and contemporary
culture that are at the core of what the National Front believe to be French.271
Reflecting on the importance of Christian identity to the Front National, Roy worries there is
an erosion in France of the proper boundaries between “religion, identities, nation, culture
and values,” and that identity is becoming the “key word with which to deal with any kind of
differences (racial, religious, linguistic or ethnic)”.272 Yet he is quick to assure the reader that
there is nothing genuinely religious about the National Front under Marine Le Pen, and that
to mistake their use of Christian and laïque identity for true Christianity would be tantamount
to allowing the party to hijack true religion.273
In a similar way, Stijn van Kessel observes that religious rhetoric is common among Dutch
populist radical right parties, but that their use of religious language amounts to little more
than an attempt to exclude by the use of faith.274 Kessel notes that Geert Wilders has often
referred to “the Christian/Jewish/Humanistic culture of the Netherlands” which Wilders
argues “should remain dominant.”275 Kessel argues, however, that it is not the Christian
religion that inspires Wilders or his populist predecessor Pim Fortuyn, who made similar
remarks.276 Rather, he argues that the Party for Freedom is a secular nationalist party, which
objects to “cultural and moral relativism” and elites’ alleged inability to differentiate between
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discriminate, according to Wilders, has left many westerners unable to perceive the threat
coming from the ‘inferior culture’ of Islam.278
Sociologist Hans Vollard is in broad agreement with this perspective. In his short study of the
growing importance of Christian identity in Dutch politics, he finds that though there remain
conservative Christian political parties which advocate a return to traditional Christian values,
these parties now represent only a minority of Dutch society, a group which, following Pope
Benedict XVI, choose to see themselves as a “creative minority” protecting European
heritage.279 Centre-right and populist right Dutch parties, including The People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy and Geert Wilders Party for Freedom, while they identify
themselves as ‘Judeo-Christian,’ he writes, differ in several important ways from the
traditional Dutch Christian right. According to Vollard, ‘Judeo-Christian’ is a term used by
Dutch right-wing parties as a kind of “sacred code word to denote a secular, liberal order
distinct from Islam, reflecting the culturalization of Christian religion in Europe.”280 This
“confusing mix of Christian and secular cultures,” writes Vollard, “rather than a Christian
faith has gained political significance in recent years.”281
Roy and Kessel are certainly correct to assert that the National Front and Party for Freedom
are not religious parties in the sense that they encourage their supporters to attend Church,
worship God, or follow teachings of the Catholic church. But they are perhaps too quick to
waive away the National Front’s strange sacralising of nation, identity, and secular culture
into a broader ‘Christian’ tradition, and of the power of this discourse in contemporary
France and the Netherlands. Rather, it may point to a sacred element – as suggested by
Vollard – in the populist radical right’s merging of Christian identity, the will of the people,
nation, and secularism.
Rogers Brubaker has observed this curious sacralising of secularism and secularising of
religion in some populist radical right parties. He describes this as a “Christianist secularism”
appearing in Europe, and notes that Christianist political figures in Europe appear to be
changing their conception of secularism and national identity in the face of Muslim
278 Ibid.
279 See Sandro Magister, “Interview with Pope Benedict: De-Christianized Europe. Church as ‘Creative
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immigration.282 “Just as Muslims’ religiosity emerges from the matrix of Islam,” he writes,
“so ‘our’ secularity emerges from the matrix of Christianity (or the ‘Judeo-Christian
tradition’).”283 Furthermore he notes how the “definition of the constitutive other in religio-
civilizational terms invites a characterization of the self in the same register.” Therefore
populist radical right parties’ overarching concern “with Islam calls forth, implicitly and
sometimes explicitly, a concern with Christianity.”284
Brubaker argues that populist radical right parties in “Northern and Western Europe form a
distinctive cluster” insofar as they construe “opposition between self and other not in
narrowly national but in broader civilizational terms.”285 This “partial shift” he writes has
occurred due to a perceived “civilizational” threat posed to Europe by Islam.286 In turn, this
perception has given rise to an “identitarian Christianism, a secularist posture, a philosemitic
stance, and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of
speech.”287 Brubaker observes this most strongly in the Netherlands. Dutch Party for
Freedom leader Geert Wilders, he notes, is the most prominent exponent of the
civilisationalist position, and describes in his rhetoric a world in which Judeo-Christian and
Humanist societies must battle retrograde and barbaric Islam.288 This is not to say that
Wilders is not a nativist. Rather, his nativism is couched within a larger civilisationalist
frame, itself informed by his conceptions of religious identity and culture.
The presence of Islam appears to be the major driver of ‘Christian identitarianism’ in Western
Europe. For example, in her article describing the reasons behind the electoral success of the
Marine Le Pen led National Front, Nonna Mayer has noted the growing importance of
Catholic identity in France and the role it plays in driving Catholics to support the National
Front, despite the Church’s condemnation of the party. This support occurs in part, she
contends, due to “the greater visibility of Islam in the public space, with the development of
282 Brubaker, “A new ‘Christianist’ secularism in Europe,” 2016.
283 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1200, 2017.
284 Ibid.
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Mason, “Nigel Farage rows back on call to grand asylum to Syrian refugees,” 30 December, 2013.
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/dec/30/nigel-farage-asylum-syrian-refugees-christians; See “UKIP
Policies for Christians: An Overview,” UK Independence Party Website, 2015.
http://www.election2015.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/UKIPChristian_Manifesto-1.pdf.





street prayers for instance, as well as in the political debate (about French identity and values,
about wearing the headscarf and the burqa).”289 The presence of Islam, when combined with
the rational fear of Islamic terrorists, have according to Mayer brought “Catholics to assert
more than before their own religious identity as different from Muslims', if not superior.”290
Therefore they turn to the National Front, which affirms their religious identity based
nativism, even as the Church teaches them to overcome xenophobia.291
Christian identitarianism appears to be bound up tightly with the term ‘Judeo-Christian.’
What, then does this term mean to populist radical right parties? Amanda Kluveld has
described the importance of the notion of a Judeo-Christian tradition to Dutch right-wing
populists such as Wilders and Fortuyn.292 She finds little genuine historical or religious
content in the idea of a Judeo-Christian tradition. Thus she regards the use the term “Judeo-
Christian” as primarily a descriptive term for Europe’s secular culture, and empty of religious
content.293 Europe, she writes, has no “civil religion,” is deeply secularised, and does not
possess – and never has possessed – a Judeo-Christian culture or tradition.294 The phrase, she
argues, is part of a “toolbox” full of similar language, all of which is vague, changeable, and
without any connection to religious faith or Christian ideals.295It is at best, she writes, a stand
in for whatever politicians are claiming European culture to be: democratic, free, secular – or
something else entirely should the need arise.296
This definition fits well with Brubaker’s description of populist radical right parties’
Christian identitarianism, which he describes as ultimately secular.297 For Kluveld, Roy, and
Brubaker, the populist radical right has created an imaginary Christian or Judeo-Christian
past for the purposes of excluding Muslims from their societies. Brubaker puts it most
succinctly when he describes how populist radical right parties have “emphazised
Christianity as a cultural and civilization identity” only in response to the perceived
289 Nonna Mayer, “From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right, Parliamentary
Affairs, 66, 160-178, 2013, 175. doi:10.1093/pa/gss071.
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“civilizational threat from Islam.”298 In the same way, as populist radical right parties “have
become more concerned about the public visibility of Muslim symbols and practices, they
have come to stress their secularism. As they have highlighted the threat posed by
“Islamization” to Jews, women, gays, and free speech, they have emphasized their own
philosemitism and their commitment to gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of
expression.”299 Brubaker concludes that “the shift to a secularist and ostensibly liberal yet
Christianist stance by national populists in Northern and Western Europe is partial and
fragmentary” but also “strikingly contradictory.” It is liberal yet deeply illiberal, and its
identitarian Christianism is devoid of religious content.300 These contradictions are the result,
he writes, of the eclectic nature of populism which “instrumentalises and exploits” whatever
issues are available.301
Daniel Nilsson DeHanas & Marat Shterin, while building on the work of Roy and Brubaker,
shift the discussion by arguing that populism itself embraces the concept of the sacred.302
They contend that while populists may not incorporate Christian ethics or theology into their
policies, they can be understood as sacralising secular concepts such as ‘the people’ and ‘the
nation.’303 Moreover, they argue that the rise of forms of populism which differentiate
between the ingroup and outgroup according to religion is potentially very dangerous.
“Religious forces” they write, “can be powerful drivers for democratic renewal and for
speaking truth to power. But what happens when democratically-oriented public religions go
awry? The multifaceted roles of religion in populism should prompt us to abandon any naïve
assumptions that religion is merely an empowering force, or that when it does empower it
will work for the social good.”304 DeHanas and Shterin thus draw attention to the sacred
aspect of Christianism among populist radical right parties, which they compare to Islamism
as another public religion or form of religious identity politics.
DeHanas and Shterin’s observation of a sacred element in populism itself suggests that
populists – while by no means religious parties – do in fact blend the sacred and secular
together at times. One of the most interesting conceptualisations of the relationship between









the secularisation narrative has always mistakenly pitted the secular against the religious; the
material against the spiritual; the immanent against the transcendent.305 While such binaries
are valid in certain contexts, he writes, they fail to adequate describe how people behave in
everyday life. According to Marty, “people blur, mesh, meld, and muddle together elements
of both the secular and the religious, the worldly and otherworldly.”306 In this way, people
continuously “confound the categories of the social scientists, theologians, and
philosophers”307 by making do “with a syncretic and characteristically modern blend of
attitudes – call it religio-secular.”308
If we accept that there is already a sacred element in populist – that ‘the people’ and the
nation-state are sacralised – it is perhaps possible to imagine that linking these concepts to
religious traditions in Judaism and Christianity may help to further sacralise ‘the people’ and
the nation-state. Moreover, it is possible to accept that populist radical right parties cannot
easily be classified as wholly secular when they appear to be involved in sacralising secular
concepts ‘the people’ and the nations-state, while also secularising Christianity into ‘culture.’
The secularisation of Christianity into culture, which appears to have made possible populist
radical right parties’ embrace of (Judeo-)Christian identity, has been described by a number
of scholars. Carl Schmitt, for example, the German political and legal theorist, asserted that
all modern European concepts of the state (i.e. state sovereignty) are disguised Christian
notions.309 Anthropologist Talal Asad has shown how European secularism itself has not
been investigated, but rather perceived as normal or natural, when it is in fact a particular
product of European history.310
International Relations scholar Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, building on Asad’s arguments, has
shown the continuing influence of Christianity on European politics, not despite secularism,
but rather through the culturalisation of Christianity in secularism. The European ‘secular’
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conception of the distinction between religion and politics has come out of a Christian
context, she writes, from which it cannot be entirely separated. 311 This idea is perhaps an
echo of José Casanova’s description of secularism as an attempt “to turn the particular
Western Christian historical process of secularization into a universal teleological process of
human development from belief to unbelief, from primitive irrational or metaphysical
religion to modern rational postmetaphysical secular consciousness.”312 Of course, as
sociologist Charles Taylor points out, the mere fact that secularisation has its roots in a
specifically Western context need not mean that only in the West do we find a distinction
between the sacred and secular.313 Nonetheless, secularism as a worldview remains, as Hurd
has noted, a peculiarly Western and Christian method of differentiating between things,
people, and places, sacred and profane.314
Hurd observes the continuing importance of Christian identity in European politics in the
European Union’s decision to prevent Turkey – a majority Muslim yet constitutionally
secular nation – from joining the Union.  Turkey, she points out, could not have been refused
membership on the grounds that it was too religious, because the country has been staunchly
secularist since its founding.315 She observes that despite its supposed commitment to
neutrality on religious matters, the European Union remains a ‘Christian club’ – not because
its member states have particularly religious citizens, but because they share historical
Christian roots and a contemporary commitment to secularism. Turkey does not have
Christian roots, and therefore was seen, Hurd argues, as incompatible with the European
values of the European Union.316
The curiously Christian nature of French secularism is demonstrated by Mayanthi Fernando,
who writes that despite France’s self-identification as a secular nation which does not
discriminate on religious grounds, its secularism privileges Christianity.317 She observes that
the secular state funds the upkeep of Churches built before 1905, and allows the funding of
311 Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, 12-14, 2008.
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some Catholic schools, yet views any similar accommodation of Muslims as violating secular
principles.318 This is perhaps because Christianity and particularly Catholicism has been
secularised into ‘culture’ in France, a process which allows elements of Christianity to exist
within in public sphere. Islamic culture, which has not been secularised into French culture,
might be viewed as ‘religious’ at all times, and is perhaps for this reason forbidden in public
life. The secularisation of Christianity into culture is further demonstrated in the Italian legal
case in which a citizen objected to crucifixes being placed in Italian state schools. After
numerous court cases, it was found that the crucifix was a ‘cultural’ rather than ‘religious’
object, and should be allowed in schools.319 This may be so, but it is difficult to imagine a
menorah or Islamic crescent being viewed in a similar manner (i.e. as a cultural and not
religious object) in Italy or elsewhere in Europe. Only Christianity has been so thoroughly
secularised that its most sacred objects can be interpreted as cultural and not religious items.
It is perhaps this close connection between European secularism and Christianity that allows
the populist radical right to maintain a Christian identity, even as they hold positions that
traditional Christianity might abhor. Moreover, it shows how it is possible for populist radical
right parties to invoke Christianity in a defense of secularism against a perceived Islamic
threat. For the populist radical right in Western Europe, references to Christianity may in fact
be references to the secularised culture of Europe which they wish to preserve. If so, they are
not interested in actual Christian beliefs and practices, and may actually oppose traditional
Christianity and Judaism’s presence in the public sphere, and the re-introduction of
traditional Christian teachings on sexuality.320 It is perhaps instructive, then, to consider the
difference between post-secularists who like the populist radical right perceive secularism to
be a product of the Christian or Judeo-Christian tradition, and wish for Christianity to return
to the public sphere, and the populist radical right. Both post-secularists and the populist right
perceive the Christian influence on secular culture. Yet where the post-secularists see a role
for actual Christian theology, belief, and practice in public life, populist radical right parties
318 Ibid.
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makers,” International Journal of Law and Education, 15 (2): pp. 7-27, 2010. For a similar example of Christian
symbols secularized into culture in Austria, see Bernhard Weidinger, “Equal before God, and God Alone:
Cultural Fundamentalism, (Anti-)Egalitarianism, and Christian Rhetoric in Nativist Discourse from Austria and
the United States,” Journal of Austrian-American History, 1(1), 2017, 40-68.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jaustamerhist.1.1.0040.
320 This would explain why gay libertarian Pim Fortuyn could praise the Judeo-Christian roots of the
Netherlands. See Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in
comparative perspective,” 1196, 2017.
75
are uninterested in Christian beliefs and practices unless they have been secularised into
culture.
Towards understanding the role of religion in populist radical right discourse
From this survey of the scholarship on religion and the populist radical right, it is possible to
surmise that religion plays an important role in formation of identity in the discourse of many
populist radical right parties in Western Europe. This identity is not merely religion-based but
also civilisationalist, and almost Huntingtonian in its separating of peoples into categories
based on religious heritage.321 Importantly, this religious/civilisationalist discourse drawing
Christianity and secularism into a single “Judeo-Christian” tradition is particular, as Brubaker
observes, to Western Europe, and especially common to the region’s populist radical right
parties.322
Most importantly, the populist radical right in Western Europe uses religious identity to
differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘others.’323 They do this by defining national and civilisational
identity in religious terms, referring to ‘Christian’ or “Judeo-Christian’ Europe in their
discourse, and claiming that Western values are based on Christian principles.324 Despite the
references to religion in their discourse, it is not possible to describe populist radical right
parties as religious. While the populist radical right uses language which is similar to that
used by religious and post-secular scholars and thinkers (i.e. they claim to be attempting to
‘save’ Europe or the West by drawing on its Christian or Judeo-Christian heritage), the
populists do not wish to move society beyond the secular, or return religion to the public
sphere. Rather, the scholarship shows us that the populist radical right in Western Europe is
broadly secularist, and appears to use the terms “Judeo-Christian” and “Christian” to refer to
the secular culture of contemporary Western Europe.
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Perhaps what the post-secularists and populists have in common is that they are each
responding to the increasing presence of Islam in Europe, and the effect Muslim immigrants
have upon Europeans’ self-identification. The presence of Islam in Europe appears to have
made some Europeans feel more ‘Christian.’ The content of this Christian identity, however,
appears to differ widely. Populist radical right politicians – and perhaps their supporters –
appear to perceive Christianity to be more or less synonymous with contemporary secularism,
and thus when they identify as Christian they are ultimately identifying themselves as
secularists. The increasing number of Muslims in Europe, and some European Muslims’ self-
identification as Muslim and resistance to secularisation, thus appears to have precipitated the
populist radical right’s association of Christianity or Judeo-Christianity with secularism.
Post-secularists have similarly responded to the arrival of large numbers of Muslims in
Europe by reflecting on the non-universality of European secularism. Habermas for example,
finds inadequacies in the secular worldview, in particular its exclusion of religion from the
public sphere, which he argues not only deprives secular Europeans of ideas associated with
religion but – more dangerously – excludes Muslims from participating in European public
life.325 Habermas also sees a close link between European culture and Christianity, and
argues that Europeans need to re-discover elements of their Christian heritage in order to
improve their societies.326 Moreover, post-secularists may see in the coming of Islam, and
perhaps in the ability of European Muslims to resist secularisation, a possibility for Christians
to de-secularise and perhaps to a degree re-Christianise Europe.327
This associating of Christianity with European secularism is not entirely erroneous. French
secularism – as Fernando has demonstrated – incorporates elements of Christianity within it
and frequently privileges Christianity as a result.328 On the other hand, Marine Le Pen’s claim
that Equality, Fraternity, and Liberty are Christian principles secularised is problematic, due
to these principles being the motto of the French Revolution, which sought to replace
Christianity with the cult of Reason. Understanding populist radical right parties’ perception
of the link between secularism, and Europe’s secular culture, and Christianity is important,
325 See Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society,” pp.17-29, 2008.
326 According to Habermas,” “egalitarian universalism, from which sprang the ideas of freedom and social
solidarity, of an autonomous conduct of life and emancipation, of the individual morality of conscience, human
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Baptist Metz on Religion, Reason, and Politics,” 453, 2012
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then, if we are to understand why populist radical right parties in Western Europe
differentiate between the ingoup and outgroup based on religious identity. For populists it
appears that Muslims represent a religious ‘other’ which threatens the secularised Christianity
they wish to preserve and protect. Populist radical right parties thus attempt to keep the public
sphere free from Islam in order to preserve the secularised Christianity they see as the basis
of contemporary Western culture and values.
Brubaker’s term “Christianist-secularism” therefore appears the most apt description of
populist radical right parties’ use of religion in their discourse, insofar as the populist radical
right may be understood as combining Christian identity with a secularist worldview, and
identifying secular European culture in part as Christianity secularised.329 At the same time, it
would be wrong to assume that there is no sacred dimension to the parties of the populist
radical right. As DeHanas and Shterin observe, populism itself has a sacred dimension,
insofar as it perceives ‘the people’ and the nation-state as sacred objects. Moreover, when
combined with Christianist-secularism, populists’ sacralising of ‘the people’ may become
more potent. The addition of a religious identity element may allow for increased
sacralisation of ‘the people’ and the nation-state through their linking with an ancient
religious tradition, a Europe united by a common religious heritage and culture, and with the
historical antagonism between Christians and Muslims. Thus while the discourse of populist
radical right parties is best described as secular, it may also be described as ‘religio-secular’
in the sense that it sacralises ‘the people’ and the nation-state, even as it secularises
Christianity into ‘culture.’
From this survey of the literature on religion and populist radical right parties, it is possible to
identify the following features in the discourse of populist radical right parties in Western
Europe. Populist radical right parties in Western Europe instrumentalise religion as part of an
effort to exclude Muslims from European society.  They do this primarily at a discursive
level, partly due to their frequent lack of legislative power in most Western European states,
but perhaps also because they may see their essential task as revising ideas about national and
civilisational identity so as to exclude Muslims (a task which is difficult to legislate upon
without first through altering discourse). Their discourse is best described as ‘Christianist-
secularism’ insofar as they perceive European culture as Christianity secularised, and express
a desire to protect Christian-secular ‘Western civilisation’ from Islam. The power of this
329 Brubaker, “A new ‘Christianist’ secularism in Europe,” 2016.
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discourse appears to be related to changes occurring in European society caused by the large-
scale migration of Muslims to Europe since the 1970s, and in relation to the specific Muslim
identity adopted by/given to European Muslims since the 1980s. Europeans’ encounter with
Islam in Europe thus appears to have (1) revealed the non-universal nature of European
secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the privileged place Christianity enjoys within
European secular culture, due to Christianity’s secularisation into ‘culture.’ Recognition of
this appears to have allowed populist radical right parties to categorise secular European
culture as ‘(Judeo-)Christian,’ and to therefore declare Islam to be inimical to this culture.
Remaining unclear is the place of Judaism within populist radical right discourse. Populist
radical right politicians may sometimes speak of the West belonging to a Judeo-Christian
tradition, and may even praise Israel or claim to be acting as protectors of Europe’s Jews, but
it remains uncertain the degree to which they welcome Judaism and Jewish culture within the
public sphere. Moreover, the radical right was once highly anti-Semitic, and even today
radical right politicians – especially when agitating against ‘globalism’ – repeat anti-Semitic
tropes and conspiracy theories.330 Also remaining unclear is the existence and importance of
‘the sacred’ in populist radical right discourse. For example, does the linking of ‘the people’
with (Judeo-)Christianity help to further sacralise ‘the people’ and ‘the state?’ The existing
literature cannot answer this question.
The existing scholarship on religion and populist radical right in Western Europe is strong
when explaining how populists instrumentalise religion, but not as strong in explaining why
this discourse remains powerful in a secularised region such as Western Europe.
Contemporary scholarship tends to focus on religion being co-opted or ‘hijacked’ by
populists. However, it does not often adequately investigate why religion is so easily
hijacked. Equally, the scholarship does not focus enough on the role of Islam in re-shaping
European identity, and altering European understanding of secularism, and the relationship
between secularism and Christianity. Importantly, Brubaker’s theory of populist radical right
parties in Western/Northern Europe being Christian Identitarian movements with a particular
Christian-secularist ideological orientation, has not yet been substantially tested. Nor has the
proposition that populist radical right discourse itself has a sacred aspect. Equally, it is not
entirely clear which populist radical right parties should be included in the ‘Christianist-
330 See in particular Hungarian populist Viktor Orban’s attacks on George Soros. See Erna Paris, “Viktor
Orban’s War on George Soros and Hungary’s Jews,” The Globe and Mail, 1 June, 2018.
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secular’ group, or how indeed they should be grouped if not according to their geography i.e.
as belonging to Western Europe.
It is possible, based on this survey of literature, to form a hypothesis in answer to the
question: Why is religion – in presumably secular Western Europe – used as a method of
differentiating ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the populist radical right?’ My
hypothesis builds on Brubaker’s description of the populist radical right in Western/Northern
Europe’s use of religion in their discourse as a form of ‘Christianist-secularism,’ incorporates
Roy and Joppke’s observation that the Christian faith is largely absent in Europe, but
Christianity’s remains have been secularised into ‘culture,’331 and also incorporates DeHanas
and Shterin’s claim that populism itself makes a sacred object of ‘the people’ and the nation-
state.332 To these ideas it adds Habermas’ crucial observations that (1) the presence of Islam
in Europe confronts “Christian citizens with competing religious truths” and makes “secular
citizens conscious of the phenomenon of public religion,”333 and (2) before the coming of
Islam to Europe, it was possible for Europeans to perceive their own secularism as universal,
neutral, and normal.334 My hypothesis furthermore draws upon the work of Kluveld, and her
description of “Judeo-Christianity” as an ultimately empty term with extremely flexible
meaning, significant only insofar as it can be used to exclude people who do not fit into the
category it attempts to define.335
My hypothesis, then, is that populist radical right parties in Western Europe use religion to
differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in their discourse because they have embraced
‘Christianist-secularism.’ Christianist-secularism has itself come about as a result of Muslim
immigration to Europe, which has made secular Europeans more aware of public religion,
and cognizant of the particular – and especially Christian – nature of their own secular
culture. The arrival of Muslims in great numbers in Europe highlighted the manner in which
Christianity has been secularised into culture, demonstrating cultural continuity between
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Europe’s religious past and its secular present which may not have been as obvious before the
arrival of Muslims. The resulting recognition of the Christianity embedded in secular
European culture has allowed the populist radical right to wield Christian identity – a
civilisation-based identity which can be incorporated within the populist radical right’s
nativism – as a weapon against the minority Muslim populism. In the following chapter I
describe my methods for testing this hypothesis.
Chapter Three: Methods
This chapter (1) describes my thesis question and hypothesis, (2) defines the key terms and
geographical boundaries of my thesis, (3) describes the methods through which I analyse
populist radical right parties’ use of religion in their discourse, and (4) justifies my rationale
for using these particular methods.  The chapter is divided into three sections. The first
outlines my thesis question, hypothesis, and defines the key terms and concepts used in the
thesis. The second justifies my choice of case studies: the French National Front and Dutch
Party for Freedom. In short, I select these parties because they are two prominent and
successful populist radical right parties in Western Europe which appear to belong to the
Christianist-secular group; because France and the Netherlands held elections in the same
years of 2012 and 2017, allowing for a comparison of their discourse at near identical points
in time, and because both France and the Netherlands were impacted by the ‘immigration
crisis’ of 2015-2016, making it possible to compare the reaction of the two parties to the
unprecedented movement of people from the Middle East and North Africa to Europe. The
third section describes and justifies my choice of methods:  the application of Fairclough’s
method of Critical Discourse Analysis to three texts published by Party for Freedom leader
Geert Wilders and National Front leader Marine Le Pen respectively. The Critical Discourse
Analysis is combined with a series of questions which I use to test my hypothesis: (1) does
the discourse display the key elements of Christianist-secularism: “identitarian Christianism,
a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender
equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech?” (2)  How is Islam constructed in the discourse?
(3) How is Christian identity used to exclude Muslims from European society?
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Thesis Question and Hypothesis
This thesis asks why populist radical right parties in Western Europe use religion in their
discourse to differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘others.’ My hypothesis is that Europeans’
encounter with Islam in Europe has (1) revealed the non-universal nature of European
secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the secularisation of Christianity into
European ‘culture.’ Recognition that Christianity has been secularised into ‘culture’ has
allowed secular Europeans to identify themselves – and their nation and ultimately Western
civilisation – as Christian or Judeo-Christian. It has thus created Christianist secularism, a
type of Christian identitarian politics which perceives contemporary European culture to be
‘Christianity secularised.’ A number of populist radical right parties in Western Europe have
embraced Christianist secularism, which they use to define their respective national identities
in religio-civilisational terms, i.e. as (Judeo-)Christian. In doing so, they are able to exclude
Muslims from their society, on the grounds that Islam is an alien religion which – unlike
Christianity and possibly Judaism – has not and cannot be secularised into ‘culture.’
I borrow the term Christian secularism from Brubaker, who used it in an essay for Imminent
Frame to describe the features of the Christian identitarianism practiced by a number of
Western/Northern European populist radical right parties.336 Brubaker groups these parties
according to “identitarian Christianism, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an
ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech.”337
Christianist secularism is devoid, however, of religious content. Though it mimics the
language of the religious and, especially, post-secular thinkers who wish to (to varying
degrees and in various ways) de-secularise Europe, Christianist secularism does not seek to
move beyond the secular frame. Rather, it is deeply secularist and wedded to liberal
enlightenment separation of religion from other spheres of existence. It is therefore Christian
only insofar as it perceives Western civilisation to be culturally (Judeo-)Christian, and this
being so, ‘the people’ to themselves be (Judeo-)Christian..
Brubaker describes Christianist secular populist radical right parties as inhabiting Western
and Northern Europe. I do not object to Brubaker’s classification, but I have simplified the
336 Brubaker, “A new ‘Christianist’ secularism in Europe,” 2016. Brubaker does not use the term ‘Chrstianist
secularism in quite the way I do, preferring to name the populist parties as Christian identitarian. However, I
think his term is a more useful categorisation, as there are many types of Christian identity movements, but what
is so particular about the type Brubaker identifies is its wholly secular nature.
337 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.
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term to ‘Western Europe,’ which I use in a less geographical and more cultural sense to
describe the historically Latin Christian world which underwent secularisation in the post-war
period. It might be objected that Poland and Hungary would be included as ‘Western’ under
this classification, whereas I describe those two countries as belonging to Eastern Europe. I
do not include Poland and Hungary in my study, however, because their post-communist
trajectory has been complex, and appears to involve some de-secularisation. Christian
identitarianism might be an appropriate term to use for the government of Hungary’s use of
religion to exclude Muslims from society, but Hungary’s Christian identity appears to lack
the reverence for the secular, the liberal social stance on gay rights, and the philo-semitism of
the ‘Christianist secular’ group.338
Classification is difficult without extensive study of potentially Christianist secular populist
radical right parties. Brubaker, significantly, does not include the UK Independence Party,
because the party “has been much less rhetorically preoccupied with Islam than Continental
national populists, and the Brexit campaign turned fundamentally on other issues as well.”339
This may be true, however, the party has been rhetorically concerned with Islam at times, has
used imagery to present Muslims as a threat during the Brexit campaign, and contended that
Britain is a secular nation with values and culture based on Christianity.340 Brubaker excludes
the Alternative for Germany on the basis that it is anti-Semitic.341 This is not entirely true.
Rather, the party is strongly pro-Israel, even though some of its members deny the Holocaust
in whole or party.342 This is similar to the National Front in France, which claims to support
Israel but sometimes tries to minimise French collaboration with Nazi Germany during the
Holocaust. Therefore I include both UKIP and AfD in the Christianist-secularism category. I
338 See Church Attendance and Religious Belief in Postcommunist Societies Mary L. Gautier  Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion Vol. 36, No. 2 (Jun., 1997), pp. 289-296.
339 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.
340 See “Brexit: UKIP’s ‘unethical’ anti-immigration poster,” Al Jazeera, 28 June 2016.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2016/06/brexit-anti-immigration-ukip-poster-raises-questions-
160621112722799.html; see also “UKIP Policies for Christians: An Overview,” UK Independence Party
Website, 2015. http://www.election2015.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/UKIPChristian_Manifesto-1.pdf
341 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.
342 See Raphael Ahren, “Loathed by Jews, Germany’s far right AfD loves the Jewish State,” The Times of Israel,
24 September, 2017. https://www.timesofisrael.com/loathed-by-jews-germanys-far-right-afd-loves-the-jewish-
state/.
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do not include the Austrian Freedom Party among the Christian-secular parties solely due to
its traditionalist stance on homosexuality.343
A study of the various populist radical right parties I have mentioned will demonstrate
important differences. Perhaps the only party which satisfies Brubaker’s definition of
Christianist secularism is the Dutch Party for Freedom. This is not to say that the other parties
do not share some or all of these features. However, they share them to different degrees. The
French National Front has been perceived, since the party presidency of Marine Le Pen, to
have moved away from its social conservatism and towards a moderate position on abortion
and gay rights.344 However, it could not easily be described as socially liberal, and still
contains highly conservative Catholic members.345 It would be wrong, however, to classify
only the Party for Freedom, and moreover the Dutch populist tradition, as Christianist
secular. While the National Front is less liberal, and less philo-Semitic than the Party for
Freedom, both share the same core Christianist secular features – though admittedly not to
the same degree – and ought to be categorised as such, while remembering that no
categorisation can be perfect.
Rationale for case studies
A range of methods are used to test my hypothesis. The primary method is case studies of
two populist radical right parties in Western in the 2012-2017 period. I choose the 2012-2017
period because the period coincides with the largest (so far) growth in the electoral success of
right-wing populist parties in Europe.346 This period is ideal for examination, then, due to its
343 The Austrian Freedom Party would otherwise qualify in this category. For example, the party uses Christian
symbolism and language but denies they have any religious content: see Bernhard Weidinger, “Equal before
God, and God Alone: Cultural Fundamentalism, (Anti-)Egalitarianism, and Christian Rhetoric in Nativist
Discourse from Austria and the United States,” Journal of Austrian-American History, 1(1), 2017, 40-68, 57-58.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5325/jaustamerhist.1.1.0040. See also Niels Spierings, Marcel Lubbers &
Andrej Zaslove, ‘Sexually modern nativist voters’: do they exist and do they vote for the populist radical right?,
220, 2017.
344 See Steve Cannane, “Marine Le Pen’s de-demonising of the National Front puts her within striking distance
of the Presidency,” ABC News, 8 May, 2017. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-06/french-election-marine-
le-pen-de-demonises-national-front/8503110.
345 See comments by Marine Le Pen’s politically active niece, then a National Front candidate, in John
Lichfield, “Why we should be scared of Marine Le Pen’s Front National” The Independent, December 8, 2015.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/why-we-should-be-scared-of-marine-le-pens-front-national-
a6765751.html
346 See Pippa Norris, “It’s not just Trump. Authoritarian populism is rising across the West. Here’s why.” The
Washington Post, March 11, 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/11/its-not-
just-trump-authoritarian-populism-is-rising-across-the-west-heres-why/?utm_term=.dbe9847566fa; Ronald F.
Inglehard and Pippa Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural
Backlash, Paper for the roundtable on “Rage against the Machine: Populist Politics in the U.S., Europe and
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significance to the two parties I study and because the period is itself historically significant
for the populist radical right movement in Europe.
My two case studies analyse the National Front of France and the Party for Freedom of the
Netherlands. The National Front and Party for Freedom, while in certain ways the products of
unique social forces, are representative of wider Western European populist radical right
Christianist-secular parties. Both parties display in their discourse, to varying degrees,
“identitarian Christianism, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly
liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech.”347Moreover, both
speak of the values of their respective societies, and of their collective civilisation, as a
secularised form of (Judeo-)Christianity.
At the same time, the two parties differ in important respects – particular in their histories and
ideological trajectories – allowing for a useful comparison between them. The National Front,
while in many respects unique, is an example of a neo-fascist and conservative Catholic party
which has transitioned to become a populist radical right Christianist-secular party.348 Other
examples of this type include the Italian League (Lega – formerly Lega Nord)349 and Austrian
Freedom Party. 350 Studying the National Front may help us understand those parties as well,
and indeed other right-wing populist parties with roots in fascism, neo-fascism, and Catholic
integralism. The National Front was founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen in the early 1970s, and
grew out of links to earlier French neo-fascist and Catholic integralist movements.351
Throughout most of its history it was an anti-Semitic, far-right, socially conservative and
sometimes traditionalist Catholic movement, which opposed communism and mass
immigration from France’s colonies.352 After 2011, however, and under the new leadership of
Marine Le Pen, the National Front turned against explicit racism and anti-Semitism, and
towards populism. As a populist radical right party the National Front began to abandon its
old ultra-conservative rhetoric, and instead support the secularising principles of laïcité,
which the party had previously opposed.353
Latin America”, 10.00-11.30 on Friday 2 September 2016, annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Philadelphia, 2. https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1401.
347 Ibid.
348 See Roy, “The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laïcité,” 79-87, 2016.
349 Duncan McDonnell, “The Lega Nord,” 2016.
350 Betz, “The Growing Threat of the Radical Right,” 84, 2003.




At the same time, the National Front under Marine Le Pen did not abandon the party’s pro-
Christian policies and rhetoric. Indeed, after 2011 Christianity remained an important part of
the party’s identity. In this period the National Front began to alter its rhetoric on religion.
Rather than oppose secularism, the National Front merged Christian identity politics with
support for laïcité, claiming French culture to be Christianity secularised. Islam was then
identified as being alien to French ‘civilisation,’ and considered antithetical to France’s
Christian-secular political tradition.354
In a similar way, and due in particular to party leader Geert Wilders’ vast commentary on
politics and religion in 2012-2017, it is readily possible to test my hypothesis against the
discourse of the Dutch Party for Freedom in 2012-2017. Wilders published and wrote
prolifically in English on his personal blog, made speeches across the world, and presented
himself as an international figure enjoined in the struggle for civilisation against the
totalitarian “political ideology” of Islam.355 Wilders and the Party for Freedom also published
manifestos which explain the party’s policies towards religion, secularism, and in particular
Islam.356 Like Le Pen, he has spoken and written at length – indeed in far greater detail than
his counterpart in the National Front – about the need to protect the West’s “Judeo-Christian
and Humanist” values from Islam and what he calls “cultural relativism.”357
I also choose to examine the Party for Freedom because it contrasts in many respects with the
National Front, and provides an example of a party with an entirely different history, in a
nation with a vastly different religious, cultural, and political history and contemporary
climate, to that of the National Front and France. For example, the Netherlands is a monarchy
with a history of religious toleration made necessary due to the religiously mixed – Catholic
and Protestant – nature of Dutch society. Moreover, while religious toleration was generally
practiced by the Dutch within their nation after the devastating wars of religion, Catholics
and Protestants inhabited different economic, religious, and social spheres called ‘pillars.’358
This is in contrast with France, where the Catholic Monarchy had famously been violently
354 See Marine Le Pen, Presidential Campaign Launch Speech, 2017.
355 Teun Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, Abingdon:
Routledge, 2014, 114.
356 See for example Geert Wilders, “Preliminary Election Program PVV 2017-2021,” Geert Wilders Weblog, 26
August, 2016. https://www.geertwilders.nl/94-english/2007-preliminary-election-program-pvv-2017-2021.
357 See for example Geert Wilders, “Resisting threat of fanatical Islam,” Geert Wilders Weblog, May 5, 2012.
https://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/in-english-mainmenu-98/in-the-press-mainmenu-101/77-in-the-
press/1786-wilders-resisting-threat-of-fanatical-islam.
358 See See Paul Dekker and Peter Ester, “Depillarization, Deconfessionalization, and De-Ideologization:
Empirical Trends in Dutch Society 1958-1992,” Review of Religious Research, 37:4, 1996, pp.325-341.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3512012. Accessed: 19-06-2017 02:13 UTC.
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uprooted, the population overwhelmingly Catholic, and a separation of Church and state
insisted upon by the secularising principles of laïcité.359
Moreover, the Party for Freedom is a much younger party than the National Front, and lacks
its deep links to fascist and integralist movements. Rather, its founder, Geert Wilders, broke
away from the ruling liberal-conservative People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy and
formed his own populist movement, modelled in part on the personal style and ideology of
slain anti-Islam populist politician Pim Fortuyn and the religion based identity politics of
former People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy leader Frits Bolkestein.360 Despite these
differences, the National Front and Party for Freedom retain many similarities, not merely in
terms of ideology but also in their rhetorical style and reliance on charismatic leadership.
2012-2017 is an especially useful period to study when trying to understand the rise radical
right populism in Western Europe, partly because populist radical right parties broke through
from the fringes and into mainstream politics in a number of European nations during this
period, but also because the ‘immigration crisis’ – which saw more than one million (mostly
Muslim) refugees enter Europe – occurred during this period. The National Front and Party
for Freedom are especially comparable in the 2012-2017 period. Both faced elections in
2012, both rejected mainstream Dutch and French approaches to the 2015 immigration crisis
and opposed allowing Muslim refugees to settle in Europe,  and both enjoyed increased
popularity 2016-2017, culminating in electoral success in 2017. In these ways the two
parties’ political trajectories are strikingly similar, though there are also a number of
important differences.
In 2012 National Front policy retained the party’s traditional conservative opposition to
immigration, abortion, and gay marriage.361 However, the party departed from its traditional
opposition to laïcité. The 2012 National Front political programme, for example, lauds laïcité
as an integral element of the French Republic.362 Significantly, it also describes Christianity
as being the religion of the majority of French people for more than a millennium, and argues
359 See Hurd’s remarks on the special nature of laïcité, and its differences from other forms of secularism. Hurd,
The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, 31, 2008.
360 For details of Bolkestein’s relationship with Wilders see Willem Mass, “The Netherlands,” In James
Hollifield, Philip Martin, Pia Orrenius, Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, Third Edition, Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 271.
361 Ibid, 10.
362 “Notre Projet, Programme Politique du Front National,” Front National website.
https://www.frontnational.com/pdf/Programme.pdf, 2011, 105.
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that France’s national culture and traditions are Christian in nature.363 Immigrants, according
to the manifesto, should not flout these Christian traditions which are an integral part of
French identity.364 In this way, the National Front meshed laïcité and Christianity into a
single French tradition, which by its own nature excludes and ‘others’ Muslims.
The 2012 French Presidential elections were the first test for Marine Le Pen’s National Front
and its new policies and rhetoric emphasising France’s dual secular and Christian identity.
Though Le Pen failed to make the second round of voting, she played an important role in
ensuring Prime Minister Nicolas Sarkozy’s defeat, and increased her party’s vote to a 17.90%
of all votes, a more than 7% increase over the party’s 2007 result.365
In the highly significant year of 2015, in which hundreds of thousands of refugees left war-
torn Syria and Iraq, Afghanistan and Eritrea, and migrated to Europe, the National Front
Freedom opposed mainstream French party’s policies towards settling refuges in Europe, and
demanded that Muslim migrants be forbidden from entering France and the Netherlands
respectively. The 2015 immigration ‘crisis’ coincided with --- and was plausibly in part
responsible for – an increase in the Nation Front’s popularity with the French electorate. In
2015 regional elections the party received the most support of any contesting party, winning
27.73% of the vote; just over 1% more than the Nicolas Sarkozy led The Republicans.366
By 2017 the National Front had broken into mainstream French politics. Their 2017 election
campaign focused on combating what they conceived to be the twin threats facing France:
Islam and economic globalisation. The National Front policy in 2017 demanded that laïcité
be strengthened to combat Islamic fundamentalism, and women’s rights protected from
Islamism.367 Yet intriguingly, in her campaign launch speech Marine Le Pen mixed the
religious and secular – Christianity and laïcité – together and remarked that France’s core
values, ‘Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,’ proceed “from a secularization of principles stemming
from our Christian heritage.”368
The 2017 French elections, the first round of which were held on April 23 and the second on




366 Les Républicains; essentially a rebranded UMP.
367 Ibid, commitment 9.
368 Ibid.
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Marine Le Pen came second, winning 21.30% of the vote.369 Her right-wing rival from The
Republicans, Francois Fillon, attracted just over 20% of the vote. The winner was En
Marche! candidate Emmanuel Macron, who won 24.01% of the vote. Le Pen faced Macron
in the second round. This time Macron trounced Le Pen, winning 66.10% percent of the vote
to Le Pen’s 33.90%.370
In the Netherlands during the same period the Party for Freedom followed a similar
trajectory, winning support during the immigration crisis – perhaps due to their anti-
immigration policies – but faltering upon becoming the most popular party, and ultimately
coming second at the 2017 elections. The Party for Freedom took a set of policies to the 2012
elections which demanded Dutch sovereignty be restored, Dutch membership of the
European Union be put to a vote, and which called for Dutch identity, culture, and values to
be protected from Islam and Islamisation. Party for Freedom policy in 2012 was to no longer
permit Dutch citizens to possess dual nationalities, ensure migrant communities integrate by
forcing them to take classes to learn to become Dutch,371 to forbid the construction of
Mosques, cease funding of Islamic schools, and ban Muslim attire such as the hijab in all
government buildings.372 The 2012 elections, however, proved to be a major setback for the
party, which lost nine seats and received just 10% of the overall vote.
2015 was a particularly significant year for the Party for Freedom, which saw its vote
rebound from 2012 lows amid a record number of people seeking asylum in Europe from the
Middle East and North Africa. Geert Wilders opposed accepting any Muslim asylum seekers,
and criticised mainstream and left-wing Dutch and European politicians who advocated
allowing refugees to settle in Europe. The Party for Freedom performed poorly in senate and
provincial elections held in March 2015, receiving a slightly smaller share of the vote than in
the previous elections held in 2011.373 The party’s fortunes changed in August 2015, a time
during which the scale of the immigration ‘crisis’ had become apparent, and public opinion
appears to have started to turn against people seeking asylum and the politicians who
369 “French presidential election: first round results in charts and maps,” The Guardian, April 23, 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/apr/23/french-presidential-election-results-2017-latest.









supported them.374 Significantly, polling suggests that between September 2015 and February
2017 the Party for Freedom was either the most widely supported party in the Netherlands, or
the second most supported party.
The Party for Freedom entered the 2017 election campaign as one of the two most widely
supported parties in the Netherlands, and with a political programme centered upon “de-
Islamising” the Netherlands and restoring Dutch culture and identity to its “Judeo-Christian
and Humanist” origins. The party’s Preliminary Election Program promised to “de-Islamize
the Netherlands” by banning all asylum seekers and immigrants from Islamic countries,
“withdraw all asylum residence permits,” banning the construction of Mosques, banning
Islamic headscarves from “public functions,” detaining radical Muslims who appear to
threaten the country in some way, and expelling dual citizens who commit crimes.375 The
2017 Dutch election resulted in the VVD winning 33 seats, the Party for Freedom coming
second with 20 seats and 13.1% of all votes, and the CDA third with 19 seats.
In the 2012-2017 period, then, both the National Front and Party for Freedom experienced –
like many other right-wing populist parties in Western Europe – unprecedented popularity
and influence, particularly after the 2015 immigration ‘crisis.’ The two parties used similar,
yet not identical, political and religious rhetoric. Both argued that Islam threatened their
respective national identities and cultures, and was antithetical to their nation’s – and
civilisisation’s – Jewish and Christian heritage, and therefore that Muslim immigration must
be curtailed or ceased altogether.
These similarities in policy, rhetoric, and election results occurred despite the different
political and religious contexts of the Netherlands and France, suggesting similar phenomena
occurring across both nations, and perhaps beyond them. By examining the National Front
and Party for Freedom, then, it is possible to test my hypothesis in different cultural and
political conditions in Western Europe, thereby improving the accuracy of my analysis and
conclusions. Furthermore, it is important to study the language the parties use about Islam,
first because Islam and Muslim immigrants are often casts as antagonists for the battle for
Western Civilisation. Islam is unusually prominent throughout their respective discourses.
374 The Peil poll graphic illuminates the sharp rise in the Party for Freedom’s electoral fortunes in the second
half of 2015, which – despite peaks and troughs – continued until the 2017 elections. See the graphical
illustration of Peil polls archived at https://home.noties.nl/peil/politieke-voorkeur. A clearer image of the party’s
rise in the second half of 2017, using Peil and other polling services, can be found here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_Dutch_general_election,_2017.
375 Geert Wilders, “Preliminary Election Program PVV 2017-2021,” 2016.
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This is perhaps because Islam has attained a uniquely prominent place in Western Europe as
the ultimate ‘other’ – a foreign religion which seems to threaten both Christianity and the
secular state.376 The rhetoric of the two parties, then, appears to reflect the threat perceived to
be posed by Islam. To understand the reasons for this perception, then, it is useful to carefully
study the manner in which Islam and Muslims are described in the discourse of the National
Front and Party for Freedom.
Methods
The case studies of the National Front and Party for Freedom each comprise two chapters.
The first chapter of each case study provides the context for the discourse analysis which
forms of majority of the second chapter, but also tests part of my hypothesis: that Europeans’
encounter with Islam in Europe has (1) revealed the non-universal nature of European
secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the secularisation of Christianity into
‘culture:’ two factors which have in turned made it possible for non-religious Europeans to
identify as ‘Christian,’ and thus allowed populist radical right parties to claim a Christian
identity and exclude Muslims from ‘Christian’ Europe. In order to understand the historical
context in which the two parties operate I draw upon scholarship examining the history of
religion, and indeed of secularism, in France and the Netherlands respectively.377 Therefore,
these two chapters address not only the parties themselves, their antecedents and ideological
foundations, the changes they have undergone, and their recent growth and success, but also
describe the political and religious context out of which the Party for Freedom and Front
National have come.
To test my hypothesis, then, I examine the historical French and Dutch attitudes towards
religion and secularism, and the changing nature of their respective national identities during
the second half of the 20th century. In particular, I examine whether the arrival of large
numbers of Muslims in France and the Netherlands altered Dutch and French national
identity, and moreover increased Christian identity within the two countries. To do this, I
examine literature addressing this issue, but mostly importantly I examine the discourse of
the National Front and Party for Freedom respectively to determine whether the increase in
the visibility of Islam in Europe coincides with an increase in anti-Muslim rhetoric and
376 Joppke? Roy?
377 See for example Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam, 2007; Koen Vossen The Power of Populism: Geert
Wilders and the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, New York: Routledge, 2016; James Shields, The
Extreme Right in France: From Pétain to Le Pen, New York: Routledge, 2007; Peter J. Davies, The National
Front in France: Ideology, Discourse, and Power, London:Routledge, 1999.
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Christian identitarianism. I thus examine the rhetoric, policies, and election results of the
National Front and Party for Freedom from their inception to 2017 in order to determine
whether the growth in popularity of the parties reflects a growing Christianist-secularism
within France and the Netherlands, itself the result of Europeans’ encounter with Islam in
Europe.
Chapter four, which provides context for the discourse analysis of the Party for Freedom,
begins with historical study of Dutch attitudes towards religion. It describes how
denominationally mixed Dutch society formed ‘pillars’ in order to deal with religious
difference. It describes the post-war collapse of pillarisation, the secularisation of Dutch
society and identity which followed, the effects of the arrival of Islam in the 1970s, and the
subsequent rise of Christian identitarianism on the Dutch centre-right and populist right.
Chapter six provides context for the discourse analysis of the National Front. It describes
French attitudes towards religion and secularism during the 20th century, and describes the
National Front’s rise from an anti-secular neo-fascist and Catholic integralist party in the
1970s, to a Christianist secular party under Marine Le Pen. It demonstrates how the
secularisation of post-war France and large-scale Muslim immigration contributed to the rise
of Christian identitarianism in France, and allowed for its exploitation by the National Front
under both – though in different ways – Jean-Marie Le Pen and Marine Le Pen.
The Critical Discourse Analysis chapters (chapters five and seven) draw on the contextual
chapters and attempt to understand the use of religion in the discourse of the National Front
and Party for Freedom in the 2012-2017 period. The two case study chapters follow an
identical structure in order to provide direct comparison and improve data quality. Three key
events are isolated:  The respective French and Dutch elections in 2012, the 2015
immigration ‘crisis,’ and the respective French and Dutch elections in 2017. The two parties’
use of religion in the discourse surrounding each event is analysed in order to test my
hypothesis that (1) Europeans’ recognition that Christianity has been secularised into
‘culture’ has allowed for non-practicing Christian Europeans to identify themselves – and
their nation and ultimately Western civilisation – as Christian or Judeo-Christian, and that
this effect has created Christianist secularism.’ (2) The Party for Freedom and National Front
are among a number of populist radical right parties in Western Europe that have embraced
Christianist secularism, which they use to define their respective national identities in
civilisational terms, i.e. as (Judeo-)Christian. They use this discourse to exclude Muslims
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from their society on the grounds that Islam is an alien religion which – unlike Christianity
and possibly Judaism – has not and cannot be secularised into ‘culture.’
The study of populist radical right discourse is important, then, because the parties often
perceive politics “in terms of a  ‘metapolitical’  contestation  of  the  power  to  define
concepts  and  shape  discourse.378 That is, the populist radical right’s primary goal is to re-
shape discourse on national identity, introducing religious and civilisational conceptions of
national identity, and in doing so exclude groups they perceive to be outside of the
boundaries of their concept of national identity: particularly Muslims and ‘elites.’ The
centrality of discourse – and in particular shaping national discourse on identity and national
belonging – to populist radical right parties in Western Europe makes analysing their
discursive use of religion is the best way of understanding their conception of national
identity, and the role religion plays in shaping this conception of identity.  Analysis of the
National Front and Party for Freedom’s discursive use of religion, when combined with
analysis of wider cultural and political developments in France and the Netherlands
respectively, can thus reveal important information about the reasons behind populist radical
right parties in Western Europe use of religion.
To test my hypothesis, then, I select three examples of National Front and Party for Freedom
discourse to closely analyse – three texts – in each case study chapter. I analyse the discourse
of the respective party leader, using one representative example of discourse used by Marine
Le Pen and Geert Wilders respectively.379 I use material in English given this is my native
language. This decision impacts my study in obvious ways, limiting the material I may use.
However, it has a far greater impact on my National Front case study. While English is for a
variety of historical reasons widely understood and used in the Netherlands, it is less widely
used and understood in France. Equally, Party for Freedom leader Wilders is much happier to
speak English than Marine Le Pen, not merely for cultural reasons particular to the
Netherlands, but perhaps because he appears to wish to portray himself as an international
figure, and not merely a nationalist. Therefore there is an abundance of English language
378 Hans Georg Betz & Carol Johnson (2004) Against the current—stemming the  tide: the nostalgic ideology of
the contemporary radical populist right, Journal of Political Ideologies, 9:3, 311-327, 324.
DOI:10.1080/1356931042000263546 https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931042000263546.
379 To determine how representative the texts are I have read an and searched for keywords in texts published by
Wilders on his personal website, in news reports on Wilders and Marine Le Pen in The Guardian newspaper
discussing speeches and interviews they have given respectively, and also consulting the literature on the
policies and discourse of the National Front and Party for Freedom. This literature I discuss in detail in chapters
4 and 6.
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material produced by Wilders and his party, but very little produced by Le Pen and the
National Front.  However, supporters of Marine Le Pen have produced English translations of
her most important speeches, such as her campaign launches in 2012 and 2017, which I rely
upon in this thesis. Wilders, on the other hand, often speaks and writes in English, and has
much of his work translated into English on his personal website. Therefore I select, from
material posted by Wilders on his website, examples of his rhetoric which demonstrate best
his views on religion, secularism, Islam, and the importance of the Judeo-Christian and
Humanist tradition. It is rare to find entire speeches by Marine Le Pen translated into English.
The only sources available are provided by American far-right and alt-right organisations and
blogs. 380 Marine Le Pen has, however, written articles for English speaking publications.381
Texts are selected for analysis therefore on the basis that they are in English, produced during
the 2012 and 2017 election campaigns, and during the 2015 immigration crisis. Selection is
based on two other factors: that the speeches are politically significant and contain
information about the respective parties’ conception of national identity, and the role of
religion and secular within their respective nations. It would serve no purpose to analyse a
speech which did not at least in part address religious and identity issues.
To test my hypothesis I perform a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of the six selected
texts. CDA has been used to analyse populist radical right discourse, most significantly in the
work of Ruth Wodak, in particular in The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing populist
discourses mean and her co-edited volume Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and
Discourse .382 However, CDA does not appear to have been used to comprehend the specific
role religion plays in the discourse of populist radical right parties in Western Europe. CDA
is suitable for this task because populist radical right Christianist-secular parties aim
primarily to change the concepts of national identity and belonging, tasks that must occur at a
discursive level before they may occur in legislation. Moreover, because the Party for
380 See for example Anonymous, “Marine Lepen (sic) speech on why she is running for President of France,”
Media Research Centre TV, 16 March, 2012. https://www.mrctv.org/videos/marine-lepen-speech-why-she-
running-president-france; Marine Le Pen, quoted in “Marine Le Pen: Why I am running for President of
France,” 2012.
381 Marine Le Pen, “To Call This Threat by Its Name,” The New York Times, 18 January, 2015.
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/opinion/marine-le-pen-france-was-attacked-by-islamic-
fundamentalism.html
382 See Ruth Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing populist discourses mean, London: Sage, 2015;
Wodak, KhosraviNik, and Mral, (Eds.). Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse. London:
Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.5040/9781472544940. See also the Stanford University
project, “Decoding Marine Le Pen’s Rhetoric,” which critically analyses Le Pen’s political rhetoric
https://decodingmarinelepen.stanford.edu/.
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Freedom and National Front are not in government and therefore have little legislative power
in the Netherlands and France respectively, their primary source of power is their rhetoric.
Their power lies, in particular, in their ability to influence public opinion and pressure centrist
parties into adopting populist radical right positions.
The purpose of my CDA is to test my hypothesis. To do this I seek answers in the selected
texts to the following questions: (1) does the discourse display the key elements of
Christianist-secularism: “identitarian Christianism, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance,
and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech?”383
(2)  How is Islam constructed in the discourse? (3) How is Christian identity used to exclude
Muslims from European society? By asking these questions of the selected texts I am able to
ascertain whether the Party for Freedom and National Front can be classified as Christianist-
secular, the parties’ conception of Islam and the perceived danger it poses to the West’s
(Judeo-)Christian civilisation, and the manner in which Christianist-secularism is wielded to
exclude Islam and Muslims from the France and the Netherlands respectively – key claims
made in my hypothesis.  Equally, by studying the potentially changing nature of the
discourse, I am able to understand how the immigration crisis of 2015 may have altered the
parties’ use of religion in the discourse.
Critical Discourse Analysis approaches language as something more than symbolic: as social
practice, and thus socially (and politically) consequential. Indeed, language practices “may
have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power
relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities
and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people.”384 For
“language and other social practices are always in unity,” making certain that language
influences and expresses the social power of groups and individuals.385
Marine Le Pen’s and Wilders’ discourse, and particularly their rhetoric on religion and
religious identity, appears to have had a powerful effect on French and Dutch politics
respectively. Their language, such as their use of terms such as ‘Judeo-Christian and
Humanist’ and ‘Christian heritage’ to describe contemporary European culture, defines
European identity in a religious way which excludes Muslims from any possibility of
383 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.
384 Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, Methods for Critical Discourse Analysis, London:Sage 2009, 6.
385Ibid, 10.
95
belonging to Europe. Such language has an effect beyond the simple act of speech, but is
influenced by – and in turn influences – political ideology and other social practices. The
popularity of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders is testament to the power of their language,
and demonstrates the importance of analysing their rhetoric on religion. Their religious
rhetoric both helps define French and Dutch identity, yet must also reflect French and Dutch
peoples’ ideas of their own respective identities, and the role religion plays in defining these
identities.  Equally, their rhetoric provides evidence of the effects emerging post-secularism
may be having upon European society.
Following CDA techniques developed by Norman Fairclough I examine the discourse on
religion of the Party for Freedom and National Front, not only as statements of their own
beliefs, but as they are related to broader French and Dutch social practice and politics.386
Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis involves analysing both the text itself, the methods
by and for which the text was produced, and the relationship between the text and wider
society. Therefore I analyse both the language of the texts produced by the two parties and
their respective leaders, but consider the reasons the texts were produced and their
relationship to French and Dutch politics respectively.
According to Fairclough, CDA is a type of “discourse analysis which aims to systematically
explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) discursive
practice, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural structures, relations and
processes; to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are
ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the
opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power
and hegemony.”387 Fairclough provides a “three dimensional framework for the analysis of
text and discourse:” which involves “1) the linguistic description of the formal properties of
the text; 2) the interpretation of the relationship between the discursive processes/interaction
and the text, where text is the end product of a process of text production and as a resource in
386 See Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. See also See Norman
Fairlough and Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis” in T.A. Van Dijk (ed.) Discourse Studies: A
Multidisciplinary Introduction, vol. 2, London: Sage, 1997.
387 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language, Second Edition, Oxford
and New York: Routledge, 2013, 93.
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the process of text interpretation and lastly, 3) the explanation of the relationship between
discourse and social and cultural reality.”388
The case study chapters use this framework and type of analysis, and are structured to
include, first, a summary of the text being examined, in which the major themes and structure
of the text is described.
Second, and building on the summary of the text, is an analysis of the language used in the
text. This section asks whether key elements of Christianist-secularism present in the text,
how ‘Islam’ is constructed within the text, and whether/how Christianist-secularism is used to
define national identity and therefore exclude Muslims from Dutch and French society
respectively. This section notes the frequency of terms used by Wilders and Le Pen, in
particular references to religion, and analyses the manner in which they are used to separate
‘the people’ from ‘others’.
Third, and building on the summary and language analysis, is the ideological analysis. The
purpose of this is to uncover the meaning of text, and to situate the text within a wider
political/social discourse which it may reproduce or help to produce. This segment attempts
to understand and/or uncover the link between the discourse evident in the selected texts and
the wider populist radical right discourse around religion and politics. It thus draws on the
context provided in earlier chapters on religion and populist radical right parties, and tests
whether Christianist-secular politics has been made possible by Europeans’ encounter with
Islam in Europe, which has made explicit the secularisation of Christianity into ‘culture,’ and
therefore allowed Christian identity to be used to define ‘the people’ exclude Muslims from
(Judeo-)Christian Western civilisation.
My method, as a four step process, is as follows:
(1) Select three texts produced by Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders respectively, and at three
points: during the 2012 election campaign, during the 2015 immigration crisis, and during the
2017 election campaign. Texts are selected according to certain criteria. They must be in
English, have content related to national identity, and be broadly representative of the
political positions of the leader and their respective party. Texts produced by Wilders are
sourced from his personal website; texts produced by Marine Le Pen sourced from Time
388 Forough Rahimi and Mohammad Javad Riasati, “Critical Discourse Analysis: Scrutinizing Ideologically-
Driven Discourses”, International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 1(16),2011, 109.
http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_1_No_16_November_2011/13.pdf.
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Magazine, and translations of Le Pen’s speeches on the Gates of Vienna weblog and Media
Research Centre TV.389
(2) Subject each text to Fairclough’s process of Critical Discourse Analysis. First, analyse the
language of the text to comprehend how Marine Le Pen and Geert Widlers construct national
and civilisation identity, and the manner in which religion is or is not invoked as part of this
construction. Second, interpret the text as a product of party ideology and discourse. Third,
interpret the text within a wider National and Western European political and social context.
To do this the text is compared with and contrasted against data from other sources (party
manifestos, other statements by party members and the leader, other politicians, and most of
all the information gathered in the preceding chapter) to build a picture of what is being
communicated in the texts, and its wider political and social significance.
(3) Following these steps, determine whether the data produced supports my hypothesis by
asking of it following questions: (1) does the discourse display the key elements of
Christianist secularism: “identitarian Christianism, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance,
and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech?”390
(2)  How is Islam constructed in the discourse? (3) How is Christian identity used to exclude
Muslims from European society?
(4) In a separate chapter, compare and contrast the data produced in the case studies, and
consider what it means in a wider European political and social context. Was the hypothesis
correct? In what ways was it correct and incorrect? What was missing? Most importantly,
answer the thesis question: Why is religion used as a tool with which to differentiate ‘the
people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the populist radical right in Western Europe?
One problematic issue this thesis must address is the question of deciphering the difference
between the two parties’ instrumental use of religion and their ‘genuine’ religious
motivations (assuming they have any). Because we cannot know what is in a politicians head
or heart, so to speak, and equally because elements of Christianity are so embedded in
European culture, it is perhaps impossible to completely separate instrumental use of religion
from ‘genuine’ religious feeling. If a non-religious politician encourages citizens to partake in
389 I have cross checked these translations by comparing them to their sources and found them to be accurate
translations, based upon my own reading of the French language sources and of Google Translate’s translation,
and where possible compared them to quotations and descriptions in English language media.
390 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.
98
religious activities because she or he believes this practice will be beneficial to society, is this
an instrumental use of religion or somehow ‘genuine?’ Obviously, this action cannot be
‘genuinely’ religious because it does not stem from actual religious belief and practice.
However, it also seems more than simply instrumental. Just as it is possible, then, for a
religious politician to use religion ‘instrumentally’ it may be possible for a non-religious,
secularist politician – perceiving something beneficial in religious belief and practice – to
encourage religious practice among their countrymen in a way which is not linked to a
cynical attempt to win votes or achieve some simple political goal.
This thesis, then, does not argue that it is possible to always distinguish between the
instrumental use of religion in discourse and ‘genuine’ religious expression. When this thesis
identifies ‘instrumental’ use of religion, it is narrowly referring to language which is devoid
of a serious connection to Christian theology, traditional Christian morality, and does not
form an attempt to return French or Dutch society respectively to its Christian religious roots.
Rather, an instrumental use of religion is understood in this thesis in the sense that religion
may be used as an instrument to establish or propagate an identity based in part or whole on
religion. An instrumental use of religion is thus a type of secular language which may imitate
religious language, or may simply imply a religious impulse, but in reality serves to maintain
secular differentiation of religion from other spheres of human activity. Equally, the thesis –
while it refers to Islam and Christianity as ‘religions’ – does not seek to homogenise these
two very different traditions into a single category. As I discussed in my introduction, it is not
possible to establish a single category of ‘religion,’ into which we can always place certain
practices and ideas. However, the purpose of the thesis is not to discuss these issues at length,
but rather to comprehend what contemporary Western European populist radical right parties
mean when they discuss religion and religious identity. Therefore when the thesis discusses
religions, it uses the term in the context of understand how – for example – Marine Le Pen
and Geert Wilders understand Christianity and Islam, and their respective relationships with
secularism and the secular state. In particular, and because Islam is described by a number of
populist radical right figures as a unique threat to secularism and Judeo-Christian European
culture, the thesis seeks to understand whether it is Islam’s supposedly ‘religious’ nature (i.e.
that Islamic cultures and Muslims are more religious than Christian cultures and Christians,
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and therefore less amenable to secularisation) which makes it a particular threat to ‘the
West.’391
Chapter 4: The Party for Freedom and Religion
Over the next two chapters I test my hypothesis by examining the Dutch populist radical right
Party for Freedom’s use of religion in their discourse. The purpose of this chapter is to test
part of my hypothesis: that Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has (1) revealed the
non-universal nature of European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the
secularisation of Christianity into European ‘culture.’ By testing this it is possible to establish
whether recognition that Christianity has been secularised into ‘culture’ has allowed for non-
practicing Christian Dutch – such as Party for Freedom leader Geert Wilders and many of his
supporters – to identify themselves as Christian or Judeo-Christian. The chapter will also
provide the historical and political context for the discourse analysis chapter that follows.
I test this part of my hypothesis by examining national identity in the Netherlands before and
after secularisation, the impact of Muslim immigration Dutch identity, and most importantly
populist right-wing and radical right politicians and parties response to Muslim immigration
to the Netherlands. Party for Freedom discourse during the 2012 – 2017 period must be
understood both within the context of the party’s history and Geert Wilders’ personal history
and political development, but also within the context of the historical relationship between
religion and politics in the Netherlands. Therefore this chapter examines the Dutch manner of
managing religious difference since the period of secularization in the 1960s, the subsequent
effects of Muslim immigration on Dutch national (and civilisational) identity, and the manner
in which Geert Wilders’ life experiences contributed to the formation of his political
ideology.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first examines the role of religion in post-war
Dutch society and politics. It contends that the entrance of Muslim immigrants into the
391 Secularist populists in the Netherlands, for example, have spoken of the unique threat of Islam to Humanism
and Christianity since the 1990s. See Teun Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium,
Germany and the Netherlands, Abingdon: Routledge, 2014, 117; Hemel, “(Pro)claiming Tradition: The “Judeo-
Christian” Roots of Dutch Society and the Rise of Conservative Nationalism,” 53, 2014.
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heavily secularized post-war Netherlands, which no longer divided people into ‘pillars’ based
upon religious identification but sought to solidify a single secular-nationalist identity, played
a vital role in creating the conditions required for Christianist secularism to emerge.
The second section presents an example of the political effects engendered by the emergence
of Christianist secularism in the Netherlands, itself a product of the entrance of Muslims into
a secularised and de-pillarised Dutch society. This section thus examines the formation and
development of the Party for Freedom, and considers the reasons behind the party’s rapid rise
which began with its breakthrough success at the 2010 Dutch general elections, and perhaps
culminated in its second place finish in at the 2017 general election. This section contends
that the Party for Freedom’s use of religion in its discourse can be situated within a particular
Christianist secular Dutch discourse on religion, which emerged in the 1990s and is
associated with murdered populist politician Pim Fortuyn, and Party for Freedom leader
Geert Wilders’ political mentor Frits Bolkestein.
The final section attempts to explain the ‘return’ of religion to Dutch politics in the 1990s and
2000s. It examines the rise of the Party for Freedom, and explores the reasons it has
experienced electoral success while using religion to separate ‘the people’ from ‘others,’
thereby linking contemporary secular Dutch culture with Judaism and Christianity, and
demonizing Islam as incompatible with Dutch culture. In this section I examine whether the
party’s Christianist secular discourse is the product of Muslim immigration (and Muslim
difference) demonstrating to Europeans the secularised Christianity embedded in their
culture.
Religion and Politics in the Netherlands
The rise of the populist radical right in the Netherlands – as in other parts of Europe – has
been connected with the decline of industry and the increasing number of immigrants.392 This
being so, the rise of the populist right in Western Europe is sometimes explained as the result
of working class and lower middle class anger at stagnating wages and the turn away from
392 Inglehart and Norris, “Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural
Backlash,”2, 2016.
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manufacturing.393 It could be argued that the declining number of jobs for white working
class Dutch, combined with the increased competition from visibly different migrants, has
produced a rise in the vote for the populist radical right Party for Freedom. In this way, right-
wing populism might be understood as a working class male revolt against globalism and
neoliberalism, which due to the political centre-left’s support for mass immigration and the
neoliberalism of the EU, must take the form of a right-wing or conservative movement.
The economic argument, while strong, may be incomplete. In this thesis, while not
disregarding the economic aspects of the rise of populism, I also engage with the ‘cultural
explanation’394 for the popularity of populist radical right parties; that the rise of populism is
also an expression of some Dutch people’s fears that their culture will be overwhelmed or
significantly changed by Muslim immigrants. In this section, I argue that Islam’s increasing
presence in the Netherlands has changed Dutch culture and identity, and that the presence of
Islam has made some Dutch more aware of the importance of religious identity and more
cognizant of the Christian (albeit heavily secularised) elements of their own culture. It is this
new consciousness of the importance of religion – as Habermas has described it – and
cognisance of religion’s influence on Europe’s past and present, which appears to have
influenced populist radical right discourse, particularly in the case of Geert Wilders and his
Party for Freedom. 395
The visibility of Muslims, and the controversial nature of Islam, in Europe, has many causes
and is complex in nature. Roy, for example, helpfully shifts the discussion away from a ‘clash
of civilisations’ causing Islam to become controversial, noting that “It is a mistake to think
that the phenomena of religious radicalism (Salafism) and political radicalism (Al
Qaeda) are mere imports of the cultures and conflicts of the Middle East. It is above all a
consequence of the globalization and Westernization of Islam. Today’s religious revival is
first and foremost marked by the uncoupling of culture and religion, whatever the
religion may be. This explains the affinities between American Protestant
fundamentalism and Islamic Salafism: both reject culture, philosophy, and even theology
in favour of a scriptural reading of the sacred texts and an immediate understanding of
393 Ibid.
394 Inglehart and Norris point out that it is not only economically depressed regions and communities which
favour populist radical right parties; rather, communities and regions enjoying economic prosperity are
increasingly voting for populist radical right parties for what appear to be broadly cultural reasons: i.e. fear of
immigrants, or a desire to end ‘political correctness.’ See Ibid, 2-3.
395 Habermas, “Notes on Post-Secular Society,” 20-21, 2008.
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truth through individual faith, to the detriment of educational and religious
institutions.”396
Roy argues that Muslim immigration to Europe has “created a divide between religion
and society, between religion and culture, to the extent that religious belief is lost sight
of. Suddenly, a Muslim living in Europe has somehow to reinvent, to rediscover or, to be
more precise, to define what, to his thinking, belongs to the religious world. Therefore,
for a Muslim, being in a minority, or being an immigrant, compels him to ultimately
think about the basic nature of Islam. He is forced to objectify Islam, to try to define the
essence of Islam as objectively as possible.”397 This is important, because it shows how
the visibility of Islam is not merely the result of European xenophobia – though this is a
factor – but also due to the growth of religious identity among Muslims immigrants to
Europe, itself a product of the immigrant experience.
It is important to bear this in mind when considering the visibility of Islam in the
Netherlands, a country with a complex religious history, and which has become deeply
secularised since the 1960s. In such an environment – secularised, but with a Christian past –
Islam is bound to be especially visible, and Muslims are understandably likely to re-interpret
their identities and religiosities in response to the culture around them. The Netherlands has,
since the Reformation, existed as a religiously mixed society in the sense that it had large
populations of both Catholic and Protestant citizens, along with small but significant
Orthodox and Jewish minorities. Until the mid-20th century, each religious group existed in a
relatively isolated environment, with no one group able to entirely dominate all others
politically or numerically. While Protestantism became the official religion of the
Netherlands, the country remained religiously mixed, a situation which “resulted in a fragile
balance of power which guaranteed minority rights to the various denominations.”398
In the 19th century, the Dutch developed a way of dealing with religious difference which
became known as pillarisation, or the pillar system. Pillarisation meant dividing society into
396 Olivier Roy, “Islam in Europe: Clash of religions or convergence of religiosities?: Eurozine, May 3, 2007.
https://www.eurozine.com/islam-in-europe/. See also Roy’s comments on the roots of growing Muslim identity
in the West among Muslim immigrants in Olivier Roy, “They love death as we love life: jihad and the roots of
terror,” Qantara, July 19, 2018. https://en.qantara.de/content/interview-with-french-extremism-researcher-
olivier-roy-they-love-death-as-we-love-life-jihad.
397 Ibid.
398 Paul Dekker and Peter Ester, “Depillarization, Deconfessionalization, and De-Ideologization: Empirical
Trends in Dutch Society 1958-1992,” Review of Religious Research, 37(4), 1996, pp. 325-341, 327.
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segments based upon different religious and political ideologies.399 The Dutch, therefore, did
not divide people on the basis of class, language, or ethnicity. Rather, pillars reflected the
differing moral and religious worldviews of the Dutch population. Pillars began to be
established in the late nineteenth century, first by Protestants and Catholics, followed later by
socialists and liberals.400 The 19th and 20th centuries thus saw the emergence of “the
Calvinist,” the “Dutch Reformed pillar, the Roman Catholic pillar, (and) the socialist pillar,”
in the Netherlands.401 Life in the Netherlands became structured around pillars, which
“created their own organizations” and heavily influenced the life of those who lived within
them.402 For example, each pillar had it own set of organisations, including political parties,
schools, youth movements, hospitals, and newspapers.403
This somewhat unique arrangement proved successful in managing religious difference in
the Netherlands, perhaps because it allowed for different groups to maintain a degree of
autonomy from one another, while integrating all into a larger nation-state and national
‘Dutch’ identity.404 Or as Speicker and Steutel put it, “pillarization enabled social groups with
incompatible moral-religious doctrines to create their own strongly organized worlds, while
at the same time peaceful cooperation was ensured among the pillars.” Indeed, with perhaps
the exception of the period of Nazi rule, during which Jewish people were deported – often
due to collaboration between non-Jewish Dutch and Germany authorities – the pillar system
allowed religiously different Dutch peoples to live together cooperatively and in peace until
well into the 1960s.405 While different to one another and based on different ideological
positions, the pillars did have in common a belief system which was influenced by
Christianity, Humanism, or a combination of the two. Thus even though there were important
differences between each pillar, cooperation was often made easy due to the ultimately
Christian-Humanist based ideologies upon which each pillar was based.
399 Ben Spiecker and Jan Steutel, “Multiculturalism, pillarization and liberal civic education in the Netherlands,”
International Journal of Educational Research, 35, 2001, 293–304, 294.
400 Dekker and Ester, “Depillarization, Deconfessionalization, and De-Ideologization: Empirical Trends in
Dutch Society 1958-1992,” Review, 328, 1996.







In the 1960s and 1970s pillisation collapsed. The reasons for this are complex, but can be
explained as in part the result of the secularisation of Dutch society, and the creation and
enlargement of the welfare state in post-war Netherlands.406 This second factor may have also
contributed to secularisation, insofar as it took away the welfare duties which once fell upon
churches. The collapse of religious observance, in particular, in the 1960s and 1970s must
have contributed to the weakening of the mostly religion based pillar system, which relied
upon not merely religious observance but religious identification. As the Dutch ceased to
identify as belonging to a religion based pillar, the entire system began to crumble. Pillar
based political parties, grounded upon particular religious denominations, began to lose
suppose and ultimately coalesce, drawing together Catholics and Protestants in a manner
hitherto unimaginable.407 The coalescing of the Catholic and Protestant parties into a single
“Christian” party indicates a blurring of the differences between Catholics and Protestants,
who perhaps saw – in the face of a secularising society – more commonalities between the
two denominations than differences.
The end of pillarisation did not cause immediate harm to the Dutch nation, insofar as it did
not destroy Dutch identity. Rather, the end of the pillar system contributed to a sweeping
change in Dutch society, which moved from being based upon collective religious identities,
to a society in which “political beliefs are increasingly based on personal choice and less on
tradition.”408 Yet the end of pillarisation appears to have ultimately proved somewhat
problematic for the Netherlands. The migration of several hundred thousand Muslims into a
rapidly secularising – and thus de-confessionalising and de-pillarising – Netherlands
presented a number of difficulties for both Muslim and non-Muslim Dutch. These problems
led to the question of the compatibility of Islam with Dutch culture, and indeed with the
Christian-Humanist heritage of Dutch culture, becoming widely debated during the 1990s and
2000s, as disquiet about the influence of Islam increased. Eventually, political parties would
emerge in the Netherlands based, to a significant degree, around ending Muslim immigration
and curtailing the influence of Islam. Some conservative and, especially, populist radical
right politicians would begin to assert the need to make “Judeo-Christianity and Humanism”
the leading culture of the Netherlands, in an effort to combat the so-called Islamisation and
406 Dekker and Ester, “Depillarization, Deconfessionalization, and De-Ideologization: Empirical Trends in
Dutch Society 1958-1992,” Review, 330, 1996
407 Ben Spiecker and Jan Steutel, “Multiculturalism, pillarization and liberal civic education in the
Netherlands,”, 295, 2001.
408 Dekker and Ester, “Depillarization, Deconfessionalization, and De-Ideologization: Empirical Trends in
Dutch Society 1958-1992,” Review, 399, 1996.
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“moral relativism” undermining Dutch culture.409 These developments can only be
understood in relation to the effects on Dutch identity caused by the entry of Muslims into a
depillarised and heavily secularised Netherlands, and the subsequent emergence of a
Christianist secular Dutch identity, which emphasised the peculiarly Christian nature of the
Netherlands’ secular culture.
The Netherlands, like most other Western European nations, began to encourage large-scale
scale immigration from peoples of Muslim majority nations in the 1960s and 1970s. By 2008
the number of Muslims in the Netherlands had reached around 900,000, or 6% of the total
population.410 People with a Turkish or Moroccan background make up the vast majority of
the Dutch Muslim population, with smaller numbers coming from Suriname, Iraq, and
Indonesia.411 It is interesting to note that few Dutch Muslims come from the Netherlands’
former colonies Suriname and Indonesia. Instead, Muslim migrants came to the Netherlands
as ‘guest-workers’ whose religion appears to have been barely noted by Dutch authorities.412
Indeed, the growth of Islam in the Netherlands appears to have been unexpected. Turkish and
Moroccan ‘guest-workers’ were assumed to either be a temporary phenomenon which would
disappear as soon as their employment ended, or it was imagined that those who stayed
would assimilate into Dutch society and secularise in the manner that the Dutch themselves
had in the post-war period.413 Yet after 1974, when the foreign labour recruitment officially
ended, many ‘guest-workers’ chose to remain in the Netherlands. Equally, other Muslim
migrants came as family members of a ‘guest-worker’, or as refugees, to the Netherlands.414
Muslims thus neither ‘went home’ to Turkey, Morocco, or another Muslims majority nation,
nor did they assimilate into Dutch culture by privatising their faith and ceasing to practice
Islamic rituals.
As the Muslim population of the Netherlands increased, so did the visible presence of Islam.
When Muslim ‘guest-workers’ began arriving in the early 1970s, there were very few places
409 Hemel, “(Pro)claiming Tradition: The “Judeo-Christian” Roots of Dutch Society and the Rise of
Conservative Nationalism,” 53, 2014.
410 Thijl Sunier, “Islam in the Netherlands,” in Religious Newcomers and the Nation-State: Political Culture and
Organised Religion in France and the Netherlands, Erik Sengers and Thijl Sunier (eds), Delft: Eburon, 2010,
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of worship available. By 2010 there were 450 Mosques operating throughout the Netherlands
and more than 30 Islamic schools.415 How significant, then, is the Muslim presence in the
Netherlands? Roughly 6% of Dutch identify as Muslims.416 At the same time, so visible are
Muslims that their numbers are vastly overestimated by the Dutch, who on average imagine
that 19% of their fellow citizens are Muslim, a number they expect to increase to 26% by
2020. The number of Muslims in the Netherlands is expected to grow to just 6.9% by
2020.417 Of course, it is possible that Muslims will grow as an overall percentage of the
Dutch population well into the future, due to continued high levels of immigration.
Perhaps for a certain number of Dutch, particularly middle-class professionals who may see
themselves as ‘European’ rather than narrowly Dutch, or even see themselves as citizens of
the world, demographic change occurring in the Netherlands is of little interest or
importance. But it is clear that not everyone in the country feels this way. Populist radical
right parties and their supporters are aware of these demographic changes, and see nothing
positive in the decline of the ‘white’ European and Dutch population and the growth of Islam
across the continent.418
The growth of right-wing populism in the Netherlands, which occurred primarily during the
2000s and 2010s, thus appears to be closely connected with the increasing visibility of, and
growing controversy related to, Islam throughout the country. It is perhaps best not to simply
call every politician who identifies Dutch culture as “Judeo-Christian and Humanist” and
claims Islam is antithetical to the Judeo-Christian tradition as part of the populist radical
right. Indeed, perhaps the first Dutch politician to use this language was centre-right People’s
Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) leader Frits Bolkestein, who in the early 1990s
began to use Christianst language when claiming that Muslims threatened the Netherlands’
Judeo-Christian values. Moreover, while several other European nations have populist radical
right parties with deep roots in fascist movements, and which have been active since the
1970s, the right-wing populism in the Netherlands emerged out of the centre-right, and
415 Thijl Sunier, “Islam in the Netherlands,” in Religious Newcomers and the Nation-State: Political Culture and
Organised Religion in France and the Netherlands, Erik Sengers and Thijl Sunier (eds), Delft: Eburon, 2010,
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416 “Perils of Perception” Ipsos Poll, 2016. https://www.slideshare.net/IpsosMORI/the-perils-of-perception-in-
2016-ipsos-mori/1.
417 “Dutch overestimate size of the Netherlands’ Muslim population,” Dutch News, 14 December, 2016.
http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2016/12/dutch-greatly-overestimate-size-of-muslim-population/
418 See Geert Wilders, “Wilders: The Bell Tolls for Europe as Europeans are in danger of being replaced,” June
2, 2017. http://www.breitbart.com/london/2017/06/02/wilders-europeans-danger-replaced/.
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indeed out of a pro-Enlightenment liberal tradition. Neither of the two best known Dutch
populist radical right and anti-Muslim politicians, Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders, had
affiliations with any far-right or fascist movements. Indeed, both were defenders of
secularism and social liberalism against religious fundamentalism. However, both Fortuyn
and Wilders shared a perhaps surprising admiration for what they called Judeo-Christianity,
and believed that Jewish and Christian values and ideals underpinned the contemporary
secular values of the Netherlands.
This curious element of this use of religion is that it is coming from secularists who might
ordinarily be expected to dismiss religion – all religion – as a retrograde worldview. Neither
Wilders nor the late Fortuyn could be considered religious. Both were supporters of a broadly
progressive social agenda, including support for gay rights.419 Why, then, should they have
expressed admiration for Judaism and Christianity, religions which secularists had previously
considered irrelevant at best, and retrograde conservative elements at worst? The answer may
lie in the manner in which Muslim immigration has helped change Dutch perceptions of the
relationship between religion and politics, and moreover the relationship between Christianity
and secularism. Furthermore, it may lie in the way in which Muslim immigration has
contributed to the emergence of Christianist secularism in the Netherlands.
Muslims are a very visible minority in the Netherlands. This is not merely due to their
appearance and forms of religious practice, though these certainly mark Muslims out as being
different. It is also due to the particular religious and political situation in the Netherlands,
where due to secularisation religion is often viewed as a private matter, yet in which
Christianity suffuses the culture in a manner so ubiquitous it is almost never remarked upon.
In such an environment Muslims, who do not always secularise and privatise their faith, and
may not take part in the Christian rituals of Dutch society (Christmas, Easter, etc…) must
stand out from others who accept the privatization of religion and the precedence given to
Christianity as the only allowable (if largely secularized and turned into ‘culture’) public
faith.  Despite the Christian nature of Dutch public culture, it is Islam which is singled out by
populist radical right parties as a “political” faith.420 Yet Dutch Muslims have not until
recently formed or voted for Muslim identity political parties. Moreover, one cannot
419 Koen Vossen, Classifying Wilders: The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and His Party for
Freedom, Politics, 31(3), 179-189, 2011, 186-187.
420 Teun Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, Abingdon:
Routledge, 2014, 117.
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reasonably accuse Dutch Muslims of trying to turn the Netherlands into an Islamic state.
Even the small Dutch ‘Denk’ (the word means ‘think’ in Dutch) party, which might be
considered a Muslim party or a Dutch-Turkish Party, advocates a broadly left-wing agenda
which might be described as, multiculturalist, anti-Israel, and pro-Turkey.421
The combination of the high visibility of Muslims within the Netherlands, and a perception
among some Dutch that Islam is incompatible with Dutch culture and values, has perhaps
contributed to the many social problems experienced by Dutch Muslims. There are, for
example, an extraordinarily high number of Muslims in Dutch prisons, a problem also
reported in a number of other Western European countries with large Muslims populations.422
One can speculate that Muslims’ relatively weak socio-economic position, the hostility they
face from Europeans who may fear or despise them, and simple cultural differences have
undoubtedly all played a role in creating this problem. Indeed, the cultural differences
between the ethnic Dutch majority and Muslim immigrants should not be ignored, though
they should at the same time not be exaggerated. An important difference between the two
populations is the issue of blasphemy and free speech, which has caused enormous friction on
more than one occasion.423 These issues have undoubtedly played a role in making anti-
immigrant and in particular anti-Muslim populist politicians popular. Conversely, a sense
among supporters of populist radical right parties that Islam is incompatible with Dutch
Judeo-Christian and Humanist values is likely to have contributed to bad relations between
Muslims and non-Muslims in the Netherlands, and to have further marginalised Muslims.
The perception held by some Dutch that Muslims are not and cannot become good Dutch
citizens because they belong to a religion which cannot secularise, and the concomitant
redefining of Dutch culture and secularism as a product of (Judeo-)Christianity, appears to
have led to a situation in the Netherlands in which the persistence and continued influence of
religion has become increasingly recognised. It is possible, then, to draw a line between the
421 After the 2017 Dutch elections, Denk held three seats on the Dutch House of Representatives, see “Dutch
Election Results,” The Economist, March 16, 2017. https://www.economist.com/graphic-
detail/2017/03/16/dutch-election-results.
422 According to a report in the Washington Post, “Research by the Open Society Institute, an advocacy
organization, shows that in the Netherlands 20 percent of adult prisoners and 26 percent of all juvenile offenders
are Muslim; the country is about 5.5 percent Muslim.” Molly Moore, “In France, prisons filled with Muslims,”
Washington Post, April 29, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/04/28/AR2008042802560.html
423 I am thinking here of the Danish cartoon saga, the screening of Geert Wilders’ film Fitna and Theo van
Gogh’s film Submission, the death threats against Ayaan Hirsi Ali due to her criticism of Islam.
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secularisation of the Netherlands and subsequent end of pillarisation and the emergence of
anti-Muslim political parties which allege Islam is incompatible with Dutch ‘Judeo-Christian’
society. Where pillarisation allowed for a variety of different notions of Dutch identity, the
end of the pillar system left the country with a cohesive but far narrower sense of identity.
Equally, it left the secularised Dutch impatient with collectivised notions of identity based
upon a single religious denomination. The presence of Muslims thus demonstrates the
Christianity embedded within secular Dutch culture, and the privilege given to Christianity
over other religions in Dutch society. The Netherlands may claim to be a secular country
which privileges no one religion over another, yet it makes public holidays of important
Christian holidays, and recognises no Islamic holidays or religious occasions despite a
growing Muslim population. Having a growing Muslim population makes this embedded
Christianity more visible, and this visibility makes it possible for non-religious Dutch to
claim their culture is Christian and secular humanist, and provides the basis for populist
radical right parties to use this identification of Dutch culture as Christian to exclude Muslims
from society. In other words, the presence of Muslims has provided the impetus for populist
radical right figures such as Wilders and Fortuyn to use Christianist secular rhetoric which
defines Dutch society as Judeo-Christian and Humanist, and therefore excludes Muslims on
the dual grounds that Islam is alien to the Netherlands, and because unlike Christianity it does
not differentiate between religion and politics.
The Rise of Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom
One of the most prominent and widely supported users of Christianist secular rhetoric in the
Netherlands is Party for Freedom leader Geert Wilders. Reviled by many in his own country
and abroad, yet seen by his supporters as perhaps the only politician willing to be honest
about the challenge of Islam, Wilders has made a career out of framing Islam as a hostile
force bent on conquering the Netherlands’ Judeo-Christian and Humanist culture.
Who then is Geert Wilders, where did he come from, and what led him to lead a populist
radical right movement in the Netherlands? Wilders was born in 1963 in Venlo, in the far
south-east of the Netherlands, close to the German border. Born to a Dutch father and to a
mother with dual Dutch and Indonesian heritage, Wilders was raised a Roman Catholic but
left the church in his late teens. Being perhaps something of a searcher for meaning and
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identity his youth – unsurprising given his mixed heritage – Wilders travelled extensively
across the Middle East and North Africa. During a stay in Israel, where he volunteered at a
Moshav, he discovered an especial affinity with Israelis and sympathized with Zionism.424
Further travels throughout the Arab world seem to have solidified his opinion that the more
Western oriented Israelis possessed a culture superior to that of their Arab neighbours, whose
religion he blamed for their nations’ authoritarianism and poverty.425 Conversely, Wilders
saw in Israel proof of the virtues of Judaism, and came to believe that Israelis provide a
model of cultural strength the West ought to emulate.426 He also became convinced that
Jerusalem, the “cradle of the Judeo-Christian tradition,” ought to be defended from
Muslims.427
Returning to the Netherlands, Wilders studied Social and Medical insurance in Amsterdam,
and later received some legal certifications from the Open University of the Netherlands.
After four years working in social security – during which he appears to have acquired a
distaste for the Netherlands’ bureaucratized welfare system, and a belief in the superiority of
neoliberal market based solutions to healthcare problems428 – Wilders began working as a
speechwriter for the centre-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). His
time working for and representing the VVD can be divided into three broad periods: 1990 –
1997, during which he worked on policy; 1997 – 1998, when he represented the VVD in the
Utrecht council; and 1998 – 2005, as a Member of Parliament representing the VVD.429
Intellectually, Wilders’ time in the VVD is split between the 1990 – 2001 period, in which he
took a strong stand against Muslim immigration but supported neo-liberal policies, and the
424 Cnaan Liphshiz, “Is the Honeymoon over for Geert Wilders and Dutch Jews?” Times of Israel, May 2, 2014.
http://www.timesofisrael.com/is-the-honeymoon-over-for-geert-wilders-and-dutch-jews/.
425 See David J. Wetheim, “Geert Wilders and the Nationalist-Populist turn Towards the Jews in Europe” in The
Jew as Legitimation: Gentile-Jewish Relations beyond Antisemitism and Philosemitism, David J. Wertheim
(editor), Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017, 280-281.
426 Cnaan Liphshiz, “Is the Honeymoon over for Geert Wilders and Dutch Jews?” Times of Israel, May 2, 2014.
427 David J. Wetheim, “Geert Wilders and the Nationalist-Populist turn Towards the Jews in Europe” in The Jew
as Legitimation: Gentile-Jewish Relations beyond Antisemitism and Philosemitism, David J. Wertheim (editor),
Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017, 281.
428 Teun Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, 117, 2014.
429 A Reuters article profiling Wilders notes the following: “When he entered politics in 1990 without a
university degree after a stint working for a health insurer, it was as a social policy specialist, advising the
liberals on ways to cut back on the Netherlands' then very generous out-of-work allowances. Colleagues
remember a driven expert with a skilled politician's command of his technical brief, with little time for
socializing. His party started in that technocratic tradition, advocating pro-business, Atlanticist
neoconservatism.” See Thomas Escritt, “The Globetrotter Confined: The Hardening of Geert Wilders,” Reuters,
February 28, 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-election-wilders-idUSKBN1671JB.
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post-2001 period in which his views on Islam became radical and extremely hostile, and he
began to embrace American style neoconservatism.430
Why did Wilders join a centrist party when he already had radical views about Islam and the
religious basis of culture and civilization? There are three plausible explanations. In certain
respects it is not surprising, given how early on Wilders began thinking in a civilisational and
religious manner, that he was not attracted to the far-right parties of his day, which were anti-
Semitic and racialist. Wilders, as we have seen, was from his late teens sympathetic towards
Israel and saw the world through the prism of religion based civilizations, not simply through
a racial lens. It is difficult to imagine Wilders’ philo-Semitism and preference for religion
based civilisational identity of racial identity being welcome inside the European far-right of
the 1980s. Equally, Wilders was in the 1980s and 1990s a supporter of the neoliberal, pro-
free trade and anti-welfare policies espoused by the VVD.  Yet another important reason for
Wilders’ decision to join and remain part of the VVD was the presence within the party of
Frits Bolkestein.
Bolkestein was an important figure in Dutch politics. A onetime VVD leader (1990 – 1998),
he was a man who appears to have been at times something of an outlier within his own
party, especially on issues such as Muslim immigration and the importance of preserving
Dutch culture from growing Islamic influence. In hindsight, and when his influence on
populists Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders is taken into consideration, he looms as an even
more important figure in Dutch politics than he may have appeared in the 1990s.
In 1991 Bolkestein made a series of remarks which anticipate the worldview of many of
Europe’s populist radical right movements. Discussing the difficulties integrating Muslims
into Dutch society, he painted a picture of two clashing cultures; a Dutch culture one based
on “Rationalism, humanism and Christianity” and an Islamic culture which was antithetical
to these things.431 In a perceptive passage discussing these remarks, Ernst van den Hemel
comments that Bolkestein appears to be arguing that only Christianity – or perhaps cultures
430 Teun Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, Abingdon:
Routledge, 2014, 117.
431 Hemel, “(Pro)claiming Tradition: The “Judeo-Christian” Roots of Dutch Society and the Rise of
Conservative Nationalism,” 53, 2014.
112
derived from Christianity – possess humanist and rationalist values.432 Therefore it can be
surmised from this argument that, according to Bolkestein, the more Muslims enter Dutch
society the less humanist and rational it is likely to become. Bolkestein had as early as 1991
spoken of the Netherlands’ Christian heritage. By 1994, he was warning that the Netherlands’
economic and legal orders lacked a firm moral underpinning.433 This was unsatisfactory and
possibly dangerous; Christianity and humanism, he argued, would “offer the moral guidelines
and unity for a political community facing a growing influx of migrants.”434 Equally,
Bolkestein disdained cultural relativism “because it denied the superiority of Western
values.”435 Fearing that cultural relativism and the lack of a single religiously underpinned
identity and set of ethics would weaken cohesion, Bokestein wished to change the VVD’s
political program to include references to Christian culture and identity.436
While Bolkestein was not able to convince the VVD to return references to Christianity to the
VVD’s program, according to Vollaard the debate he began within the party about the
relationship between Christianity and contemporary secular Dutch culture moved into the
public sphere.437 The degree to which the notion that Dutch culture was rooted in a religious
tradition gained traction is evident in the parliamentary record. The term “Judeo-Christian”
was virtually unheard in Dutch parliament before the year 2000, having been used just 33
times between 1814 and 2000. Between 2000 and 2011, however, the word was used on 143
occasions.438 The context of the term’s use also changed. Before 2000 it was mostly used in
an explicitly religious context, and by Christian parties. After 2000 it was mostly secular
politicians using the term, usually during speeches describing the impossibility or difficulty
of integrating Muslims into Dutch “Judeo-Christian” society.439
Bolkestien’s remarks are significant for a number of reasons. They demonstrate a shift away
from race based arguments about immigration, and towards culture and religion based
arguments for excluding certain groups from residency and citizenship. (Of course, by this I










“Swarte Piet” at Christmastime shows racist attitudes have not completely abated.440
Furthermore, the sight of Party for Freedom supporters chanting “less Moroccans” at a rally
suggests much the same.)441 They also demonstrate the use of religious language in Dutch
politics in a relatively new way – in the service of secularism. As Hemel notes, Bolkestein’s
remarks show a superficially post-secular style mixing of religion and politics. Yet there is no
religious content within them, and no attempt to encourage the Dutch to return to Church or
even believe in God.
Significant though they were, Bolkestein’s ideas do not appear to have influenced VVD
immigration policy, which continued to welcome tens of thousands of Muslims immigrants –
mostly from Morocco and Turkey – into the Netherlands. But they struck a chord with Geert
Wilders, who had already formulated opinions similar to those Bolkestein expressed during
his time in Israel, and who was adopted by the older politicians as something akin to a
protégé.442 Wilders, then, was for many years in certain respects a conventional member of
the VVD, yet in his views on the danger posed by Islam and the importance of Judeo-
Christian and Humanist values he was – like his mentor Bolkestein – something of an outlier.
Despite his unconventional views on Islam and whatever disagreements he had with VVD
policy, Wilders remained in the party for almost fifteen years, and served in VVD led
coalition governments.
It has been observed of Wilders that after 2001 – and no doubt motivated by al Qaeda’s
terrorist attacks on the United States and the George W. Bush administration’s embrace of
Neoconservatism in their wake – he moved sharply in a neoconservative direction. According
to Teun Pauwels, he embraced the particular tenets of this doctrine: “market liberalism,
traditional values and aggressive democratic interventionism against chosen adversaries.”443
Wilders travelled to “Israel and the United States to familiarize himself with the ideas and
440 The black slaves or ‘helpers’ of Sinterklaaus made an appearance at the Dutch embassy in Canberra,
Australia, embarrassing and astonishing the Australian government. Alexandra Beech and Tegan Osborne,
“Embassy Hosts Traditional Dutch Sinterklaas event in ACT with characters dressed in black face,” ABC News,
December 8, 2015. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-12-07/embassy-hosts-dutch-sinterklaas-event-with-black-
face-costumes/7008374.
441 See Nina Siegal, “Geert Wilders, Dutch Far-Right Leader, Is Convicted Of Inciting Discrimination,” The
New York Times, December 9, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/world/europe/geert-wilders-
netherlands-trial.html.
442 Willem Mass, “The Netherlands,” In James Hollifield, Philip Martin, Pia Orrenius, Controlling Immigration:
A Global Perspective, Third Edition, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 271.
443 Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, 117, 2014.
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methods of neoconservative think tanks.”444 He gave vocal support for the War on Terror, the
Guantanamo Bay detention camp, and advocated for regime change across the Middle
East.445 At the same time, Wilders also began calling for the arrest and detention of anyone
considered to pose a threat to Dutch security. He became critical of the political
establishment, and sought to capitalize on anti-establishment feeling. And, perhaps most
importantly, he began to categorise Islam as a totalitarian ideology, and not a true religion,
wholly at odds with the West’s Judeo-Christian values.446
In 2004 Wilders resigned from the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy. The decision
was perhaps some time in the making. In 1998 Wilders’ mentor Bolkestein left the VVD for a
position in the European Parliament. In the years following his absence, Wilders appears to
have gradually grown unhappy under the more liberal direction of Bolkestein’s successor
Hans Dijkstal.447 The VVD maintained a moderate and centrist political orientation – despite
the tumultuous character of the period, including the September 11 attacks, invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq, and the politica l assassinations of Pim Fortuyn and Theo Van Gogh –
throughout the first half of the 2000s. Wilders, as we have seen, had grown more radical in
his views during this time. Matters came to a head in 2004 when Wilders wrote a ten point
programme for the Limburg branch of the VVD which advocated, among other things, a “ban
on radical mosques and the repatriation of radical Muslims.” When the VVD leadership
demanded that he “distance himself” from his own plan, Wilders chose instead to resign from
the party.448 For a year he sat in Parliament as ‘Group Wilders’ before founding the Party for
Freedom, where he was to be leader and sole member, in February 2006.
Frustration with the VVD on the Muslim immigration issues was perhaps not the only reason
Wilders had for forming a new political party. Another key reason was perhaps the success of
a populist in Dutch politics: Pim Fortuyn. A gay man with very liberal views on cultural
issues, he enjoyed a sudden and extraordinary rise to prominence in the early 2000s. Fortuyn
was the author of a curious manifesto complaining of the Netherlands’ cultural and economic
malaise. Muslims were a particular target of his ire in his manifesto, for they represented to







Netherlands as belonging to a wider European Judeo-Christian and Humanist culture under
threat from Islam and Muslim immigrants.449 As a liberal and a gay man Muslims’ religiosity
and conservative views on sexual matters troubled him, and he was not – like most left-wing
politicians – sympathetic towards their plight as a minority group. Rather, Fortuyn treated
Muslims as he would a conservative Christian group – or worse, because he believed that
Christianity was a direct forerunner of Humanism. Islam, Fortuyn suggested, was inherently
conservative and hostile towards Dutch liberal values.450 Thus Islam was not only a reminder
of the religious conservatism which had been overcome or transformed into secular
liberalism, but something far more insidious: a religious tradition which could not overcome
itself and secularise.
The 2002 murder of Fortuyn and the earlier departure of Bolkestein from Dutch politics
opened up a space within the Netherlands for a new right-wing movement. Fortuyn had
already shown that there was a great appetite in the Netherlands for a party which took a
liberal approach to sexual morality and gender issues, but which defined Dutch identity as
‘Judeo-Christian and Humanist,’ and in doing so excluded Muslims (and indeed other
religious conservatives) from being considered truly Dutch.
Wilders’ increasingly radical views were no doubt solidified by the death threats he has
received during his time in Dutch public life. Having become notorious for his views on
Islam and Muslim immigration, Wilders received serious threats to his life from Muslim
extremists shortly after his departure from the VVD. The gravity of the threat was
demonstrated when filmmaker Theo van Gogh, director of the Ayaan Hirsi Ali written anti-
Islam film Submission, was murdered by a Dutch-Moroccan Islamist. The killer, having shot
van Gogh, cut his victim’s throat almost to the point of decapitating him, and using a small
knife pinned to his chest a ‘hit list’ of names. Among those listed was Geert Wilders.
It is possible that Wilders’ physical isolation after the murders of Fotruyn and Van Gogh and
the subsequent threats to his own life changed his politics. Wilders’ politics did indeed
449 Kluveld, “Secular, Superior, and Desperately Search for its Soul: The Confusing Political-Cultural
References to a Judeo-Christian Europe in the Twenty-First Century, 250, 2016.
450 According to Fortuyn, “In Holland, homosexuality is treated the same way as heterosexuality: in what
Islamic country does that happen?” Fortuyn also remaked about Islam, “How can you respect a culture if the
woman has to walk several steps behind her man, has to stay in the kitchen and keep her mouth shut?” See
Elizabeth Kolbert, “Beyond Tolerance,” The New Yorker, September 9, 2002.
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/09/09/beyond-tolerance.
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change in a significant way in the mid-2000s. After founding the Party for Freedom, Wilders
gradually abandoned his position in favour of free trade and welfare cuts, embracing the trade
protectionism and pension increases which appealed to his core supporters in the disaffected
working class. Yet most importantly, by founding his own party Wilders was able to
concentrate on the issues he believed most significant: restricting Muslim immigration and
regaining Dutch sovereignty from the European Union. Thus through the creation of the Party
for Freedom he was able to disassociate himself from the somewhat unpopular – especially
among working class people – economic liberalism of the VVD, while at the same time
making a simple, direct appeal to anti-Muslim sentiment across the political spectrum.
The Party for Freedom entered the 2006 election campaign with a populist-nationalist
political platform based on restricting Muslim immigration, restoring Dutch sovereignty,
stopping Turkey gaining EU membership, and preventing the EU from increasing their power
over the Netherlands through new constitutional measures.451 Despite having been founded
only nine months earlier, the party received 6% of the vote at the 2006 elections, winning
nine seats and allowing Wilders to remain in Dutch Parliament.452 Wilders was now the
leader of the fifth largest party in the Netherlands, and had attracted a core group of
supporters – mostly from non-religious and disaffected working class men – who appreciated
his anti-Muslim views and Euro-skepticism.453 The election result gave Wilders a new
prominence and importance in Dutch public life. He used his new profile to attack Muslim
immigrants, Islam, left-wing political movements in the Netherlands, and the European
Union.
After 2006 Wilders developed a new line of attack against the political left, arguing that it
was working hand in hand – whether leftists knew it or not – with Muslims to Islamise the
country. By introducing the idea that all cultures were equal, and advocating multiculturalism
and mass immigration, Wilders argued, the left was encouraging Muslims to refrain from
assimilating into Dutch culture. Furthermore, because they did not recognize in Islam an
existential threat to the Netherlands or Europe, Wilders branded the CDA led Dutch




government cowards, and demanded that they stand up to Islam, cease further immigration
from Muslims, and make Judeo-Christianity the country’s leading culture.454
Furthermore, after 2006 Wilders and the Party for Freedom drifted further away from the
centrist neoliberalism of the VVD, and towards populist nationalism. He began accusing
Polish, Bulgarian and Romanian immigrations of stealing jobs rightfully belonging to the
Dutch.455 He campaigned for better care for the elderly.456 Reversing his earlier support for
neoconservatism and military intervention, he called for Dutch troops to be recalled from
Afghanistan, and ceased calling for the promotion of democracy in the Muslim world.457 The
Dutch people, he argued, were not sufficiently patriotic. Schoolchildren must be taught to be
true patriots in school, and told why Dutch Judeo-Christian and Humanist values were
superior to all others – especially Muslim values.458
Wilders’ new populist-nativist orientation affected his attitude towards Muslims. Where once
he had argued that Muslims could become secular democrats, and indeed that the West ought
to forcibly spread liberal democracy to the Middle East, he now argued the Netherlands
should cease participation in International Peacekeeping in places such as Afghanistan.459 He
produced a film in 2009, Fitna, in which his new attitude to Islam was elaborated upon. In the
film, Islam is presented as wholly antithetical to Dutch culture, and based upon hatred,
intolerance and the will to dominate non-Muslim societies and – if possible – transform them
into Muslims. Fitna caused enormous controversy. Yet Wilders did not cease attacking Islam,
but continued his criticisms in the face of continued death threats, a ban on his entering the
UK, and the condemnation of many other Dutch politicians.
Leaving behind his increasingly unpopular neoliberal and neoconservatives positions, like
populists elsewhere in the world Wilders constructed a reality around him in which ‘the
people’ of his nation were being oppressed by an anti-democratic minority, in this case a
454 According to Wilders in 2008, “Our Prime Minister is a big coward. The government is weak.” See Ian
Traynor, “’I don’t hate Muslims, I hate Islam’ says Holland’s rising political star,” The Guardian, February 17,
2008. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/feb/17/netherlands.islam.







coalition of leftists, Muslims and centre-right neoliberal politicians.460 At the same time, as
Koen Vossen notes, Wilders was no simple right-wing politician. He took liberal positions on
gay rights, abortion, euthanasia, and women’s emancipation, and claimed to be defending
these positions against an inherently conservative and intolerant Islam.461 Such positions are
entirely consistent with populism, which is an inherently thin ideology and can come in left-
wing, centrist, and right-wing forms, or even in forms which cannot be readily identified on
the political spectrum.462
In 2010 the CDA led government collapsed, triggering a new general election. In the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis, disillusionment with the EU, and continued fears over Muslim
integration and mass immigration, the environment suited anti-establishment politics. Yet in
the months leading up to the election the Party for Freedom had not polled especially well,
and did not appear poised to take full advantage of national anger towards mainstream
politicians. On election night, however, it quickly became clear that Geert Wilders had
become one of the most powerful people in the Netherlands. The party won 15.4% of the vote
and 24 seats, making it the third largest party in the Netherlands. The defeated CDA had
slumped to being the forth most popular party, winning a mere 13% of the vote and just 21
seats – 20 fewer than it held before the election.
The VVD won the largest share of the vote in 2010, finishing with 20.5% and 31 seats. Yet
their left-wing rivals, the PvdA, came such a close second (winning one fewer seat) that it
took a further 127 for a new government to be formed. Almost five months after the election,
the VVD formed a coalition government. The Party for Freedom, while not forming part of
that coalition, agreed to support the government in parliament – a decision which would lead
to the downfall of the VVD led coalition and a major political setback for Wilders and his
party.
In the two years that followed the 2010 elections the VVD struggled to govern, a task made
more difficult by the demands made by Wilders in exchange for his support in Parliament.
The centre-right VVD simply could not acquiesce to Wilders’ insistence that Muslims’ rights
460 Koen Vossen, “Populism in the Netherlands after Fortuyn: Rita Verdonk and Geert Wilders Compared,”
Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 11:1, 22-38, 26-28. DOI: 10.1080/15705850903553521.
461 Vossen, Classifying Wilders: The Ideological Development of Geert Wilders and His Party for Freedom,
187, 2011.
462 See Stanley, “The thin ideology of populism,” 2008.
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be curtailed, that no new mosques be built, and that the Netherlands renegotiate its agreement
with the EU on the issue of immigration controls.  By the middle of 2012, Wilders had
decided he would no longer cooperate with the VVD led coalition, and ended their formal
agreement to provide support in parliament. Thus the government collapsed and new
elections were called. Curiously, Wilders revoked support at a time hardly advantageous to
his party, who had been falling in popularity due to their intransigence and inability to
compromise with centrist parties.
In 2012 the Party for Freedom proposed a vote on Dutch membership of the European Union,
and called for Dutch identity, culture, and values to be protected from Islam. Party for
Freedom policy in 2012 was to no longer permit Dutch citizens to possess dual nationalities,
to ensure migrant communities integrate by forcing them to take classes to learn to become
Dutch,463 to forbid the construction of Mosques, cease funding of Islamic schools, and ban
Muslim attire such as the hijab in all government buildings.464 This programme was not met
with approval by Dutch voters, and the 2012 elections proved to be a setback for the party,
which lost nine seats and received only 10% of the overall vote.
In 2014 the party’s popularity began to recover, but it was not until late 2015 that Wilders’
began to enjoy a level of popularity his party had hitherto not received. 2015 was a
particularly significant year for the party which saw its vote rebound from 2012 lows amid a
record number of people seeking asylum in Europe from the Middle East and North Africa.
While the Dutch centrist parties indicated they would accept a number of asylum seekers,
Wilders opposed accepting Muslim refugees. This stance was not initially popular. The Party
for Freedom performed poorly in senate and provincial elections held in March 2015,
receiving a slightly smaller share of the vote than in the previous elections held in 2011.465
Their fortunes changed in August 2015, a time during which the scale of the immigration
‘crisis’ had become apparent, and public opinion appears to have started to turn against
people seeking asylum and the politicians who supported them.466 Polling suggests that
463 Ibid, 37.
464 Ibid.
465“Dutch political landscape never more divided, election results show,” Dutch News, March 19, 2015.
http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2015/03/dutch-political-landscape-never-more-divided-election-results-
show/
466 The Peil poll graphic illuminates the sharp rise in the Party for Freedom’s electoral fortunes in the second
half of 2015, which – despite peaks and troughs – continued until the 2017 elections. See the graphical
illustration of Peil polls archived at https://home.noties.nl/peil/politieke-voorkeur. A clearer image of the party’s
rise in the second half of 2017, using Peil and other polling services, can be found here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_Dutch_general_election,_2017.
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between September 2015 and February 2017 the Party for Freedom was either the most
widely supported party in the Netherlands, or the second most supported party, a result which
demonstrates the popularity Wilders’ anti-Muslim discourse in the Netherlands.
The Party for Freedom entered the 2017 election campaign as one of the two most widely
supported parties in the Netherlands. The party’s Preliminary Election Program promised to
“de-Islamize the Netherlands” by banning all asylum seekers and immigrants from Islamic
countries, “withdraw all asylum residence permits,” banning the construction of Mosques,
banning Islamic headscarves from “public functions,” detaining radical Muslims who appear
to threaten the country in some way, and expelling dual citizens who commit crimes.467 The
2017 Dutch election resulted in the VVD winning 33 seats, the Party for Freedom coming
second with 20 seats and 13.1% of all votes, and the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA)
third with 19 seats.
Despite coming second, the power of Wilders’ populist and Christianist secular rhetoric had a
profound impact on the Dutch centre-right during the 2017 election campaign. VVD leader
Mark Rutte and CDA leader Sybrand Buma adopted an aggressive, nationalistic style similar
to that of Wilders, and emphasised the need to protect Dutch culture from immigrants. Rutte
began his campaign for re-election by telling pro-Erdogan Dutch-Turkish protesters in
Rotterdam to return to Turkey if they weren’t willing to embrace Dutch values. Immigrants,
he later wrote in an open letter, must “act normal or go away.”468 His nativist politics, in
which he complained of unspecified “immigrants” who are causing trouble and ought to “go
away,” was almost certainly an attempt to show Party for Freedom voters that the VVD
sympathised with their anti-Muslim feelings.469
The centre-right CDA also adopted Wilders’ nationalistic tone. Party leader Sybrand Buma
called for compulsory singing of the national anthem470 in schools each morning,
described Islam as providing no cultural “enrichment” for the Dutch nation, and called for a
467 Wilders, “Preliminary Election Program PVV 2017-2021,” 2016.
468 Janene Pieters, “Turkey Upset over PM Rutte telling Turkish-Dutch to leave,” NLTimes, September 7, 2017.
http://nltimes.nl/2016/09/07/turkey-upset-pm-rutte-telling-turkish-dutch-leave
469 Adam Taylor, “Dutch PM tells immigrants ‘act normal or go away,’” Washington Post, January 23, 2017.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/01/23/dutch-pm-tells-immigrants-act-normal-or-
go-away/?utm_term=.c7e544d30b81
470 Toby Sterling, “Christian Democrat Buma  could be unexpected winner of Dutch vote,” March 15, 2017.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-election-buma-idUSKBN16L1OX.
121
new approach to immigration.471 While they did not explicitly attack Muslims, Rutte and
Buma made it clear that they intended to defend Dutch culture from immigrants who refused
to conform.  This rhetoric appears to have had its desired effect; as the campaign continued
the PVV consistently lost votes to the VVD and CDA. By the time of the election in March,
the VVD was again the most popular party, winning 33 seats in the election. The Party for
Freedom ran second with 20 seats and 13.1% of all votes, and the CDA third with 19 seats.472
Significantly, a new right-wing populist party, Forum for Democracy (FvD), emerged
following the 2017 Dutch elections, where it won two seats. FvD leader Thierry Baudet styles
himself as a defender of the West’s Judeo-Christian heritage.473 He is listed as a “friend” of
the International Centre for Western Values, an organisation which has the following
message written on its donations page: “Our commitment to Europe's Judeo-Christian
heritage, and our unwavering support for the State of Israel, complicates our fundraising
efforts on a highly secularized European continent that denies its spiritual roots and
increasingly questions Israel's right to exist.”474. This suggests that if Wilders and the Party
for Freedom should disappear from Dutch politics, the tradition to which they belong, which
began with Bolkestein – who appears to have popularised the idea of a Judeo-Christian
tradition in the Netherlands – will continue through Baudet and likely beyond him.
Despite his party’s difficulties in 2012, the period 2004-2017 must be regarded as a time of
remarkable success for Wilders, who transformed himself from a relatively unimportant VVD
parliamentarian into the most recognizable Dutch politician in the world. At the same time,
he took the Party for Freedom from nothing in 2005 into the third largest party in the
Netherlands by 2010, and by 2017 into the second largest party.
471 Peter Teffer, “Dutch election: Christian Democrat would bin Ukraine treaty” EU Observer, February 27,
2017. https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/137036.
472 “Daily Chart: Dutch Election Results,” The Economist, March 16, 2017.
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2017/03/16/dutch-election-results.
473 Journalist Sebastian Faber, profiling Baudet in an American magazine, describes him as “predictably”
invoking the “Judeo-Christian” tradition and linking it to Dutch culture. Sebastian Faber, “Is Dutch Bad Boy
Baudet the New Face of the European Alt-Right?” The Nation, April 5, 2018.
https://www.thenation.com/article/is-dutch-bad-boy-thierry-baudet-the-new-face-of-the-european-alt-right/. See
also Baudet speaking of the West needing Christian values, despite he himself not believing in the Christian
God. Paul van der Bas, “Thierry Baudet: Westerse wereld zit in identiteitcrisis, we hebben christelijke warden
nodig,” De Dageliijske Standard, February 15 2017. http://www.dagelijksestandaard.nl/2017/02/thierry-baudet-
westerse-wereld-zit-in-identiteitscrisis-we-hebben-christelijke-waarden-nodig/.
474 International Centre for Western Values, Donations Page. http://www.icwv.org/donate.html.
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Islam and Christianism in the Netherlands
Christianist politics is not new in the Netherlands, and can be traced back at least as far as the
early 1990s in the rhetoric of Bolkestein.475 It was prominent in the rhetoric of Pim Fortuyn,
but reached greater significance in the late 2000s during the rise of Wilders’ Party for
Freedom, and plays an important role in the rhetoric of Thierry Baudet.476 In other words,
Christianism is a part of anti-Muslim politics in the Netherlands, and plays an especially
important role in populist radical right discourse.  The variety of Christianism most
prominent in the Netherlands can be described as Christianist secularism – a secularist
posture combined with Christian identity.477 The Party for Freedom is the paradigm of a
Christianist secular populist radical right party, though Fortuyn’s and Baudet’s respective
parties’ may be similarly categorised. All were or are secularist, ostensibly liberal, pro-gay
and pro-women’s rights, supportive of freedom of expression, yet also hostile towards Islam,
and wedded to the idea of the West being a Christian or Judeo-Christian civilisation.478 The
popularity of the Party for Freedom alone demonstrates that a significant portion of the
electorate – at least 10% -- either approve or do not significantly disapprove of Christianist
secular rhetoric.479 This may appear to be a small number, but in the multi-party Dutch
political system it is large enough to give a party winning this level of support significant
parliamentary representation.480
475 See Hemel, “(Pro)claiming Tradition: The “Judeo-Christian” Roots of Dutch Society and the Rise of
Conservative Nationalism,” 2014.
476 See Sebastian Faber, “Is Dutch Bad Boy Baudet the New Face of the European Alt-Right?” 2018.  See also
Baudet speaking of the West needing Christian values, despite he himself not believing in the Christian God.
Paul van der Bas, “Thierry Baudet: Westerse wereld zit in identiteitcrisis, we hebben christelijke warden nodig,”
2017.
477 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.
478 ‘Ostensibly’ is the important term here. Populist radical right parties most often support restrictions on
religious expression, particularly on Muslim’s free expression of their faith. Despite their commitment to
freedom, these parties are illiberal. See Rogers Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the
European populist moment in comparative perspective,” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40:8, 1191-1226, 1210,
2017. DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700.
479 The Party for Freedom won 10.08% of the vote at the 2012 elections, its worst performance to date. See
Bengü Hosch-Dayican, Chintan Amrit, Kees Aarts, and Adrie Dassen, “How Do Online Citizens Persuade
Fellow Voters? Using Twitter During the 2012 Dutch Parliamentary Election Campaign,” 34(2), 135-152, 140,
2014. https://doi.org/10.1177/0894439314558200; it won 13.
480 For an explanation of the volatility of Dutch politics in the depillarised era, and of the difficulity any party
faces getting more then 40% of the overall vote, see Ruth Dassonneville, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and Philippe
Mongrain, “Forecasting Dutch elections: An initial model from the March 2017 legislative contests,” Research
and Politics, 4(3), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168017720023.
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Christianist secular rhetoric, then, has a powerful place in Dutch politics. While it may have
its origins in the early 1990s, the events of September 11 2001, solidified the importance of
Christianist secular rhetoric in Dutch political life, encouraging politicians to increasingly
describe their own society as Christian or Judeo-Christian and contrast it with the Islam of the
9/11 hijackers.481 The rise of Christianist secularism can thus be understood as a response to
the increasing visibility of Islam in the Netherlands, and to post-9/11 perceptions of Islam as
a threat to Dutch freedoms. It did not exist before large scale Muslim immigration to the
Netherlands, and did not have a powerful place within the country before 2001. The 2015
immigration crisis, in particular, appears to have increased the popularity of the Christianist
secular Party for Freedom, further suggesting that the linking of secularism to (Judeo-
)Christianity is related to the visibility of Islam within the Netherlands.
In the second half of the 20th century the Dutch largely cast aside their religious beliefs as
they dismantled the increasingly irrelevant pillar system. In its place came a new identity
based around secular liberal principles of tolerance and individualism. Secularism –the
privatisation of religious belief and the differentiation of religion from other spheres of
human activity – thus became an important element of Dutch culture. More than this,
secularism was presumed to be a condition of modernity, and the end point of a process of
modernisation that begins with an irrational and dangerous religious worldview and ends with
a rational secular worldview.482 Christianity remained embedded in Dutch culture, but was
safely secularised and de-sacrilised, and perhaps went almost unnoticed due to the post-
Holocaust lack of another major religious tradition within the Netherlands.483
The arrival of Muslim immigrants into secularised, de-pillarised Dutch society, however,
appears to have challenged the secularisation narrative and made some Dutch more cognizant
of the persistence of religion. Muslims have been perceived as refusing to become Dutch, and
481 The Term “Judeo-Christian” was used just 33 times between 1814 and 2000. Between 2000 and 2011,
however, the word was used on 143 occasions. See Hemel, “(Pro)claiming Tradition: The “Judeo-Christian”
Roots of Dutch Society and the Rise of Conservative Nationalism,” 91, 2014.
482 Berger, “The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview, 3-5, 1999.
483 Of the 156,000 Dutch Jews alive in 1941, only 50,000 survived the Holocaust and remained in the
Netherlands in 1945. See Evert Van Imhoff, Hannah Van Solinge, Bert Jan Flim, “A reconstruction of the size
and composition of Jewish Holocaust Survivors in the Netherlands, 1945,” Population Research and Policy







belonging to a “totalitarian” religion threatening the secular state and liberal Dutch society.484
Practicing Muslims, then, could not easily fit into Dutch culture, which was secular, liberal,
and often suspicious of public religion.
In the early 1990s right-wing Dutch politicians reacted to increasing Muslim immigration by
identifying the Netherlands as a Christian and secular society, incompatible with Islam.485
This was done perhaps in part because by identifying the Netherlands in this way it was
possible to exclude ‘threatening’ non-white Muslims from Dutch society.  But there is reason
to believe it was not merely a cynical co-opting of religion for political purposes, though even
if this were the case it would still indicate that religion retained a surprising power in the
Netherlands despite secularisation. Muslim difference has made, as Habermas points out,
secular European more aware of public religion.486 For the secular Dutch right, the arrival of
large numbers of Muslims in the Netherlands is considered as a threat to rational secular
society precisely because public religion is perceived as dangerous. Equally, Muslim
immigration appears threatening because it demonstrates the non-universality of Dutch
secularism, and the possibility that it is possible to live within a modernised society without
privatising religion. Muslim immigrants may have appeared easily secularised when
secularism was assumed to be an irresistible force privatising religion. When Muslims did not
privatise their beliefs – or were perceived to resist secularism – secularism began to appear
weak, and moreover a special feature of (Judeo-)Christian societies.
The presence of Muslims also demonstrated the hitherto unexamined Christianity embedded
in Dutch culture. Muslim difference, for example, increases awareness of the Christian
elements existing within secular Dutch culture, including the presence of Christian holidays,
the familiar presence of Churches in Dutch cities, and Christian schooling. Islamic schools,
holidays, and places of worship, on the other hand, are never secularised into Dutch culture,
but instead perceived as religion intruding into the secular sphere.487 The result is a growing
484 See Wilders’ attacks on  Islam for being a “totalitarian political ideology” hostile towards Dutch freedoms in
Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,” 2015.  See also Mark Rutte’s remarks in
2017 demanding “immigrants” either act “Dutch” or “go home” in Janene Pieters, “Turkey Upset over PM Rutte
telling Turkish-Dutch to leave,” NLTimes, September 7, 2017. http://nltimes.nl/2016/09/07/turkey-upset-pm-
rutte-telling-turkish-dutch-leave
485 Hemel, “(Pro)claiming Tradition: The “Judeo-Christian” Roots of Dutch Society and the Rise of
Conservative Nationalism,” 53, 2014.
486 Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society,” 20, 2008.
487 Hence Wilders’ and Baudet’s demand that only Islamic clothing be banned in public. See Faber, “Is Dutch
Bad Boy Baudet the New Face of the European Alt-Right?” 2018. The Party for Freedom calls for the banning
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perception that secularism is not a break from Christianity, but rather a continuation of
Christianity. This perception is reflected in the discourse of the Dutch populist radical right.
The Dutch right began to describe Muslims as a threat to ‘Christian’ yet ‘humanist’
civilisation in the early 1990s, though apart from Bolkestein and VVD-era Wilders, centre-
right politicians have not explicitly attacked Muslims or described them as inherently
incompatible with Dutch (Judeo-)Christian culture.488 In the post 9/11 period, however, the
populist radical right, from Fortuyn to Wilders and Baudet, demanded the cessation of
Muslim immigration on the grounds that Islamisation threatens the future of Dutch ‘Judeo-
Christian’ culture.489
In the reactionary world of populist radical right politics, the nativism of the Party for
Freedom is shaped to a significant degree by their perceived ‘enemies.’ If Muslims are the
enemy, ‘the people’ must be Christian and secular. Positive elements of Dutch political
culture – democracy, freedom of expression, separation of Church and state – are framed as
creations of Christian and humanist culture, and claimed to be antithetical to Islam. Yet this
framing is made possible only by a wider Dutch re-conceptualising of Dutch culture as
Christian or Judeo-Christian in the face of Muslim immigration.
The development of Christianism in the Netherlands, and its adoption by the populist radical
right, is thus connected to immigration of Muslims to the Netherlands, and to the greater
visibility of public religion after the September 11, 2001 Islamist terror attacks on the United
States. The secularisation of the Netherlands and subsequent dissolving of the pillar system of
managing religious difference – which was not needed in an environment in which religion
was privatised – left religion largely outside of the public sphere. Christianity did not
disappear entirely from the public sphere, but was instead secularised into Dutch and/or
Western ‘culture.’ When Muslims entered this environment, first as guest workers and later
of Mosque construction, see Geert Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,” 2015;
Peter Teffer, “Dutch election: Christian Democrat would bin Ukraine treaty” EU Observer, February 27, 2017.
https://euobserver.com/beyond-brussels/137036. https://www.geertwilders.nl/index.php/94-english/1937-
speech-geert-wilders-bornholm-denmark-june-13-2015.
488 See Sybrand Buma’s remarks on Islam providing no “cultural enrichment” in Toby Sterling, “Christian
Democrat Buma  could be unexpected winner of Dutch vote,” March 15, 2017.
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-netherlands-election-buma-idUSKBN16L1OX.  See also Rutte’s attacks on
Turkish-Dutch in Adam Taylor, “Dutch PM tells immigrants ‘act normal or go away,’” Washington Post,
January 23, 2017; https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/01/23/dutch-pm-tells-
immigrants-act-normal-or-go-away/?utm_term=.c7e544d30b81
489 See Kluveld, “Secular, Superior, and Desperately Search for its Soul: The Confusing Political-Cultural
References to a Judeo-Christian Europe in the Twenty-First Century, 250-251, 2016; Faber, “Is Dutch Bad Boy
Baudet the New Face of the European Alt-Right?” 2018.
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as permanent migrants, their resistance to secularisation and increasing identification as
‘Muslim’ was sometimes perceived by secular Dutch as a challenge to secular differentiation
of religion from politics. While a church, or a Christian religious holiday, or even a crucifix,
might be understood a part or a symbol of Dutch ‘culture,’ a mosque, an item of Islamic
dress, or an Islamic holiday, was often perceived to be an unwelcome religious intrusion into
secular public space.490 As a result, Muslim difference highlighted the otherwise unexamined
Christianity embedded within Dutch culture, making some Dutch identify as Christian when
faced with Islam. This Christianity, however, is little more than an identity, and has no
religious content but is best understood as Christianist secularism – a type of nativism based
on a religio-civilisational classification of people. Christianist secularism, then, is a
reconceptualising of secularism as a product of Christianity, rather than a break from
Christianity.
The Party for Freedom have enjoyed electoral success while seizing upon this wider re-
conceptualising of secularism as ‘Christian,’ and of Dutch culture as Christian and secular,
and use Christianist secularist rhetoric to justify the exclusion of Muslims from Dutch
society.491 My examination of the rise of Christianism in the Netherlands in this chapter,
particularly within the context of the establishment and growth of the Party for Freedom,
suggests that Dutch people’s encounter with Islam in the Netherlands has (1) revealed the
non-universal nature of Dutch secularism, and (2) demonstrated the secularisation of
Christianity into Dutch ‘culture.’ Recognition that Christianity has been secularised into
‘culture’ has allowed for secular Dutch to identify themselves – and their nation and
ultimately Western civilisation – as Christian or Judeo-Christian. It has thus created
Christianist secularism, a type of Christian identitarian politics which perceives contemporary
European culture to be ‘Christianity secularised.’ The Party for Freedom – among other
populist parties in the Netherlands – have embraced Christianist secularism, which they use
to define Dutch identities in religio-civilisational terms, i.e. as (Judeo-)Christian. In doing so,
they are able to exclude Muslims from their society, on the grounds that Islam is an alien
490 Baudet’s FwD “has proposed a “Law in Defense of Dutch Values” that, among other things, would prohibit
arranged marriages, demand that the Holocaust be taught in all schools, and ban any face-covering garments,
including balaclavas and niqabs, from public spaces.” Faber, “Is Dutch Bad Boy Baudet the New Face of the
European Alt-Right?” 2018. The Party for Freedom calls for the banning of Mosque construction, see Geert
Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,” 2015; Brubaker, “A new ‘Christianist’
secularism in Europe,” 2016.
491 The Party for Freedom’s share of the vote increased three per cent between 2012 and 2017. However, the
emergence of Baudet no doubt took votes for the PVV, as did the increasingly nativist rhetoric of Rutte and
Buma during the 2017 election campaign period.
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religion which – unlike Christianity and possibly Judaism – has not and cannot be secularised
into ‘culture.’ The following chapter examines the discourse of the Party for Freedom in
2012-2017 in order to test this hypothesis.
Chapter five: Discourse Analysis of the Party for Freedom 2012-2017
In the previous chapter I argued that the Party for Freedom uses religion in its discourse to
differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ because it has embraced a form of Christian
identitarianism I have labelled (following Brubaker) Christianist secularism. Christianist
secularism, I argued, is a reaction to Muslim immigration to and the higher visibility of Islam
in the Netherlands. The presence of Islam, I contended, has made secular Europeans more
aware of public religion, and cognizant of the particular – and especially Christian – nature of
their own secular culture. It has thus highlighted the manner in which Christianity has been
secularised into culture, demonstrating cultural continuity between Europe’s religious past
and its secular present which may not have been as obvious before the arrival of Muslims.
The resulting recognition of the Christianity embedded in secular European culture has
allowed the Party for Freedom to wield Christian identity – a civilisation-based identity
which can be incorporated within the party’s nativism – as a weapon against the minority
Dutch Muslim populism.
In this chapter I test this hypothesis by examining the Party for Freedom’s use of religious
discourse between 2012 and 2017. This period is significant, because it falls between an
initial low point for the party – the 2012 elections – in which it lost most of its seats in Dutch
parliament as well as its place as part of a ruling coalition, and a new high in 2015-2016,
when the party began to top opinion polling in the wake of growing concern over the
immigration ‘crisis.’ This period of resurgence did not last, however, and the party found
itself losing support in the lead-up to the March 15 2017 election, ultimately coming second
with 20 seats to the VVD’s 33 seats.492 Despite the party’s failure to maintain the support it
held in 2015-2016 in the election of 2017, the period between 2012 - 2017 marked a
resurgence for the Party for Freedom after the disappointment of the 2012 election results.
Though the Party for Freedom finished a distant second in the 2017 election, ongoing
492 “Daily Chart: Dutch Election Results,” The Economist, March 16, 2017.
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2017/03/16/dutch-election-results.
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concern about Muslim immigration appears likely to keep populist radical right movements –
and Christianist secular discourse – relevant in the Netherlands for the foreseeable future.
In order to understand the meaning and purpose of the Party for Freedom’s use of religion in
their discourse, this chapter analyses its leader’s – Geert Wilders – discourse at three
important junctures: at during the 2012 election campaign, at the height of the 2015 refugee
crisis, and during the 2017 election campaign. Using Fairclough’s Critical Discourse
Analysis I analyse the discourse of the Party for Freedom.493 In this chapter, I apply CDA
techniques to three texts produced by Geert Wilders, and by examining his language attempt
to understand the underlying messages, purposes, and ideology of the texts, as well as
understand the political and social practices to which they are related. This chapter consists of
two elements. First, a Critical Discourse Analysis of three texts written by Geert Wilders, one
during the 2012 election campaign, one during the 2015 immigration crisis, and another
during the 2017 election campaign. Following this is a discussion of the data produced by the
CDA, in which my hypothesis is tested against the findings produced by the CDA and my
discussion of its results.
Party for Freedom Discourse during the 2012 Election Campaign
In this first section of the chapter I analyse Party for Freedom’s use of religion in their
discourse in the election year of 2012. I have selected for analysis a speech Wilders gave, in
English and later published on his personal website, at the Colorado Christian University on
June 30, 2012. To understand the meaning of this speech and Wilders’ use of religion, I use
techniques derived from Fairclough’s CDA. The purpose of this is to understand the
relationship between the text and the social practices and ideologies by which it was
produced and which it in turn may produce. Following Fairclough’s conventions, I examine
the medium through which Wilders delivers the text, the time, place, and intended
audience(s) of the text, analyse the language, and finally examine the ideologies to which the
text belongs and to which it may contribute. In particular, the CDA tries to uncover the
underlying messages in Wilders’ discourse. To do this I seek answers in selected texts
produced by Wilders to the following questions: (1) does the discourse display the key
493 See Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992; Norman Fairlough
and Ruth Wodak, “Critical Discourse Analysis” in T.A. Van Dijk (ed.) Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary
Introduction, vol. 2, London: Sage, 1997.
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elements of Christianist secularism: “identitarian Christianism, a secularist posture, a
philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and
freedom of speech?”494 (2)  How is Islam constructed in the discourse? (3) How is Christian
identity used to exclude Muslims from European society? The CDA thus pays special
attention to the manner in which conceptions such as “the people,’ ‘Islam,’ and ‘Judeo-
Christianity,’ are constructed in the texts, how they are used to create an exclusive nationalist
identity, and their role within the party’s nativist ideology. The language of the texts are
analysed, and word frequency of key terms relating to Islam and Christianity are noted, as are
terms related to ingroup and outgroup formation i.e. ‘our,’ ‘they,’ ‘we,’ etc...  More frequent
use of ‘Islam’ and ‘Christianity,’ especially in conjunction with terms used to create ingroups
and outgroups, will indicate the degree to which Wilders relies on religious identity to aid in
ingroup and outgroup formation.
The medium chosen by Wilders is a speech to a particular conservative American audience at
Western Conservative Summit; the speech was later transcribed and published on Wilders’
personal website. The speech was given during the lead-up to an election, and should
therefore be considered part of his 2012 election campaign. The address appears to be aimed
at two different audiences. He addresses a conservative American audience with whom he
claims to share a Christian based worldview. Equally, his remarks cannot be understood apart
from the coming Dutch elections, and therefore Wilders’ speech must considered to be aimed
at a domestic audience.
Summary of Wilders’ speech at the Western Conservative Summit, Denver, USA, 2012495
Opening remarks: (paragraphs 1-5.) Wilders thanks the summit organisers for inviting him.
Expresses sympathy for those affected by nearby wildfires. Praises city of Denver, especially
its Christian University and ‘Centennial Institute’ “with its motto ‘Faith, family and
freedom’.496 Your motto shows that you have your priorities right. Faith, family and freedom
are the pillars of our Judeo-Christian civilization and need to be defended.”497 Wilders also
494 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.






introduces his major theme: “the situation in Europe and in particular in my own country, the
Netherlands.”498
Wilders tells the audience of the effect of Islam on his life: (paragraphs 6-13) “For the past
eight years I have been living under 24 hour police protection;” “I have been marked for
death for criticizing Islam; ” “My views, in a nutshell, are that Islam, rather than a religion, is
predominantly a totalitarian ideology striving for world dominance. I believe that Islam and
freedom are incompatible.”499
Explaining the dangers of Islam: (paragraphs 14-24) “There are many moderate
Muslims, but there is no such thing as a moderate Islam. There is only one Islam and it is a
dangerous ideology. It is intolerant, it is violent. It should not be tolerated, but should be
contained.” “During the past three decades, Europe made a fatal mistake. It allowed millions
of people from Islamic countries to immigrate into Europe. So many people rooted in a
culture entirely different from our own Judeo-Christian and humanist tradition have entered
Europe that our heritage, our freedoms, our prosperity and our culture are in danger.”
Warning Americans against allowing Muslims to settle in the United States:
(paragraphs 25-40) “many Americans see immigration as something which is inherently good
for a country, since it contributed so much to the United States. But while most of the former
immigrants to the United States came from Europe, a continent with the same Judeo-
Christian roots as America, Europe's contemporary immigrants do not share our common
roots. On the contrary, the Islamization of our society is undermining our Western Judeo-
Christian values.” “Islam is also coming for America. Indeed, it has already arrived. Your
country, too, is facing a stealth jihad.”500
Wilders’ plan to protect the West from Islam: (paragraphs 40-67)
“Defend the right to speak what we see as the truth;” “end cultural relativism. “...our Judeo-





process;” “take pride in our nations again;” “We will not submit to Islam. Never. We will
survive with our own Judeo-Christian heritage”; “the truth will set us free.”501
Language analysis
Wilders’ purpose in this speech is to convince his audience that Islam poses a threat to
Western civilisation, and that to combat Islam his audience must “end cultural relativism”
and proclaim the superiority of “Judeo-Christian values.” The language Wilders uses reflects
the distinction he makes between Islam, which is constructed as a tyrannical political force,
and the “Judeo-Christian” West, which is constructed as a free society. Key terms “Judeo-
Christian” and “freedom” appear six times each, always as a reference to the culture of the
West. In contrast, Islam is defined as a “totalitarian ideology” pretending to be a religion, and
a “threat” to the culture, heritage, and values of the West. Muslims are ‘othered’ throughout
the speech, and described as not belonging to “our nations,” (mentioned twice), “our
civilisation,” (twice) and “our culture” (twice). This “our” or alternatively this “we” (used 56
times) is described in religious terms, explicitly in “our Judeo-Christian values” and our
“Judeo-Christian civilisation,” but otherwise implicitly. “We” belong to Judeo-Christian and
Humanist civilisation, which is “ours.” “We” are free, peaceful. “They,” on the other hand,
are Islamic, unfree, and “violent,” and bent on “our” destruction.
Wilders’ text is a powerful example of Christianist secular discourse.  His Christian
identitarianism appears early in the text, as he claims he and his audience belong to a “Judeo-
Christian” civilisation in need of “defending.”502 This Judeo-Christianity is invoked not as a
system of ethics, a form of worship and religious practice, or a type of spiritual feeling.
Rather, it is invoked as an identity and as the ultimate source of the West’s culture and
values, and furthermore used as a description of the people who ought to inhabit Western
states. In other words, the term is used to describe “us” and in doing so to exclude “them.”
Wilders’ biblical reference “the truth will set us free” is a rare example – perhaps
understandable given he is addressing a primarily Christian audience – of the Party for
Freedom leader quoting (or almost quoting) from the Bible. It is, however, an exception
which proves the rule, perhaps, that Wilders’ rarely makes any statements based on
references to the Bible in his rhetoric. This statement, while certainly biblical, is used here in




The text is unusual insofar as Wilders mentions the importance of “faith.”503 Religious faith
is not often mentioned in a positive manner by populist radical right parties. Wilders,
however, does not explain why faith is good, or even what he means by the term, and does
not mention it again in the speech. The text is secular, insofar as it speaks of “Judeo-
Christian” values, but not Jewish or Christian ethics, theology, or morality. The Bible is
absent from the text, despite Wilders’ praise for “faith.” Moreover, Western civilisation is
described as partly “humanist,” indicating that Wilders believes the West cannot be defined
by religion alone.504 Humanist is not defined in the text, and may be a term referring to post-
Christian atheist/agnostic Westerners.
At the same time, Wilders and his party’s philo-Semitism appears through his inclusion of
Judaism and Jewish people within the bounds of Western civilisation. The problematic nature
of this claim – especially in light of the Holocaust – is not examined in this text. Nor is the
manner in which Judaism or the Hebrew Bible has contributed to Western culture discussed.
The Judeo in ‘Judeo-Christianity’ is not defined in the text, but should not be understood as
being entirely cynical in nature, and an attempt to win Jewish votes. Wilders’ affection for
Israel appears sincere, and may be in part the result of the time he spent in the country during
the 1980s. Therefore the Judeo part of his ‘Judeo-Christian and Humanist’ category, while
absent of religious meaning, is not entirely empty. Its use indicates that Wilders believes
Jewish people are Western and secular, and therefore welcome inside ‘Judeo-Christian and
Humanist’ civilisation.
Homosexuality and womens’ rights are not discussed in this text, perhaps because some in
his conservative Christian audience might object to Wilders liberal stance on sexual morality
and support for women’s rights. Wilders’ major theme, however, is the need to defend
“freedom” from the forces of Islam.505 He claims to be a victim of Islam and the unfreedom it
spreads wherever it goes, and therefore urges his audience to not make the same “mistake”
the Dutch made by allowing Muslims to immigrate and then suffering a loss of freedom as a
result.506
Islam is constructed in the text as a “totalitarian” political ideology, not at religion, bent on






the ultimate antagonist, and a source of violence and fanaticism. Muslims who do not act
violently are described as not following the true teachings of Islam, which are never moderate
but extreme. The identity of the West is described, on the other hand, as “Judeo-Christian and
Humanist,” and linked to “freedom.” Judeo-Christianity and Humanist is not defined, but
appears to be constructed as a kind of mirror image of Islam, and therefore invoked in order
to exclude Muslims from the West. It is, as Kluveld has remarked, a vague and changeable
term without any connection to religious faith or Christian ideals. It is at best a stand in for
whatever Wilders is claiming Western culture to be: democratic, free, secular – or something
else entirely should the need arise.507 Confronted by Islam, Wilders merges Judeo-
Christianity and Humanism – three concepts which may at times be opposed to one another –
into a single cultural tradition. This cultural tradition, according to the text, is the basis for the
free, prosperous and peaceful culture of the West. Therefore in order to protect Western
civilisation from “totalitarian” Islam, the West must, according to Wilders, recognise the
“superior” nature of Judeo-Christian values, and defend them from Islamisation.
Ideological and Social Context
Wilders’ use of religion in this text can be understood within the context of populist radical
right discourse in the Netherlands,508 and in particular as an example of the Christianist
secular rhetoric used by a number of populist radical right parties both within the Netherlands
and across Western Europe.509 A central concern of the Party for Freedom and other populist
radical right parties is the growth of Islam in the West, which they seek to combat by
demanding the cessation of Muslim immigration. Much of the Party for Freedom’s use of
religion in their discourse, then, is concerned with Islam and the alleged dangers it poses to
Western society. The discourse of the Party for Freedom should thus be understood within
the context of the growth of Islam in Europe, and the manner in which it has altered European
self-conception. The discourse of the Party for Freedom should be understood as reacting to
507 Kluveld, “Secular, Superior, and Desperately Search for its Soul: The Confusing Political-Cultural
References to a Judeo-Christian Europe in the Twenty-First Century, 241, 2016.
508 Wilders’ comments may also be understood within an American context. Wilders is of course speaking to an
American audience consisting mostly of religious (Christian) conservatives, in a post-9/11 (yet pre-Trump)
environment in which demonization of Muslims was common. Many in his audience would have applauded his
anti-Islam rhetoric and Christian identitarianism. Wilders’ popularity among conservatives in the United States
in 2012 is interesting, and suggests that identitarian populism was already – well before the election of Donald
Trump – gathering support inside conservatives circles. Much could be said on this subject; this thesis, however,
is on the Western European political situation, and will therefore not comment further on the immediate
American context of Wilders’ speech.
509 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017; Marzouki and McDonnell, “Populism and Religion,” 1-2, 2016.
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and being shaped by events – the increasing presence and visibility of Islam in the
Netherlands – but as also trying to re-shape public discourse and conceptions of Dutch
national identity.
The presence and visibility of Islam in the Netherlands immigrants has made secular Dutch
more aware of public religion, and Muslim difference and religiosity has made them
cognizant of the secularised Christianity within their contemporary culture. In this
environment, it is possible for xenophobic parties such as the Party for Freedom to exploit
cognizance of secularised Christianity existing within Dutch culture, and weaponise it, using
it as a tool to exclude non-Christians – particularly Muslims – from Dutch society. Wilders’
text reflects this recognition of Christianity’s secularisation into Western culture. He makes
no reference to religion beyond a brief and vague reference to the importance of “faith,” yet
describes Western culture as being based upon Jewish, Christian, and Humanist principles.510
While he tempers his Christianist secularism before his American audience, leaving out
references to his pro-gay politics and praising “faith,” Wilders’ message remains entirely
secular. His description of Western civilisation and its values as “Judeo-Christian and
Humanist,” while not entirely contradictory, appears designed to highlight the secularised
elements of Judaism and Christianity within Western secular culture, and to show the
continuity between secular humanism and Christianity.511 In doing this, Wilders’ attempts to
capitalise on the religionising effect the presence of Islam has on Western society, and the
manner in which Muslim immigration has increased cognizance of the historical role
Christianity and Judaism played in shaping Western identity and culture.
Wilders claims Western “freedom” and “prosperity” comes from the Judeo-Christian
tradition.512 He capitalises on Western fears of Islam by placing Muslims outside of “our”
Judeo-Christian and Humanist tradition, and linking the relative poverty and unfreedom of
many Muslim majority nations with Islamic culture, suggesting that Muslim immigrants will
destroy Western freedom and wealth. Wilders’ ability to connect the secular culture of the
contemporary Western world which is made possible by the change in self-perception inside
secularised Western countries that has occurred due to Muslim immigration. Wilders’
rhetoric in this text capitalises on this change and tries to create a new Western civilisational
identity, based on a combination of Judaism, Christianity, and secular humanism. This




‘civilisation’ is constructed as a mirror image of Wilders’ conception of Islam – backward,
anti-humanistic, unfree, and violent. These conceptions of Islam on the one hand, and the
Judeo-Christian and Humanist West on the other, are inculcated in the Party for Freedom’s
nativism, which in this text Wilders expresses by praising the nation-state, but defines
Western states’ national cultures – and by extension the Western ‘ingroup’ – as Judeo-
Christian. Thus we see an absence of racialist language in Wilders’ speech, but an abundance
of religio-civilisationalist rhetoric designed to re-shape Western identity and thereby exclude
Muslims from living within Western states.
The Party for Freedom’s use of religion in its discourse in 2015
Two-thousand and fifteen was a significant year in the Netherlands, and indeed in Europe,
due to the record number of people – mostly Syrian and Iraqi Muslims – seeking asylum in
Europe. More than one million people sought refuge in Europe, with around 890,000 settling
in Germany in 2015 alone.513 The Netherlands, in contrast, accepted just over 2000 refugees
in the 2015-2017 period.514
As the number of people seeking asylum in Europe increased, so did the sense of crisis.
Perhaps due to this growing sense of crisis, and the perception among some Europeans that
their governments were unable or unwilling to stop the flow of people coming to Europe,
right-wing populists across Europe seized the initiative and campaigned heavily and often
successfully against centrist parties who, they argued, had failed ‘the people’ and allowed
Muslim immigrants to threaten European identity and culture.515
Unsurprisingly, much of Geert Wilders rhetoric in 2015 revolved around the immigration
‘crisis’ facing Europe and the Netherlands. To understand the Party for Freedom’s response
to this crisis, I analyse a text produced by Wilders during the height of the crisis, and in
which he elaborates at length on his conception of Western religious identity and the danger
513 “Refugee numbers in Germany dropped dramatically in 2017,” DW, January 16, 2018.
https://www.dw.com/en/refugee-numbers-in-germany-dropped-dramatically-in-2017/a-42162223.
514 The Netherlands agreed to take 7000 refugees, but only settled 2100 by mid-2017. See Refugees in the
Netherlands, Government of Netherlands website, https://www.government.nl/topics/asylum-policy/refugees-in-
the-netherlands.; “The Netherlands has accepted 2100 refugees under EU quota scheme,” Dutch News, July 27,
2017. https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2017/07/the-netherlands-has-accepted-2100-refugees-under-eu-quota-
scheme/.
515 See Norris, “It’s not just Trump: Authoritarian populism is rising across the West. Here’s why,” 2016.
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posed to the West by Muslim migrants. The speech, while it does not deviate from Wilders’
and the Party for Freedom’s typical anti-Muslim, Judeo-Christian identitarianism, has been
chosen for analysis because in it Wilders speaks – in untranslated English – longer and more
extensively than usual on his and his party’s conception of Western culture and identity and
its relationship with Judaism and Christianity. The speech therefore provides rich information
about Wilders’ and thus the Party for Freedom’s discursive use of religion.
In a dramatic address before a Free Speech Organisation in Bornholm, Denmark,516 Wilders
elaborated on his opposition to Islam, but also on the religious underpinnings of
contemporary Western culture and identity.517 The speech is addressed to multiple audiences.
His initial audience was attendees associated with the Free Speech Organisation. Wilders
decision to speak before a free speech organisation in Denmark may have meant speaking in
front of a friendly audience, who may have perceived Wilders as a courageous figure whose
right to express himself had been unfairly curtailed in his home country. Equally, because the
speech was later published on his personal website the audience for the speech extended
beyond the initial hearers, and toward Wilders’ supporters in the Netherlands and across the
world.
Summary of Wilders’ speech to the Free Speech Society, Bornholm, Denmark.
Opening remarks: (Paragraphs 1-5) Wilders thanks the organisation for inviting him, praises
Denmark, and the Free Speech Society, remarking that “the Danish Free Press Society is one
of the most courageous organizations in the world.”518
516 To interpret this text I turn again to Fairlough’s discourse analysis, examining the time, place, and intended
audience(s) of the text, the key words and phrases used therein, and the primary message(s) the text, and their
relationship with emerging post-secular discourse and practice in the Netherlands. I will do this for all
subsequent section examining the rhetoric and policies of the Party for Freedom.
517 Geert Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,” 2015.
518 Ibid.
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Wilders discusses the attack on the First Annual Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest in
Garland, Texas: (paragraphs 5-8) “, the Garland event was attacked by two jihadis from
Islamic State.” “We have been born in free Western nations. Freedom is our birthright. And
those who want to deny it to us do not belong in our society.”519 “Next week, I will show the
Garland cartoons on Dutch state television in the broadcasting time allotted to my party ...we
have to show them that we will not be intimidated ...we will never submit ...we will always
remain the free people we are.”520
Wilders proposes to fight Islam’s attack on free speech by attacking Muslims’ right to
free expression: (paragraphs 6-34) “there are people ...who will say to me: "You are an
advocate of free speech, and yet you want to ban the Koran and close down mosques and
Islamic schools. Isn't that a contradiction?" I tell you: It is not.”521 “Islam is a totalitarian
ideology aimed at establishing tyrannical power over non-Muslims.”522 “West has a concrete
identity. Our identity is not Islamic but based on Judaism, Christianity and humanism. Our
freedoms result from this identity. By depriving Islam of the means to destroy our identity,
we are not violating freedom; we are preserving our identity and guaranteeing freedom.”523
“The terrible situation we are in today is caused by our tolerance of evil.” “...our Western
leaders today are making the same mistake that the European leaders made in the 1930s.
They are appeasing Islam and refuse to see it for what it really is: dangerous and evil.”524
Wilders describes his programme for ‘saving’ Europe from Islamic rule: (paragraphs
35-56) “Let us stop bowing to Islam! No appeasement of Islam anymore!”525 “A choice has
to be made ...between Islam and freedom.”526 “...one million immigrants, mostly Islamic, are
waiting in North Africa to cross into Europe. If we do not stop them, we will be facing a










...Do not think that this will not affect the world in which future generations will be living;”
“If Christianity or Buddhism were to become dominant in the world, there would hardly be a
problem for freedom of speech. But when Islam becomes the major force, it is going to be
hell for everyone;”  “...churches and Christian schools will be closed down by Islam and
women and homosexuals will be treated badly;" “We are at war and we should win it.”527
Language Analysis
The theme of Wilders’ speech is the importance of defending freedom of expression from
Islam. Yet Wilders is clear that he does not defend universal freedom, but would curtail the
freedom of Muslims to practice their religion on the grounds that the spread of Islam itself
threatens freedom of expression. He further claims that Islam is ideologically opposed to
freedom, that the freedoms of the West are the product of the Judeo-Christian tradition, and
that therefore Muslim migrants to Europe undermine the Judeo-Christian basis of European
culture and politics and threaten its freedoms. Because ‘freedom’ (used 31 times in the
speech), is for Wilders a product of the Jewish, Christian, and Humanist tradition, it is
frequently referred to as “ours” (seven times). Wilders thus implies that “Islam” (mentioned
20 times) is naturally opposed to freedom.
At the same time he draws a sharp line between Muslims and westerners, ‘othering’ Muslims
in an attempt to convince his audience that they should be excluded from Western societies.
“We” (used 62 times), according to Wilders, in the West love freedom, which is a part of our
Jewish, Christian, and Humanist “identity” (used 5 times), but Islam threatens this identity
and therefore the freedoms which stem from it. He gives his audience the impression he and
the non-Muslim population of Europe find themselves at the mercy of a large and implacable
foe, a notion belied by the fact that Muslims make up just 6% of the Dutch population.528 Yet
Wilders,’ in somewhat hyperbolic language, describes Islam as an “evil” force which will by
“2070” become larger than Christianity, and which will inevitably affect the freedoms
enjoyed by Westerners. Islam is further described as a monolithic force, containing not only




role in forcing all Europe to submit to “Sharia” (used 8 times) law.529 Thus Wilders declares
that the West must “defend” its culture and freedoms, and “resist” Islam and its attempt to
“enslave” Europe.530
Wilders’ Christianist secularism is displayed throughout his address. His Christian
identitarianism in this text is absent of religious content. Furthermore, his concept of Judeo-
Christianity is not clearly defined, but is used to define the ‘identity’ of the West, and
described as the origin of Western freedoms. It does not, therefore, refer to anything
pertaining to Jewish or Christian theology, ethics, or spirituality. Equally, while portraying
himself as a defender of “Judeo-Christian” values such as “freedom,” he announces an
illiberal plan to deny Muslims the right to express their faith and ideas.531 In this way Wilders
is able to define himself as a defender of liberalism, while simultaneously proscribing
Muslims’ right to freedom. He further casts himself as a defender of freedom by describing
the oppression of women and homosexuals, Christians and Jews which will allegedly occur if
Europe does not forbid Muslims from migrating to and Islamising Europe. He does this
rhetorically by referring to himself and his audience as part of the Western ‘ingroup’, and by
defining the West as a freedom loving civilisation based upon Judeo-Christian and Humanist
values. “We” are Western, and therefore “freedom is our birthright,” according to Wilders.
Muslims are Wilders’ ‘outgroup.’ “They” despise freedom and therefore do not belong in the
West.
Islam is constructed throughout the text as a form of slavery, but also as a Nazi like force
bent on invading Europe.532 Proof of Islam’s inimical attitude towards freedom is presented
in the text in the example of the violence directed at organisers and participants in the First
Annual Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest in Garland, Texas, on May 3, 2015. Wilders
frames the attack on the event by two American Muslims in a simple manner befitting his
hostility to Islam, and as an example of Islam’s inherent intolerance of freedom of
expression. The potential for a political motive behind the attack is ignored by Wilders, who
ascribes the violence committed by just two American Muslims entirely to the religion of




532 Perhaps Wilders’ is playing on the term ‘Islam’ meaning something like ‘submission.’ This concept of
submitting to God is not merely Islamic, however. St. Paul describes himself as a slave or servant of Christ in
Philippians 1:1.
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The Garland incident is further framed as a small taste of what is to come if European
politicians allow Syrians, Iraqis, and other North African and Middle Eastern people to
migrate to Europe in large numbers. The ‘immigration crisis,’ which Wilders describes as
involving one million mostly Muslim people waiting in North Africa for an opportunity to
migrate to Europe, is thus framed as a catastrophe for freedom loving peoples, who will be
overwhelmed by “evil” Muslims who will destroy freedom of expression and enslave the
continent under the banner of Islam.533 In his quest to defend Judeo-Christian freedoms from
Islam, Wilders compares himself to Winston Churchill defending Britain from Nazi
Germany, and Abraham Lincoln fighting the rebellious, slave owning American South.534
Religion, in the form of Judeo-Christian and Humanist identity, is used to ‘other’ Muslims
throughout the text. While Judeo-Christian and Humanist is a remarkably empty term, it is
clear that it refers to the ingroup, or “us.” Jews, Christians, women, homosexuals, and secular
humanists, are “us.” Muslims are constructed as the one group outside of this ingroup. In this
way, Wilders’ construction of Islam cannot be understood apart from his construction of
Judeo-Christianity; both exist as mirror images of each other. The former contains everything
Wilders considers negative (religiosity, conservative sexual mores, authoritarianism,
totalitarianism) while the latter contains that which Wilders approves (freedom, European
culture). The emptiness of ‘Judeo-Christianity’ is reflected in Wilders’ remark that it would
not matter if Buddhists ruled the world, because they – like Christians – love freedom.535 Far
from claiming freedom to be purely Western and Christian in origin, Wilders falsely claims
freedom to be common across humanity and lacking only in Muslim dominated
environments.
Ideological and Social Context
The text must be understood in the context of the political and social events occurring during
the period in which it was written, and in particular in relation to the growing immigration
‘crisis’ of 2015. The text can thus be read as a response to the growing number of mostly
Muslim peoples arriving in Europe after fleeing violence in Syria, Iraq, and other parts of the
Middle East and North Africa. Disquiet in the Netherlands and across Europe over the
potential negative consequences of the unprecedented migration of Muslims to Europe grew




across 2015, with the popularity of populist radical right movements which opposed granting
Muslims asylum in Europe growing as a result.536 In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders was
among the most strident voices demanding that no Muslim be granted asylum in the
country.537 His 2015 speech may thus be understood as providing justification for this stance,
and using the Garland incident as an example of the consequences of allowing Muslims to
immigrate to a Western country.
Wilders’ opposition to European Union and Dutch government plans to allow Muslim
refugees to find asylum in a variety of European nations, on the grounds that Islam threatens
Judeo-Christian and Humanist freedoms, appears to have proven successful. The Party for
Freedom performed poorly in senate and provincial elections held in March 2015, receiving a
slightly smaller share of the vote than in the previous elections held in 2011.538 The party’s
fortunes changed in August-September 2015.539 Polling suggests that between September
2015 and February 2017 the Party for Freedom was either the most widely supported party in
the Netherlands, or the second most supported party. The Party for Freedom’s growth in
popularity thus occurred during the high point of the immigration crisis, during which the
party strongly opposed – unlike the mainstream Dutch political parties – allowing Muslim
asylum seekers refuge in the Netherlands. It cannot be conclusively proven that Dutch voters
supported the party in greater numbers due to their anti-immigration stance. However, given
the explosion in popularity of right-wing populist parties across Europe which occurred
during this time, and the explicitly anti-immigration and anti-Muslim rhetoric used by these
parties, it is difficult to believe that the Party for Freedom’s opposition to allowing Muslims
536 See Norris, “It’s not just Trump. Authoritarian populism is rising across the West. Here’s why,” 2016; Jasper
Muis and Tim Immerzeel, “Causes and consequences of the rise of populist radical right parties and movements
in Europe,” Current Sociology, 65(6), 2017. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392117717294.
537 See Wilders’ comments on the wisdom of adopting Australia’s policies towards unlawful immigration in
order to stop “Islamization”  in Geert Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders for US congressmen, Washington
D.C.Conservative Opportunity Society, 29 April, 2015. https://www.pvv.nl/36-fj-related/geert-wilders/8324-
speech-geert-wilders-for-us-congressmen-washington-dc-conservative-opportunity-society-29-april-2015.html.
538“Dutch political landscape never more divided, election results show,” Dutch News, March 19, 2015.
http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2015/03/dutch-political-landscape-never-more-divided-election-results-
show/.
539 The Peil poll graphic illuminates the sharp rise in the Party for Freedom’s electoral fortunes in the second
half of 2015, which – despite peaks and troughs – continued until the 2017 elections. See the graphical
illustration of Peil polls archived at https://home.noties.nl/peil/politieke-voorkeur. A clearer image of the party’s
rise in the second half of 2017, using Peil and other polling services, can be found here:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_Dutch_general_election,_2017.
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to find refuge in the Netherlands did not play a role in their increasing popularity during
2015.540
In understanding the success of the party’s opposition to Muslim immigration, it is important
to examine Wilders’ use of the term ‘freedom.’ If Muslims are to be excluded on the grounds
that their presence is likely to prove injurious to freedom, it is vital that we understand what
is meant by this term. For Wilders, as for other populist radical right parties in Western
Europe,’ European “Judeo-Christian” freedoms cannot survive the mass immigration of
Muslims to Europe. For Wilders, then, freedom is a very important concept. His choice to
name his political group ‘Party for Freedom’ indicates how important the concept of is for
him and his supporters.541 He does not, in the text, offer a definitive description of ‘freedom.’
He claims that Western freedoms are the product of Judaism, Christianity, and Humanism,
but it is difficult to find any religious content in his understanding of freedom. In the text,
‘freedom’ refers to the contemporary Western freedom to be homosexual, draw images of
Muhammad, and moreover do other things that Islam forbids or is claimed to forbid.  ‘Judeo-
Christian and Humanist’ freedoms might then be understood to refer to secular liberal
freedoms, in particular the freedom to defy religious orthodoxy on a range of social issues.
This ‘freedom’ may be related to Christianity and Judaism insofar as Wilders believes that
the two religions separate religion from other spheres of human life in a way Islam cannot,
and thus insofar as the two religions have been separated from the ‘sacred’ and secularised
into parts of Western culture.
This close linking of (Judeo-)Christianity and “freedom” is common to several populist
radical right parties in Western Europe, where a further blurring of the line between (Judeo-
)Christianity and secular culture is a feature of their Christianist secularism.542 Secular
humanism, in Christianist secularism ideology, is not a break from Christianity, but part of a
Judeo-Christian tradition, the continued existence of which guarantees the freedoms of those
who live within its boundaries. Reflected in the text, then, is Christianist secularism, which
weaponises the blurring of the boundary between secular culture and its freedoms and
(Judeo-)Christianity, and uses it as a rhetorical tool to exclude Muslims from Western
societies.
540 Norris, “It’s not just Trump. Authoritarian populism is rising across the West. Here’s why,” 2016.
541 The Austrian Freedom Party another example of an anti-liberal party claiming to support freedom.
542 See Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.
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The Party for Freedom’s use of religion in its discourse in 2017
In the lead up to the 2017 elections Geert Wilders wrote an article, “Wilders Plan: Time for
Liberation,” encapsulating his ideology and his party’s political agenda in that year.543 The
article was published initially in Dutch, but translated into English and published on Wilders’
personal website. Like much of Wilders’ discourse, it is aimed at both a domestic and
international audience. Importantly, while the article serves as both an election year political
manifesto designed to rally supporters and a piece of populist political commentary on the
failings of the Rutte government, it may be read as a document promoting typically populist
radical right ideas of nationalism, welfare chauvinism, opposition to Islam, and the protection
of the West’s Judeo-Christian freedoms and identity. This article is thus chosen for analysis
because it provides an English language expression of Wilders’ and the Party for Freedom’s
identitarianism, which does not deviate from the party’s previous stated positions on the need
to protect the Netherlands’ Judeo-Christian and Humanist culture and identity from Muslims
and elites, yet provides a succinct example of Wilders’ and his party’s marriage of Judeo-
Christian identitarianism, nationalism, and welfare chauvinism.
Outline of “Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation”544
Wilders praises the historical achievements of the Dutch people: (paragraphs 1-4) “Pim
Fortuyn was right. Nothing is impossible for us. We are Dutch;” “We are the only people in
the world living in a country which for the largest part we created ourselves;” “We founded
New York and discovered Australia. Sometimes, it seems like we have forgotten it all.”545
Wilders attacks Mark Rutte and his VVD government: (paragraphs 5-9) “This government
has destroyed our country with its austerity policies and has allowed our country to be
colonized by Islam. ...Let us liberate our country;” “A politician like me, who speaks the truth
about a huge problem many Dutch are confronted with every day – yes, I am talking about
the terror of Islam and the Moroccan problem – is dragged to court ...while imams can preach
all the hatred they want and the political elites keep silent.”546





Wilders decries the influence of Islam in the Netherlands: (paragraphs 10-12) “Islam says it
wants to kill us. The Koran leaves no doubt about that.” “(Muslims) give us the middle
finger. Islamic hooligans parade with IS flags through the streets in The Hague and occupy
bridges with Turkish flags in Rotterdam. This is our country, but their flags are waving.”
“...this is our country, our Netherlands! And it cries for liberation.”
Wilders’ plan for liberating the Netherlands: (paragraphs 13-19) “I will protect our beautiful
country. And this is only possible if we de-Islamize. I want to make it the core of my policy;”
“Our values are not Islamic, but are based on the Judeo-Christian and humanist civilization.”
“Twelve years ago, Theo van Gogh was murdered. He gave his life for the freedom that lies
at the heart of our Dutch identity. And that identity must defend itself. We must not allow
those who want to destroy our freedom to abuse freedom in order to take ours away. We must
stop being naive and defend ourselves. Because this is our country.” “Even Zwarte Piet
(Black Pete) is not allowed anymore. The elite wants to abolish the word "allochtoon"
(foreigner), but it is the native people who are losing their country.” “...this great nation ...is
ours and will remain ours!”547
Wilders introduces a new nationalist economic plan: (paragraphs 20-22) “Dutch money for
the Dutch people! Not a penny to Africa, Turkey, Greece or Brussels anymore;” “We will be
able to give our elderly a decent old day. We will be able to lower the retirement age to 65
again and no pensions will have to be cut;” “It is intolerable that Dutch people are avoiding
healthcare because they cannot afford it, while asylum seekers, who on average have 1,000
euros more healthcare costs a year, get everything for free.”548
Wilders calls for “direct democracy:” (paragraph 23) “Our political system is ...ruled by the
same arrogant political elites with their false promises and hypocritical apologies. If the mess
created by Mark Rutte has taught us one thing, it is this: the people should be able to pull the
emergency brake when the political elites violate their will.”549
Wilders describes his ideal Netherlands: (paragraphs 24-26) “A strong and sovereign country
where hard work is rewarded and the weak are protected, where terrorists cannot just cross
the border at Hazeldonk [main border crossing with Belgium], where women can walk the





pensions are decent, where all citizens – including Jews, homosexuals, women, and critics of
Islam – are safe. Where patriotism is not an insult but a badge of honor. Where Islam is
shown the door.” “It is time for liberation! Let us reclaim our country together.” 550
Language Analysis
“Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation” is a nationalistic and nativist text in which Wilders
portrays himself as the potential saviour of the “destroyed” Netherlands. In accordance with
his nationalism and nativism, Wilders’ use of language in his article is designed to create a
dichotomy between ‘the people’ of the Netherlands and the “elites” and “Muslims” he claims
are destroying the country. He addresses his readers as “we” on 37 occasions, and uses the
term “our” on a further 54, including when describing “our country” (6 times), “our identity”
(3 times), “our flag” (3 times) “our culture” (3 times), and “our freedom” (2 times). In the
text “we” refers to the Dutch people, and therefore Wilders’ use of “we” and “our” in this
manner reinforces his connection to and his representation of ‘the people.’ The Dutch people,
according to Wilders, are not Muslim or Moroccan. Rather, they are “based on Judeo-
Christian and Humanist civilization.”551
This sentence illuminates Wilders’ crude nativism, or his method of distinguishing the
ingroup (‘the people’) from the outgroup. While deeply nationalist and a nativist, Wilders’
nativism is partly based upon a Huntingtonian civilisationalist conception of the world in
which Islam and the Judeo-Christian and Humanist West are in a state of conflict. Muslims
are therefore constructed in this article as the ultimate ‘other.’ Most often, Muslims are
contrasted with “we” and said to belong to a culture incompatible with that of “our” country.
As in previous occasions, Wilders claims that this incompatibility stems from Muslims and
Dutch having a vastly different religious heritage, which has led the two groups to hold
widely differing values and senses of group identity.552 According to Wilders, Muslims
cannot belong to “our” culture, civilisation, and share in “our identity” because they belong to
a foreign (Islamic) system of values and a different identity.’553 As a result of this different







Moreover, the Judeo-Christian and Humanist tradition is again linked closely with “freedom”
(used 8 times). Islam, on the other hand, is linked in the text to Nazism and the occupation of
the Netherlands by Germany forces during the Second World War. Wilders ties his struggle
against both Islam and ‘elites’ to the fight against Nazi Germany. He speaks of the
Netherlands as if Muslims had occupied it the way the Nazis had in the early 1940s.
Therefore he writes of the country requiring “liberation” (liberate/liberation is used 7 times)
from Islam, just as it required liberation from Nazism. Islam is referred to extensively
throughout the text, always in a negative manner, (Islam\Islamic 10 times) with an explicit
call for the country to “De-Islamise” occurring on one occasion.554
Wilders contrasts the dismal state of the “occupied” and “hijacked” Netherlands under Mark
Rutte, who is described as “arrogant,” “elite,” and compared to a “laughing donkey,” with his
own ideal Netherlands. In this version of the country – in which Wilders is Prime Minister –
the people are again proud of their nation. Moreover, in this fantasy, Wilders constructs
himself as a protector of Jewish people, and gay and women’s rights, from conservative
Islam.555 In this imaginary Netherlands, Islam has been “shown the door,” resulting in a freer
and happier society. Muslims here become the threatener of the Netherlands’ core value of
freedom, and of its national and civilisational Judeo-Christian and humanist identity.556
Wilders’ Christianist secularism emerges several times in the text. Most significant is his
stock characterisation of the Netherlands as part of Judeo-Christian and Humanist
civilisation. While invoking two religions, his use of this term is a part of the Party for
Freedom’s secularist posture: it contains no religious (theological, ethical) content drawn
from Christianity or Judaism. In the text Wilders’ use of the term has two functions: it defines
Dutch culture in opposition Islam, and on this basis demands the exclusion of Muslims from
living within Dutch society.
Other aspects of Christianist secularism are displayed in the text. Wilders’ ostensible
liberalism is demonstrated in his demand that Dutch freedoms be protected from totalitarian
Islam, and in his declaration that if he were Prime Minister gay people, women, Jews, and
critics of Islam would be safe from Islamic violence. Equally, this ostensible liberalism is





Netherlands – prevented from expressing their religious belief in public if not removed from
the country altogether.
Islam is constructed in the text as one of the two primary antagonists (alongside the ‘elites’
who allowed Muslims to enter and ‘Islamize’ the Netherlands) against which Wilders
struggles in the name of ‘the people.’ While one ethnic group is singled out, the “Moroccan
problem” is mentioned only briefly, and in conjunction with the larger Muslim problem
Wilders perceives to be affecting the Netherlands. 557 Muslims are described in the text as
trying to take away the freedoms the Dutch enjoy, casting Muslims as anti-freedom, and
casting Judeo-Christian and Humanist based Dutch culture as pro-freedom. The concept of a
Judeo-Christian and Humanist civilisation, which Wilders invokes in the text, is thus used to
differentiate the ingroup (‘the people’) from outgroups (Muslims) throughout the text.
Wilders does not define exactly what ‘Judeo-Chrisitian and Humanist’ means, or who may be
included in the category, other than to declare Muslims to be outside its boundaries. Judeo-
Christian and Humanist culture is described primarily as being pro-freedom, and is for this
reason antithetical to “totalitarian” Islam.558 No actual religious content appears to exist in
Wilders’ claim that his society is based upon Judeo-Christian values. Religious belief has
thus nothing to do with being Judeo-Christian and Humanist, except insofar as practicing
Muslims cannot fall within this category. This suggests that the term’s primary purpose is to
define Dutch and Western culture in such a way so as to exclude Muslims from being
included within its boundaries.
Ideological and social context
The text was written during the 2017 Dutch parliamentary election campaign, and in response
to the centre-right VVD government’s response to the 2015 immigration crisis. In particular,
the text responds to the VVD’s decision to allow Muslim refugees – albeit only 2,000 – find
asylum in the Netherlands.  Wilders’ use of religion in the text is therefore best understood
within this context. The decision to allow the majority Muslims refugees to settle within the
Netherlands was initially popular with the Dutch public. As the number of asylum seekers
grew, however, the public mood changed. More Dutch began to sympathise with the anti-
immigration position taken by the Party for Freedom. The rising popularity of the Party for
557 Ibid.
558 Ibid. “Totalitarian” is a favourite claim of Wilders about Islam, see his use in Geert Wilders, “Speech Geert
Wilders for US congressmen, Washington D.C.Conservative Opportunity Society, 29 April, 2015.
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Freedom is reflected across Western Europe, where a number of other populist radical right
parties grew in popularity due in part to their anti-immigration policies. In the text Wilders
attempts to capitalise on the change in public mood by demonising Muslims, claiming in
particular that Islam is a Nazi like totalitarian ideology bent on Islamising the Netherlands
and destroying its freedoms. These freedoms are framed as Judeo-Christian in origin, a
framing common to Dutch populist parties and politicians.559 In the text Wilders makes little
distinction between Judeo-Christianity and Humanism, describing the three as compatible or
essentially the same thing. However, Wilders is not trying to make a sophisticated
philosophical connection between the two religions and the secular politics and culture of the
contemporary Netherlands. Rather, the concept of ‘Judeo-Christianity and Humanism’ is a
relatively empty term which offers, for Wilders, an identity which can be used as a tool with
which ‘the people’ may be differentiated from ‘others,’ and which may help the Dutch
overcome the loss confidence in the supremacy of their culture.560 For example, in the party’s
one page manifesto for 2017, a plan to “de-Islamize” the Netherlands is announced, but any
plan for protecting Christianity and Judaism is absent, indicating the party’s overall lack of
interest in religion and deep secularism.561
Judeo-Christianity can be used as a tool in this manner because Muslim immigration to the
Netherlands, and moreover the greater visibility of Islam in Europe, has already shown to
Europeans the significance of Christianity as a culture force within secular Dutch and wider
Western culture. Once it became possible for secular Dutch to identify as cultural Christians,
then it was possible for Wilders to wield Judeo-Christian and Humanist identity as a weapon
against the Netherlands’ Muslim minority. Thus even though ‘Judeo-Christian and Humanist’
is a relatively empty term built upon an inversion of European perceptions of Islam as the
mirror image of Christianity and anti-Enlightenment, the term has power in the Netherlands
due to recognition of the secularisation of Christianity into culture.
Discussion
559 Geert Wilders, “Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation,” 2016.
560 See “Spiegel Interview with Wilders: ‘Merkel is Afraid,’ Spiegel Online, November  9, 2010.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/spiegel-interview-with-geert-wilders-merkel-is-afraid-a-
727978.html.
561 Geert Wilders, “Preliminary Election Program PVV 2017-2021,”, 2016.
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Critical Discourse Analysis reveals three aspects of Wilders’ rhetoric in 2012-2017. First,
Wilders uses Christianist secular rhetoric throughout the three texts. Christian identitarianism
is a common feature of the texts, with Wilders identifying Western civilisation, Dutch
culture, and the values and heritage of ‘the people’ as Judeo-Christian and Humanist, and
insisting that Judeo-Christianity alone defines the culture and values of the Netherlands. At
the same time Wilders is strongly secularist, and apart from a brief positive mention of
“faith” in 2012, says nothing positive about religious belief and practice whatsoever.562
Rather, he seeks to defend the practice of separating Church and state from Islam, which he
claims will – if allowed – dissolve any difference between religion and politics and initiate
Islamic rule in the Netherlands.
Wilders’ Christianist secularism is also displayed in his ostensible liberalism. He portrays
himself in the texts as a defender of gay and women’s rights, the right to freedom of
expression, and in particular the right to speak publicly against Islam – all rights he claims
are threatened by the ‘Islamisation’ of the Netherlands. Yet his liberalism is hollow insofar as
his party wishes to use deeply illiberal and authoritarian tactics to suppress Islam, including
the banning of the Qur’an and the construction of Mosques, and the creation of a Judeo-
Christian and Humanist leitkultur in the Netherlands.563
Wilders’ philo-Semitism – which is in his case personal, yet also a hallmark of the
Christianist secular ideology of a number of parties belonging to the populist radical right – is
in evidence throughout the examined texts. Judaism is described as a founding element of
Western civilisation.564 Wilders’ philo-semitism may be understood as an attempt to win
Jewish votes, though given the small number of Jews in the Netherlands and their left-leaning
politics, this attempt is unlikely to prove successful. It is perhaps more likely, then, that the
purpose of Wilders’ philo-Semitism is to demonstrate the superiority of Western civilisation
over Islam. Wilders and his party supports the state of Israel, and uses the economic success
and democratic nature of the country to demonstrate the superiority of Israeli culture and
values over Islam. By bringing the Jewish people inside Western civilisation, through the
creating of a Judeo-Christian heritage, Wilders is thus able to ‘prove’ his point that Judeo-
Christian Western values lead to freedom and prosperity while Islam leads to totalitarianism
562Geert Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders at the Western Conservative Summit, Denver,” 2012.
563 Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, 114, 2014.
564 Wilders’ trip to Israel perhaps shaped his philosemitism, see Cnaan Liphshiz, “Is the Honeymoon over for
Geert Wilders and Dutch Jews?” Times of Israel, May 2, 2014. http://www.timesofisrael.com/is-the-
honeymoon-over-for-geert-wilders-and-dutch-jews/; 564. Wetheim, “Geert Wilders and the Nationalist-Populist
turn Towards the Jews in Europe 281, 2017.
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and violence. Equally, support for Jewish people and Israel is used by Wilders to indicate that
the Party for Freedom is a liberal party opposed to the anti-Semitism of the radical right. In
doing this he is able to defend himself and his party from charges that they are a racist and
extreme organisation.
Second, Wilders uses the concept of a Judeo-Christian and Humanist tradition to divide
between ‘the people’ who belong to the Netherlands and those who do not belong. The terms
“we” and “our” are among the most common words Wilders uses, sometimes adjoined to
“civilisation,” “heritage,” and “country.” He does not refer, however, to ‘our religion,’ but
most often speaks of Judaism and Christianity as if they were ideologies which have
contributed to the creation of Western culture, rather than religious traditions. This religion-
based civilisational identity is employed by Wilders in the service of Dutch nationalism. Thus
Wilders’ nationalism is of a special kind; he speaks often of civilisational concerns, and
promotes himself as an international figure of significance, yet his civilisationalism never
overshadows his belief in the supremacy of the nation-state as the highest form of human
organisation. Perhaps the best way of understanding this seeming contradiction is that
Wilders’ brand of nationalism is based upon a civilisational concept of Dutch identity, and
that he invokes religion based civilisational identity so as to make a clear distinction between
the Judeo-Christian ‘people’ who belong in the Netherlands, and the Muslims who do not
belong.
The purpose of this civilisationalist language is to construct a group – consisting of Wilders,
the party and its supporters, and people he believes share in his conception of Dutch identity
– to whom the Netherlands belongs to who alone belong to the Netherlands. In creating this
group, Wilders automatically excludes groups and individuals who do not fit the criteria he
has set for membership of ‘the people.’ Throughout the texts Wilders excludes Muslims and
‘elites’ from this “we,” and constructs them as illegitimate foreign elements within the
Netherlands, which first threatened and then ultimately “destroyed” the country. He defines
Dutch and Western identity as “Judeo-Christian and Humanist.” Islam is thus, by being left
out of this formulation, identified by Wilders as outside of this tradition, but also antithetical
to Judeo-Christianity and Humanism. Therefore he demands the exclusion of Muslims from
Dutch society. Equally, Wilders demands the Netherlands be saved from “elites,” who have
“destroyed” the country by handing it to Muslims.565 His quarrel with elites is also expressed
565 Geert Wilders, “Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation,” 2016.
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in terms relating to religious identity. ‘Elites’ have, according to Wilders, abandoned the
Judeo-Christian and Humanist tradition and embraced cultural relativism.566 This
abandonment of or loss of confidence in the Judeo-Christian and Humanist tradition has,
according to Wilders, had serious consequences for the Netherlands. He claims the
replacement of Judeo-Christianity and Humanism with cultural relativism has created a space
for Islam to flourish, and ultimately “Islamicize” the Netherlands.567 Therefore it is not only
Muslims who are rejected from Wilders’ conception of the Dutch people, but ‘elites’ who
reject the religion derived identity and values which he claims define the Dutch nation.
Wilders’ differentiation of peoples based on religious identification and history is not unique
to him or the Party for Freedom, but part of a wider discourse on religion in the Netherlands.
This discourse is common among both the populist radical right within the Netherlands, and
among right-wing populists and some conservatives in wider Western Europe. Frits
Bolkestein and Pim Fotruyn, and later Thierry Baudet, have decried the alleged danger Islam
poses to the Netherlands’ Judeo-Christian culture and identity.568 Moreover, the wider
populist radical right movement in Western Europe can also be situated within this discourse,
as indeed can some conservative centre-right European politicians. In France, right-wing
populist National Front leader Marine Le Pen emphasises the dual (Judeo-)Christian and
secular nature of French culture, and alleges that Islam is incompatible with this culture.569
The Alternative for Germany Party uses similar rhetoric arguing for the exclusion of Islam
from Christian based, yet secular, German society.570 This discourse is thus not limited to the
Netherlands, but is evident throughout Western Europe. Moreover, an appeal to Christian or
Judeo-Christian identity, and the demand that Muslim immigration cease because Islam is
566 Ibid.
567 Ibid. Attacking cultural relativism occurs elsewhere in Wilders’ discourse. See for example Calla Wahlquist,
“Geert Wilders tells Australia to abandon multiculturalism or end up like the EU,” The Guardian, 21 October,
2015. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/oct/21/geert-wilders-tells-australia-to-abandon-
multiculturalism-or-end-up-like-the-eu.
568 See Hemel, “(Pro)Claiming Tradition: The ‘Judeo-Christian’ Roots of Dutch Society and the Rise of
Conservative Nationalism,” 53-54;  Elizabeth Kolbert, “Beyond Tolerance,” The New Yorker, September 9,
2002; Faber, “Is Dutch Bad Boy Baudet the New Face of the European Alt-Right?”2018.
569 See for example Le Pen’s comments about the Judeo-Christian heritage of France in Marine Le Pen, quoted
by Alduy in “Has Marine Le Pen Already Won the Battle for the Soul of France?” 2014; see also Le Pen’s
comments on the Christian heritage of French secularism in Marine Le Pen, Presidential Campaign Launch
Speech, 2017.
570 According to AfD politician Hans-Thomas Tillschneider "Islam is foreign to us and for that reason it cannot
invoke the principle of religious freedom to the same degree as Christianity," a remark met by “loud applause.”
The party also declared in a manifesto that Islam is not part of Germany. See “Far-right AfD says Islam not
welcome in Germany,” Al Jazeera, May 2, 2016. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/05/afd-islam-germany-
160501155848003.html.
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incompatible with (Judeo-)Christian identity and culture, is an essential element of populist
radical right politics.
Third, the texts construct Islam as a monolithic civilisation opposed and antithetical to Judeo-
Christian and Humanist civilisation. In the three texts Wilders uses religion and religious
identity in a primarily instrumental manner, i.e. in order to exclude Muslims and ‘elites’ from
Dutch society, but his language also reflects a belief that national identity, and the identity of
‘the people,’ can be described in religio-civilisational terms. Islam is constructed throughout
the texts as a civilisation based upon a “totalitarian ideology”. The texts do not describe Islam
as a ‘religion.’ This may be because Wilders, as a secularist, conceives of religion as a wholly
private affair which must be excluded from the public sphere. The perception that Islam does
not remove itself from the public sphere, but contains its own system of political
organisation, may encourage Wilders to label it a particular threat to secularism and thus to
homosexuals, women, and non-Muslims.
Wilders’ anti-Muslim rhetoric grows in intensity over the 2012-2015 period. Where in 2012
Wilders was merely warning against encroaching Islamisation, by 2015 his rhetoric was
apocalyptic, decrying the potential of Muslim refugees from Syria and other parts of the
Middle East and North Africa to spread “evil” Islam and destroy Western freedoms.571 By
2017 Wilders was claiming to live in a Netherlands “destroyed” by the ‘elite’ VVD
government, which allowed Muslims immigrate and reduce Dutch freedoms.572 The
escalating demonisation of Islam – which takes the form of the use of rhetoric which
attributes to Islam and Muslims all negative qualities, while attributing to Western “Judeo-
Christian and Humanist” civilisation all positive qualities – can itself be attributed to growing
fears about immigration and Islam occurring during the immigration ‘crisis’ of 2015.
Wilders’ rhetoric during this period can thus be understood as an attempt to capitalise on the
growing fear of Muslims and Islam during 2015 by using extreme and apocalyptic language,
casting Muslim immigrants as a invading force and Islam as a totalitarian doctrine hostile to
the freedoms inherent in Judeo-Christian and Humanist societies.  Positioning himself as a
potential savour, he claims to be the only person capable of rescuing the Netherlands from the
subjugation and slavery Islam inevitably brings. Thus Wilders constructs Islam as the
negative imame of Judeo-Christian and Humanist Western free societies. “We” in the Judeo-
Christian and Humanist Netherlands are free, peaceful, and prosperous. “They” are Muslims;
571 Geert Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,” 2015.
572 Geert Wilders, “Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation,” 2016.
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unfree, violent, prone to terrorism, totalitarian, “evil” and bent on invading and enslaving the
West.



















































Throughout the examined texts, then, Wilders uses almost no language that could be
described as ‘religious.’ His concept of the West as Judeo-Christian and Humanist
civilisation is not remotely theological or religious in nature, but a concept created as Islam’s
mirror image and in order to exclude Muslims from Dutch society. Part of the
instrumentalisation of religion in the texts involves Wilders’ attack ‘elites’ who encourage
multiculturalism and what Wilders calls ‘cultural relativism’ in the Netherlands. By defining
Dutch culture as Jude-Christian and Humanist, and describing this tradition as the reason for
the Netherlands’ prosperity and success, Wilders is able to portray the ‘elites’ who have
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encouraged Muslim immigration and multiculturalism as threatening the heritage, future, and
people of the Netherlands.
Despite his invoking of Christianity and Judaism, Wilders does not appear to see anything
positive in the moral teachings of the two religions, or to use the religions as tools with which
to sacralise the Dutch state and make it an object of worship.  Rather, for Wilders, ‘the
people’ and the Dutch nation are already sacred and worthy of protection, not Christianity or
Judaism. If churches are worthy of preserving in the face of Islamisation, it is not because
they are religious centres, but because they are symbols of Dutch and Western culture. In this
way, Wilders makes Churches sacred through their association with secular Dutch culture.
Paradoxically, if Christianity and Judaism are sacred to Wilders, it is only because they have
been secularised into the Dutch culture he holds to be sacred.
Wilders’ ability to weaponise religious heritage and concept of Judeo-Christianity and
Humanism thus stems from the secularisation of Christianity into ‘culture,’ a process which
took place after secularisation, and after the entrance of Muslims into secularised, depillarised
Dutch society. As the pillar system broke down in the 1960s and 1970s, religion became
increasingly divorced from Dutch people’s sense of personal, group, and national identity.
However, when Muslim ‘guest-workers’ neither left the Netherlands after their initial period
of employment ended, nor secularised and assimilated into Dutch society, their presence
began to be perceived by politicians such as Fits Bolkestein, Pim Fortuyn, and Geert Wilders,
as a threat to secular society and Dutch identity. By maintaining their Muslim identity and
traditions, Muslim immigrants demonstrated the inability of secularism to convince Muslims
to privatise their faith, cease practicing their religion openly and identifying themselves
according to their religion. Thus entry of Muslims into the Netherlands, and their subsequent
marginalisation due to their religious beliefs and practices, demonstrated that Dutch
secularism was not religiously neutral but privileged Christianity. While it pretended to be
neutral, the Dutch secularism allowed, for example, Christian holidays to be nationally
celebrated with public holidays, a privilege Islam was never allowed. Indeed, in Dutch
secularism, Christian holidays become secularised into ‘cultural events’ synonymous with the
Netherlands. Islamic holidays are, on the other hand, always seen as ‘religious’ in nature and
thus a threat to secular differentiation of religion and politics.
Thus while secular culture appeared neutral when there was no religious difference, the entry
of Muslims demonstrated the Christian or post-Christian nature of Dutch secularism. As
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Christianity became secularised into culture, in the face of Muslim difference Dutch secular
became partly Christianised, until the two seemed almost inseparable. The Party for Freedom
perceives this religionising of Dutch identity occurring, and bases its political platform upon
the identification of Dutch culture with (Judeo-)Christianity, and upon the notion that Islam is
incompatible with Dutch culture. Therefore, the religious differentiation practiced by the
Party for Freedom is a reflection of the religionising of Dutch identity, and the popularity of
the party is a product of public acceptance of religion as a source and element of identity,
culture, and heritage.
There is, then, a causal relationship between Wilders’ conception of the Netherlands as a
Judeo-Christian and Humanist culture, and the growing presence of Islam. The presence of
Islam, and in particular his perception of Muslims as a group uniquely resistant to
secularisation, have undoubtedly played the largest roles in convincing Wilders that his own
society and its secular culture is the product of a Judeo-Christian heritage. Thus in his
rhetoric Islam is described as a uniquely dangerous force antithetical to Judeo-Christianity
and its core value of ‘freedom.’
The presence of Muslims, their retention of Islamic dress, symbols, beliefs and practices, and
some Muslims violent reaction to the denigration of their religion and its founder, appear to
have convinced Wilders that Islam is incompatible with secularism. Moreover, the presence
of Muslims and their obvious differences have demonstrated the non-universality of Dutch
culture and its values. Instead, when contrasted with Islam, Dutch culture appears to be
closely connected with Christianity. The Enlightenment and secular humanism appear, when
compared with Islam, to be not merely a break with Christianity, but also a continuation of
Christianity.
Moreover, by defining Dutch society and Western Civilisation as Judeo-Christian and
Humanist Wilders denies both the universality of secularism, but also the inevitability of
secularism’s triumph over religion. Moreover, Wilders’ rhetoric suggests he believes that
secularism – as a form of national identity – is not equipped to alone withstand Islamisation,
but requires Christianity and Judaism to be incorporated into a religio-secular Judeo-Christian
and Humanist tradition in order to provide secularism with the strong identity and confidence
in its basic principles it requires to be able to reject Islamisation.
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Wilders thus demonstrates a loss of faith in the ultimate triumph of secularism over religion.
Where in 2012 he was merely warning against the threat of an Islamic takeover, by 2017 he
was claiming that the Netherlands had been Islamised and effectively ruined.573 And where in
the mid-2000s Wilders had supported American neoconservative efforts to bring freedom and
democracy to Iraq and Afghanistan, by 2017 not only did Wilders no longer believe this was
a possibility, but claimed Muslims had drastically reduced Dutch freedoms.574 To combat this
loss of freedom and culture, Wilders claims the Dutch must return to their Judeo-Christian
and Humanist heritage and values.575 What is most interesting about this new use of the
West’s religious heritage is that it involves the use of religion to buttress ‘weak’ secularism
against its perceived enemies, and therefore a blurring of the lines between the secular and
the religious. There is, then, in Wilders rhetoric a growing recognition that secularism is, (a)
unique to the West, but has, (b) failed to triumph over Islam. This loss of faith in the march of
secularism throughout the world, and a newfound sense that secularism may be weak inside
Europe, is at the root of Wilders linking secular culture to the Netherlands’ religious heritage,
and his efforts to strengthen Dutch and Western identity in the face of threats stemming from
the “totalitarian ideology” of Islam.576
Why, then, does the Party for Freedom use religion in their discourse to differentiate ‘the
people’ from ‘others,’ or the ingroup from outgroups, in the 2012-2017 period?  The research
conducted as part of this chapter indicates that the party uses religion in this manner because
it has embraced Christianist secularism, or a secularism which grafts a Christian identity onto
a secularist worldview. The party has adopted Christianist secularism as a way of meeting the
perceived challenge posed by Islam and Muslim immigrants to the secular Dutch state.
The Party for Freedom’s use of religion in their discourse is a product of many forces:
racism, xenophobia, fear of Islam, low fertility rates and the subsequent necessity of a large-
scale immigration program to support economic growth, and longing for an imagined past in
which the country was culturally uniform and united. Most of all it is the product of cultural
573 Compare Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders at the Western Conservative Summit, Denver,” 2012, against the
more extreme rhetoric about Islamisation expressed here: Wilders, “Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation,” 2016.
574 See Geert Wilders, “Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation,” 2016.
575 See Pope Benedict XVI, “Europe and its discontents,” First Things, January 2006.
https://www.firstthings.com/article/2006/01/europe-and-its-discontents; John Milbank and Adrian Pabst,The
Politics of Virtue: Post-Liberalism and the Human Future, London: Rowman & Littlefield,2016, 2;  Adrian
Pabst, “A Christian Commonwealth of Nations is Europe’s best future,” ABC Religion and Ethics, January 31,
2013. http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2013/01/31/3679912.htm; Jürgen Habermas, Time of Transitions,
Ciaran Cronin and Max Pensky (editors and translators), Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2006, 150-151.
576 Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders at the Western Conservative Summit, Denver,” 2012.
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uncertainty. Having discovered that Muslims are often not interested in assimilating into the
irreligious, secular culture of the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom has lost confidence in
the universality of Western secularism. Thus having lost their triumphalist secularism and
belief in the universality of Western culture, the Party for Freedom perceive the Netherlands
to be open only to people who share their ‘Judeo-Christian and Humanist’ heritage.
Wilders’ rhetoric on religion and religious identity has helped produce electoral success for
the party, because it is designed to capitalise on the changes in Dutch self-perception which
occurred after de-pillarisation and large scale Muslim immigration to the Netherlands, and on
Dutch fears of cultural and ethnic decline.  Wilders use of religion as a tool of differentiation,
and beyond him Fortuyn’s and Baudet’s use of similar rhetoric, reveals how Muslim
immigration has made some Dutch perceive their secular worldview and culture to be a
product of their nation’s (Judeo-)Christian heritage, rather than a break from Christianity.
Equally it reveals that when challenged by Islam, secular populist radical right parties will
draw on their nation’s Christian heritage in order to exclude Muslims and defend their culture
from perceived Islamisation. This is done partly – perhaps mostly – for instrumental reasons,
yet Wilders’ use of religion in his rhetoric suggests that he perceives ‘culturally relativist’
secular culture to be too weak to stand on its own against Islam. He therefore invokes the idea
of “Judeo-Christian and Humanist” civilisation, which is supposedly “superior” to all others
yet under tremendous threat from cultural relativism and Islam, in order to defend secular
Dutch culture from Muslim immigrants.577 In doing so, he uses Judaism and Christianity to
buttress secularism against supposedly anti-secular Islam. The end result is Christianist
secularism: a strange mélange of religious identity grafted onto a secular nationalist
worldview, ostensible liberalism, philo-Semitism, and deep hostility towards Islam. While
one of the central purposes of Christianist secularism is to protect secular society from Islam,
it also re-introduces religion to the public sphere, if only in the form of identity, and
combines religion, culture, and concepts of nation and people together in a dangerous
manner. Thus while Christianist secularism is a response to the perception that Muslim
immigrants allow religion to escape its boundary in the spiritual realm and invade the public
sphere, Christianist secularism is also a sign of a concerning religionising of national identity
in the Netherlands.
577 See Kluveld, “Secular, Superior, and Desperately Search for its Soul: The Confusing Political-Cultural
References to a Judeo-Christian Europe in the Twenty-First Century 241, 2016.
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Chapter Six: The National Front and Religion
I have argued throughout this thesis that the discourse of populist radical right parties in
Western Europe can be understood in relation to the concept of Christianist secularism.578 I
have further argued that the increasing visibility of religion – particularly Islam – in Europe
has encouraged populist radical right parties to use religion as a tool with which to
differentiate between ‘the people’ and ‘others.’ Therefore I argued that following the mass
immigration of Muslims to Western Europe, some Europeans have come to believe that (1)
their own secularism is unique to their societies and a product of their particular religious
heritage, and (2) Islam represents a wholly different religious and political tradition which by
its own nature cannot secularise and is therefore incompatible with Western culture and
values.
Over the next two chapters I will test my hypothesis by examining the use of religion in the
discourse of the French National Front. In this chapter I begin my analysis by examining the
National Front’s historical use of religion. I show how the party’s use of religion and sense of
France’s religious identity has changed over time, and been received differently by the
French public throughout the past four decades. I describe how as France became more
secular, and as the party’s supporters became more secular, the National Front retained its
strong religious identity and use of Catholic symbolism. I also show how under Marine Le
Pen’s leadership the party began to position itself as both a defender of laïcité and secular
republican values, but also of Christianity and France’s Catholic heritage.
The chapter is divided into four sections. The first describes the religious and political
context in which the National Front came into being, and contends that the National Front
began as part of a long tradition in right-wing French politics which explicitly links French
culture to Catholicism and opposes laícité. The second section examines the National Front
under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen (1972-2011.) It contends that under Jean-Marie Le
Pen the National Front remained a radical right, anti-Semitic, Catholic identity political party,
though one which over time became focused on the threat of Islam to the “Judeo-Christian”
French state.
578 Brubaker, “A new ‘Christianist’ secularism in Europe,” 2016; Brubaker, “Between nationalism and
civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective,” 1193, 2017.
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The third section examines the Marine Le Pen led National Front (2011--), and demonstrates
how the party’s rhetoric on religion shifted during this period, as Marine Le Pen moved the
party away from the anti-Semitic radical right and towards the populist radical right. The
section contends that under Marine Le Pen the party moved away from its traditional Catholic
identity politics, and reconceptualised laïcité as an integral part of France’s Judeo-Christian
heritage. The final section attempts to explain Marine Le Pen’s use of religion in her
discourse, and argues that it should be understood in the context of a broader re-
conceptualising of French identity and religion after large scale Muslim immigration to
France, and as an expression of the Christianist secularism prevalent among a number of
populist radical right parties in Western Europe.
The National Front’s relationship with Religion in historical context
The National Front is a populist radical right political movement founded in 1972, and which
has its origins in a number of earlier conservative and fascist movements which opposed
Gaullism and Communism, and displayed sympathy towards the Ancien Régime and the
Catholic Church.579 Since its inception the party has emphasised the importance of
maintaining French identity, and for this reason has consistently opposed immigration,
especially immigration from majority Muslim countries.580
The National Front, however, is not a strictly Catholic party. It has even been described as
“anti-Christian” by a prominent French Catholic bishop.581 Yet the party has a long and
complex relationship with Christianity. Its relations with the Catholic Church, in particular,
have been particularly curious. While the Church has on occasion condemned the party’s
xenophobia, the party has continued to use specifically Catholic symbols – Joan of Arc,
Clovis – as emblems for both the National Front and for the French nation.582
Contemporary France is renowned for being a secular state. The nation’s official secular
ideology is known as laïcité, a word which may be translated simply as secularism, but which
I will refer to in its French form when talking about the French conception of secularism. It is
579 See Daniel Stockemer, The Front National in France: Continuity and Change under Jean-Marie Le Pen and
Marine Le Pen, Spring: Cham, Switzerland, 2017, 7-12.
580 See Peter Davies, The National Front in France: Ideology, Discourse, and Power, Routledge: London and
New York, 1999, 19-22
581 Peter Davies, “The National Front and Catholicism: From Integrisme to Joan of Arc and Clovis,” Religion
Compass 4(9), 2010, 576–587, 576. 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2010.00237.x
582 Roy, “The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laïcité,” 89, 2016.
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possible to elucidate laïcité or laicism by comparing it to what Elizabeth Shakman Hurd has
termed “Judeo-Christian secularism.”583 Laicism, according to Hurd, conceives of religion as
an “adversary” and an “impediment to modern politics”.584 Judeo-Christian secularism, which
is the form of secularism practiced in the United States, allows religion to be practiced in the
public sphere, though with certain restrictions, and often encourages religious organisations
to take an active role in public life.585
French laicism – laïcité – seeks to exclude religion from public life and attempts to create a
religiously neutral state. From a purely legal point of view, contemporary French secularism
is best defined by France’s 1905 law on the separation of Churches and State.586 This law,
which remains the basis of French notions of religion’s place in public life, enshrines
“Freedom of conscience” on religious matters and forbids the state from funding religious
activity – with certain exceptions.587
France did not always, of course, have a secular constitution. The strict division between
religion and politics, and church and state, is a product of the anti-clerical nature of the 1789
French Revolution. In their haste to create a new society based upon the principles of liberty,
equality, and fraternity, French revolutionaries “unleashed violent bouts of anticlericalism
and dechristianization and a terror that led to the death of 2-3,000 clergy and the exile of over
30,000 more”.588 In their Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which
guaranteed religious freedom and removed the privileges enjoyed by the Catholic Church, the
revolutionaries were able to begin the secularisation process which ultimately culminated in
the 1905 law establishing laïcité as a fundamental principle.589
583 Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations, 31, 2008. Hurd makes an important point in her
book about the influence of religion in the Western world when she remarks that “authoritative forms of
secularism that dominate modern politics are themselves contingent social constructions influenced by both so-
called secular and religious assumptions about ethics, metaphysics, and politics” See Hurd, The Politics of
Secularism in International Politics,14, 2008.
584 Ibid, 31.  See also Ibid, 36-37.
585 Ibid.




588 David Blackbourn, “The Catholic Church in Europe since the French revolution,” Comparative Studies in
Society and History 33(4): 778-790, 1991, 789.




Yet Catholicism did not disappear, and France remains, at least according to the CIA World
Factbook, “63-66%” Catholic.590 Nor has the public presence of Christianity vanished,
despite the promise of secularism to create a religiously neutral public sphere. The French
government continues to contribute to the upkeep and even reconstruction of Churches built
before 1905, and to co-fund Christian and some Jewish – but not Muslim – schools to this
day.591 Thus while the 1905 law promised equality of religions in France, practically the
country has continued to privilege Christianity (often equating it with integral elements of
French ‘culture’), and in particular Catholic Christianity.592
After the terror and repression of the Revolution, a number of French Catholics began to
organise politically around the restoration of the Monarchy and a return of Catholic identity
and values.593 Others, as Oscar Arnal writes, saw their only hope for survival, in attempts to
Christianise the revolution and to “identify with positive forces for change within modern
society.”594 Political parties which sought to return France to its ‘true’ Catholic and
Monarchical self attained a degree of significance in the late 19th century, where they enjoyed
a degree of support, and sometimes disapproval, from the Catholic Church.595
The most important of these groups was the integrist Action Française. Created in the
aftermath of the Dreyfus Affair and dominated by Catholic nationalists, the party was
consistent in its opposition to secular republicanism. It is interesting to note that Charles
Maurras, a classicist who dominated the party intellectually throughout most of its history,
believed that nation was more important than religion; his devotion to returning France to its
Catholic roots was not precipitated by religious beliefs. Rather, Maurras thought that France
was essentially a culturally Catholic nation, and that the country ought not to deny this
important aspect of its ‘authentic’ self.596 Later, in the mid-20th century, Nazi controlled
Vichy France embodied many of the values of France’s radical right, combining conservative
Catholic social views, Christian identity and authoritarian governance. This should not be
surprising, especially given that Action Francaise leader Charles Maurras supported the
590 CIA, The World Factbook, Entry for France. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/fr.html.
591 See Mayanthi  Fernando, “The French Myth of Secularism,” The Conversation, January 15, 2015.
https://theconversation.com/the-french-myth-of-secularism-36227.
592 Ibid.
593 Oscar L. Arnal, Ambivalent Alliance: The Catholic Church and the Action Francaise, 1899 – 1938,
Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985, 3
594 Ibid.
595 For a full discussion of the Catholic nature of Action Francaise, and the relationship between the party and
the Catholic Church, see Arnal, Ambivalent Alliance: The Catholic Church and the Action Francaise, 1985.
596 Ibid, 14-15.
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Vichy puppet state, and together with certain other party members wielded a great deal of
influence inside the regime.597
In the second half of the 20th century, however, the most important influence on French
politics after the war came from General Charles de Gaulle, the first and founding President
of the Fifth French Republic, and from the political philosophy named after him, Gaullism.
While de Gaulle was himself a Catholic and a political conservative, he upheld France’s
secular constitution and its revolutionary ethos: liberté, egalité, fraternité. As Gaullism
became the dominant political philosophy of post-war France, so mainstream conservatives
began to accept laïcité as an essential element of the French state and French culture.
The radical right, however, continued to challenge Gaullism and oppose laïcité and its
characteristic demand that religion be entirely privatised and removed from the public sphere.
For example, the Action Française movement, though it had complex relations with the
Church, conceived of the French nation as essentially Catholic.598 Action Française became
discredited after the end of the Second World War due to its association with the Nazism, but
its anti-secularism and emphasis on the importance of retaining France’s Catholic culture was
inculcated in a later political movement, the National Front.
The National Front can thus be understood as part of a long tradition in right-wing French
politics which explicitly links French culture to Catholicism and opposes laícité. The party,
much like the Action Française, has never been exactly aligned with the Catholic Church.
Rather, it embraced Catholic thinkers who were sometimes at odds with the Vatican. Indeed,
it was not the contemporary Catholic Church to which the National Front expressed loyalty,
but to France’s ancient Catholic heritage. Thus the party often held traditional, pre-Vatican II
Latin Mass at party events, and invoked Catholic practices as key aspects of French
identity.599
One of the most significant developments in France during the 1970s was the advent of mass
immigration from French colonies. During this period opposition to immigration became the
defining characteristic of the National Front and of radical right politics in France. Of course,
the country had experienced waves of immigration, including from North Africa, during the
597 John Pollard, The Papacy in the Age of Totalitarianism: 1914-1958, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014,
315.
598 See Arnal, Ambivalent Alliance: The Catholic Church and the Action Francaise, 1985.
599 Peter Davies, The National Front in France: Ideology, Power, and Discourse, 29, 1999.
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19th and early 20th centuries.600 After the Second World War, and due to concerns about
France’s low fertility and the need for workers, immigration levels were increased.601 Most
significantly, a large and growing proportion of immigrants to France were from North
Africa, particularly Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. In 1946 just 2% of immigrants to France
were North African. By 1982 39% of immigrants came from this region.602
The presence of mostly Muslim people from the Middle East and North Africa, and indeed
parts of sub-Saharan Africa, had a powerful effect on French politics. Immigration had
simply not been an important issue in France before the mid-1970s. Even radical right did not
organise itself around opposition to immigration before the 1970s.603 In the 1980s, however,
opposition to immigration – particularly from North African countries – became a defining
policy of groups such as the National Front. The growing number of French citizens
identifying as Muslim – 8-10% of the population as of 2008 or between 5-7 million people –
solidified opposition to immigration as the key policy issue for the party.604 What is most
interesting is that the National Front objected to these immigrants primarily on cultural and
religious, rather than on racial, grounds. This was partly, perhaps, to do with a growing taboo
around racism and racist language in France, or as Roy suggests a conscious choice to fight
Gramsci inspired left-wing ideas about ending ‘white’ cultural hegemony.605
The increasing unpopularity of Muslims in France – and the related growing power of the
National Front – may also be related to the economically and educationally disadvantaged
position of some French Muslim immigrants and their children. Due perhaps to the poverty
and isolation experienced by Muslim communities, Muslims tend to be vastly
overrepresented in the prison population.606 The criminality of jihadist groups, who have
600 Perhaps surprisingly, France has settled more immigrants in the past two centuries than any other country in
Europe. In 1930, foreigners made up a larger share of the French population than the population of the United
States. See Alec G. Hargraves, Immigration, Race and Ethnicity in contemporary France, London: Routledge,
1999, 5.
601 Hargraves, Immigration, Race and Ethnicity in contemporary France, 10-11, 1999.
602 Hargraves, Immigration, Race and Ethnicity in contemporary France, 11-12,1999.
603 Roy, “The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laïcité,” 80-81, 2016.
604 Percentage of Muslims estimated by the US State Department in 2008. The French government did not keep
figures on religious and ethnic demographics. See US Department of State, “International Religious Freedom
Report 2008: France.” https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/2008/108446.htm.
605 Roy, “The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laïcité,” 82-83, 2016.
606 No official figures are kept, but it is likely that at least 27% of all inmates in French prisons are Muslims,
with a figure of 40-50% more likely, and probably no more than 60%. Whichever number is correct, it is clear
that Muslims – who are 8-10% of the population – are overrepresented in the prison population. See Sam
Bowman, “Are 70% of France’s Prison Inmates Muslim?” Adam Smith Institute, March 29, 2017.
https://www.adamsmith.org/blog/are-70-of-frances-prison-inmates-muslims. See also “Caged Fervour: Should
jails segregate Jihadists?” The Economist, September 17, 2016.
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21707230-should-jails-segregate-jihadists-caged-fervour.
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killed hundreds of French people in the past two decades, has also undoubtedly played an
important role in increasing the visibility, and unpopularity, of Muslim immigrants. Yet
perhaps as important as these factors is the different and perhaps greater religiosity of
Muslims, which makes Muslims especially visible in France. All have contributed to a
growing sense among non-Muslim French that one can either be Muslim or French, but one
cannot be both.607
This is not to say that real cultural differences have not emerged between the Muslim and
non-Muslim populations of France. Indeed, the controversy surrounding the 2012 publication
of cartoons satirising Islam’s Prophet in Charlie Hebdo, which angered some French
Muslims, might be used to highlight apparent differing attitudes to freedom of speech in
France. Yet it would be misleading to simply state that Muslim are less tolerant of free
speech than other French. While the French state considers racial vilification a serious
offense, and prosecutes racist ‘hate speech’, it is reluctant to prosecute those who insult a
person or group’s religious beliefs and practices. For some French Muslims this may seem
hypocritical, and they may wonder why freedom of speech is allotted to those who insult
Islam, but not those who insult a racial group.
However one interprets the Charlie Hebdo affair, this difference of opinion on the matter of
freedom to criticise or satirise religion has led some French, to conclude that Islam is
incompatible with laïcité. Such is the basis for the party’s call to halt immigration from
Muslim countries to France. This is particularly interesting, because the party – as we have
seen – was from the beginning rooted in a tradition of opposition to secularism. Yet at least
since 2011, when Marine Le Pen took over the leadership of the party, we see the party
seeking to preserve France’s Catholic heritage and identity by defending laïcité from hostile
and religious Muslims.
The idea that Islam threatens laïcité has prompted a long running debate in France over the
wearing of religious items or religious dress in public places. Thus France has banned certain
forms of Islamic dress, while also restricting the religious ornamentation worn by people of
607 A notion perhaps not substantiated by facts. When asked if they identify more as Muslim than French
citizens, 46% of French Muslims said they considered themselves more Muslim, and 42% considered
themselves French citizens first. In Britain, however, 81% of Muslims reported feeling more Muslim first. Jodie
T. Allen and Richard Wike, “How Europe and its Muslims populations see each other,” in Muslims in Western
Politics, Abdulkader H. Sinno (ed.), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009, 154.
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other faiths – including Christianity – in public places.608 In this case, French politicians
reacted against the perceived oppression of women by Islam by trying, in their own way, to
regulate women’s dress. In another irony, conservative politicians – who a generation ago
might have opposed the wearing of the bikini on the grounds that it is immodest – now try to
prevent religious women from dressing in a manner they perceive to be ‘modest.’ Thus we
find Marine Le Pen and the National Front attacking Muslims from a relatively left-wing or
liberal position, and describing Muslims as a conservative and retrograde element threatening
liberal sexual freedoms.609
In the next two sections of this chapter I discuss the history of the National Front, which I
divide into two eras: the Jean-Marie Le Pen era and the Marine Le Pen era. I cannot cover, of
course, every aspect of the National Front during these two eras. Therefore I describe and
analyse only the events which shaped the party’s relationship with religion, and show how
this relationship evolved over time and in relation to Muslim immigration and increasing
secularisation.
The National Front and religion: 1972-2011
The National Front’s relationship with religion, and especially with the Catholic Church,
evolved partly as a result of both the personality of Jean-Marie Le Pen, as well and the
growth of non-white and often non-Christian immigration to France in the 1970s and 1980s.
Throughout his period as leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen did not merely lead the party but in
crucial ways personified the party.610 His personal story, personality, and political and
religious beliefs helped form the party he dominated for more than three decades.
Jean-Marie Le Pen was born in 1928 in Trinité-sur-Mer, a fishing village in Brittany.611
Educated at the Jesuit college Saint-Francois-Xavier, he lost his father, who was serving in
the French Navy, when he was fourteen years old.612 Le Pen appears to have engaged in a
certain amount of myth-making about his own formative experiences. He claimed to have
608 Legifrance, “LOI n° 2010-1192 du 11 octobre 2010 interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l'espace
public (1),” (version current as of October 31, 2017).
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670.
609 Alduy, “Has Marine Le Pen already won the battle for the soul of France?”, 2014.
610 Ibid, 1.
611 Jonathan Marcus, The National Front and French Politics: The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen, New
York: New York University Press, 29, 1995.
612 Ibid.
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worked for the French resistance during the war, and to have illegally “kept a rifle, an
automatic pistol and ammunition in his home.”613 He appears to have exaggerated his role in
the resistance, claiming to have personally taken part in battle against German troops, a
suggestion which has since been discredited. 614
What we do know about Le Pen’s youth is that he became something of a street fighter
during his university days, when he studied law in Paris, and where he was engaged in street
battles against Communist youth.615 A self-styled patriot and defender of French colonialism,
he quit his studies and volunteered to fight against the Communist Vietnamese, and later
fought in Algeria during the French-Algerian war.616
Le Pen joined Pierre Poujade’s populist movement, the UDCA, and was elected to the
National Assembly in 1957. He claimed to be attracted to the UDCA because it sought to
defend the interests of shopkeepers against big business and ‘elites,’ though the party’s
xenophobic, anti-intellectual, and anti-Semitic politics no doubt also appealed to the young
Le Pen.617 After falling out with Poujade, Le Pen became involved in other radical right
movements sympathetic towards the Vichy regime and French Nazi collaborationists before
founding, in 1972, from out of disparate right-wing elements his own party, the National
Front.618
In its first few years, the party was not particularly concerned with the issue of
immigration.619 The party was at first more interested in rehabilitating the Vichy regime and
other collaborationists, opposing Communism, defending French Colonialism, and promoting
conservative social values. Yet from its inception the party has sought to identify itself as a
protector of French identity. The prevalence of Nazi sympathisers among the early National
Front organisers meant there was a decidedly neo-pagan aspect to the party’s notion of
French identity, and what Olivier Roy has called an exulting of “pre-Christian Europe”.620
Roy suggests that even though the early National Front “took the Celtic ‘cross’ as their







619 Roy, “The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laïcité,” 80-81, 2016.. Yet for an opposing
position see Davies, “The National Front in France: Ideology, Discourse and Power,” 20, 1999.
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of the Vatican II liberalizing reforms.621 According to Roy, religion was not deeply important
to the early National Front, which in its 1973 programme made no reference to religion or
laicité.622 Nor was the party orientated towards populism at this point, Roy writes, but was
driven by primarily by pagan neo-fascist ideology.623
While Roy is right to point out the importance of neo-pagan, anti-Christian ideology in the
National Front, it must be remembered that Catholic identity – if not Catholic belief – has
since the beginning been important to the party. Jean-Marie Le Pen has described himself as a
believing Catholic, and has throughout his political life surrounded himself with Catholic
fundamentalists and others who believe that France ought to have a strong Catholic
identity.624 There is always a temptation among thinkers who sympathize with Christianity, or
with religion in general, to dismiss the religious nature of the National Front Of course, the
party cannot be said to be a religious party in the sense that it bases its policies upon Christian
principles. However, under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen the party celebrated the
traditional Latin mass at their rallies and other events, and is influenced by Catholic thinkers
including rebel Archbishop Marcel Lefebvre, who was himself a vocal supporter of the
National Front.625 It is very likely that Latin Mass was celebrated at party rallies in part
because it was perceived to be especially conservative and right-wing, rather than because the
party actually wished its supporters to engage with Catholic principles and theology.
Nevertheless, traditional Catholicism and Christian imagery was important to the National
Front precisely because – though the party’s voters were rarely devout – the party believed
“that in some undefinable way, the Church is a bulwark against the ‘mortal perils’ that
confront France, and that the good health of the Church conditions that of the nation.”626 This
mixture of different elements – neo-pagan, Catholic, secular – within the party makes it
difficult to categorise the party as solely Catholic. Having said that, under Jean-Marie Le
Pen’s leadership the party was firmly attached “to religious teaching and the values of the
Church in its strictures on the family, abortion, contraception and homosexuality.”627




624 See Peter Davies, “The National Front and Catholicism: From Integrisme to Joan of Arc and Clovis,”
Religion Compass 4(9), 2010, 576–587.




revolution, and described it as an essentially anti-Catholic event which sought to destroy the
Church and Catholic France.628
The early National Front’s anti-Communist, anti-Semitic, and Vichy regime sympathising
brand of politics does not appear to have appealed to French voters, and the party struggled to
attract support throughout the 1970s. An important change came over the party in the late
1970s – Roy dates it from 1978 – when the party changed both its political ideology as well
as its rhetoric. Rather than attack Communist and Jewish influence in France, the party
focused on stopping immigration to France, which they claimed was undermining French
culture and creating unemployment. However, the party did not object to immigrants based
solely on their race, but instead complained that people of different cultures could not live
together. The mostly Muslim North African immigrants who began arriving in France in
large number in the 1970s could not, according to the party, assimilate into French society
because they had grown up in an entirely different culture and with a vastly different
religious heritage.629
The advent of large scale non-European immigration had an interesting effect on French
culture. Jean Raspail’s 1973 novel The Camp of the Saints captures the reaction of some
French people when confronted by the first large wave of Arab and African migrants. In his
book Raspail describes the invasion of Europe by third world peoples – who are supported by
Western intellectuals who see the newcomers as a cleansing force – who by the end of the
story have marginalised white people and taken over their territories. It is instructive to note
that Raspail is not specifically concerned about religion in his novel, and does not identify
migrants by their faith. Indeed, his novel did not sell well when it was first released and was
poorly reviewed by all publications with the exception of a handful of radical right
magazines. Yet The Camp of the Saints grew in popularity over time, and became embraced
by right-wing thinkers across the Western world who adapted its racist ideology to fit their
own religion and culture based differentiation of peoples, and who – like a growing number
of French – were concerned about the effect Muslim immigration was having on their
country.630
628 Ibid, 29.
629 Roy, “The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laïcité,” 82-83, 2016.
630 For an example of the populist right’s embrace of Raspail’s book see Virgil, “Decline and Fall: The Grim
Message of The Camp of the Saints” Breitbart, 24 November 2014. http://www.breitbart.com/big-
government/2014/11/24/decline-and-fall-the-grim-message-of-the-camp-of-the-saints/.
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The National Front was the party which capitalised on the fears some French people held
about the future of the country and its culture in the face of mass immigration. The party’s
skilful use of identity politics, its use of the language of ‘culture’ rather than ‘race’ or
ethnicity, and its anti-immigration program brought the party increased support in the 1980s.
While Le Pen received just 0.76% of the vote in the 1974 Presidential elections, his party’s
fortune’s soon improved, and by the early 1980s was winning seats in European and
legislative elections.631 Its electoral success saw Jean-Marie Le Pen elected as a municipal
councillor in Paris in 1983, won him a seat in the National Assembly in 1986, and saw him
receive 14.4% of the vote in the 1988 presidential elections as he became one of the best
known – and most controversial – French politicians of his generation.632
Drawn to the National Front in the 1970s and 1980s were a number of important Catholic
thinkers, many from the ultra-conservative and Traditionalist wing of the Church. Perhaps
most significantly, from the late 1970s until his death, the National Front enjoyed the
occasional support of Archbishop Lefebvre – who was excommunicated by the Church in
1988 – who approved of the party’s ultra-conservativism and support for Tridentrine Mass.633
Despite this support from some important Catholic figures, in the first two decades of its
existence the party remained on the fringes of French politics, yet over time attracted voters
in increasing numbers. For example, it is interesting to note that during this period the
number of devout Catholics voting for National Front candidates decreased markedly. In the
period 1984 – 1997, the number of devout Catholics voting for the party halved, while non-
religious National Front voters more than tripled in number.634 Yet during this period the
party continued to use Catholic imagery, promote traditionalist Catholicism, and even hold
Latin mass at their election events.635 The party’s deep links with Catholicism – which
continued even as the Church itself disavowed the party – can be partly attributed to the
existence of an influential Catholic wing.636 But the importance of Catholicism goes beyond
the importance religion holds to devout Catholics. Rather, Catholicism appears important to
non-religious National Front voters, who may see in the Church and in Catholicism vital
elements of the culture which makes France French.
631 Marcus, The National Front and French Politics: The Resistible Rise of Jean-Marie Le Pen, 52, 1995.
632 Ibid, 52-53.
633 See Peter Davies and Derek Lynch, entry for “MGR Marcel Lefebvre” in The Routledge Companion to
Fascism and the Far-Right, London and New York: Routledge, 2002.
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The continuing use of Catholic imagery demonstrates how important Catholic identity –
rather than devout Christian belief – was to the National Front. For example, in 1996 the
party celebrated the 1500th anniversary of the baptism of Clovis, the Frankish king who
converted his people to Christianity, who the party described as the creator of “this eternal
France that we love.”637 For the party, France was created the moment that Clovis was
baptised, thereby forever linking Christianity to French identity.
The National Front’s other symbol for France and the Party, Joan of Arc – the peasant girl
who in the 15th century was called by God to defend France from the English – is similarly
linked to Christianity, specifically to Catholicism. In the National Front’s celebration of both
figures there is a mixing of religion and nationalism, which specifically describes the French
people as both indigenous to the land and of Christian heritage. How Christian, it must be
asked, is this kind of ethno and religious nationalism? The New Testament does not, of
course, advocate ethno-nationalism, but rather St. Paul famously remarks in a letter that when
one becomes a Christian religious heritage and ethnicity ceases to be important, but one is
bound together with all other Christians. Yet one suspects that Jean-Marie Le Pen would
prefer a France that was white, yet entirely without belief in any god or supernatural force, to
a France that was devoutly Catholic but black African. This is not to say that religion is not
important to Le Pen and the National Front, but that they believe Catholicism alone does not
make a French person, but rather Catholic heritage is one important ingredient in French
identity.
For the National Front under Jean-Marie Le Pen, France was for people who shared his
religious and ethnic heritage and who were deeply rooted in France. Certain groups were
automatically excluded by Le Pen under this scheme. Minority groups were, according to Le
Pen, not to be despised as inferior, but merely as being too different to become French. Thus
Le Pen was able to say that he loved “Maghrebins” but that “their place is in the Maghreb.”638
To defend French identity was not to condemn difference, but for Le Pen was to celebrate of
national differences and particularities, and in particular to defend the true French people who
were not cosmopolitans but rooted in their particular way of life.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s the party reached new heights of popularity and
significance under Jean-Marie Le Pen. At the 1995 Presidential elections Le Pen won 15% of
637 Ibid, 584.
638 Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe, 183, 1994.
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the vote but failed to make the second round of voting.639 In 2002, however, he astonished the
world by finishing second in the first round of Presidential voting.640 It is important to note
that Le Pen’s campaign in 2002 was based largely on his populist style argument that
immigrants and elites – French President Chirac chief among them – were responsible for the
rising crime and unemployment that allegedly plagued France. During the campaign, Le Pen
described the “Islamic population” of France as holding values “different from those of the
Judaeo-Christian world.”641 French Muslims, he said, “spat at the president of the republic”
and “booed when the national anthem was played at a soccer game.”642 Moreover, according
to Le Pen, the North African Muslim population of France is a “grave phenomenon” which
threatens France’s future.643 In such statements we see how Le Pen – a noted anti-Semite –
has reacted to the mass migration of Muslims to France by turning towards a ‘Judeo-
Christian’ identity. For Le Pen, this identity excludes Muslims from being accepted into
French society, for the obvious reason that they are not ‘Judeo-Christian.’ Despite Le Pen’s
rhetoric, his National Front remained anti-Semitic, and did not meaningfully include the
Jewish people within this identity.644 Equally, Le Pen’s late turn towards Judeo-Christian
identity begs the question, why are Muslims outside the Judeo-Christian tradition when their
religion is in part derived from Judaism and Christianity?
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s objections to Islam appear to stem from his Francophillia, racism, and
his ultra-conservative attitude towards maintaining traditional hierarchies. This is significant,
because it puts him at odds with many populist radical right politicians – including his
daughter – who emerged in the 2000s, and who hold more moderate or even progressive
views on sexual and gender matters. For this new generation of right-wing populists, the
Islamic veil must be banned because it oppresses women. Jean-Marie Le Pen did not oppose
the Islamic veil, and was not overly concerned about female oppression. Rather, he once
639 Peter Davies, The Extreme Right in France, 1789 to the Present: From de Maistre to the Present, London:
Routledge, 2002, 145. It’s important to note that most NF support came from the skilled and unskilled working
classes see Bruno Cautrés, “Old wine in new bottles? New wine in old bottles?: Class, Religion, and Vote in the
French Electorate -- the 2002 Elections in Time Perspective,” in The French Voter: Before and After the 2002
Elections, Michael S. Lewis-Beck (ed), Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, 82.
640 The reaction of experienced journalists demonstrates the surprising nature of Le Pen’s success in 2002, see
“France’s Election Shock,” PBS Newshour, April 22, 2002. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/europe-jan-
june02-election_4-22/.




644 Jean-Marie Le Pen was forced out of the party he founded, partly on the grounds that his views – and anti-
Semitism – was too extreme. See “France’s National Front expels founder Jean-Marie Le Pen,” The Guardian,
20 August, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/20/frances-national-front-party-expels-founder-
jean-marie-le-pen.
172
attempted to ‘joke’ about the veil by saying that he favoured its use because “it protects us
from ugly women.”645 Moreover, Le Pen’s conservatism sometimes resembles Islamic
conservatism, especially in their shared opposition to homosexual rights, abortion, and
feminism. To the end of his time as leader of the National Front, Le Pen never fully embraced
the values of laïcité, nor did he ever cease describing French culture in partly religious terms.
Rather, he opposed Muslim immigration not because he feared it would lead to a more
religious and conservative society, but because he saw Muslim immigration as a tool used by
the left to destroy Catholic – or later ‘Judeo-Christian’ – France.
Despite his impressive result in the first round of voting in 2002, Le Pen did not ultimately
become President of France. His initial success galvanised the left, which collectively voted
against the National Front leader and for his more moderate right-wing rival, Jacques Chirac.
The relatively unpopular Chirac won in a landslide, with Le Pen receiving just 17% of the
vote and finding himself utterly rejected by the French electorate. Perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, following this rejection by voters the party found itself in the political
wilderness for several years, and experienced mounting financial problems which
accompanied a loss of electoral support.
The National Front and Religion: 2011--2017
In 2011 Jean-Marie Le Pen resigned from the leadership of the party he had created and
dominated for several decades. The party’s inability to gain new supporters and its financial
woes, as well as Jean-Marie Le Pen’s age, appears to have eventually forced him to retire
from his role. His daughter, Marine Le Pen, succeeded him as leader. Marine Le Pen very
quickly began to reform the party, in line with her conception of French identity, which was
strikingly different to that of her father.
Marine Le Pen made a number of significant changes when assuming the position of leader.
She attempted to detoxify the party’s fascist image by disciplining members – including her
own father – who made grossly anti-Semitic comments, denied the Holocaust, or minimised
Nazi war crimes.646 At the same time, she consciously moved the party toward the centre by
645 Ibid.
646 See Steve Cannane, “Marine Le Pen’s de-demonising of the National Front puts her within striking distance
of the Presidency,” ABC News, 8 May, 2017. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-06/french-election-marine-
le-pen-de-demonises-national-front/8503110.
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softening its ultra-conservative social policies, particularly on issues such as gay rights and
abortion. Importantly, by moving the party towards the centre Le Pen was able to attack
French Muslims for being too conservative, and for not observing secular differentiation of
religion from politics. Thus while her father had attacked Islam from a radical right
perspective, Marine Le Pen attacked Islam from a populist position, emphasising the danger
Muslims allegedly pose towards women, homosexuals, and the principle of secularism.647
Marine Le Pen has described herself as a Catholic, yet she could not be described as a
socially conservative Catholic. She has avoided marriage since her 2006 divorce and has a
partner, Louis Aliot, a French lawyer of Algerian-Jewish heritage who himself became Vice-
President of the party in 2011. Despite her own rejection of Christian norms, she has
described France as a country founded on Judeo-Christian values, and has called French
culture secularised Christianity.648 At the same time, Le Pen has taken an increasingly
hardline position in defence of laïcité during her time as party leader, and appears to support
– unlike her father – France’s 1905 law separating Church and State.649 Yet this increasingly
uncompromising defence of secularism has not meant that she no longer regards France as a
Judeo-Christian nation. Rather, Le Pen appears to maintain not merely the compatibility of
Judeo-Christian beliefs and secular differentiation, but that Judeo-Christianity underpins
France’s secular values.
Marine Le Pen’s leadership had an immediate effect on the National Front’s popularity. In
2007, under her father’s leadership, the party won 10% of the vote at the Presidential
elections. In 2012 the party achieved its then best ever result, with more than 17.90% of
French voters backing Marine Le Pen for President of France. Her popularity continued to
rise, with an astonishing 33% of French voters backing the National Front at the 2017
presidential elections.650 While Marine Le Pen’s leadership had an almost immediate effect
on the party’s image and rhetoric, party policy changed little in her first two years as leader.
While on economic matters the party increasingly emphasised the need for protectionism,
647 See Le Pen’s comments on protecting homosexuals and women from Muslim immigrants in Alduy, “Has
Marine Le Pen already won the battle for the soul of France?” 2014.
648 At a party rally in 2017 she described France’s core secular values – Liberity, equality, and fraternity – as
coming from its Christian heritage. See Emma Green, “The Spectre of Catholic Identity in Secular France,” The
Atlantic, May 6, 2017. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/christian-identity-
france/525558/.
649 Roy, “The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laïcité,” 2016, 90.
650 See the official results from the French interior ministry as reported  in The Guardian, Sean Clarke and Josh




their social policy remained very conservative and right-wing.651 The National Front
remained opposed to immigration, the relaxing of abortion laws, and allowing homosexuals
to marry.652 The manner in which policies were presented, however, did change in 2012.
Culture and religion are brought to the forefront of National Front policy, but in an entirely
different manner to that of the Jean-Marie Le Pen years. Christianity and secularism are
blurred into one single entity called French culture, which is said to be threatened by
globalisation – by neoliberal economics and the Islamic faith brought to France by migrants.
For example, in 2007 the party’s election manifesto claimed immigrants were destroying the
French economy, French culture, and behind a great deal of criminal activity. As Stockemer
and Barisione write, “during most of Jean Marie Le Pen’s presidency, anti-immigration or
xenophobia was the central theme of the party’s programme; all other policy areas were seen
through an anti-immigration lens.”653 In 2012 economic and cultural protectionism were the
focal points of the manifesto. Immigration was dealt with more subtly, and the problems
immigrants brought to France woven into the manifesto’s sections on economic and social
policy, and emphasis on the need to protect France from global capitalism and Islamic
fundamentalism.654
The most significant policy change was on laïcité. Jean-Marie Le Pen was strongly anti-
secularist, and sought to return France to its Catholic roots. National Front policy during his
time as leader reflected his position on laïcité which he saw as an impediment to returning
France to its authentically Catholic self. The 2012 National Front manifesto, however, lauds
laïcité as an integral element of the French Republic and makes only one reference to
Christianity, and only then in the final pages.655 This mention, however, is extremely
enlightening. The FN manifesto notes that Christianity has been the religion of the majority
of French people for more than a millennium, and thus France’s national culture and
651 Gilles Ivaldi. The Successful Welfare-Chauvinist Party? The Front National in the 2012 elections in France.
ESA’s Research Network on Political Sociology (RN32) Mid-term conference, Nov 2012, Milano, Italy. Panel
on ‘The Populist Radical Right in the Context of the Economic and Socio-Political Crisis: Comparative
Perspectives and Country Studies,’ 18. https://hal.inria.fr/halshs-00765428/document.
652 Ibid, 10.
653 Daniel Stockemer and Maruo Barisone, “The New Discourse of the National Front under Marine Le Pen: A
Slight Change with a Big Impact,” European Journal of Communication, Vol. 32(2) 100–115, 2017, 107.
654 Ibid.
655 “Notre Projet, Programme Politique du Front National,” Front National website.
https://www.frontnational.com/pdf/Programme.pdf, 2011, 105.  While I try to avoid French language sources,
this section of the manifesto has not been addressed in English.
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traditions are Christian in nature.656 Immigrants should not flout, the manifesto says, these
Christian traditions which are, after all, an integral part of French identity.657 Curiously,
following this declaration is a stronger message defending laïcité, which the party intends to
strengthen by altering the constitution to make recognition of religious groups illegal, ban
religious attire (especially the Islamic veil) from public places, and prevent Muslim led
women’s only swimming events at public pools.658 The mention of France’s Christian
heritage appears to contradict the message that secular neutrality – laïcité – is a vital part of
French life. Again, however, this seeming contradiction can be explained if for Marine Le
Pen both Christianity and secularism are intrinsic elements of authentic French culture.
While 2012 was an electorally successful year for the National Front, it was not until the
December 2015 regional elections that the party moved into the French political mainstream.
The success of the party occurred during the height of the immigration crisis, during which
Marine Le Pen strongly opposed allowing Muslim asylum seekers refuge in France, a
position at odds with her conservative and left-wing rivals. The 2015 regional elections were
thus the first significant test of the party’s anti-asylum seeker policies.659 The National Front
received the most support of any contesting party, winning 27.73% of the vote, just over 1%
more than the Nicolas Sarkozy led The Republicans.660 Despite winning the greatest share of
the vote, the party failed – stymied by the concerted efforts of other parties – to win a single
region. Nonetheless, Marine Le Pen was now one of the most influential politicians in
France, and though her party held no regional seats, the National Front’s hard-line against
Muslim asylum seekers was clearly supported by – at the very least – the 27% of French who
voted for the party.
Success followed the party into 2017. In February 2017 the National Front summarised its




659 Muslim immigration was among the most contentious issues in France in 2015. For example, French
novelest Michel Houellebecq published in 2015 his novel Submission, which described the coming Islamist
revolution in France, which he author has occur in the year 2022. In Submission Marine Le Pen appears to be
heading for victory in the second round of presidential elections, but is upstaged by a Muslim Brotherhood
candidate who – with the support of the left – wins a majority of votes and becomes French President. The new
president enacts sweeping reforms which quickly do away with secularism, gender equality, and which privilege
Islam above other religions. Houellebecq’s primary target in his somewhat satirical novel is not so much
Muslims or Islam, but French secular culture and the intellectuals it produces, which the non-religious
Houellebecq finds little worth in, and which he appears to perceive as being weak and almost deserving of being
swept away by the more vigorous culture of Islam.
660 Les Républicains; essentially a rebranded UMP.
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people.661 The “144 Commitments” is a populist and nationalistic document in which the FN
pledges to take France out of the Eurozone so as to protect its economy and culture.662
Significantly, left-wing protectionism and welfarism are mixed with more traditional right-
wing economic policies such as lowering taxation and cutting spending. For example,
industries are to be re-nationalised when necessary,663 and immigration limited to 10,000
people per year.664 On the other hand, financial incentives are to be given to French families
in order that they should produce more children,665 and French civilisation, values, traditions,
and identity are to be defended in an amended French constitution.666 To this end, laïcité is to
be strengthened to combat Islamic fundamentalism, and women’s rights protected from
Islamism.667 Interestingly, abortion and the restoration of the death penalty – discussed in the
2012 FN manifesto – go without mention in 2017.668
Christianity is not mentioned by name in the 2017 manifesto. In her rhetoric, however,
Marine Le Pen returned to the theme of France as a Judeo-Christian civilisation threatened by
Islamists. In a speech announcing her decision to run for President, Le Pen described liberty,
equality, and fraternity as Christian principles secularised – principles she implied were
absent in Islam. Le Pen’s niece and National Front candidate, Marion Maréchal-Le Pen,
moved beyond her aunt’s Christianist secular rhetoric and called for France to return to its
Christian roots, and for the exclusion of Islam on the basis that it is incompatible with
Christianity. Thus in 2017 the National Front displayed in their discourse a mixture of
Gaullist secularism, Christianist secularism, and in the rhetoric of Maréchal-Le Pen
something more akin to Jean-Marie Len Pen style Catholic identity politics. Drawing it all
661 The document is no longer available on the FN’s national website and Marine Le Pen’s 2017 campaign
website has been deleted. Google cache of document can be found here:
https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:yw3VV1SZqesJ:https://www.marine2017.fr/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/a4_35_engagements_fedes_bd.pdf+&cd=5&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=au The document has
been preserved by the Loiret branch of the FN: http://www.fn-loiret.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-
presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf
662 John Henley, “Marine Le Pen promises liberation from the EU with France first policies,” The Guardian,
February 6, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/marine-le-pen-promises-liberation-from-
the-eu-with-france-first-policies.
663 Front National “144 Engagements Présidentiels,” http://www.fn-loiret.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/projet-
presidentiel-marine-le-pen.pdf. Commitment 34.
664 Ibid, commitment 26.
665 Ibid, commitment 55.
666 Ibid, commitment 91.
667 Ibid, commitment 9.
668 Paul Smith, “What Marine Le Pen’s 144 point presidential plan for France actually says,” The Conversation,
February 14, 2017. https://theconversation.com/what-marine-le-pens-144-point-presidential-plan-for-france-
actually-says-72910.
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together is opposition to Islam and Muslim immigration, and a sense that French identity and
heritage must be defended from the threat posed by Muslim migrants to France.
The 2017 French Presidential elections, the first round of which were held on April 23 and
the second on May 7, marked the electoral breakthrough for which the FN had been longing.
In the first round of voting Marine Le Pen came second, winning 21.30% of the vote.669 Her
right-wing rival from The Republicans, Francois Fillon, attracted just over 20% of the vote.
The winner was En Marche! candidate Emmanuel Macron, who won 24.01% of the vote.
Thus Marine Le Pen faced Macron in the second round. This time Macron trounced Le Pen,
winning 66.10% percent of the vote to Le Pen’s 33.90%.670 While the heavy loss no doubt
disappointed Le Pen and her supporters, never before had an FN candidate won so many
votes. Marine Le Pen received almost twice as many votes as her father received in his
supposed breakthrough year of 2002. There were special circumstances in 2017 which may
explain the increased National Front vote. The Republicans’ candidate, Fillon, lost popularity
during the campaign due to a scandal in which he and his wife became embroiled.671 Equally,
Le Pen was running at a time in which voter dissatisfaction with the traditional governing
parties had reached a high.672
It would be wrong, therefore, to suggest that the party’s success post-2011 was due entirely to
Marine Le Pen’s attacks on Islam and reconceptualisation of French culture as Judeo-
Christian and thus incompatible with Islam. Perhaps more significantly, under Marine Le Pen
the party became, more explicitly, a party for working class patriots opposed to both
neoliberalism and multiculturalism. In other words, Le Pen positioned the National Front as
the party for people who opposed right-wing economics but favoured cultural homogeneity,
and who favoured left-wing economic protectionism and welfarism but opposed left-wing
efforts to make France a multicultural society. Like other populists, the National Front under
Marine Le Pen sought to blame ‘globalists’ and ‘elites’ for the real and imagined problems
669 “French presidential election: first round results in charts and maps,” The Guardian, April 23, 2017.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/apr/23/french-presidential-election-results-2017-latest.
670 “French Presidential Election May 2017 full second round results and analysis,” The Guardian, May 26,
2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2017/may/07/french-presidential-election-results-
latest.
671 See Angelique Chrisafis, “Francois Fillon under formal investigation for ‘fake jobs offenses,’” The
Guardian, 14 March, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/14/francois-fillon-placed-under-
formal-investigation-over-fake-jobs.
672 According to polls, Hollande was the “most unpopular president in French polling history.” See “Alone and
unpopular, France’s Hollande throws in the towel,” France24, 1 December, 2016.
https://www.france24.com/en/20161201-france-hollande-unpopular-president-legacy.
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mass immigration has brought to France since the 1970s, and divided these ‘elites’ from ‘the
people’ of France who have allegedly suffered on account of their mismanagement.673
It is moreover difficult to know whether the National Front’s use of religion in their discourse
specifically influenced voters. One cannot easily imagine the average person in the street
speaking about the Judeo-Christian foundations of their secular culture. Yet 33.90% percent
of voters supported a candidate who expressed exactly this notion, suggesting that there must
be some feeling within France that Muslims do not fit into French culture because they lack a
Christian heritage and/or because they practice a faith which does not differentiate between
religion and politics. The National Front remains divided on the issue of secularism, with a
Catholic wing remaining hostile to Marine Le Pen’s devotion to laïcité – even if she
understands the concept as being derived ultimately from Christian principles. Yet whether
Catholic or secular, the party consistently identifies France’s Christian heritage with
contemporary French identity, and attracts both secular and religious voters who sympathise
with its political programme.
Explaining the National Front’s use of religion in their discourse
Christian identity has played a powerful role in the discourse of the National Front almost
since its inception. In this chapter, however, I have shown a shift occurring in National Front
rhetoric on religion, which became especially pronounced after the resignation of Jean-Marie
Le Pen and Marine Le Pen’s assumption of party leadership. This change involved two
distinct things. First, a move away from race based differentiation of peoples, and from a
conception of French identity which emphasised race or ethnicity, and towards a
religious/cultural based differentiation of peoples and a conception of French identity based
on religion and culture. Second, the party began to accept laïcité as an essential part of
French culture. This acceptance of laïcité did not mean, however, that the party’s Christian
identity was jettisoned. Rather, under Marine Le Pen’s leadership laïcité became identified as
a unique expression of France’s Judeo-Christian culture and heritage.
Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front opposed laïcité and France’s secular identity, and sought
to return France to a pre-secular condition in which Catholic identity and conservative
673 “The main thing at stake in this election is the rampant globalisation that is endangering our civilisation” –
Marine Le Pen quoted in Angelique Chrisafis, “Marine Le Pen rails against rampant globalisation after election
success,” The Guardian, April 24, 2017.
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Christian values formed the basis of French identity and culture. Late in his career he spoke
of France’s Judeo-Christian identity, and warned of the danger Islam posed to this identity,
however his party did not abandon its then essential anti-secular position.
Marine Le Pen shifted the party’s rhetoric, and dramatically altered its conception of French
identity after becoming leader in 2011, by meshing together France’s Christian heritage with
its secular culture and constitution. In doing so, she was able to bring secular and (Judeo-
)Christian French into a single identity, while constructing Muslims as an ‘other’ outside of
the religio-secular Judeo-Christian identity.  This shift has involved a secularising of
Christianity into ‘culture,’ and sacralisation of laïcité, merging the two into a single Judeo-
Christian tradition which is at once both secular and sacred.
Why have these changes occurred? This conceptualising of laïcité as an integral part of
French identity and culture, rather than an imposition upon it, has been noted by Olivier Roy.
Yet according to Roy, Marine Le Pen is a secularist who uses religious rhetoric merely in
order to legitimise her – and her party’s supporters – antipathy towards Muslims. He argues
that Marine Le Pen has effectively removed from the National Front its Catholic values, and
shifted it towards an embracing of laïcité.674 Marine Le Pen’s use of religion is thus described
as cynical and instrumental, and designed merely to construct Muslims as an ‘other’ and
exclude them from French public life.
There is no doubt that the National Front constructs Muslims as a pernicious ‘other’ which
threatens French culture and identity. However, it may be too simplistic to dismiss Marine Le
Pen’s rhetoric as wholly cynical in nature. Roy himself points to something more complex
occurring in France, where he notes “religion, identities, nation, culture, and values” coming
together and leaving identity to become the “key word with which to deal with any kind of
differences (racial, religious, linguistic or ethnic)”.675 Moreover, the National Front is not the
only political party emphasising the religious aspect of French identity, or suggesting that
(Judeo-)Christian values are a cornerstone of French culture. Former French President
Nicolas Sarkozy made remarks which appeared to break with France’s secular republican
tradition, describing the French as “heirs to 2000 years of Christianity”676 and calling for a
“positive laïcite” which could welcome religion back into the public sphere through a
674 Roy, “The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laïcité 91, 2016.
675 Ibid, 93.
676 Kemal Kirisci, “Religion as argument in the debate on Turkish EU membership,” in Dietrich Jung and
Catharina Ruadvere (eds), Religion, Politics, and Turkey’s EU Accession, New York: Palgrave MacMillan,
2008, 29.
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dialogue.677 The French, he argued, ought to be proud of their “magnificent Christian
heritage, and added that “as a secular president” he felt free to talk about these issues, and to
urge the French to remember that they are obliged to pass on this heritage to their children.678
In this way Sarkozy very explicitly sought to return religion into public life, though it should
be observed that by ‘religion’ Sarkozy clearly meant Christianity, and perhaps solely
Catholicism. His attitude towards Islam is perhaps revealed in his steadfast opposition to
Turkish membership of the European Union, which Sarkozy opposed on cultural grounds,
and by his decision to ban the Islamic veil from public places. 679 Sarkozy’s call for Christian
culture and heritage to be embraced by French people, and for Islam to be excluded from the
public sphere, strongly resembles the National Front’s identity politics and religion based
differentiation of peoples. This suggests that religion, or perhaps simply religious identity,
has become more important to French people at least since the early 2000s.
Given France’s – and especially mainstream French politics – secular reputation this is
somewhat surprising. There is no indication, however, that France is becoming a more
religious nation. Rather, populist radical right and some conservative French politicians are
meshing together religion and secularism in an effort to redefine French identity and culture
so as to link it exclusively with Judaism and/or Christianity. There is no question that this is
done in part to legitimise fear and dislike of Muslims, and to legitimise the repression of
Islam within France. However, it may also point to deeper changes within French society
which have developed as a result of the increasing visibility of religion in France, and the
growth of Islam and Muslims’ perceived unwillingness/inability to privatise their religious
beliefs and practices.  Of course, this is not to suggest that the Christianism of Sarkozy is the
same as that of Marine Le Pen, or Francois Fillon. The Christianism of Marine Le Pen is
special to her insofar as it appears to be a Christian identity grafted onto an entirely secularist
political programme. Where Sarkozy calls for religion to return to the public sphere, Le Pen
demands its total exclusion, except where it has been thoroughly secularised into ‘culture.’
Marine Le Pen thus can be understood to hold a Christianist secular worldview, different to
the more post-secular Christianism of Sarkozy.
677 Robert Marquand, “With Pope’s visit, Sarkozy challenges French secularism,” Christian Science Monitor,
September 15, 2008. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2008/0915/p01s01-woeu.html.
678 Paola Totaro, “Sarkozy genuflects to Christian past in pilgrimage for votes,” Sydney Morning Herald, March
5, 2011. http://www.smh.com.au/world/sarkozy-genuflects-to-catholic-past-in-pilgrimage-for-votes-20110304-
1bhzl.html.
679 Kemal Kirisci, “Religion as argument in the debate on Turkish EU membership,” 29, 2008.
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That Christianism should become prevalent in the discourse of a number of right-wing
French political parties while France itself becomes increasingly secular may appear curious,
but it becomes understandable if there has been a meshing of identity, religion, culture, and
nation in France in which both Christianity and laïcité become intrinsic elements of national
culture and identity. For example, though the secular and religious may seem to be in
opposition, or at least belong to different spheres of human activity, in the rhetoric of Marine
Le Pen they are merged into a single tradition and conception of French identity. Thus for Le
Pen, French culture is Christianity secularised; laïcité is sacralised and said to form the final
product of the France’s Judeo-Christian heritage, and Christianity is secularised into culture
and made part of France’s identity.680
The mechanism by which this identification of France as simultaneously secular and (Judeo-
)Christian has occurred appears to be through two separate events: the introduction of Islam
into the country, and the eroding of France’s national sovereignty by the forces of
globalisation, neoliberalism, and the European Union. For example, according to Marine Le
Pen, the twin threats to French culture and identity are Islam and neoliberalism. The latter Le
Pen identifies as part of an agenda spread by ‘elites’ and the European Union, which she
claims to be undermining France’s identity and culture and eroding the French nation itself.
Islam, too, according to Le Pen, threatens French identity and culture, due to the two
cultures’ fundamental incompatibility. Too many Muslims in France, according to Le Pen,
have not secularised, but continue to practice their religion in public. For Le Pen, this is an
indication that Islam, unlike Judaism and Christianity, “is not soluble in secularism.”
To combat the perceived threat of Islam and neoliberal/EU attacks on French sovereignty and
identity, Le Pen – like Sarkozy – turns towards France’s religious past. By defining French
culture and identity as Judeo-Christian yet secular, Le Pen is able to ‘other’ Muslims, and
exclude them from French society. Equally, she is able to reject the neoliberalism and
multiculturalism of the European Union as an Anglo-Saxon imposition on France, antithetical
to its Judeo-Christian heritage and contemporary secular culture.681 This instrumental
explanation of Le Pen’s post-secular seeming blending of laïcité and Judeo-Christianity into
French ‘culture’ does not tell us, however, why this specific language is being used. Le Pen
680 See Le Pen’s remark that France has “Christian roots” yet is “laïque.” Marine Le Pen, quoted by Roy in
“The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laïcité, 91, 2016.
681 See Le Pen’s comments after the coming second in the first round of voting in the 2017 Presidential
elections, as quoted by Chrisafis in “Marine Le Pen rails against rampant globalisation following election
success,” 2017.
182
and the National Front could just as easily legitimise anti-Muslim attitudes and call for the
exclusion of Muslims on purely secular grounds. Equally, they could oppose neoliberal
economics and the weakening of French sovereignty on secular-nationalist grounds. Why,
then, is religion and religious identity invoked by Le Pen when defending France and French
identity from its perceived enemies?
The answer may lie in the manner in which Muslims immigration has altered some French
people’s sense of their national and civilisational identity. Following the mass immigration of
Muslims to France, Marine Le Pen and people who share her worldview have come to
believe that (1) laïcité is unique to France and a product of its particular religious heritage,
and (2) Islam represents a wholly different religious and political tradition which by its own
nature cannot secularise, and is therefore incompatible with French identity, culture, and
values. This has occurred, first, because Muslim difference and visibility makes French
culture more visibly Christian in nature. Before the mass migration of Muslims, and
especially before it became clear that most French Muslims were unlikely to assimilate into
French culture and entirely privatise their religious beliefs and practices, National Front
rhetoric highlighted the differences between laïcité and Catholicism. For the party and its
leader Jean-Marie Le Pen, secularism appeared to mark an unwelcome break from the ‘true’
Catholic France.
After Muslims became numerous, and Islam became a visible and visibly different presence
in France, the National Front began to become conscious of the elements of France’s secular
culture which marked not a break but a continuation of Catholicism and (Judeo-)Christianity.
As this occurred, the barrier between the secular and religious began to break down as both
were merged into ‘identity’; Christianity was secularised into French culture and identity, and
laïcité was sacralised – not as a religion, but as a vital element of French culture and the laws
of the French nation-state. In this environment it is possible for Christmas to become a
secular holiday, and a skyline filled with Church spires no longer simply a symbol of
Christianity, but an element of French culture. In contrast, symbols of Islam – including the
headscarf – may be interpreted as an affront to the France’s Judeo-Christian identity and
culture.
By defining French culture – including French secularism – as a product of France’s
Christian heritage, the party is able to exclude Muslims from the public sphere, on the basis
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that Muslim belong to a religion that cannot secularise, and thus cannot become truly
‘French.’ In linking secularism to Christianity, and demonising Islam as unable to secularise,
the National Front is ultimately acknowledging that secularism is unlikely to triumph over
Islam, and that Islam must therefore be excluded from France. Thus by insisting on the
cessation of Muslim immigration to France, and by demanding oppressive measures targeting
Islam and Islamic symbols, the Marine Le Pen led National Front tacitly acknowledge the
inability of laïcité to secularise France’s Muslims.
It is possible, then, to understand the Marine Le Pen’s use of religion in her rhetoric as an
expression of the Christianist secularism common among populist radical right parties in
Western Europe. For example, despite her appeal to Christianity, there is no evidence that Le
Pen and the National Front seek to benefit from the moral language of Christianity and
Judaism, or wish to use religion inspired ethics when discussing complex moral issues such
as euthanasia or abortion. Rather, religion is admired for its ability to define French culture,
values, and identity in a manner which prevents the National Front’s enemies from defining
themselves as French. Moreover, Le Pen has moved the party away from policies informed
by conservative or traditional Catholicism, and towards policies informed by contemporary
secular mores. Equally, while the National Front is deeply nationalist, it has a civlisationalist
streak. As Davies notes, while the National Front objects strongly to “artificial” European
constructions such as the European Union, it is supportive of the notion of a common
European heritage which must be defended from outsiders.682 In these ways, the National
Front meets the criteria set by Brubaker for inclusion in the Christianist secularist group of
populist radical right parties.683
My examination of the rise of Christianism in the France, particularly within the context of
the growth of the National Front post-2011, suggests that French people’s encounter with
Islam in France has (1) revealed the non-universal nature of French secularism, and (2)
demonstrated the secularisation of Christianity into French ‘culture.’ Recognition that
Christianity has been secularised into ‘culture’ has allowed for secular French to identify
themselves and the French nation-state as Christian and/or Judeo-Christian. This effect has
682 Peter Davies, The National Front in France: Ideology, Discourse, and Power, Routledge: London and New
York, 1999, 96-97.
683 See Rogers Brubaker, “A new ‘Christianist’ secularism in Europe,” The Imminent Frame, October 11, 2016.
https://tif.ssrc.org/2016/10/11/a-new-christianist-secularism-in-europe/; and Rogers Brubaker, “Between
nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective,” Ethnic and Racial
Studies, 40:8, 1191-1226, 1193, 2017. DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700.
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contributed to the Christianist secularism of Marine Le Pen; a type of Christian identitarian
politics which perceives contemporary European culture to be ‘Christianity secularised.’ The
National Front has largely – though not entirely – embraced Christianist secularism, which
they use to define French culture as (Judeo-)Christian. In doing so, they are able to exclude
Muslims from their society, on the grounds that Islam is an alien religion which – unlike
Christianity and possibly Judaism – has not and cannot be secularised into ‘culture.’ The
following chapter examines the discourse of the National Front in 2012-2017 in order to test
this hypothesis.
Chapter Seven: Discourse Analysis of the National Front: 2012-2017
In the previous chapter I argued that under the leadership of Marine Le Pen the French
National Front used religion in its discourse to differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other.’ It
did this, I argued, because it has embraced a form of Christian identitarianism I have labelled
(following Brubaker) Christianist secularism. Christianist secularism, I argued, is a reaction
to Muslim immigration to and the higher visibility of Islam in France. The presence of Islam,
I contended, has made secular Europeans more aware of public religion, and cognizant of the
particular – and especially Christian – nature of their own secular culture. It has thus
highlighted the manner in which Christianity has been secularised into culture, demonstrating
cultural continuity between Europe’s religious past and its secular present which may not
have been as obvious before the arrival of Muslims. The resulting recognition of the
Christianity embedded in French culture has allowed the National Front to wield Christian
identity as a weapon against Muslims.
In this chapter I test this hypothesis by examining the National Front’s discourse in the 2012-
2017 period. During this period Marine Le Pen initiated the de-demonisation programme,
which was intended to remove visibile racism and anti-Semitism from the party, and which
appears to have helped the party re-fashion its image as a mainstream political party. The
period is ideal to test against my hypothesis, because within it the National Front moved
away from its Catholic conservatism and towards what Brubaker calls ‘Christianist’
secularism, the most important features of which include “identitarian Christianism, a
secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality,
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gay rights, and freedom of speech?”684 Furthermore, the popularity of the party’s new image
and relationship with religion and secularism was tested at Presidential elections twice during
this period: in 2012 and 2017.
I test my hypothesis against the party’s discourse at three separate points: during the 2012
presidential campaign and elections; during the immigration crisis of 2015, and during the
2017 presidential campaign and elections. Through techniques derived from Fairclough’s
Critical Discourse Analysis I analyse the discourse of the National Front.685 I apply CDA
techniques to three texts produced by Marine Le Pen, and by examining her rhetoric attempt
to understand the underlying messages, purposes, and ideology of the texts, as well as
understanding the political and social practices to which they are related. This chapter
consists of two elements. First, a Critical Discourse Analysis of three texts written by Marine
Le Pen, one during the 2012 election campaign, one during the 2015 immigration crisis, and
another during the 2017 election campaign. Following this is a discussion of the data
produced by the CDA, in which my hypothesis is tested against the findings produced by the
CDA. The language of the texts are analysed, and word frequency of key terms relating to
Islam, secularism (laïcité) and Christianity are noted, as are terms related to ingroup and
outgroup formation i.e. ‘our,’ ‘they,’ ‘we,’ etc...  More frequent use of ‘Islam’ and
‘Christianity’ especially in conjunction with terms used to create ingroups and outgroups will
indicate the degree to which Marine Le Pen relies on religious identity to aid in ingroup and
outgroup formation.
National Front Discourse during the 2012 Election Campaign
Once elected President of the National Front on January 16, 2011, Marine Le Pen began a
policy of de-demonisation, shifting the party’s image from a radical right, anti-Semitic, racist,
and socially conservative party, to a more mainstream ‘patriotic’ populist movement. Under
the de-demonisation programme, the party’s relationship with religion changed. Before 2011.
the party maintained an at least ambivalent, if not hostile, stance towards laïcité.686 Upon
684 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.
685 See Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change, 1992. See also Fairlough and Wodak, “Critical Discourse
Analysis,” 1997.
686 Davies, “The National Front and Catholicism: From Integrisme to Joan of Arc and Clovis,” 576, 2010.
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becoming party President Marine Le Pen, however, reversed this stance, declaring laïcité and
Christianity to be fundamental elements of French society and culture.
For example, in a 2011 interview to French parliamentary TV broadcaster LCP Le Pen
claimed that French culture and secularism had Christian roots, and that Islam was inimical to
secularism. “Secularism is absolutely not compatible … not natural in Islam, because Islam
mixes the spiritual and the temporal," she told the television station.687 “Muslim countries
that are secular,” she added, “have usually been so due to force.”688 France, on the other
hand, has “Christian roots” which have given the country its “identity.”689 French identity
was furthermore not merely Christian but “secular.”690 “We’ll hold this identity,” Le Pen
insisted, “and we won’t let this identity be changed.”691 These remarks illuminate the
underlying notions of the relationship between Christianity and laïcité, and the reasoning
behind her opposition to Muslim immigration, Le Pen took to the 2012 Presidential election.
The French Presidential election of 2012 emerged as a three way battle between incumbent
conservative president Nicolas Sarkozy, Socialist challenger Francois Hollande, and Marine
Le Pen. This situation pitted Marine Le Pen against Nicolas Sarkozy in a battle to win over
right-wing voters.  While neither Le Pen nor Sarkozy emerged triumphant after the elections,
which were won by Francois Hollande’s Socialist Party, the two right-wing presidential
candidates’ battle for the conservative vote exposed the continuing importance of religious
identity in secular France. Le Pen and Sarkozy each sought to win over conservatives by
emphasising the need to protect French identity from ‘outsiders’ – particularly Muslims –
though in strikingly different ways.  During his presidency Sarkozy had described France as a
Christian country which was harmed by its ultra-secular constitution and public culture, and
which would benefit from returning Christianity to the public sphere.692 Marine Le Pen took a
somewhat different approach, emphasising the importance of strengthening laïcité in order to
protect French civilisation from immigrants. Upon receiving the required backing from her





692 See Sarkozy’s comments on Christianity and France to this effect as reported by Robert Royal in “Sarkozy
and Secularism,” First Things, January 3, 2008. https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2008/01/sarkozy-
and-secularism.
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party and its supporters to run for President in 2012, she gave a speech describing the reasons
behind her decision to run, her core ideological values, and her vision for France.693
In the following section I analyse this particular text using techniques derived from
Fairclough’s CDA. The purpose of this is to understand the relationship between the text and
the social practices and ideologies by which it was produced and which it in turn may
produce. Following Fairclough’s conventions, I examine the medium through which Le Pen
delivers the text, the time, place, and intended audience(s) of the text, analyse the language,
and finally examine the ideologies to which the text belongs and to which it may contribute.
In particular, the CDA tries to uncover the underlying messages in National Front discourse.
To do this I seek answers in selected texts produced by Marine Le Pen to the following
questions: (1) does the discourse display the key elements of Christianist secularism:
“identitarian Christianism, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an ostensibly
liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech?”694 (2)  How is Islam
constructed in the discourse? (3) How is Christian identity used to exclude Muslims from
European society? The CDA thus pays special attention to the manner in which conceptions
such as “the people,’ ‘Islam,’ and ‘Christianity,’ are constructed in the texts, how they are
used to create an exclusive nationalist identity, and their role within the party’s ideology.
Summary of Marine Le Pen Speech, ‘Why she is running for President of France,’ 16 March,
2012.
0.00 – 1.35 (Opening remarks: “Beginning today millions of citizens will feel hopeful again”;
“They should know that they can have confidence in me, that I am conscious of the immense
task, of the unheard-of sacrifices that will be necessary to restore the country;” “The moment
has come to tell all French people the meaning of my candidacy.”695
693 It is rare to find entire speeches by Marine Le Pen translated into English. The only sources available are
provided by American right-wing organisations and blogs. MRCTV and the “Gates of Vienna” weblog have
translated and transcribed, respectively, Le Pen’s 2012 speech. See https://www.mrctv.org/videos/marine-lepen-
speech-why-she-running-president-france and https://www.gatesofvienna.blogspot.com.au/2012/03/marine-le-
pen-why-i-am-running-for.html.
694 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.
695 Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen Speech: Why she is running for President,” March 16, 2012.
https://www.mrctv.org/videos/marine-lepen-speech-why-she-running-president-france
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1.35 – 2.00 (Le Pen introduces herself and the core reasons she is running for French
President) “Chairman of a political party, a woman, mother of three, I fight.” “I fight against
everything in the Republic that harms France today ... and I defend the vision of the France
that I love.”696
2.00 – 3.05 (Le Pen argues that France suffers from high crime and a lack of security) “Like
all mothers I would like my family to live in security;” “for all mothers I want to restore
peace and order in our country;” “But I see that this is not the case;” “The number of criminal
attacks has only gone up ... the number of immigrants implicated in these attacks has been
going up constantly!”697
3.05 – 4.27 (Le Pen criticises France’s schools and government efforts to improve them) “As
a mother, I hope, as do all French mothers, that my children have a successful life;” “I ask the
schools to transmit to them the knowledge accumulated by the brilliant generations that
preceded us ... I don’t want a levelling to the lowest common denominator, I don’t want
political correctness in our secondary schools;” Our teachers suffer from an ill that our
society has tolerated for too long: the refusal to use any authority on certain pupils.”
4.28 – 5.00 (Le Pen attacks immigrants and defends herself against charges of racism) “No
material or human investment can repair the damage done to a society that yields
permanently to undisciplined individuals and violent minorities;” “They say I am fiercely
anti-immigration. It’s true.” “They dare to say I am xenophobic and racist. Nothing could be
further from the truth of my life;” “I simply say that I totally refuse immigrants who
themselves refuse the authority of French law and French culture.” 698
5.00 – 6.46 (Le Pen praises France and French culture) “French civilization is a splendid
alchemy of our art, our laws, our literature, of our fundamental rights, dearly acquired, of our
beliefs, our values, our traditions, our habits, our mores, our code, our life-style;” “I do not
want this civilization to bend under the blows of financial interests or fanatical ideologies
whose concepts take us back to the Inquisition;” “...I want a France that is part of the modern
world, proud of her civilization and unyielding to those who want to impose on her principles





minorities? Everyone can practice his religion and respect his own customs, Christian, Jew,
Muslim, Buddhist.  There is only one condition: that they respect the French Constitution.”699
6.46 – 9.47 (Le Pen attacks ‘globalist’ politicians who give away French sovereignty to the
European Union and for France to adopt neoliberal economic policies) “Today Brussels rules,
and with it the all-powerful world of finance rules to an ever-greater degree;” “Our
politicians’ margin of maneuver in the management of the affairs of France has become so
small that we wonder what the point is in electing them. ...they can only watch as the people
sink into poverty;” “I prefer those who, like myself, see things as they are and make few
promises, (but fight) in the name of our freedom and our prosperity against the dictatorships
of Europe and minorities;” “the model of society proposed by the globalist left is
diametrically opposed to my convictions;”700
9.47—12.38 (Le Pen outlines the National Front’s economic and social programme) “To do
this I will oppose the law of the jungle, where disloyal competition has become
insurmountable, where relocating, economic destruction, poverty and massive unemployment
have become an uncrossable limit;” “I am also a woman who fights against the mendacious
Right, the Right that abandoned its values;” “I am a Frenchwoman among Frenchmen;”
“France can return to the path of success and grandeur. The people can return to feeling
proud.”701
Language Analysis
There are three especially significant aspects to Marine Le Pen’s address. The primary
purpose of the speech is to present Le Pen as a saviour who alone has the ability to return
France “to the path of success and grandeur,” and who can return pride to “the people.”702
Her frequent use of the first person singular pronoun “I” (used 63 times), while
understandable in the context of a speech announcing run for President, is self-aggrandising,
and contributes to a typically populist attempt to present the leader as a saviour figure capable
of communing with and understanding the needs of ‘the people.’ Le Pen constructs herself as
maternal figure, a mother who is devoted to France and who can stand up to “Frenchmen”







this way, Le Pen attempts to transform herself from ordinary woman into a Joan of Arc
saviour figure capable of returning France to its former greatness.
Second, Le Pen creates an ingroup consisting of ‘the majority’ and an outrgoup, consisting of
“immigrants,” “minorities,” “the globalist left,” and the “mendacious right.”704 These groups,
she claims, have hurt France and taken away ‘the people’s’ pride in their nation.
“Immigrants” (used twice) are indeed the major villains in the address, along with “globalist”
politicians who have introduced neoliberal economics to France.705 Immigrants are
constructed as a “violent” and criminal ‘other’, who have harmed France by attempting to
impose their culture on the French people.706 Globalist politicians have introduced “the law of
the jungle” into France, hurting the French people and economy, and diminishing the power
and sovereignty of the nation-state.707 Together they form two outgroups which threaten the
“prosperity” and “freedom” of the ingroup.708
The ingroup Le Pen identifies as ‘the people,’ on whose behalf she claims to speak, are not
described in ethnic or religious terms. They – or rather “we” (used 17 times) – are people
who respect the authority of the French constitution and conform to “our” (used 29 times)
French culture.709 The vague descriptions of the outgroup and ingroup are an example of the
third important feature of Le Pen’s rhetoric in this text: her use of coded language to refer to
the ingroup and outgroups. The terms “Immigrants,” “religious minorities,” and “violent
minorities” are used in place of exact ethnic or religious descriptors. Equally, terms such as
“the people,” and references to people who conform to French culture and respect French
law, are used in place of exact descriptions of the ethnic and religious composition of the
ingroup. These unspecific terms allow Le Pen to attack minority groups without being
accused of singling them out, and enables her to avoid the charge of xenophobia or racism.
Terms such as French “civilisation”, “ways of life,” “mores,” and “codes,” are used without
explanation, though they are obviously infused with meaning.
Ideological Analysis
The text may be understood within the context of the de-demonisation program initiated by








social conservatism, and towards mainstream secular French politics. Thus where under Jean-
Marie Le Pen the National Front vocally opposed abortion, homosexual rights, and generally
held to conservative or traditionalist Catholic principles, Marine Le Pen’s speech is empty of
references to this conservative program. It is silent on gay rights, women’s rights, and
Catholicism, neither opposing nor approving of them.
The text, however, is clear about what it opposes. Marine Le Pen declares opposition to
“immigrants” and “globalists” who threaten the culture and livelihood of “the people,’’ or the
“majority” of French citizens on whose behalf she claims to speak.710 While Le Pen’s
references to globalists and globalisation are clear enough, and appear to describe politicians
who support or implement neoliberal economic policies and facilitate mass immigration, her
references to immigrants are somewhat opaque.
Repeated references to the French constitution, the problem of “violent” minorities and the
need for a secular system which allows people of all faiths to exist as coequals, betrays the
primary target of Le Pen’s language: Muslim immigrants. While the text is perhaps intended
to be read as a secularist defence of secular neutrality in the public sphere, and an attack on
religious believers who refuse to observe laïcité, it is also a response to the increasing
visibility of Islam within France. As a result, the text may also be understood in relation to
French resistance to globalisation, and opposition to mass immigration, in particular the
immigration of North African and Middle Eastern Muslims to France. If we understand the
“religious minorities” to refer primarily to Muslim immigrants who have not assimilated into
French culture, we can see that Islam – or perhaps any religious person who does not observe
secular differentiation of religion and politics, and who brings their religious beliefs and
practices into the public sphere – is constructed in the text as a violent threat which tries to
impose its own beliefs on others, and in doing so violates the principles of laïcité.
Thus throughout the text Le Pen constructs a strict dichotomy between the ingroup and
outgroup by using the terms “we” and “us” to refer to the secular and culturally French, and
excluding globalists and religious minorities from this ingroup. Islam, while not specifically
placed in the outgroup, is present in the text as a violent religion whose adherents do not
always obey French law. Yet because there are no explicit references to Christianity, it is
difficult to situate the text within the Christianist secular discourse identified by Brubaker.
710 Ibid.
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Rather, the text is strictly secularist and lacks the vital Christian identity element which
Christianist secularism grafts onto a secular worldview.
At the same time, it is important to note that the National Front’s 2012 political programme
can be situated within the Christianist secular paradigm. The programme explains the party’s
conception of French culture, values, and civilisation, claming that Christianity has been the
religion of the majority of French people for more than a millennium, and that therefore
France’s national culture and traditions are Christian in nature.711 Immigrants should not
flout, the manifesto says, these Christian traditions which are an integral part of French
identity.712 However, the party also issues a strong message in the programme defending
laïcité, which it intends to strengthen by altering the constitution to make recognition of
religious groups illegal, banning religious attire (especially the Islamic veil) from public
places, and preventing Muslim led women’s only swimming events at public pools.713
Because the programme of the National Front contains Christian identarianism, it is possible
to identify it as belonging to the wider populist radical right Christianist secular discourse
described by Brubaker. Thus while Marine Le Pen’s 2012 speech cannot be described as an
example of Christianist secularism, it is itself situated within a wider discourse in which
Christian identity is used to other and exclude Muslims. Moreover, Le Pen’s language does
not contradict the party’s Christian identitarianism. Le Pen speaks of the importance of
protecting French culture from religious minorities, however she does not describe the nature
of French culture, what it is or who to whom it belongs. Yet Le Pen and the party under her
leadership have previously described the “culture” of France as secular but also deeply
Christian.714 Equally, Le Pen has described Muslims as a particularly pernicious element in
French society, insofar as Islam is a non-Christian religion uniquely resistant to
secularisation.
The key to understanding the underlying message of Le Pen’s address, then, lies in
understanding her conception of French civilisation and values, the reasons she objects to the
“immigrants” and “globalists” she frames as enemies of French civilisation, and moreover
711 Notre Projet, Programme Politique du Front National,” Front National website.
https://www.frontnational.com/pdf/Programme.pdf, 2011, 105.  While I try to avoid French language sources,
this section of the manifesto has not been addressed in English.
712 Ibid.
713 Ibid, 106.
714 See Notre Projet, Programme Politique du Front National,” 105,2011; “Le Pen: Islam not compatible with
secular society,” 2011
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who she understands these “immigrants” and “religious minorities” to be.715 Le Pen’s 2012
speech expresses the notion that France is a secular society open to people of all faiths, as
long as they are willing to abide by the secularising principles of the French constitution.716
Yet the party’s manifesto is clear – as was Le Pen in previous instances – that France has a
Christian culture which must be protected from the eroding and diluting effects of
globalisation, and especially from the Muslim immigrants globalisation has brought to
France.  Thus in the text Le Pen is able to use vague terms such as “culture” and “religious
minorities” knowing that at least a portion of her audience will likely recognise that for the
National Front, French ‘culture’ is specifically Christian, and that the religious minority
referred to in the text is France’s Muslim community.717
National Front Rhetoric on Religion in 2015
The mass immigration of more than a million people from the Middle East and North Africa
to Europe – many of them Syrians fleeing the war in their country – made 2015 a particularly
significant year in France. While some French and European politicians called for refugees to
be welcomed, Marine Le Pen argued vocally against allowing any asylum seekers to settle in
France. Throughout 2015, as refugees arrived in Europe, she argued that France must refuse
entry to these people who, she said, posed a grave threat to the country and its culture.718
Le Pen was not alone in making this argument. She was joined by populist radical right
parties across the continent of Europe, several of which were able to capitalise on the sense of
crisis and claim that the governing centrist parties of their respective nations were failing ‘the
people’ by allowing Muslim immigrants to settle in Europe.719 In Britain, Germany, Austria,
and the Netherlands, populist radical right parties grew in stature and significance in 2015,
each arguing that Muslim asylum seekers must be repelled, because their presence threatened
715 Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen Speech: Why she is running for President,” 2012.
716 Ibid.
717 Ibid.
718 See “Le Pen compares migrant influx to barbarian invasion of Rome,” RT, September 15, 2015.
https://www.rt.com/news/315466-le-pen-migrant-barbarian-invasion/; Lisa Mayor, “France’s National Front
leader calls Canada’s refugee plan ‘madness.’” CBC, November 27, 2015.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/france-le-pen-canada-refugees-1.3340209; Lucy Draper, “National Front’s
Marine Le Pen says majority of refugees are economic migrants,” Newsweek, September 9, 2015.
http://www.newsweek.com/marine-le-penmarine-le-pen-migrantseconomic-migrantsfront-nationalnational-
600595.
719 See Norris, “It’s not just Trump: Authoritarian populism is rising across the West. Here’s why,” 2016.
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European nations’ identity and culture.720 In each case populist radical right parties made the
defence of national identity from Islam a central element of their political platform.721
Immigration was not the only significant issue affecting France in 2015. A related issue,
Islamist terrorism – in particular the November 13 attack attributed to Islamic State terrorists
which killed hundreds of French citizens – had a powerful impact on French politics. The
attacks appeared to prove Le Pen to be correct in her earlier assertion that allowing Muslims
into Europe would increase the risk of further terrorist attacks and harm French and European
culture. Indeed, shortly after the November 13 attacks, Le Pen authored a short article in Time
in which she condemned the killings, and described her own vision for ‘saving’ France from
Islamic fundamentalism.722 In her article, Le Pen links the November 13 terrorist attacks to
the migration crisis, arguing that France must no longer be prevented by European Union
laws from protecting itself.723 She further suggests that Islamic fundamentalism can be
combated by strengthening laïcité.724
Summary of “Marine Le Pen: How France will combat the enemies of liberty,” Time
Magazine, November 18, 2015.
Paragraph 1: (Le Pen recounts the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and affirms the connection
between Freedom and the French nation) “For the sixth time in a year, Islamic terrorism has
struck France—and this time more viciously than ever before;” “...the Marseillaise embodies
...our unwillingness to yield to the barbarism of Islamic fundamentalism. Charles De Gaulle
once said “There exists an immemorial covenant between the grandeur of France and the
freedom of the world.”725
“Paragraph 2: (Le Pen criticises successive French governments for allowing the attacks to
take place) “...if the enemies of liberty have decided to attack France with such barbarity, it’s
because over decades our country has forgotten that liberty must be organized, that it must be
720 Ibid.
721 Betz and Meret, “Right-Wing Populist Parties and the Working Class Vote: What Have You Done for Us
Lately?” 107–121, 2013.





defended, that it is a kind of power which must be nurtured. To forget that truth weakens
freedom.”726
Paragraphs 3-4 (Le Pen calls for a strengthening of French sovereignty to combat Islamic
fundamentalism) “Liberty is exercised in the context of national community;” “It is
synonymous with a nation defined by strong borders, defined by our values, defined by our
way of life, which is appreciated around the world;” “Not all of those we’ve opened our
doors to have come to France with a love of our way of life;” “It only takes a dozen
terrorists—some French in nationality, but not spirit, and others capitalizing on the poorly
managed migrant crisis—to take the lives of at 129 of our countrymen.”727
Paragraphs 5-6: (Le Pen affirms the importance of closing France’s borders to “migrants,”
closing “radical mosques,” and “liberating” Muslims from radical Islamism) “We must
reclaim our national borders permanently and rescind French citizenship to dual-national
jihadists because they do not deserve to be considered French;” “We must close radical
mosques;” “We must stop welcoming thousands of migrants and regain our national
sovereignty.”“We must also clarify Islam’s role in France. Our Muslim compatriots must no
longer be hostage to radical Islamists. French rule of law and a renewed commitment to
secularism will liberate them.”728
Paragraph 7: (Le Pen calls for French foreign policy to focus upon fighting Islamic
fundamentalism, ally itself with Russia and the Syrian government) “The threat we face calls
us to ally with those who fight fundamentalist Islam; “Let’s stop undercutting sovereign
states, as Nicolas Sarkozy did disastrously in Libya in 2011.”729
Paragraph 8: (Closing remarks; Le Pen calls for world solidarity with France in the fight
against Islamic fundamentalism for liberty) “...a strong France, faithful to itself and master of
its own destiny, is indispensable to world peace. Let us stand together. It is the only way to








Perhaps because she addresses an international but primarily American English speaking
audience in this article, Le Pen seldom refers to herself in first person (“I” is used 3 times),
but instead writes of “we” (used 19 times) and “us” (used 28 times).731 Thus rather than
present herself as the saviour of France, Le Pen uses inclusive language to internationalise
her perspectives and ideology, and to connect France’s struggles with terrorism with that of
the United States and other countries which fight “Islamic fundamentalism.”732 Le Pen’s
“we” refers first to the French nation, but the term is also used to include her readers who
value “liberty” and “freedom.”733 This “we” thus serves to separate individuals and groups in
favour of liberty from the enemies of freedom: religious fundamentalists and politicians who
violate “national sovereignty.”
By dividing the world between pro-freedom and anti-freedom camps, Le Pen is able to
identify herself and France within the pro-freedom side. According to Le Pen, France has a
unique role to play in the world as a bastion of liberty. Therefore, she seems to suggest, all
those who love freedom must defend France from the Islamic fundamentalists and globalist
politicians who directly or through misguided policies attack French freedoms.734 Moreover,
because Le Pen identifies herself as a defender of France and its freedoms, she appears to
suggest, the world must support her efforts to fight Islamic fundamentalism and to close
France’s borders, thereby preserving its freedoms.
Throughout the article she contrasts the “freedom” (used 4 times) and “liberty” (used 4 times)
of the French nation with “Islamic fundamentalism” and “Islamic terrorism.”735 France, in Le
Pen’s article, is described as a symbol and beacon of freedom in the world. Islamic
fundamentalism, on the other hand, is an “enem(y) of liberty”.736 She constructs French
Muslims as either Islamic fundamentalists or victims of fundamentalism who require
liberation. The purpose of this language is to ‘other’ Muslims and place them in an outgroup,
and furthermore to identify them as enemies of freedom, or as innocent victims of Islamic
fundamentalism who must be liberated by the secularism which will allow them to privatise




734 Whether Islamic terrorists are actually fighting against French freedoms is unclear; it is likely there are a




Significantly, unlike in her 2012 speech, here Le Pen names the religious minority she claims
is threatening French liberty: Islam. However, she is careful to attack only “Islamic
fundamentalism,” not Islam itself or all Muslims. Rather, she separates (bad) Islamic
fundamentalists, who do not privatise their religion, from (good) Muslims who are observant
of laïcité.737 This separation reflects the distinction she makes between illegitimate public
religion, and legitimate private religion. Muslims who secularise and thus privatise their faith
may be accepted members of French society. Those who do not do this are fundamentalists
and must be barred.
Throughout the text Le Pen’s language closely associates Islamic Fundamentalism – a term
whose meaning is not explored – with unfreedom, while France and the concept of the
nation-state are associated with freedom and peace. Nationalism and the Westphalian nation-
state are thus constructed as peaceful and free entities, which themselves promote peace and
freedom in the world. According to Le Pen, liberty can only exist within the context of the
nation-state: supra-nation bodies such as the European Union are fundamentally hostile
towards freedom, as are political parties and individuals who seek to erase national
borders.738 Thus Le Pen describes France’s loss of liberty and peace as the result of the
country’s membership in the European Union. EU membership has precipitated a loss of
liberty in France, according to Le Pen, chiefly because it prevents the French from managing
their own borders.
Furthermore, Le Pen identifies Sarkozy’s (and by extension U.S. President Obama’s)
violating of Libya’s national sovereignty, done in order to hasten the end of Colonel
Gaddafi’s rule over Libya, as an example of what can go wrong when politicians ignore
national sovereignty.739 What Le Pen appears to be suggesting is that the Libya disaster, and
the flood of immigrants which Gaddafi was holding back from crossing the Mediterranean, is
the direct result of the decision to ignore Libyan state sovereignty and invade the country. Le
Pen’s linking of the failed revolution and international military intervention in Libya and the
gradual dismantling of French borders and sovereignty is, then, an attempt to demonstrate
how freedom and liberty can exist only within the sovereign nation state in full control over
its borders, and any attack on national sovereignty is thus also an attack of freedom itself. In





couching it in rhetoric which associates the party’s nativism and anti-immigration (and
particularly anti-Muslim) politics with freedom and liberty.
Ideological Analysis
Le Pen’s use of language places her within both the Western European populist radical right
movement, but also within French secular nationalism and especially the centre-right Gaullist
tradition. The connection with populism is evident in her divisive language, which separates
freedom loving peoples in the West from anti-freedom “Islamic fundamentalists,” and her
attacks on the European Union in the name of national sovereignty.740 Her sympathetic
attitude towards Russia may also connect her rhetoric to the populist radical right, which
tends to view Russia as a standard bearer for nationalism and opposition to “cultural
relativism.”741
Equally significant is Le Pen’s attachment to secular nationalist Gaullism, a philosophy
which her father opposed during his time as National Front leader, and which he viewed as an
affront to France’s Catholic heritage. Marine Le Pen’s quoting of de Gaulle, her description
of France as a secular country, and her subtle anti-American language connect her rhetoric to
De Gaul’s secular nationalism and France first policies. She subtly attacks United States’
policy towards the Middle East, and in particular towards Libya and Syria. She suggests the
U.S. and France chose to support the wrong sides in the conflicts, and should have sought to
protect secular dictators Muammar Gaddafi and Bashar al-Assad against “Islamic
fundamentalist” rebels.742 These statements, while not entirely out of character for the leader
of a party which is historically anti-American and fundamentally hostile to the liberal world
order, are a demonstration of Le Pen’s attempt to re-orient the party away from Catholic
identity politics and towards the Gaullist centre-right.
The text is thus highly secularist, but does not contain the Christianism of the party’s 2012
manifesto. References to Christianity are absent from the text, which makes no mention of
France’s Christian heritage or Christian culture present in contemporary France. Therefore it
is not an example of the Christianist secularism identified by Brubaker as being common to





the period in which Marine Le Pen authored this article, she used language which falls within
Brubaker’s Christian secular category. For example, in 2012 Le Pen described the culture and
mores of France as being of very ancient Christian heritage, further categorising France as a
Judeo-Christian – not Islamic – country.743 The absence of Christian identitarianism from this
text is significant. It shows an effort to disguise the party’s Christianism from a wider
audience, and to present secularism as something neutral – rather than peculiarly Christian –
as she and her party have presented laïcité elsewhere.744
Other elements of the Christianist secular worldview remain: the text presents a pro-secular,
ostensibly liberal and pro-freedom worldview despite authoritarian orientation of the National
Front.  Thus while the text is intended as a defence of liberty, the National Front under
Marine Le Pen favour an authoritarian secularism, in which religion is removed from public
sphere except where it is safely secularised into culture. The text is silent on other aspects of
the Christianist secular ideology. For example, Le Pen does not demonstrate the philo-
Semitism and concern for women’s and gay rights common to other populist radical right
parties in Western Europe. Her silence on these issues, however, is significant. The National
Front under Jean-Marie Le Pen opposed gay marriage and abortion rights, and was famously
anti-Semitic. Marine Le Pen’s silence on these issues may be interpreted as a part of her de-
demonisation effort to rebrand the party as a mainstream, socially moderate movement,
though without losing the support of the National Front’s social conservative voters.
Throughout the text fundamentalist Islam is presented as the primary antagonist in France’s –
and by extension the free world’s – struggle for freedom. Islam itself is not constructed as an
enemy, only fundamentalist Muslims and their interpretation of Islam. Le Pen thus
differentiates between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims; ‘good’ Muslims are constructed as secular,
and having privatised their faith in accordance with laïcité and French culture. ‘Good’
Muslims thus practice a legitimate form of religion; legitimate because it is apolitical and
private. ‘Bad’ Muslims, on the other hand, practice their faith publicly, wear Islamic clothing
and symbols in public places, and do not comply with the secularising principles of laïcité.745
Their interpretation of Islam, according to Le Pen, does not separate Church and state (so to
speak) or religion from politics. Rather, Islamic fundamentalists’ Mosques are politically
743 Alduy, “Has Marine Le Pen already won the battle for the soul of France?” 2014.
744 See Notre Projet, Programme Politique du Front National,” 105, 2011 ; “Le Pen: Islam not compatible with
secular society,” 2011.
745 Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen: How France will Conquer the Enemies of Liberty,” 2015.
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dangerous centres of intolerance, and responsible for France’s problem with terrorism.746
‘Bad’ Muslims practice an illegitimate form of Islam; illegitimate because it is political and
public.
In constructing Islam in this way, ‘good’ Muslims may become part of the “we” Le Pen
refers to in the text, and which she associates with France, secularism, and freedom.747 ‘Bad’
Muslims, however, are an outrgroup which is associated with fundamentalism, religion, and
authoritarianism. Furthermore, the text constructs Muslims as either fundamentalists or
hostages of Islamic fundamentalism. Islamic fundamentalism is, then, constructed as a force
preventing the necessary secularisation of Islam occurring, and thus preventing the
integration of Muslims into French culture.
Marine Le Pen’s secularism is emphasised in the text, but the National Front’s embrace of
Gaulism and laïcité was somewhat undercut by her niece and National Front candidate
Marion Maréchal-Le Pen,  who remarked that Muslims could “not truly be French” because
they did not share the “customs and lifestyle” of France’s “Christian heritage”.748 Maréchal-
Le Pen’s remarks echo the National Front 2012 manifesto as well as Marine Le Pen’s own
remarks about the “Christian heritage” of France in the impossibility of secularising Islam.749
The Christianism of National Front’s 2012 political platform, Marion Maréchal-Le Pen, and
earlier statements by Marine Le Pen, contradict the ultra-secularism of Le Pen’s Time
Magazine article.
The contradiction may not, however, be as extreme as it first appears. Much of Le Pen’s
ultra-secularism in the text is compatible with her and her party’s Christianist claims that
France has a Christian culture. The text does not deny Christianity’s role in forming French
culture; rather, it merely emphasises the importance of secularism to France. On the other
hand, the text suggests it is possible for Muslims to secularise, something Le Pen has denied
on other occasions.750 The text’s silence on Christian identity suggests that Marine Le Pen is
an opportunistic politician, attempting to present French secularism as neutral space in this
text, but describing the same as a culturally Christian space when it suits her purposes.
746 Ibid.
747 Ibid.
748 John Lichfield, “National Front: Marine Le Pen and Marion Maréchal-Le Pen expect electoral breakthrough
for France’s far-right,” The Independent, December 4, 2015.
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/front-national-marine-le-pen-and-marion-mar-chal-le-pen-
expect-electoral-breakthrough-for-france-s-a6761051.html
749 “Le Pen: Islam not compatible with secular society,” 2011.
750 Ibid; Alduy, “Has Marine Le Pen already won the battle for the soul of France?” 2014.
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National Front discourse on religion in 2017
The French political landscape in 2017 was defined by the loss of public support for the
traditional governing centrist parties, particularly Francois Hollande’s Socialists. This loss of
support opened a space for the technocratic centrist En Marche! movement and the National
Front, which capitalised on growing dissatisfaction with the status quo and offered new forms
of politics in its place. The two political parties offered strikingly different policies and
visions of France’s future. En Marche! leader Emmanuel Macron positioned himself as an
internationalist and firm supporter of European integration, remarking that “there is not a
French culture. There is a culture in France, and it is diverse.”751 By 2017 En Marche! was
the most popular party in France.
Marine Le Pen’s National Front emerged during the 2016-2017 period as the most popular
right-wing party in France, eclipsing centre-right Les Republicans, the party of Nicolas
Sarkozy and Francois Fillon.  Le Pen’s political programme opposed the internationalism and
neoliberalism of En Marche!, and her party articulated a starkly different vision of France
and French culture. Le Pen and Macron would emerge as winners from the first round of
Presidential elections in May, 2017. In the first round of voting Marine Le Pen finished
second, winning 21.30% of the vote.752 The winner was En Marche! candidate Emmanuel
Macron, who won 24.01% of the vote. In a run-off election, Macron won 66.10% percent of
the vote to Le Pen’s 33.90%.753 Macron’s technocratic centrist platform of neoliberalism and
globalism had won over Le Pen’s nativism, left-wing economics, and identity politics.
Marine Le Pen discussed her policies and conception of French culture in her official
Presidential campaign launch. In the address, given in the city of Lyon on February 5, 2017,
Le Pen contrasts the ‘Islamised’ and ‘financialised’ France of today with the secularised
Christian values of the ‘true’ France of yesteryear.754
751 The New York Times, “In Their Own Words: Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron,” The New York Times,
May 5, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/world/europe/emmanuel-macron-marine-le-pen-
quotes.html.
752 “French presidential election: first round results in charts and maps,” 2017.
753 “French Presidential Election May 2017 full second round results and analysis,” 2017.
754 While Le Pen’s speech, and her comments on the importance of Judeo-Christian to France, were reported in
the English language press, the most complete transcript of her speech appears on the website of the “right-wing
think tank” the Gates Institute. Marine Le Pen, “Presidential Campaign Launch Speech,” Gates Institute Online,
February 5, 2017. https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/9900/le-pen-speech.
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Summary of Marine Le Pen’s Presidential Campaign Launch Speech, Lyon, 5 February 2017
Paragraphs 1-8 (Le Pen defines the key topic of her address: the threat to French culture
posed by ‘globalisation.’)
“The question is simple and cruel: will our children live in a free, independent, democratic
country; will they live according to our cultural references, our values of civilization, our
style of living, and will they even speak our French language...” “...unlike our adversaries, I
am interested not only in the material heritage of the French, but I also want to defend our
immaterial capital.”755
Paragraphs 9-27 (Le Pen defines the “two totalitarianisms” threatening France: economic
globalisation and Islamic Fundamentalism)756
“Globalization develops at two levels: from below with massive immigration and global
social dumping; and from above with the financialization of the economy.” “Economic
globalization, which rejects any limits, has weakened the immune system of the nation by
dispossessing it of its constituent elements: borders, national currency, the authority of its
laws in conducting economic affairs, and thus allowing another world to be born and grow:
Islamic fundamentalism.” “These two ideologies want to subjugate our country.”
Paragraphs 28-34 (Le Pen discusses the deleterious effects of “economic globalisation” on
the nation state)
“With the globalists, cultures of peoples, that is, what makes the world's diversity, are
destined to be erased in order to facilitate the commercialization of standard products and to
facilitate hyper profits at the cost of ecological depletion of the planet or child labor of the
Third World;” “This world where economics is an end in itself and man, a simple tool in its
service, plunges us into an ephemeral era, in short, an artificial and deeply dehumanized
world.”757
Paragraphs 35-41 (Le Pen describes the threat Islamic fundamentalism poses to France)
“I want to denounce this powerful alliance between the promotion of savage globalization on





direct consequence, the establishment of Islamic fundamentalism;” “Islamic fundamentalism,
instrumentalizes the principle of religious freedom in an attempt to impose patterns of
thought that are clearly the opposite of ours;” “We do not want to live under the yoke or
threat of Islamic fundamentalism. It tries to impose upon us...The prohibition of mixing in
public places, the integral veil or not, prayer halls in companies, street prayers, cathedral
mosques, The submission of woman by prohibiting the skirt, work or bistro.”758
Paragraphs 42-50 (Le Pen globalisation and “radical Islamism” with the “Christian” culture
of the majority of French).
“Behind these two ideologies is inexorably the enslavement of people;” Economic globalism
professes individualism, and radical Islamism communitarianism;” “France was built and on
the principles in which the immense majority of French people still recognize themselves: the
pre-eminence of the person and therefore its sacred character, individual freedom and
therefore individual consent, national feeling and therefore national solidarity, equality of
persons and therefore the refusal of situations of submission.”759
“These principles for which we are fighting are affirmed in our national motto "Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity," which itself proceeds from a secularization of principles stemming from
our Christian heritage.”760
Paragraphs 51-59 (Le Pen demands greater “patriotism” in France)
“France is an act of love. This love has a name: patriotism.” “It is what pits our vision against
that of the globalists.” “We believe it is time to revitalize national sentiment.” “To all, and
especially to people of all origins and all faiths that we have welcomed into our country, I
repeat: there are no and there will be no other laws and values in France than those that are
French.”
“We will strictly apply the rules of secularism in a country whose tragic history has learned to
guard against the wars of religion. We will extend the rules of secularism to public spaces
and we will inscribe them in labor laws.”761






“The first liberty is security.” “We will re-establish the rule of law;” “We will stress the
certainty of prosecution, the certainty of sanction, the certainty of punishment, the certainty
that delinquent aliens are automatically deported.” “In terms of terrorism, we do not intend to
ask the French to get used to living with this horror. We will eradicate it here and abroad”
“Since we are at war with Islamic fundamentalism, we will apply to the enemies of France
the legal devices of the state of war;” “Places of Islamic preaching will be closed and the
sowers of hatred condemned and expelled. The legal windows of Islamism, especially on the
Internet, will be extinguished;” “Finally, this revolution of liberty is that of our collective
liberties, for state sovereignty, that is to say, for a free people to decide for themselves. This
struggle for sovereignty is first, principal, essential, cardinal.”762
“I will announce a referendum within six months on remaining or exiting the European
Union.” “The old left-right debates have outlived their usefulness. ...debates about secularism
or immigration, as well as globalization or generalized deregulation, constitute a fundamental
and transversal divide. This divide is ...between patriots and globalists.” “The collapse of
traditional parties and the systematic disappearance of almost all of their leaders shows that a
great political re-composition has begun.”
Language Analysis
The ostensible purpose of the text is to present the 2017 Presidential election platform of the
National Front to the party’s supporters and the wider French electorate. In the text Le Pen
attempts to shape the discourse around the Presidential election by describing her party’s
policies as a response to the most important and salient issues of the day. Le Pen defines
globalisation as the key issue with which French people are concerned, particularly the
economic and cultural disruption she claims is the natural result of allowing “globalist”
politicians to pursue a neoliberal economic agenda.763
Thus throughout the text Le Pen sets herself and her party apart from mainstream French
politics, and the deleterious effects she claims the traditional governing parties’ globalism has
had upon the French nation and its culture. In order to differentiate the National Front from
her centre-right and centre-left opponents, Le Pen constructs an ingroup consisting of the




Globalists and Islamist radicals, whom Le Pen claims are destroying French culture and who
she opposes. In order to construct these groups Le Pen refers continually to a “we” (used 39
times), by which she sometimes means merely the National Front, but often the majority of
French citizens, who she claims oppose the globalism of mainstream French politicians and
who she claims to alone be capable of ‘saving’ from “economic” and “cultural”
globalisation.764 Thus when Le Pen speaks of “our” France, and “our” values and culture
(‘our’ is used 57 times) she ‘others’ the “globalists” and Muslims she deems to be
fundamentalist as insufficiently French, and hostile to France and French culture.765
The majority French ingroup Le Pen calls ‘patriots,’ while the outgroup is the “globalists”
(globalisation/globalist/globalists used 23 times). This distinction between patriotism and
globalism is most important in the text, and identified as a new political paradigm in France,
replacing the outdated left vs right dichotomy. The ‘patriotic’ ingroup identified by Le Pen is
culturally French, and therefore culturally Christian yet observant of France’s secular laws,
pro-freedom, and endangered by economic and cultural globalisation. The outgroups are
defined by their hostility to France, either because they support economic and/or cultural
globalisation, which Le Pen claims is disrupting and destroying the French nation-state and
culture, or because they are Islamic fundamentalists who refuse to observe the principles and
laws of laïcité. Thus Le Pen places “globalist” politicians and businesspeople, and “Islamist
radicals” in her outgroup throughout the text. 766
Constructing an ingroup and outgroup based on a patriot-globalist divide is especially useful
for Le Pen, whose party has long defined itself as a patriotic group associated with neither the
left nor the right, but which is always loyal to France. Throughout the text the National Front
is identified as the party of patriots, who will defend France from the culturally and ethically
diluting forces of the market and business, and furthermore defend France’s Christian derived
secular values and culture from Islamic fundamentalism. Le Pen thus presents herself and her
party as potential savours of France, and as the only political group that loves France enough





and culture that it has allowed Islamic fundamentalists to create “another world” of religious
fanaticism inside secular France.767
Muslims themselves are not automatically placed within the text’s outgroup. Rather, only
Islamic fundamentalists and Islamist radicals are described as being antithetical to the values
and culture of France, and an existential threat to the country. However, by describing France
as a culturally Christian nation, and speaking of secularism as though it were a specific
product of Christianity, Le Pen may be understood as ‘othering’ Muslims and excluding them
from belonging to ‘the people’ or the French and culturally Christian ingroup.
Ideological Analysis
The text can be understood as an example of populist – and specifically populist radical right
– discourse. It is populist insofar as text constructs Le Pen as a potential national saviour who
stands above politics and enjoys a direct connection with ‘the people,’ whose interests she
alone claims to represent.  Furthermore, it is specifically right-wing populist insofar as the
text constructs an ingroup (‘the people’) which represents the ‘true’ and ‘good’ people of
France, and pits them against outgroups (globalists; Islamic fundamentalists)  who threaten
the ingroup and their interests (the French nation-state, secularism, Christian values.)
The text is also best understood as a reaction to and an attempt to capitalise on a number of
social and economic issues affecting contemporary France. These include the 2015
‘immigration crisis,’ ongoing economic problems stemming from the 2008 financial crisis
and beyond it the disrupting influence of neoliberal economic policies, mass immigration
(particularly from non-European nations), and terrorism and other criminal activities. Le Pen
links these disparate problems and issues together, claiming them to be the result of the
negative influence of globalisation which ‘globalist’ politicians have forced upon France.
‘Globalists’ are, according to Le Pen’s text, the ultimate enemy of France and French
culture.768
In the text Globalists are claimed to be destroying French culture by placing the acquisition
of above all other values, above patriotism and the continuation of the French way of life.
Globalists post an existential threat to France, according to the text, insofar as they are wiping




encouraging mass immigration. The resulting loss of sovereignty and the presence of millions
of non-French (and especially non-European) people has, according to the text, injured ‘the
people’s’ pride in their country, diluted French culture, and – most pernicious of all – allowed
Islamic fundamentalism and Islamist terrorism to thrive within France. Le Pen’s argument
against globalisation, then, is that globalisation in Europe inevitability results in Islamisation.
A core concern in the text is the protection of France from Islamisation. For Le Pen,
protecting France from radical Islam means strengthening laïcité and increasing patriotic
feeling. Therefore the text is secularist. However, the text’s secularism is ‘Christianist’
insofar as it grafts a Christian identity onto a secular political platform, and suggests that the
secular is in certain respects a continuation of Christianity. The text, then, does not seek to
differentiate between the ingroup and outgroups based on race, but rather on ideological and
religious grounds: the ‘patriots’ of the ingroup love France and its Christian based secular
culture. Christian identity is thus used to exclude and other Muslims and ‘globalists,’ and
construct them as threats to France and its Christian-secular culture.
While Christianity is used to define the culture of French and the identity of the ingroup (‘the
people’), the text constructs Islamic fundamentalism – though not Islam itself – as a danger to
France. Le Pen’s argument is that while many Muslims obey France’s secular laws and
culture, Islamist radicals and Islamic fundamentalists refuse to secularise. Their insistence on
practicing their religion in public, according to the text, constitutes an existential threat to
France. Is Marine Le Pen suggesting, then, that Islam is compatible with French culture, and
only Islamic fundamentalism incompatible? While Le Pen has on occasion claimed Islam is
insoluble in secularism, more often – an in this text – she claims that only Islamist radicals
are incompatible with secular French society.769 However, Le Pen appears to be suggesting
that Islamic fundamentalists are Muslims who bring their religion into the public sphere. This
definition may include all observant Muslim within the ‘fundamentalist/radical’ category,
marking the majority of Muslims out as part of an outgroup. Equally, her complaints about
mass immigration posing a threat to French culture suggests that Islam itself, for Le Pen, is
poses a threat to the continuation of French culture. According to the text, immigrant groups
must assimilate into France’s Christian based secular society.770 Therefore, because Muslims
have been constructed as being outside this Christian-secular ingroup, Le Pen insists upon
769 “Le Pen: Islam not compatible with secular society,” 2011.
770 Marine Le Pen, “Presidential Campaign Launch Speech,” 2017.
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their exclusion because their religion is foreign and has not been secularised into French
culture.
This use of Christian identity to protect secular society marks the text as an example of the
Christianist secularism Brubaker identifies as a hallmark of a number of populist radical right
parties in Western/Northern Europe. For example, the text is ostensibly liberal, proposing to
make France more ‘free’ by eliminating the Muslim fundamentalists (and their mosques) who
threaten French liberty.771 Equally, the text supposes that liberty is a unique product of
France’s Christian heritage, and safeguarded by its secular constitution and laws.772 The text,
however, is silent on gay rights, and support for Israel. But this silence marks a move away
from Catholic conservatism, and the ultra-conservative policies towards homosexuals and
women of the Jean-Marie Le Pen led National Front.773 Indeed, the text represents Islam as a
conservative force which threatens women’s liberty, and secularism as a liberating force
which protects women from religious restrictions on their dress and behaviour.
Ultimately, Le Pen’s message is that France must turn away from the neoliberal economics
which have undermined French culture and encouraged Muslims to settle in France, and
return to the secularised Christian values that made France great. Christianity is thus not
valued by Le Pen as a moral force or a useful form of spiritual practice. Yet neither is
Christianity solely used instrumentally, and as a manner of distinguishing between the
ingroup (or ‘the people’) and outgroups. Rather, Christianity is also constructed in the text as
the progenitor of the secularism Le Pen considers to be among the most vital aspects of
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CDA reveals three important aspects of the National Front’s use of religion and Christian
identity in their discourse in 2012-2017. First, a shift in Marine Le Pen’s use of religion
throughout the period. While three texts are too few to discern an overall pattern, the data
suggests that Le Pen moved the party’s position on religion immediately – following her
acceptance of the Presidency of the National Front – away from her father’s Catholic
conservatism and Catholic identity politics.
Marine Le Pen’s 2012 text demonstrates her determination to have the National Front
embrace laïcité, and drop its attachment to Christian based social conservatism and identity,
and appears intended as a defence of laïcité from the dangers of public religion.775 France is
described as a secular country which does not allow “religious minorities” to dictate to the
secular majority.776 Islam is not defined as an enemy per se. Yet it is difficult to understand
Le Pen’s attack on religious minorities as anything other than a reference to Muslims and
Islam. Le Pen’s decision to leave Islam unnamed is significant, and demonstrates the Le
Pen’s framing of secularism as a neutral space where all religions may co-exist, provided that
they remain outside of the public sphere and privatised. This secularism is neutral – not
‘Christian.’ Yet the party’s 2012 policy manifesto uses religion differently, in a manner
which is Christianist and secular.777 Thus there is an inconsistency in the National Front’s use
of religion in 2012. Sometimes the party presents secularism as a neutral space, other times as
a product of France’s Christian heritage. In a similar way, sometimes France is presented as a
secular country, while on other occasions the Christian heritage of France is used.
A similar inconsistency is seen in 2015, and in the party’s response to the ‘immigration crisis’
and Islamist terror attacks of that year. In a 2014 interview Le Pen described France as a
nation with a Christian heritage, and whose mores and culture were profoundly Christian yet
entirely secularised.778 On the other hand, references to France’s Christian heritage are absent
from Le Pen’s Time article. There France is described as a secular nation, whose secular
freedoms are threatened by Islamic Fundamentalism and Islamist Radicals.779 Significantly,
however, Islamic fundamentalism is named as the enemy, and the form of public religion
which challenges laïcité and must be suppressed in order for France to remain secular and
775 Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen Speech: Why she is running for President,” 2012.
776 Ibid.
777 Notre Projet, Programme Politique du Front National,” Front National website. 105, 2011.
778 Alduy, “Has Marine Le Pen already won the battle for the soul of France?” 2014.
779 Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen: How France will Conquer the Enemies of Liberty,” 2015.
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free.780 Despite this inconsistency, the National Front had by 2015 decisively moved away
from Catholic identity politics and social conservatism, embracing instead secular
nationalism while remaining largely silent on issues such as abortion and gay rights.
Christian identitarianism made a strong return in Marine Le Pen’s 2017 text, where it is used
to differentiate between the ingroup (‘the people’) and the ‘Islamic Fundamentalist’ outgroup,
the role secular identity played in the 2012 and 2015 texts. It is perhaps not possible to
determine exactly why Le Pen chose to invoke Christian identity in her 2017 text. Given the
inconsistent use of Christianity in National Front discourse in 2012-2017, it is likely Le Pen
believed it was advantageous to invoke France’s Christian heritage in her defence of French
culture and secular from its perceived enemies. It may be that Le Pen discerned that her
supporters, and perhaps sections of the wider French population, had reacted to the
immigration of Muslims to France – particularly in the aftermath of the 2015 immigration
‘crisis’ – by more closely identifying as secular (or without religious belief) and culturally
Christian. This is entirely possible, due to the effects of Muslim immigration on French
identity. By this I mean the manner in which the increasing presence and visibility of Islam
has made some French cognizant of the ‘cultural’ Christianity embedded in French culture,
and which was largely invisible before it was contrasted against Islam and Islamic culture.
The Christianist secularism in Le Pen’s 2017 text may be an attempt to capitalise on the
growing Christianist secularism of sections of the French public, who have grafted a sense of
Christian identity onto their secular worldview in the face of Muslim difference.
Le Pen’s 2017 references to Christianity may also be an attempt to keep her Catholic
supporters, who were increasingly being represented by her Niece Marion Marechal-Le Pen.
Marechal-Le Pen sought to return the party to something closer to the Catholic identity
politics and social conservatism of Jean-Marie Le Pen, and was seen as something of a rival
to her aunt.781 By invoking France’s Christian heritage, Le Pen may be attempting to signal to
Marechal-Le Pen’s supporters that she too shares their affection for Christianity, and belief
that Christian identity – if not belief – is a defining aspect of French culture.
The National Front’s use of religion in 2012-2017 is complex and inconsistent. Le Pen’s
2017 text and the party’s 2012 manifesto are demonstrations of Christianist secularism. Yet
Le Pen’s 2012 and 2015 texts do not explicitly identify France as Christian, but present
780 Ibid.
781 Lichfield, “National Front: Marine Le Pen and Marion Maréchal-Le Pen expect electoral breakthrough for
France’s far-right,” 2015.
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laïcité as a neutral space between religions and frame France as a country under attack by
religious (Islamist) fanatics. The party’s use of religion must therefore be understood as
opportunistic and somewhat cynical. However, it may also be understood as a demonstration
of the secularising of France and – paradoxically – the narrowing of the distance between
Christianity and laïcité after Muslim immigration being reflected in the discourse of the
National Front. Despite the inconsistencies, then, the National Front under Marine Le Pen
have a relatively coherent position on religion: religion is dangerous if allowed in the public
sphere, and acceptable if it is secularised. Secularised ‘cultural’ Christianity, for the party, is
a vital part of French culture. Therefore Christianity must be defended if French culture is to
be defended. Laïcité is also a vital element of French culture, according to the party, therefore
it too must be defended alongside cultural Christianity. Islam is perceived as dangerous
because it has not been secularised into culture, and cannot be privatised in the manner which
Christianity has had its spiritual and moral elements subordinated to the laws of the secular
French state. Therefore, according to the party, Muslim immigration must be stopped in order
to preserve the secular freedoms of France and the continued observance of the separation of
Church and state, which both Christianity and laïcité observe.
Table indicating a shift towards a more hostile stance towards Muslims in the discourse of
Marine Le Pen in 2015, and a trend towards explicit Christian identitarianism in 2017.
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2015 immigration ‘crisis’ 2017 Election
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Second, Islam is never itself constructed as a threat to France in the three texts, but rather
violent “religious minorities,”782 “Islamic Fundamentalists” and “Islamist radicals”783 are
designated as threats to French secularism and (in the 2017 text) France’s Christian values
and heritage.784 Le Pen’s strongest criticisms, however, are not of Muslims or Islam, but of
the “globalist politicians” and globalist ideology which have reduced French sovereignty and
encouraged the mass immigration of Muslims to France.785 Yet Le Pen describes the worst
effects of globalisation as the ‘Islamising’ of France, which has occurred due to the
combination of mass immigration of Muslims into an environment in which French culture
has been diluted by neoliberal values (the worship of economic growth at the expense of
carrying on French cultural traditions).786
Therefore Islamic Fundamentalism is the unwelcome outcome of the globalisation Le Pen
fights against. Moreover, according to Le Pen, not all Muslims are threatening France and
French culture. ‘Good’ Muslims, who privatise their religion and obey France’s secular laws
and culture, are themselves categorised as victims of the ‘bad’ fundamentalist and radical
Muslims, who do not privatise their faith, but rather bring it into the public sphere in a
multitude of ways. It is possible, Le Pen appears to be suggesting, for some Muslims to live
in France, but only insofar as they assimilate into French culture, and perform a
schizophrenic splitting of their private and public selves, in which the private self is Islamic
and the public self is culturally Christian-secular. Because this is inconceivable, it is perhaps
best to admit that Le Pen finds little space for Muslims in France, and her opposition to
Muslim immigration is based upon her belief that Islam is incompatible with secularism and a
782 Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen Speech: Why she is running for President,” 2012.
783 Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen: How France will Conquer the Enemies of Liberty,” 2015.




threat to the culturally Christian secular culture of France. Thus while Christians and Jews are
incorporated within the ingroup Le Pen has constructed – with Le Pen declaring her support
for Israel, and suggesting that protecting Christians in Lebanon is part of France’s mission in
the world – Muslims always remain in the outgroup.
Islamic fundamentalism is thus constructed throughout the 2015 and 2017 texts as anti-
freedom, illiberal, anti-woman, and a dangerous retrograde element within France which
must be suppressed in order to prevent religious conflict. A public religion hostile to the
Westphalian state, Islamic fundamentalism, according to Le Pen, is so dangerous that it may
return France to the religious warfare which plagued Europe before 1648.787
Third, Le Pen constructs an ingroup and outgroups based partly – though not entirely – on
religious identity. For Le Pen the “I” and “we” the make up the ingroup are secular but
culturally Christian. The “globalist” and “Islamic fundamentalist” outgroups, however, do not
belong to France because – according to Le Pen – they do not respect French culture and law.
“Islamic fundamentalists” are claimed to be violating “our” secularism, and refusing to
assimilate into “our” “Christian” based culture.788 The key difference, then, between the
ingroup and outgroup is not merely religious identity. Rather, Le Pen’s worldview in the texts
is built around a ‘patriot’ vs ‘globalist dichotomy.’ The ingroup therefore is first and foremost
defined by its ‘patiotism,’ or its adherence to the National Front’s conception of French
culture and desire to preserve France’s sovereignty and culture in an era of globalisation.
Christian belief plays no role in defining the ingroup. Rather, observance of secular
differentiation between religion and politics, and Church and state plays a large role in
defining the difference between the ingroup and outgroup. At the same time, however,
adherence to ‘cultural’ (i.e. secularised) Christianity also plays a role in defining the ingroup.
Christianity is thus used instrumentally by Le Pen to defend her party’s intention to exclude
Muslims from French society, on the basis that if France is culturally Christian yet secular,
then Islam can have no place in France due to its incompatibility with both France’s secular
laws and Christian culture. Christianity is thus important to Le Pen because it is seen as an
aspect of French culture, a defining element which brought to France its secular ideals of
equality, liberty and fraternity. She frames Christianity as the progenitor of French values,




Christian social values. Therefore Le Pen’s use of Christianity is restricted to a tool with
which she can help construct an ingroup or a ‘people’ which excludes Muslims and anyone
who does not conform to her conception of French culture, including the ‘globalists’ who she
claims seek to dilute French culture.
From this analysis it can be surmised that under Marine Le Pen’s leadership the National
Front altered its use of religion, and while doing so has achieved its greatest ever electoral
success and political significance. A most significant change in the party’s discourse in the
2012-2017 period was its decision to embrace of laïcité as an expression of authentic French
values and France’s Christian heritage. This marked a move away from the anti-secular,
traditionalist Catholic rhetoric of policies of the Jean-Marie Le Pen era, and a move towards
the centre of French politics – a move rewarded by improved polling and electoral success at
the 2012 and 2017 elections.
Where once the FN opposed laïcité as inauthentically French, since 2011 the FN has
embraced laïcité as a vital expression of what it means to be French, and a product of the
nation’s “very anciently Christian” culture.789 Why, the, has this re-conceptualisation of
laïcité’s place in French culture occurred? Marine Le Pen is able to describe herself as a
defender of both France’s Christian heritage and laïcité because, my analysis suggests,
Muslim immigration has altered some French people’s sense of religious identity. This
change has allowed the National Front to capitalise on the subsequent blurring of Christianity
with laïcité by declaring France to be a culturally Christian yet secular state.
Moreover, the increasing electoral success of the National Front during the 2012-2017 period
suggests that when faced with large-scale Muslim migration – as occurred during the 2015
migration crisis – a significant number of French switched their votes away from centrist
parties and towards the National Front. This indicates that a growing number of French voters
accept this close identification of Christianity with laïcité, and thus accept the party’s blurring
of religion and politics as part of a cultural defence of French culture from a perceived
enemy in Muslim immigrants.
The National Front’s use of religion varied during the 2012-2017. In Marine Le Pen’s texts
France is defined as a strongly secular nation, in which Christian culture – though not belief –
is a defining element of national culture and identity. When Christianity is used by Le Pen, it
789 Marine Le Pen, “Has Marine Le Pen Already Won the Battle for the Soul of France?” 2014.
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is always used in a manner in line with Brubaker’s Christianist secular category. Post-2011,
the party portrays itself as a defender of liberal society, freedom, secularism, women, Jews,
and homosexuals from retrograde “Islamic fundamentalism.” It uses Christianity as a tool to
divide between the free and secular world from the unfree, fundamentalist world of Islam.
Thus in the Christianist secular discourse of the National Front, Christianity is never referred
to as a belief system, but as an identity and progenitor of peculiarly French values and
culture.
The key to understanding the Nation Front’s post-2011 use of Christian identity, then, is
through Le Pen’s ‘patriot-globalist’ dichotomy. Christian identity is useful to Le Pen, because
it assists her in defining the particularities of France, which she seeks to defend from (1)
globalists’ alleged intention to make France an ‘anywhere’ dominated by neoliberalism and
the market, and (2) Islamists’ alleged intention to desecularise France. For Le Pen, to be a
‘patriot’ – and thus part of ‘the people’ or the ingroup – means to be a secularist who
observes the Christian derived culture of France, and a defender of French culture and
sovereignty. The ‘patriot’ wants France to retain its unique culture, and opposes mass
immigration and neoliberalism because it dilutes and ultimately may destroy that which
makes France unique.
Christian identity is thus used to exclude Muslims on the basis that France is culturally
Christian and secular, whereas Muslims are non-Christian and non-secular. Equally, it is a
device to exclude ‘globalists,’ who deny the existence of a single French culture and wish for
France to become a more diverse, multicultural society.790 By defining France as a culturally
Christian nation, whose values and secular laws are a product of Christianity, Marine Le
Pen’s National Front has the means to exclude any group which appears to threaten France’s
secularised Christian culture. This type of Christianity, however, is not ‘religious.’ The
National Front does not appear to be attempting to sacralise its political programme or France
through its association of the two with Christianity. Rather, Marine Le Pen’s National Front
appears to perceive the French nation-state as a sacred object. Christianity becomes
sacralised, in a curious way, through its association with French culture.
The party thus merges France, secularism, and Christianity together, though without drawing
on Christian spirituality. Rather, the National Front’s project is to replace the ideology of
‘globalism’ (multiculturalism and the market) with a secular nationalism which includes
790 Emmanuel Macron, quoted in “In Their Own Words: Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron,” 2017.
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within it Christian identitiarianism, but is absent of Christian beliefs and spiritually.
Secularism nationalism, then, is the ideology with which Le Pen seeks to replace ‘globalism.’
Public religion – including unsecularised public Christianity – is forbidden in the French
public sphere under this scheme. For example, Roy has discussed the post-2011 National
Front’s complex relationship with the Catholic Church. He notes that while the party and the
Church converge on issues such as the importance of France’s “Christian identity,” the two
are increasingly at odds over the role Christian social values play within French society.791
Yet, he writes, while the National Front and the Church have open disagreements, as long as
French Catholics remain sympathetic to the party the Church must be careful “follow its
flock,” rather than risk alienating Catholics by condemning the party.792 For Le Pen,
Christianity – like all religion – is to be tolerated only when it is secularised and privatised,
and used to buttress the secular state and protect it from its ‘globalist’ and Islamic enemies.
Christian identity, and moreover the Christianist secular ideology promulgated in parts of the
National Front’s discourse, demonstrates the party’s determination to move France beyond
neoliberal economics, the dictatorship of the market, and to prevent France becoming an
‘anywhere’ rather than an expression of France’s unique history and culture. Equally, the
National Front’s Christianist secularism betrays a fear of Islam, and a belief that Islam is a
unique threat because it is particularly difficult to secularise and privatise, and thus a threat to
France’s Christian culture and secular laws. Yet the party’s Christianist secularism does not
orient the party towards, but rather away, from traditional Christian values and the Catholic
church. The National Front’s Christianist secularism orients the party towards secular
nationalism, a key element of which is recognising and defending the secularised Christianity
embedded in French culture, which the party has reconceptualised as authentically French in
the wake of mass Muslim immigration.
791 Roy, “The French National Front: From Christian Identity to Laïcité,” 92, 2016.
792 Ibid.
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Chapter Eight: Comparing case studies
This chapter compares the data produced in the case study chapters. In particular it compares
the findings of each chapter, including (1) The respective role played by Muslim immigration
and Islam’s visibility in altering the religious identity of France and the Netherlands; (2)
Whether the Party for Freedom and National Front ought to be placed inside the Christianist
secular category; (3) How the two parties construct Islam in their discourse; (4) How the two
parties use Christianity and/or Judeo-Christianity to construct an ingroup and in doing so
construct outgroups.
Building upon the comparison of the data produced in the case study chapters, this chapter
makes three major arguments. First, it contends that Muslim immigration and the increased
visibility of Islam have changed Dutch and French religious identity, and thus helped
engender the rise of Christianist secular populist radical right movements in the Netherlands
and France. Based upon this finding, the chapter further argues that it is very likely that these
forces have helped engender the Christianism of other Western European populist radical
right movements. Thus Western Europe’s Christianist secularism can be understood as
stemming primarily from the effects of Muslims immigrating into secular, post-Christian
societies.
Second, the chapter contends that the Party for Freedom and National Front, despite certain
differences, can both be placed inside the Christianist secular category. Having defined the
boundaries of Christianist secularism, the chapter further contends that Christianist
secularism can be contrasted with another form of Christian identity: ‘traditionalist
Christianism.’ The chapter contends that neither form of Christianism is a religious
movement, but rather both are motivated by political and social concerns, and graft a
Christian identity onto their respective political programs in an effort to create an ingroup and
outgroups based upon religious heritage and affiliation. The difference between the two
Christianisms lies in their attitude towards the efficacy of secularism and liberalism: while
Christianist secularists defending secularism and are ostensibly liberal, traditionalist
Christianists are openly illiberal and view secular modernity as a threat to traditional
‘Christian’ values.
Finally, the chapter contends that, while the exclusion of Muslim immigrants from the
Netherlands and France respectively is the primary purpose of the populist radical right’s
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Christianism, it is not the only purpose. The Christianism of the National Front and Party for
Freedom is also used to exclude ‘elites’ and ‘globalists,’ who are alleged to threaten the
Judeo-Christian values upon which the Netherlands and France were founded. Moreover,
Christianist secularism is in part a response or backlash against the effects of globalisation,
and an attempt to find a national identity which is able to protect and preserve contemporary
culture and values from being swept away by the disruption engendered by neoliberalism
capitalism, and the cultural relativism and multiculturalism of the centre-left (which is today
often an ally of business.) Building on this observation, the chapter contends that
Christianism is likely to remain an important element in European politics. The forces that
gave rise to Christianism – Muslim immigration, globalisation in its cultural and economic
forms, and the incoherence of mainstream centrist parties policies on immigration,
multiculturalism, and economics, remain powerful throughout Europe. As long as this
remains the case, the chapter contends, populist radical right parties will be able to exploit
anger towards elites, fear of Islam, and a growing sense of a common European ‘Christian’
identity.
Is there a relationship between Muslim immigration and the rise of Christian
identitarian populist radical right movements?
Both France and the Netherlands appear to have been impacted by Europeans’ encounter with
Islam in Europe. Findings show that post-war secularisation had a profound effect on French
and Dutch identity respectively. In each case, modernization led to secularisation in the
manner described by Berger, with religious belief increasingly relegated to the private realm
and removed from the public sphere. The entry of Muslims in large numbers into this post-
Christian secular world had an increasingly profound effect on Dutch and French society
respectively. As Muslim immigrants became increasingly perceived as unable to secularise
and assimilate into Dutch and French society respectively, they became identified as a threat
to the secular state and to national culture. At the same time, Muslim difference highlighted
the secularised Christianity embedded in Western European culture, especially Christian
holidays, symbols, and the presence of Churches across the country. In this way, Muslim
difference made some Dutch and French people more aware of religion in general, and their
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own religious (or secular) identity, heritage, and worldview.793 Muslim difference thus
engendered a new sense of identity among some Dutch and French, based upon this
recognition of secularised Christianity forming the basis of Dutch culture. This altered sense
of national and civilisational identity has been exploited by the populist radical right, which
demonises Muslims as incompatible with the Judeo-Christian tradition to which France and
the Netherlands belong, and thus demands Muslims’ exclusion from European society.
What is most striking, however, is that the process has taken place in an almost identical
manner across France and the Netherlands, despite the deep historical and cultural differences
between the two nations. That the same anti-Muslim populist radical right politics should
develop in these two very different nations suggests a more general Western European
movement towards secular Christianist populism. The historical religious affiliation of a
Western European nation, while not irrelevant, is not the most important factor; rather,
Western European nations which have undergone secularisation appear to react to mass
Muslim immigration – or even the threat of mass Muslim immigration – by turning towards
secular Christian identitarianism.
For example, the entrance of Muslims into the Netherlands in large numbers, beginning in the
1970s, appears to have altered Dutch religious identity. The entrance of Muslims does not
appear to have caused alarm at first. However, once it became clear that modernity would not
have the same privatising and secularising effect on all Muslim immigrants to the
Netherlands, the religiosity of Muslims and their overall cultural differences became, for
some Dutch, something to be feared.794 This new sense of identity, created in response to
Muslim difference, reveals itself in the speeches of Frites Bolkestein, who in the early 1990s
categorised Muslim immigrants as a unique threat to the Dutch people’s Judeo-Christian
heritage and values, alongside contemporary Dutch secular differentiation of Church and
state.795 The sudden increase in use of the term “Judeo-Christian” in Dutch parliament after
2001, perhaps due to the increased visibility and fear of Islam and Muslims after the
793 A point emphasised by Habermas and Brubaker. See Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society,” 17-29,
2008; Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1191-1226, 2017.
794 See Bolkestein’s comments on Islam’s incompatibility with Judeo-Christian Western values in Hemel,




September 11, 2001 attacks, and the later murder of Theo Van Gogh, is further evidence of a
change in Dutch religious self-identification.796
The electoral success of populism in the Netherlands throughout the 2000s and 2010s
provides the strongest evidence of this phenomenon. Populist radical right leaders Pim
Fortuyn, Geert Wilders, and Thierry Baudet, all defined Dutch culture as Judeo-Christian yet
secular, and categorised Muslim immigrants as a dangerous element within the Netherlands
and a threat to its future.797 They claimed Muslims were dangerous because their religion was
totalitarian, and incapable of allowing a secular space to develop within a society. In a sense,
they were charging Muslim immigrants with being too religious to be Dutch. Yet this is not
how they expressed their criticisms of Muslims’ religiosity. Wilders, for example, claimed
Islam was not really a religion at all. Religion is a private matter; Islam is political.798
Muslims, then, were seen by Wilders as illegitimately religious due to their alleged inability
to separate religion and politics. The immigration crisis of 2015 appears to have accelerated
the growth of the populist radical right in the Netherlands, with the Party for Freedom
capitalising on fears of an Islamic invasion and becoming – for a period of several months –
the most widely supported party in the country.
In France, too, post-war modernisation engendered secularisation, including the privatisation
of religious belief, and the differentiation of religion from other spheres of human activity.
France became increasingly identified as a secular nation. Yet Catholic identity remained
important to a number of French.799 Under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the National
Front sought to win the votes of traditionalist Catholics and the most socially conservative
French voters. Secularisation thus engendered an environment in which secularism – often in
the form of Gaullist nationalism – was pitted against the Catholic identity and ultra-
conservativism of the National Front.
796 Ibid, 91.
797 See Fortuyn’s comments on the Judeo-Christian basis of Western/Dutch cultures in Kluveld, “Secular,
Superior, and Desperately Search for its Soul: The Confusing Political-Cultural References to a Judeo-Christian
Europe in the Twenty-First Century 50, 2016; Journalist Sebastian Faber, profiling Baudet in an American
magazine, describes him as “predictably” invoking the “Judeo-Christian” tradition and linking it to Dutch
culture. Faber, “Is Dutch Bad Boy Baudet the New Face of the European Alt-Right?” 2018. See Baudet
speaking of Christian values, despite not believing in the Christian God. Bas, “Thierry Baudet: Westerse wereld
zit in identiteitcrisis, we hebben christelijke warden nodig,” 2017.
798 See Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,”2015.
799 Most French even today identify as Catholic – 53% according to a recent poll. The poll also found that only
5% of Catholics attend Mass, an indication that Catholic identity is stronger than Catholic belief. See Anne-
Bénédicte Hoffner and Gauthier Vaillant, “The Sociology of French Catholics,” La Croix, August 1, 2017.
https://international.la-croix.com/news/the-sociology-of-french-catholics/4491.
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The increasing number and visibility of Muslim immigrants in France began to change
perceptions of the relationship between Christianity and secularism. Muslim immigrants, who
often kept their own cultural and religious practices, were sometimes perceived to be a threat
to French culture.800 As Muslims became the ‘other’ in France, and the primary enemy of the
National Front, the secularised Christianity embedded in French culture became more visible,
breaking down the barrier between Christianity and secularism.
No longer was the triumph of secularism over religion in France assured. Equally, no longer
was it possible to pretend that secular spaces in France were religiously neutral. Not when
Christmas remained a national public holiday but Islamic holidays were considered too
‘religious’ to became secular holidays, or when the funding of some Christian and Jewish
schools were acceptable within France’s secular school system, but no funding of Islamic
schools was permitted.801 Recognition of the secularised Christianity in French culture made
it possible for French politicians to declare France a ‘Christian’ nation, even as Church
attendance and belief in God continued to decline.
It was not until the appointment of Marine Le Pen as National Front president that the party
defined laïcité and Christianity – and sometimes Judeo-Christianity – as the foundation of
contemporary French culture.802 The National Front’s turn under the leadership of Marine Le
Pen’s towards secularism, and moreover towards secular Christianism, helped improve the
party’s image. By orienting itself towards secular nationalism, though without disassociating
itself from its roots in Christian/Catholic identity politics, the party cast away its associations
with fascism and anti-Semitism. At the same time, it was able to exploit the growing
recognition of the secularised Christianity in French culture, and present itself as a defender
of France’s secular laws and Christian culture. By doing so, Marine Le Pen was able to de-
demonise the party, and win for the National Front the widespread support it had long desired
at Presidential elections in 2012 and, especially, 2017. Adopting secular Christianism gave
the National Front the ability to win support from secularists who saw France as ‘culturally
Christian’ but secular, and who perceived Islam to be a threat to both secular differentiation
of religion from politics, but also a threat to the elements of Chrisitianity which were
secularised into ‘culture’.
800 See Jean-Marie Le Pen’s comments on the danger of Islam in Primor, “The Veil? It protects us from ugly
women,” 2002.
801 See Fernando, “The French Myth of Secularism,” 2015.
802 See Jean-Marie Le Pen’s remark that France is a Judeo-Christian culture in Primor, “The Veil? It protects us
from ugly women,” 2002.
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My hypothesis, then, appears to be correct. As secularism and secular identity overcame
religious identity and difference in post-war France and the Netherlands, the Christianity
which remained in public life was secularised into ‘culture.’ Yet without a large non-
Christian/post-Christian population in Europe this Christianity went largely unnoticed, and
was perceived simply as ‘culture.’ Muslim difference thus revealed the secularised
Christianity remaining in European public life, despite secularism’s promise of a neutral
public sphere. Equally, Muslims’ resistance to the secularising effects of modernity showed
secularism would not always overcome religion, and revealed European secularism as – in
part – a specific product of European history and culture. Therefore Muslim immigration
opened the door for populist radical right parties to exploit growing Christian identitarianism
in Western Europe, and gave them grounds to merge, in their discourse, secularism,
Christianity, ‘the people’ and their respective nation-state, and Western civilisation into a
single religio-secular (Judeo-)Christian ‘tradition.’
What is most significant is that the Netherlands and France both experienced this movement
towards Christianist secularism, despite important differences in the two nations’ religious
and political histories. This suggests that secularism overcame Christian denominational
differences, and subsequently secularised elements of Christianity into ‘culture,’ in a similar
way in France and the Netherlands. It further suggests that Islam’s presence affects secular
Europeans in a similar way throughout the continent, challenging their understanding of
secularism as a neutral space between religions, and ultimately pushing them towards
Christianist secularism.
Is ‘Christianist secularism’ an appropriate description of the use of religion in the
discourse of the Party for Freedom and National Front?
The Party for Freedom and National Front are examples of populist radical right parties
which graft Christian identity onto a secular political platform, hallmarks of Christianist
secularism. The parties do not always, however, adhere to the elements Brubaker identifies as
belonging to secular Christian identitarian populism in Western/Northern Europe to the same
degree. For example, the Party for Freedom is the paradigm of the populist radical right
Christian identitarian party.803 Wilders’ discourse demonstrates all the elements Brubaker
803 As Brubaker suggested in Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist
moment in comparative perspective,” 1193, 2017.
223
describes as being hallmarks of populist radical right secular Christian identitarianism.
Christian identitarianism, for example, is very important to Wilders and the party for
Freedom. The West and Judeo-Christianity and Humanism are, in Wilders’ discourse,
entirely synonymous. Though the programme of the Party for Freedom is deeply nativist,
Wilders holds to a somewhat civilisationalist worldview based upon a religious classification
of peoples, cultures, and nations, and identifies the West and by extension the Netherlands as
part of ‘Judeo-Christian’ civilisation.
Wilders’ discourse is secularist, and does not contain any genuinely religious arguments,
language, or motivations. In he and his party’s discourse ‘humanism’ is often used in place of
‘secularism’ to describe the non-Jewish and Christian cultural traditions of the West Wilders
believes to be beneficial and intrinsic elements of Western – and thus Dutch – culture. In the
texts I examined, he uses the word humanism to describe something apart from the religions
Christianity and Judaism, which has joined the two to form a unique ‘Western’ cultural
tradition.  Humanism might mean the philosophic traditions of Ancient Greece and Rome, the
scientific developments of the Enlightenment, and the rise of the modern secular state which
attempts to be neutral on religious matters and demands a religion-free public sphere.
Wilders’ discourse consists, superficially, of a defence of liberalism. Yet he is happy to use
illiberal means to preserve this liberalism. Equally, though Wilders is unquestionably a
democrat, he remains an illiberal democrat who argues liberty belongs only to those who
agree with his conception of Dutch culture and identity. The liberalism Wilders’ defends is
the freedom to defy religious traditions in order to have sex with whomever one chooses, to
dress how one chooses, and to abort unwanted children. He does not defend universal
freedom of expression.804 While Wilders rages against laws which make hate speech illegal
or unlawful, of which is says he is a victim, he also demands that Muslims’ freedom to
express themselves be severely curtailed.805 If liberty means the right to tell people, as
George Orwell put it, what they do not want to hear, Wilders is not interested in liberty – not
when it may means Muslims or ‘cultural relativists’ speaking their minds.806
Yet Wilders portrays his party as defenders of freedom from the tyranny of Islam, especially
of the freedom of women, Jewish people, and gay people, to live and behave as they wish,
804 See Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,” 2015.
805 Ibid.
806 A quote from George Orwell’s proposed preface to Animal Farm. See
http://orwell.ru/library/novels/Animal_Farm/english/efp_go.
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something Wilders’ claims Islam opposes.807 Thus his pro-freedom stance appears to come
from his opposition to Islam, rather than an especial interest in women’s rights or gay rights.
On the other hand, he is powerfully and noticeably philo-Semitic, and curiously so given how
little support his party receives from Dutch Jews.808 Wilders’ philo-Semitism is powerful
enough to ensure that he speaks of ‘Judeo-Christianity’ and almost never Christianity alone.
Jews and Judaism – or whatever Wilders means by “Judeo,” a term he never explains – are
named as part of Western Civilisation in his discourse. Wilders’ personal love of Israel
notwithstanding, it is likely that his philo-Semitism – which doesn’t appear to extend beyond
admiration for Israeli society – stems from the same sources as the philo-Semitism of other
populist radical right politicians: left-wing support for Palestine and hostility towards Israel.
For some parts of the European left, anger at Israeli policies has turned into calls for boycotts
and outright anti-Semitism.809 The right thus reflexively supports Israel on the basis that the
enemy of my enemy is my friend, and perhaps in part because it approves of the supposedly
‘Western’ presence Israel brings to the Islam dominated Middle East.
While Wilders’ discourse reveals his Party for Freedom to be the paradigm of a Christian
identitarian party practicing Christianist secularism, Marine Le Pen’s discourse reveals a
more confusing picture. Christian identity continued to play an important role in National
Front discourse after Marine Le Pen’s assumption of party leadership. Yet her discourse is
always first secularist, and does not always contain references to Christianity. Le Pen’s
discourse differs in several important ways from Wilders. First, she rarely speaks of “Judeo-
Christianity,” preferring to speak of France’s dual Christian and laïque identity, heritage, and
values.810 Despite inconsistencies in her use of Christian identity, Le Pen has moved the
National Front towards Christian identitarianism and Christianist secularism. In chapter 6 and
7 I showed how Marine Le Pen initiated a de-demonisation programme and attempted to re-
orient the party towards the centre of French politics. As part of this programme, Le Pen
gradually dropped any remaining opposition to laïcité, gay rights, and abortion. Instead, she
pushed the party to embrace France’s laïque identity alongside its Christian past, to condemn
807 Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,” 2015.
808 See Tamara Zieve, “How would Dutch Jews fare under extreme-right Geert Wilders?” Jerusalem Post,
March 14, 2017. https://www.jpost.com/Diaspora/Is-pro-Israel-Geert-Wilders-good-for-the-Dutch-Jews-
484121.
809 See for example the British Labour Party’s struggles with anti-Semitism, born from their hostility towards
Israel, and particularly its right-wing government. See Benjamin Mueller, “U.K. Opens Hate Crime Inquiry into
Anti-Semitism in Labour Party, New York Times, November 2, 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/02/world/europe/uk-labour-party-anti-semitism.html
810 Le Pen does not use the term “Judeo-Christian” in the texts I analysed, though she has used it in at least one
interview: see Alduy, “Has Marine Le Pen already won the battle for the soul of France?” 2014.
225
anti-Semitism (and moreover to support Israel), and emphasise a pro-freedom agenda in
opposition to the alleged “twin totalitarianisms” or Islamism and globalisation.811
Thus both parties fit into Brubaker’s category, and can be described as Christian identitarian
parties using Christianist secular discourse. Many of the key differences between the
Christian identitarianism of the National Front and Party for Freedom are mostly differences
of degree. While the Party for Freedom strongly emphasises the need for gay rights to be
protected from Islam, the National Front tends to mention the threat homosexuals face from
fundamentalist Islam only in passing, and perhaps in order to demonstrate the perceived
incoherence of centre-left and centre-right politics, which attempts to defend Islam while also
promoting gay rights. Moreover, the French party tends to be, overall, more socially
conservative, reflecting the strong support it receives among conservative and traditionalist
Catholics and other social conservatives.
Equally, the Party for Freedom does not oppose economic globalisation to the same degree as
the National Front, owing perhaps to different economic conditions in each nation, and the
need the Dutch have for foreign investment and European economic integration. The
globalisation Wilders’ perceives to be a threat to “Judeo-Christian civilisation” is the opening
of borders and mass movement of peoples, and the unchecked spread of foreign ideas and
cultures in the Netherlands which result from the teaching that all cultures are equal.812 In
Wilders’ discourse, neoliberal economic policy is attacked for leaving older Dutch without
the medical assistance required, but not for undermining Dutch manufacturing, or for
disrupting the economy.813 This is strikingly different from the anti-globalisation rhetoric of
the National Front, which is designed to appeal to working class people concerned about job
loss and wage stagnation.814
The key difference between the two parties’ Christian identitarianism is the manner in which
it is expressed. While Wilders generally prefers to use the formulation ‘Judeo-Christian and
Humanist,’ which is sometimes shortened to ‘Judeo-Christian,’ Marine Le Pen uses a variety
of terms. Sometimes France and French identity is described as simply secular. Sometimes it
is ‘Christian,’ ‘Christian and secular,’ or ‘Judeo-Christian.’ Neither Le Pen nor Wilders has
811 Marine Le Pen, “Presidential Campaign Launch Speech,” 2017.
812 Wilders, “Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation,” 2016.
813 See Wilders, “Preliminary Election Program PVV 2017-2021,” 2016.
814 See Angelique Chrisafis, “Marine Le Pen springs surprise visit on Macron during picket line campaign trip,”
The Guardian, April 27, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/26/marine-le-pen-springs-surprise-
visit-on-macron-during-picket-line-campaign-trip.
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ever, as far as I have found, discussed the meaning of these terms in depth. They appear to
assume their audience understands the meaning. As Kluveld has noted, “Judeo-Christian” can
be used to mean whatever the speaker wishes it to mean, and is most often a theologically
empty term nationalists use to define an ‘ingroup.’815 This is how Wilders and Le Pen
respectively appear to apply the term.
Wilders’ emphasis on “Judeo” perhaps indicates a greater philo-Semitism, and an attempt to
demonstrate his commitment to the Netherlands’ tradition of religious tolerance, despite his
opposition to and desire to repress Islam. His attachment to “humanism,” rather than
“secularism,” may also be related to the Dutch humanist tradition related to figures such as
renowned Dutch Humanist scholar Erasmus, who advocated tolerance and reason alongside
Christianity – and saw them as perfectly compatible – though this may be intellectualising
Wilders’ rhetoric too much.
Le Pen’s confused mix of terms, however, may demonstrate opportunism, and an attempt to
use the most effective term in each appropriate context. Yet it appears to reflect the internal
divisions affecting the National Front. For example, the rise of Catholic identity politics and
social conservatism in the form of former National Front candidate Marion Maréchal, who
quit the party in part due to disagreement with her aunt over the mainstreaming of the party,
shows that there are multiple points of view on the religious identity of France within the
party.
Importantly, the different conceptions of respective Dutch and French identity appears to be
connected to the Wilders’ and Le Pen’s differing conceptions of the civilisation to which they
belong. Le Pen speaks of a “French civilization,”816 though she also acknowledges France’s
Judeo-Christian heritage, which is shared with other European nations. Wilders, however,
does not claim that the Dutch have their own civilisation. He merely posits that the
Netherlands is part of “Western” or “Judeo-Christian” civilisation.817 For Wilders, Western
civilisation – which includes Israel – is ‘Judeo-Christian.’ Thus ‘Western’ and ‘Judeo-
Christian’ appear to be interchangeable names for the civilisation to which the Netherlands
belongs. This is not the case for Le Pen, who separates France and French civilisation from
815 Kluveld, “Secular, Superior, and Desperately Search for its Soul: The Confusing Political-Cultural
References to a Judeo-Christian Europe in the Twenty-First Century,” 245, 2016.
816 Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen Speech: Why she is running for President,”2012.
817 Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders at the Western Conservative Summit, Denver, 30 June, 2012.” 2012.
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other nations and civilisation, portraying it as something special and important.818 Yet she
also connects France to the Christians of the Middle East, particular Lebanese Christians,
through France’s colonial endeavours and shared Christian heritage and Christian influenced
culture.819 Substantially, then, Le Pen and Wilders mean the same thing while using different
terms. “Judeo-Christianity” is not a religion. For Le Pen and Wilders terms such as “Judeo-
Christian” and “Christian,” and perhaps even “humanist,” do not refer to coherent systems of
belief, and cannot be understood as advocating religion. Christianity and Judaism are not, in
their respective discourses, ‘religious’ terms, but terms used to differentiate different peoples
according to their religious heritage and identity.
Comparing the construction of Islam in the National Front’s and Party for Freedom’s
respective discourses
An important element of the discourse of the National Front and Party for Freedom is the
‘othering’ of Muslims, one of the two outgroups (alongside ‘globalists’ or ‘elites’) defined by
Le Pen and Wilders respectively. Wilders and Le Pen use similar tools to ‘other’ Muslims.
They construct a strict dichotomy between “us” and “them,” using these terms over and over
so as to enforce the point to the audience. ‘We’ are not Muslims, they claim; Muslims are not
‘us.’
The two major outgroups identified by Wilders and Le Pen are, in their respective discourses,
connected to one another. They claim that the presence of Islam in their countries is the direct
result of ‘elites’ (to use Wilders’ preferred term) and ‘globalists’ (Le Pen) desire for mass
immigration and a multicultural environment. In a sense, the real villains in Le Pen’s and
Wilders’ respective discourses are the globalists and multiculturalists, not Muslims. Indeed,
according to Le Pen and Wilders, Muslims are at once “evil” and “dangerous” adherents of a
“totalitarian” ideology, but also victims of the same ideology which oppresses them.820
Globalists and elites, however, are presented as the ultimate villains throughout the examined
texts.
818 See Marine Le Pen’s remarks on France’s special connection with freedom in, “Marine Le Pen: How France
will Conquer the Enemies of Liberty,” 2015.
819 See Tarek Osman, “Lebanon’s Maronites and Le Pen,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, Februrary 26,
2017. https://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-forum/lebanons-maronites-and-le-pen/.
820 See Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,” 2015; Marine Le Pen,
“Presidential Campaign Launch Speech,” 2017.
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It is important to note the different terminology used by the two leaders to refer to this
‘enemy.’ Wilders prefers ‘elites’ to ‘globalists,’ and in fact does not expand much energy
attacking globalisation. This may be because he ultimately thinks globalisation is a good
thing, as long as it spreads Western ideas, culture, and religion throughout the world. For this
reason, perhaps, he praises Dutch colonial history which was itself a kind of globalisation,
though certainly a very unwelcome kind to those ‘globalised’ by the Dutch.821 Thus Wilders’
attacks ‘elites’ for allowing and at times deliberately engendering a reverse globalisation in
which the rest of the world globalises the West.822 This is an important point. It is striking to
observe how Wilders has, over time, altered his views on neoliberalism and globalisation. He
of course is not alone in revising his opinion on the efficacy of globalisation.
Globalisation once appeared to be a process in which the West would ensure its hegemony
would continue into the far future. Once it could be determined that globalisation actually
meant the shifting of wealth away from the working and middle classes in the West,
supporters of Western hegemony could no longer support globalisation. Wilders, no doubt,
changed his views on the value of globalisation once he recognised that it had become a
process in which the Netherlands – and indeed the West – would become both increasingly
multi-ethnic and multi-cultural, and in which Western power and prestige would come under
increasing challenge from non-Western societies.
According to Wilders, ‘elites’ who advocate for mass immigration and ‘cultural relativism’
inside the Netherlands, are seditious villains who are giving away their patrimony.823 ‘Elites’
have committed two ‘crimes’ against the Netherlands and “Judeo-Christian civilisation,”
according to Wilders. First, they have allowed Islam to establish a large presence in the
Netherlands and moreover throughout Europe, which is ever growing and becoming a greater
threat to the future of the West’s “Judeo-Christian and Humanist” culture and identity.824
Second, ‘elites’ have destroyed their societies’ self-confidence by promoting the idea that all
cultures are equal. Combined, according to Wilders this has had the effect of allowing Islam
to grow unchecked and ultimately ‘Islamize’ the Netherlands and other parts of Western





Europe.825 Islamisation is thus, for Wilders, the natural consequence of mass immigration and
cultural relativism.
For Wilders, Islam itself is a cancer spreading through society, oppressing everyone –
including and especially himself – to whom it draws close.826 Yet he does not condemn all
Muslims. Some Muslims are moderate people, he says.827 Islam, then, is for Wilders the
problem, not Muslims. Thus an individual Muslim can be a good member of Dutch society; a
moderate, even a progressive, and a secularist. But there is no moderate Islam, let alone
progressive Islam, and Islam is antithetical to secularism.828 Thus according to Wilders Islam
is a monolithic force, fundamentalist and totalitarian, which must be proscribed in the
Netherlands in order to protect Dutch “Judeo-Christian and Humanist” culture and identity.829
Moreover, “Judeo-Christianity and Humanism” must be made the leading culture of the
Netherlands in order to prevent Islamisation and stop elites further eroding Dutch culture and
identity by promoting cultural relativism.830 In making this argument Wilders constructs a
powerful dichotomy between the ‘Judeo-Christian and Humanist’ ingroup, and ‘Muslims,’
who by their very nature he alleges to be too dangerous to allow within Dutch society.
‘Elites’ might change their minds, drop their cultural relativism, and return to Judeo-
Christianity and Humanism. They, after all, have a Judeo-Christian Dutch heritage. Muslims
on the other hand constitute a foreign element following a religion which is antithetical to
Dutch values, and seeks – Wilders claims – to conquer and enslave non-Muslims.831
While Le Pen described Islam as “not soluble in secularism” in 2011, in the texts analysed in
this thesis she did not exactly claim – as Wilders does – that Islam itself is a problem.832 In
her 2012 address Le Pen did not name Islam or Muslims as a problem, though she implied –
by complaining of religious minorities ignoring French law – that some Muslims were
dangerous to French society.833 Yet in her 2012 speech Le Pen, by implying that there were
religious minorities who flouted “our” (France’s) secular laws, ‘others’ Muslims, creating a
825 Ibid.
826 See Wilders’ remarks on the inherently dangerous nature of Islam in Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders at the
Western Conservative Summit, Denver, 30 June, 2012.” 2012.
827 Ibid.
828 Ibid.
829 Pauwels. Populism in Western Europe: Comparing Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, 114, 2014.
830 Ibid.
831 Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,” 2015.
832 “Le Pen: Islam not compatible with secular society,” 2011.
833 Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen Speech: Why she is running for President,” March 16, 2012.
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sharp dichotomy between the secular French people and religious minorities who she alleged
refused to assimilate into their host society.834
By 2015, however, Le Pen had grown bolder and more confident in her anti-immigration
rhetoric, declaring “Islamic fundamentalism” the enemy of France, and by extension, the
enemy of freedom. Islamic fundamentalism, according to Le Pen, is also the enemy of
Muslims, who are have been enslaved by its totalitarian doctrine and require liberating. 835 If
Muslims were to secularise, then they would not, Le Pen implies, pose a threat to France. But
this secularisation appears to entail a degree of Christianisation – after all, according to the
National Front leader France’s secular values are secularised Christian values. Marine Le
Pen, then, may not be entirely sincere when she claims that she opposes only Islamic
fundamentalism, not Islam. For Le Pen, France belongs to an intellectual and cultural
tradition which begins in Greece and Rome, was influenced by Christianity (which itself
began as a form of Judaism), and was secularised during and after the Enlightenment and
French revolution. Islam does not feature in this tradition. Thus to belong to the secular-
Christian tradition Le Pen constructs in her discourse one cannot, it appears, be Muslim.
Furthermore, Le Pen’s manner of differentiating between Islam and Islamic fundamentalism
appears to be through observing whether the Muslim individual or group differentiates
between religion and politics. Yet Le Pen has charged Islam with being unable to make this
differentiation, indicating that she – like Wilders – ultimately believes that while Muslims
might make this distinction on an individual basis, Islam does not.
Yet like Wilders, Marine Le Pen’s quarrel is not largely with Muslims, but with what Wilders
calls ‘elites’ and she ‘globalists.’ ‘Globalists’ encourage mass immigration and
multiculturalism, she argues, which when combined allows Islamic fundamentalism to
flourish, ultimately undermining secular French law and “diluting” French culture and
identity.836 For Le Pen, it appears, the real problem in France is not Islam – it is the loss of
confidence elites have engineered, through their neoliberal and multiculturalist policies,
within French society. This loss of confidence allows fundamentalist Islam to grow
undisturbed by the secular state, and ultimately, Le Pen believes, Islamise France.
834 Ibid.
835 Wilders also calls Islam ‘slavery:’ 835 Geert Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13
2015,” 2015.
836 Marine Le Pen, “Presidential Campaign Launch Speech,” 2017.
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Le Pen and Wilders, though they use different terminology, both construct Islam in a
monolithic fashion in their discourse, while leaving certain narrow caveats through which
individual Muslims might win acceptance within Dutch and French society respectively. Both
create in their discourse outgroups of ‘elites/globalists’ and Muslims, and a Judeo-Christian
and humanist, or Christian and secular, ingroup. Both describe Islam as “totalitarian,”
antithetical to secularism, a form of slavery, and illegitimate insofar as it does not allow for
secular public spaces, but instead tries to fill every space with itself, knowing no difference
between religion and politics, or between church and state. Having constructed Islam in this
way, there is no choice for Le Pen and Wilders but to demand the exclusion of practicing
Muslims from French and Dutch society respectively, which – despite Le Pen’s claim to only
be demanding the removal of fundamentalist Muslims – is essentially what they do.
The Party for Freedom’s and National Front’s use of Christian identity in their
respective discourses
Christian identity is a key aspect of National Front and Party for Freedom discourse, used to
construct an ingroup based on a shared religious identity, and to exclude groups who are
perceived to hold an identity at odds with that of the ingroup. However, it would not be
correct to say that Le Pen and/or Wilders are demanding the exclusion of individuals and
groups who cannot be included within the (Judeo-)Christian ingroup. Le Pen, for example,
does not attack France’s large Vietnamese and Chinese communities for largely failing to
hold a Christian identity. She does not mention these groups of non-Christians at all, perhaps
because she does not perceive their religious identities (which may be atheist, Christian,
Buddhist, Confucian, syncretistic, etc...) as threatening laïcité and the separation of religion
and politics in France. In a similar way, Wilders specifically says he does not care if the
world is run by Buddhists, because Buddhism is not a totalitarian ideology – like Islam –
hostile to freedom and bent on world domination.837
Furthermore, non-Muslim immigration -- while perhaps not to be encouraged – is for Le Pen
and Wilders nowhere near as threatening as Muslim immigration, precisely because they
perceive only Islam as threatening to secularism. The Party for Freedom’s and National
Front’s use of Christian identity, therefore, can be understood as a specific reaction to the
837 Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,” 2015.
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perceived danger Muslims present to the secular law and culture and moreover the separation
of religion and politics.
Yet due to the increased association of Christianity with secularism, which has occurred as a
result of the growing presence of Islam in Western Europe and the religion based
civilisationalist differentiation of peoples it engendered, any danger Muslims appear to pose
to secularism may also be perceived as a threat to Christianity or the Judeo-Christian and
Humanist/secular tradition. Thus we find Wilders claiming that Muslims immigrants to the
Netherlands threaten the fruits of the Judeo-Christian tradition: democracy, freedom,
prosperity, and separation of church and state.838 Wilders’ invoking of a Judeo-Christian
tradition threatened by Muslims became increasingly dramatic during and after the 2015
immigration crisis. His warnings about the consequences of allowing Muslim refugees to
settle in the Netherlands became apocalyptic, as he claimed that Muslim asylum seekers had
the potential to destroy Dutch “Judeo-Christian and Humanist” culture and identity, and must
therefore be forbidden from settling in the country.839 In 2017, and despite a very modest
number of Muslims -- just over 2000 refugees in the 2015-2017 period840 -- Wilders declared
his (or rather “our”) country had been Islamised and thus “destroyed.”841
In Wilders discourse ‘we’ and ‘the people’ are always Judeo-Christian and Humanist. ‘They’
are Muslim. Yet ‘they’ are can also be ‘elites’ – elites who no longer believe in the
superiority of their own culture but have embraced “cultural relativism.”842 Thus Christian
identity, though constructed as a response to the Muslim ‘threat’ to secularism in the
Netherlands, is also used by Wilders to exclude his non-Muslim enemies from belonging to
‘the people’ and the Dutch nation-state. Curiously, other non-Christian communities –
Buddhists, Hindus, and non-Muslim Asians etc... – may not exactly be included within this
“we” or “us,” but neither are they precisely the ‘other.’ In other words, in Party for Freedom
discourse they are not explicitly placed within the ingroup, yet do not feature among
outgroups either. Rather, such groups are simply non-threatening to “the people” so long –
838 According to Wilders “our heritage, our freedoms, our prosperity and our culture are in danger.” See
Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders at the Western Conservative Summit, Denver, 30 June, 2012.” 2012.
839 See Wilders, “Speech Geert Wilders, Bornholm, Denmark, June 13 2015,” 2015.
840 The Netherlands agreed to take 7000 refugees, but only settled 2100 by mid-2017. See Refugees in the
Netherlands, Government of Netherlands website, https://www.government.nl/topics/asylum-policy/refugees-in-
the-netherlands.; “The Netherlands has accepted 2100 refugees under EU quota scheme,” Dutch News, July 27,
2017.
841 See Wilders, “Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation,” 2016.
842 Ibid.
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perhaps – as they do not appear to challenge secularism and their numbers remain relatively
low.
What, then, is Judeo-Christianity and Humanism for Wilders and the Party for Freedom? It is,
in part, constructed out of Islam’s mirror image. According to Wilders, Islam is totalitarian,
unable to distinguish between the secular and sacred, creates poor and backward societies,
and is bent on domination. In contrast, Judeo-Christianity and Humanism is secular, pro-
freedom, engenders prosperity, and democratic. It is impossible, then, to understand Wilders’
concept of Judeo-Christianity and Humanism without reference to his concept of Islam: one
informs the other.
In another sense Judeo-Christianity and Humanism is a “sacred code” word that means
whatever Wilders wishes it to mean.843 It is certainly not Islam. It is, rather, anything Wilders
understands as being positive: democracy, the nation-state, secularism, the patriotism,
prosperity, Western supremacy, whatever Wilders understands as Dutch culture. Conversely,
it excludes whatever Wilders understands as negative: Islam, totalitarianism, poverty, cultural
relativism, anti-Western attitudes, hostility towards women, Jews, Christians, and
homosexuals. This being so, Judeo-Christian and Humanist identity can be used to exclude
not merely Muslims but the centre-left and centre-right parties whose politicians Wilders
brands ‘elites.’ Thus anyone who advocates for open borders, multiculturalism, and what
Wilders erroneously calls ‘cultural relativism,’ can be construed by Wilders to be attacking
Judeo-Christian civilisation, identity, and values.
The National Front’s use of Christian identity in their discourse in 2012-2017 mirrors in
certain respects that of the Party for Freedom. Christian identity is, when invoked, used to
define the boundaries of ‘the people,’ and thus to exclude the groups and individuals the party
considers threatening to French identity and culture. However, Marine Le Pen invokes
Christian identity far less often than Geert Wilders – not once in her 2012 address and 2015
Time article – and is less inclined to explicitly include Judaism inside her ingroup when she
invokes religious identity. Yet these differences may be somewhat misleading. While
Wilders’ is more likely to describe Dutch and Western identity and culture as Judeo-Christian
than Le Pen, he is no less a secularist than the National Front leader. Equally, Le Pen portrays
herself as a defender of French Jews from Islam, has courted French-Jewish voters, and
843 See Vollard, “Re-emerging Christianity in West European Politics: The Case of the Netherlands,” 94, 2013.
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vocally supports Israel’s right to exist.844 Bearing this in mind, we can see the remarkable
similarities in Le Pen and Wilders’ use of religious identity, despite their use of different
terminology.
The best way of understanding the National Front’s use of Christian identity in their
discourse in 2012-2017 is within the larger context of Le Pen’s patriot-globalist dichotomy,
the defining theme of her run for President in 2017.  For Le Pen, the patriot loves their
country, and loves in particular that which makes it unique, and therefore defends it against
forces of change. Patriotism thus, according to Le Pen, requires nationalism – support for the
existence of nation-states, their inviolable sovereignty, and the security of their borders. Only
the strong and secure nation state, Le Pen suggests, can ensure the freedom and prosperity of
the individual.845 Most importantly, according to Le Pen, only the nation state can ensure
cultural continuity and the preservation of the uniqueness of each ‘nation’ of people. In other
words, the strong and sovereign nation-state alone can prevent neoliberal globalisation from
turning a ‘somewhere’ into an anywhere.846
Globalism, according to Le Pen, destroys this uniqueness, dilutes national culture and erases
difference, by giving business and government the means to move people, money, and jobs
around in an effort to maximise profits regardless of how it impacts their employees and the
societies in which they operate. We might, then, understand Marine Le Pen as opposing what
Zygmunt Bauman calls ‘liquid modernity,’ and as attempting to return France to a ‘solid’
state.847
For Le Pen, the problem with the politics of the mainstream French parties is that, no matter
whether they designate themselves as conservative or progressive, they remain essentially
globalist. Le Pen’s criticisms of the centre-left and centre-right are summed up well by Mark
Lilla, who notes that
“The left opposes the uncontrolled fluidity of the global economy and wants to rein it in on
behalf of workers, while it celebrates immigration, multiculturalism, and fluid gender roles
that large numbers of workers reject. The establishment right reverses those positions,
844 See Itay Lotem, “In a bid to detoxify the far right, Marine Le Pen wants to appeal to French Jews,” The
Conversation, March 22, 2017. http://theconversation.com/in-a-bid-to-detoxify-the-far-right-marine-le-pen-
wants-to-appeal-to-french-jews-73993.
845 See Marine Le Pen, “Marine Le Pen: How France will Conquer the Enemies of Liberty,” 2015.
846 According to Emmanuel Macron, France is already an ‘anywhere’ with no particular culture, but home to a
diverse range of cultures. See “In Their Own Words: Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron,” 2017.
847 See Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Polity: Cambridge, 2000.
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denouncing the free circulation of people for destabilizing society, while promoting the free
circulation of capital, which does exactly that. These French conservatives criticize
uncontrolled fluidity in both its neoliberal and cosmopolitan forms.”848
Le Pen is aware of the incoherence of the centre-right and centre-left, and appears to be able
to successfully exploit it. Indeed, her decision to change the name of the party to National
Rally is a sign that she recognises that the party’s association with fascism is holding
prevents it from fully capitalising on the incoherence of the centre: some French people will
simply not vote for a Le Pen or the National Front even though they may be aware of the
contradictory and self-defeating politics of the centrist parties. Le Pen’s position opposing, as
Lilla notes, the fluid movement of both people and money is actually more coherent than her
opponents’ positions. It enables her to portray herself as a defender of that which makes
France a unique ‘somewhere,’ avoiding the contradictions inherent in dogmatic left and right
politics. Equally, this position allows her to portray centrist politicians as either hopelessly
ignorant of the contradictions in the politics, or part of a self-serving elite which fails to take
into consideration the voice or interests of ‘the people’ when making policy decisions.849
Le Pen’s ‘neither left nor right’ discourse opposing “cultural” and “economic globalistation”
is based upon identifying aspects of French culture which are authentically French, and
attempting to preserve them against the forces of globalisation.850 Thus Le Pen defends in her
discourse the French language against the relentless rise of English as a ‘global’ language,
and the rights of French workers from attempts to liberalise the economy.851 For Le Pen, and
unlike most mainstream conservatives, defending workers rights is perceived to be a
conservative act intended to preserve working class ways of life and livelihoods. Thus when
Le Pen claims to be a defender of Christianity, she is also attempting to defend an element of
French culture and heritage from the forces of globalisation. When she refers to
“Christianity” she is rarely discussing the organised religion, or the set of beliefs and
principles that are called the Christian religion. Rather, she seeks to defend not this religious
Christianity, but elements of the heritage and culture of France which she believes stem from
or are Christian.
848 Mark Lilla, “Two Roads for the New French Right,” The New York Review of Books, December 20, 2018.
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2018/12/20/two-roads-for-the-new-french-right/.
849 A similar argument to that made by Wilders, who claims ‘elites’ have engineered a situation in which it is
“the native people who are losing their country”. See Wilders, “Wilders Plan: Time for Liberation,” 2016.
850 Marine Le Pen, “Presidential Campaign Launch Speech,” 2017.
851 Ibid.
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What Le Pen wishes to defend, then, is the Greco-Roman-Judeo-Christian-secular tradition to
which she believes France belongs. This tradition appears to be constructed more or less from
opposition to neoliberalism and an Islamic presence in France, rather than out of an especial
love of anything belonging to these various cultural and religious traditions. Le Pen never, for
example, praises anything especially Christian. Rather, under her leadership the party has
moved away from defending traditional Catholic and Christian positions on abortion,
homosexuality, and divorce. Christian identity and heritage is, then, primarily important to Le
Pen because it assists in her efforts to define ‘the people’ in a manner which excludes
Muslims and ‘globalists.’ An entirely secular identity might exclude observant Muslims, but
it would fail to exclude Muslims who do not bring their religion into the public sphere in any
respect. Equally, a secular identity is less useful in opposing neoliberalism or ‘economic
globalisation.’ If neoliberalism is altering the foundational values of France, and these
foundations are Christian or Judeo-Christian, then neoliberalism might be considered an
assault on Christianity. Equally, if ‘economic globalisation’ is bringing many different
peoples to France, each with their own group identity, then ‘economic globalisation’ is a
threat to the hegemonic position Christian identity has historically enjoyed in France.
Christian identity is useful to Le Pen as a rhetorical shorthand for French identity. It is used in
Le Pen’s discourse to define French identity in such a way as to include secular French who
practice ‘cultural’ Christianity, or at least who do not seek to challenge cultural Christian
hegemony, and to exclude anyone who appears to challenge this hegemony. Her notion of
Christian identity, however, is strikingly different from that of other members of her party.
This contributes to some problems with party messaging on the issue. For example, Le Pen’s
niece Marion Maréchal – who dropped ‘Le Pen’ from her surname in 2018 – actively
campaigned on a social conservative and Catholic identitarian platform in 2017.852 Marechal
shares her aunt’s disdain for “elites,” who she claims have “utterly ignored” the needs for the
working class, and created a “crisis of respresentative democracy.”853 But Marechal does not
support her aunt’s moderate position on many social and ethical issues, and is stronger in her
condemnation of ‘Islam’ rather than merely attacking ‘Islamist radicals’ and
‘fundamentalists.’ For example, according to Maréchal, France has gone “from the eldest
852 See for example Nick Miller, “Marion Marechal: the 29-year-old far-right favourite tipped to challenge




daughter of the Catholic Church to the little niece of Islam”.854 Unlike her aunt, who has
adopted the mainstream secular consensus position on abortion, Maréchal wishes to lead a
movement “protect ...children from eugenics, the elderly from euthanasia and humanity from
transhumanism.”855
Though she has left politics – for now at least – Marion Maréchal remains a well known and
influential political figure, with a high enough profile that she was invited to speak at the
CPAC conference in the United States.856 Her social conservatism marks her Christian
identitarian out as fundamentally different from her aunt’s, falling more in line with the
Christianism of Viktor Orban and Poland’s Law and Justice Party insofar as it rejects
secularism and progressivism in favour of traditional Catholic values. Her relative popularity
and influence suggests that this traditionalist Christianism is an alternative to the Christianist
secularism of Wilders and Le Pen, and may be more popular among Christians and social
conservatives who may choose to adopt a ‘Christian’ identity – and in some cases Christian
practices – in order to oppose not merely Islam and globalisation, but also secularism.857 Thus
we may be seeing two different types of Christianism developing in Europe. Each uses
Christian identity to define an ‘ingroup’ and exclude Muslims and ‘globalists.’ However, they
differ on the issue of the desirability of secularism. For this reason we see a ‘Christianist
secular’ movement developing, which grafts Christian identity on a secular worldview and
political programme, and a traditionalist Christianism developing, which opposes secularism
and attempts to re-establish traditional Christian values within Europe.
Findings
This thesis began with a question: Why is religion used as a tool with which to differentiate
‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the populist radical right in Western Europe?
854 Ibid.
855 Ibid.
856 Maréchal’s speech was recorded and can be viewed here:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=obHuTlTHMk8.
857 British writer Peter Hitchens is an example of this phenomenon. He writes, “I concede to my atheist
opponents that belief or unbelief is a choice. As a choice, it is based upon desire. I desire, and therefore choose
to believe in, one kind of universe, one that has laws and purpose with justice woven into its very fabric. The
unbeliever desires, and therefore chooses to believe in, a chaotic universe where the dead remain dead and
actions have no effect beyond their immediately observable consequences.” Peter Hitchens, “Why Modern
Atheists Rage Against God,” Truth Revolt, May16, 2014. https://www.truthrevolt.org/commentary/peter-
hitchens-why-modern-atheists-rage-against-god.
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To answer this question I studied the relevant literature and, based on my reading,
hypothesised that Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has (1) revealed the non-
universal nature of European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the
secularisation of Christianity into European ‘culture.’ Recognition that Christianity has been
secularised into ‘culture,’ I further hypothesised, made it possible for secular Europeans to
identify themselves – and their nation and ultimately Western civilisation – as Christian or
Judeo-Christian. This recognition made possible the previously implausible joining of
Christian identity with a secular worldview: what Brubaker calls Christianist secularism, or a
type of Christian identitarian politics which perceives contemporary European culture to be
‘Christianity secularised.’ A number of populist radical right parties in Western Europe have
embraced Christianist secularism, which they use to define their respective national identities
in religio-civilisational terms, i.e. as (Judeo-)Christian. In doing so, they are able to exclude
Muslims from their society, on the grounds that Islam is an alien religion which – unlike
Christianity and possibly Judaism – has not and cannot be secularised into ‘culture.’
This hypothesis appears largely correct. I was able to confirm Brubaker’s categorisation of
the Party for Freedom and National Front as being among the populist radical right parties as
Christian identitarian, and their discourse as conforming to a Christianist secular worldview.
In this way, I was able to confirm the salience of these categorisations. Equally, my research
suggests that the growth of Christian identity in Western Europe has occurred largely due to
Muslim immigration to, and Islam’s special visibility in, Europe. Furthermore, through the
comparison of these two very different parties, my research suggests that it is likely other
populist radical right parties in Western Europe may also be categorised as Christianist
secular, with their worldview developing as a reaction to Muslim immigration and visibility. I
make this assertion due to similar phenomena being observed in the two countries, despite the
large differences in the religious history of the Netherlands and France, with the former being
denominationally mixed and before the 1970s pillarised, and the latter largely Catholic yet
with a strong secular state and system of laws. If the same type of Christianist secularism
develops in these different cultures and political environment, it can be assumed that the
same forces are behind the development of Christian secularism in other Western European
nations. Therefore the Christianist secularism of the Alternative for Germany Party, or the
UK Independence Party, or indeed that of the Danish People’s Party, can also be attributed to
the increasing visibility of Islam in Europe, and the immigration of Muslims into secular
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post-Christian Germany, the United Kingdom, and Denmark – among other Western
European nations – respectively.
In 2012-2017 the populist radical right moved from the fringes of Western European politics
to the centre, disrupting the comfortable centrist consensus on the efficacy of immigration,
the European Union, and multiculturalism. The 2015 immigration event played an important
role in the rise of the populist right, allowing the populists to create a sense of existential
crisis about the future of their respective national and European culture, as hundreds of
thousands of non-Christian non-Europeans sought asylum in a number of Western European
states. In an environment in which more than one million mostly Muslim people migrated to
Europe in a single year, populist radical right parties were able to capitalise on European
fears that Muslims would ‘Islamise’ their nations, reduce employment opportunities, and
increase crime.
Yet the rise of the populist radical right, while in part the product of events such as the
immigration ‘crisis’ of 2015, and the 2008 financial crisis, cannot be attributed to single
causes. Rather, it is the culmination of decades of social change, particularly the
secularisation of European societies in the aftermath of the Second World War, the arrival of
millions of Muslim migrants from North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia, and the
adoption of neoliberal economic policies – to varying degrees – by Western European
governments. To understand the rise of populist radical right politics, then, we must listen to
the populists’ complaints and consider why they might resonate so much with their
supporters.
Despite their increasing power and presence in European public life, populist radical right
parties rely upon rhetoric devices – discourse – to influence their societies and push their
agenda. They frequently aim to re-shape national identities, and do this primarily by insisting
that they speak for ‘the people,’ and are fighting for their interests. Equally, they claim that
powerful ‘elites’ – particularly the centre-left and centre-right mainstream political parties,
but also media, business, and academia – are pursuing a political agenda which has harmed
‘the people,’ and will inevitably result in their subjugation and eventual replacement with
another people or peoples. Populists’ fight against globalisation and Islam, then, is primarily
discursive.
An important rhetorical weapon of the populist radical right was their Christianism, which
they deployed in their discourse in order to ‘other’ Muslims, as well as the ‘elites’ and
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‘globalists’ who argued in favour of allowing Muslims to find asylum in Europe. European
Christianism did not take one form. Rather, two major varieties developed: a traditionalist
Christian identity movement which emphasised conservative values and opposed secularism
and progressivism, but also a secular Christianism which was secular, ostensibly liberal and
‘pro-freedom,’ and emphasised the unity of Christian or Judeo-Christian heritage with secular
differentiation of religion from other spheres of human activity. In both Christian identity
movements opposition to Islam and globalisation was paramount, alongside the defence of
the nation state and its ability to secure its borders. This is important, because – my findings
suggest – the Christian identity movements growing in Europe are part of the populist radical
right response to more than just Muslim immigration. Rather, they are a response to
globalisation itself, in particular the decline of nation-states, and the loss of unique and local
identities, and their replacement by commercial ‘global’ culture. In other words, populist
radical right politics is often a response to the advent of an increasingly fluid global
environment.
Beyond confirming my hypothesis, my research has further proven the existence of two
major Christian identity movements in Europe: ‘traditionalist Christianism’ and Christianist
secularism.’ Brubaker’s description of Christianist secularism being the preserve of
Western/Northern European populist radical right parties has been confirmed in this
research.858 Equally, traditional Christianism can be found largely in Eastern Europe,
especially in Hungary and Poland. However, Western Europe is home to some traditionalist
Christianism. The National Front, for example, is clearly divided between the supporters of
Marine Le Pen’s turn towards Christianist secularism, and those who would prefer a
traditionalist Christianism, such as that espoused by Marion Maréchal. This suggests that
some supporters of the National Front are uncomfortable with Le Pen’s leadership, and in
particular her re-orienting of the party towards secularism, liberalism, and her lack of interest
in fighting for issues dear to social conservatives. The question for the National Front, then, is
whether they believe laïcité is authentically French, and an ally in the fight against Islam and
globalisation, or itself a step on the road towards multiculturalism and the loss of authentic
French identity.
The populist radical right parties of the Netherlands, the most prominent and important of
which is Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom, do not appear to suffer from internal divisions on
858 See Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,”pp.1191-1226, 2017.
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the issue of religious identity. The Party for Freedom is, as Brubaker has noted, the paradigm
of the Christianist secular populist radical right party.859 It is instructive, then, to consider
why Wilders and his supporters have wedded Christian identity to a secularist – and
ostensibly liberal and pro-freedom – worldview and political agenda. The turn towards
Christian identitarianism in the Netherlands is not, obviously, related to an increase in
relgiousity among the Dutch. This is not surprising, however, given that the Party for
Freedom sets itself against any threats to the secular state. Indeed, for the party, mass
immigration and multicultural is to be proscribed because it allows Muslims to settle in the
country, practice their ‘non-secular’ religion freely, and increasingly threaten the secularity of
the Dutch public sphere. Marine Le Pen’s arguments against Muslim immigration take on a
similar form.
The National Front under Marine Le Pen and the Party for Freedom can thus be understood
as opposing globalisation, mass immigration, and Muslim immigration, because they believe
secularism to be threatened on two fronts: indirectly by ‘elites’ and ‘globalists,’ and directly
by the Muslim immigrants ‘elites’ and ‘globalists’ allow to settle in Western Europe. Their
Christianism develops out of a desire to stop Muslim immigration, end multiculturalism, and
to preserve contemporary secularism and the secularised Christian culture which provides –
in their view – the basis for all contemporary Western European values and mores. In other
words, Christianist secularism develops out of a desire to protect modernity from ‘backward’
religion.
The traditionalist Christianism Marion Maréchal, Viktor Orbán, and Poland’s Law and
Justice Party, differs in important ways from the secular Christianism of the aforementioned
parties. It demands a return to traditional Christian social attitudes, and is sceptical about – if
not deeply hostile towards – the supposed achievements of modernity, especially its most
important product: secularism. For traditionalist Christian identitarians secular modernity is
robbing contemporary Europe of its built, cultural, and intellectual heritage, destroying its
morale, and making an Islamic takeover all but inevitable. Thus they desire a return to
traditional values derived from Christianity so as to make their nations great again, or at least
protect their cultures from being washed away by modernity’s powerful tide.
Where is religion in this programme? Traditionalist Christianists appear to start with a
political and ideological problem with modernity, and from there deduce that a return to
859 Ibid, 1197.
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Christian values and identity will solve the problem. Thus for all Christianists, politics come
first. Christianists who approve of the enlightenment project, secular modernity, and
progressive (or maintstream) social values, yet oppose multiculturalism and Islam, will often
become secular Christianists. On the other hand, people who see secular modernity as part of
the problem, having opened the door to globalisation, multiculturalism, and mass
immigration, will more often become traditionalist Christianists. In either case, it is the
politics that comes first. One might object and argue that religion is a matter of private belief.
This may be so – the point is contestable – yet the Christianity of even the traditionalist
Christianists is primarily about identity and values, not personal belief. To identify as
Christian and perform certain elements of Christian practice is enough for Orbán and
Maréchal, neither of whom appear to care whether a ‘Christian’ goes to Church or holds
genuine Christian beliefs. Thus we can only conclude that, in contemporary Europe, one may
choose to become Christian due to political beliefs, and not merely a deeply held spiritual
connection to the Christian religion.860
For the secular Christianists, religion is dangerous and must be kept out of the public sphere
unless safely secularised into ‘culture.’ Yet religion remains highly important. Christianity or
Judeo-Christianity is part of a sacred matrix incorporating nation, people, civilisation, and
religion.  There is no spiritual element to this (Judeo-)Christianity, yet there is a sacred
element. If we accept that the world, as sociologist Martin E. Marty has argued, is not simply
secular or religious, but most often religio-secular, then we must also accept that the populist
radical right in Western Europe is meshing together the sacred and secular; secularising
Christianity into ‘culture’ and making the secular state and its ‘people’ sacred.861 The state,
the ‘people,’ ‘culture’ and identity form a sacred matrix into which (Judeo-)Christianity
performs an important role, defining the heritage of ‘the people’ and their culture. For secular
Christianists, anyone who stands against these things violates their sacredness, and must be
opposed. (Judeo-)Christianity is thus not merely a rhetorical tool used to exclude Muslims. It
is part of the sacred matrix due to its role in creating the culture of ‘the people’ and thus
shaping the values and identity of the nation-state. Invoking the Christian or Judeo-Christian
tradition helps the populist radical right link contemporary culture and values to their
respective nation’s – and civilisation’s – distant past. In doing so, they are able to point to a
sacred tradition which has existed from ancient times to the present, and which ought to be
860 A point made by in Lilla, “Two Roads for the New French Right,” 2018.
861 See Martin E. Marty, “Our Religio-Secular World,” pp. 42-48.
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protected from those who would change or destroy it. While this sacred tradition might have
its roots in pre-Westphalia Europe and the Middle East, for the populist radical right the
Judeo-Christian tradition provides a basis for defending nationalism and the monocultural
nation-state from ‘globalists’ of the left and right.
The populist radical right in Western Europe uses religion in its discourse, but it is not a
religious movement. Rather, its discursive use of religion amounts to a secularist defence of
European modernity, culture, and heritage – as defined by the various populist parties –
against religion and the globalising forces that have allowed religion to return to prominence
in Western Europe. As such its discourse is xenophobic and anti-Muslim, and mired in
bigotry and scapegoating. But the populist radical right’s discourse may also prove attractive
to people attempting to hold on to traditions, identities, and cultures, which they perceive to
be in a process of being swept away by the forces of globalisation. Thus populist radical right
discourse may be understood by some as a defence of the particular, and an attempt to
prevent a unique ‘somewhere’ becoming yet another ‘anywhere.’
For these reasons the populist radical right is likely to continue to enjoy popular and electoral
success across Western Europe. The issues that drive the growth of the movement are
unlikely to disappear. Globalisation is likely to continue in its many forms; mass immigration
to Europe is an economic necessity due to the very low number of births each year; the
presence of Islam is very unlikely to diminish but will most likely grow year on year; markets
will continue to disrupt economies and the lives of ordinary people. The centre-left and
centre-right, though diminished in parts of Western Europe, will continue to exert their power
by pushing a globalising agenda which itself engenders a populist backlash.
If Western Europe’s left-wing parties hold contradictory political positions, championing on
the one hand workers rights and demanding higher wages, but on the other hand calling for
open borders and mass immigration, a populist backlash against these positions is inevitable.
Equally, radical right populism will flourish as long as the mainstream right ‘conservative’
parties fail to comprehend that there is nothing remotely conservative about free market
capitalism. Rather, the market’s propensity for ‘disruption’ and ‘creative destruction’
engenders social change incompatible with conservatism. Of course, the populist radical right
cannot provide solutions to Western Europe’s problems. Their discourse is centred upon
turning ‘elites’ and ‘Muslims’ into scapegoats, onto which the blame for declining Western
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European wages for workers, fertility, and changing demographics are blamed. Thus they do
not attempt to address the deeper social and economic problems affecting Western Europe.
At the same time, it should not be difficult to imagine how the rapid immigration of hundreds
of thousands of Muslims into a secular, post-Christian European nation might create
conditions advantageous to Christianist secular populist radical right parties. A study, albeit
conducted in the United States, suggests that political parties can easily encourage voting
based on a group identity, by reminding a former majority that they are in danger of
becoming or have become a minority.862 Perhaps, in the Western European context, as white
Christian and post-Christian Europeans decrease in number, they can be increasingly
manipulated by populist radical right parties to identify as – and more importantly vote as – a
Christian identity group. Given that Muslim immigration is likely to increase, and the white
post-Christian share of the European population decrease into the foreseeable future, the
future of Christian identity movements in Europe – secular and traditionalist – seems assured:
Christianism is very likely to remain a prominent element in populist radical right politics,
and perhaps beyond populism altogether.
Some final questions, some of which are difficult to answer without greater investigation,
remain. This thesis has shown how populist radical right movement cannot be characterised –
under the parameters I have delineated – as religious movements. Yet at the same time, it has
described a blurring of the boundary between religion, secularism, nationalism, and what
might be called civilisationalism, in the discourse of two populist radical right movements.
Yet this blurring is not a post-secular blurring of the boundary between religion and the
secular. Rather, in the mouths of the populist radical right in Western Europe, ‘religion’ has
become a powerful identity tool, used to separate ‘us’ from ‘them.’ For the populist radical
right, then, Christianity or Judeo-Christianity, effectively means ‘secularism’ and ‘not Islam’
– Islam being a ‘religious’ religion incapable of secularising.
The questions remaining, then, are how this information benefits our analysis and
understanding of the relationship between religion and politics in Europe. For example, the
thesis has discussed the apparent differences between the use of religion in the discourse of
the populist radical right in Eastern and Western Europe, showing how a traditionalist
Christianism is more common in the Central/Eastern (Hungary, Poland), while a secular
862 See Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce
Responsive Government, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2016, 232.
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Christianism is more common in the West/North (Netherlands, France). Any discussion of
this difference must be prefaced with a caveat reminding the reader that more study and
analysis is required of Christianism in Hungary and Poland before a deep understanding can
be reached. In a sense, the difference between traditionalist Christianism and secular
Christianism is irrelevant: both use religion for political ends, and moreover in an attempt to
exclude Muslims from immigrating to their nations and playing a role in public life. In doing
so, we cannot automatically label either Christianism falsely religious. After all, religion can
be, and is frequently, political. However, it is instructive to note how radical right populists in
Eastern Europe appear to more typically view public religion as an antidote to liberalism,
while radical right populists in Western Europe more typically view public religion as a
hostile, anti-secular force brought to their nations’ by Muslim immigrants. Thus the latter –
perhaps counter-intuitively – wield religious identity as a shield against public religion, and
especially against Islam when it is seen to be intruding into the public sphere. Making this
distinction, we can see how – in this age of religious revivals and political populism –
religion may be used by both secularists and religious groups to achieve political ends.
This is important. Religious identity is a powerful weapon in the hands of politicians,
especially when used as a tool by the populist radical right to define their respective national
identities (by way of a greater religion based ‘Christian’ civilisational identity). Deciding –
for example – who can be counted inside Christianity or the Judeo-Christian tradition, and
who is excluded, thus means being able to decide who is welcome and unwelcome in
Western Europe. This phenomenon may not be entirely unique to Western Europe and
European settler societies. For example, we might consider how a Hindu nationalist might
conceive of themselves as secular, yet argue that only a Hindu can ‘truly’ be Indian, and thus
that Muslims and Christians must be excluded from the Indian public sphere (or from India
entirely). In this case, as with the secular Christianism of the populist radical right in Western
Europe, secularism is not linked so much to religious belief and practice, but to religious
identity – and thus to certain cultural practices which are linked rightly or wrongly to
religion. Thus the power of religion remains even among the secular, if only as a form of
identity. And the ability to define the boundaries of religion, and who may be counted as
being inside a religious identity group, and who may not, is a powerful tool in the hands of
politicians.
This is not to say that any particular group should have a monopoly on defining ‘religion’ and
its boundaries. Understandings of ‘religion’ will always vary and shift in time and from place
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to place. Nor do I argue that Christianity is not an important part of European culture and
identity, or that this should not be in some way recognised. Rather, I argue only that there is
power in Christian identity – even after religious belief has largely left Europe – and that the
power to define the religious identity of secular nations is dangerous when left in the hands of
politicians who would use it to divide and demonise the already marginalised. To permit,
then, the populist radical right in Western Europe to define itself as a protector of Christianity
and Christians, is to allow a further religionising of identity in Western Europe, and a
strengthening of religious categorisation of peoples, already too solid.
Conclusion: Religion and the populist radical right in Western Europe
This thesis opened with a puzzle: populist radical right parties in Western Europe have made
religious identity a central aspect of their discourse. At the same time, they have achieved
unprecedented electoral success and political influence within perhaps the most secularised
part of the world: Western Europe. This is curious. If Western European politics is secular,
why do we find populist radical right parties making appeals to religious identity -- and at the
same time increasing in popularity? Moreover, how and why has this occurred, and what does
it tell us about the relationship between religion and politics in contemporary Western
Europe?
In chapter one I began to answer this question by examining the literature on populism and
the European populist radical right. Based on my review of this literature, I concluded that
the most salient description of populism was Mudde and Kaltwasser’s minimal definition: a
“thin centred ideology” which divides society into “two homogenous and antagonistic
groups: the ‘pure’ people and the ‘corrupt elite.’”863 Equally, I found that the most convincing
characterisation of the populist radical right was Mudde’s, that it is essentially nativist,
authoritarian, and populist. Chapter one then proceeded to examine a gap in the literature on
populist radical right parties in Western Europe: the use of religion in their discourse.
This question was further explored in chapter two, which examined explanations for populist
radical right parties’ discursive use of religion. First, the chapter examined whether the
populist radical right’s use of religion was related to growing post-secular consciousness in
Europe of the persistence of religion and the beneficial aspects of religious ideas and
863 Mudde, ‘The Populist Zeitgeist’, 543. 2004.
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language in the public sphere.  Thus the chapter tested the post-secularity of the Western
European populist radical right’s discourse by comparing examples of their discourse against
the post-secularism advocated by Habermas. I found that while populist radical right
politicians spoke of the importance of Christianity or Judeo-Christianity in their discourse,
they spoke of it only insofar as it related to national and civilisational identity, or as a
description of the secular national and common Western culture to which they claim to
belong – that is, the culture of ‘the people.’  Therefore I found that populist radical right
parties in Western Europe were secular – sometimes aggressively secular – and that their
discourse contained no references to Christian or Jewish spirituality, theology, philosophy, or
language.
Having found that the populist radical right is a secularist movement, chapter two examined
the literature on populism and religion, focusing on the work of scholars analysing Western
European populist parties’ use of religion. The chapter argued that Rogers Brubaker’s
observation of a ‘Christianist’ secularism emerging in Europe, and of its adoption by populist
radical right parties was the most coherent description of what we see occurring when
populist radical right parties invoke Judeo-Christian identity and/or culture in their
discourse.864
The review of literature conducted in chapters one and two led to the formulation of a thesis
question: Why is religion used as a tool with which to differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the
other’ in the discourse of the populist radical right in Western Europe? The review of
literature also led me to formulate a hypothesis: Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe
has (1) revealed the non-universal nature of European secularism to Europeans, and (2)
demonstrated the secularisation of Christianity into European ‘culture.’ This recognition that
Christianity has been secularised into ‘culture’ has allowed secular Europeans to identify
themselves – and their nation and ultimately Western civilisation – as Christian or Judeo-
Christian. It has thus created Christianist secularism, a type of Christian identitarian politics
which perceives contemporary European culture to be ‘Christianity secularised.’ A group of
populist radical right parties in Western Europe have embraced Christianist secularism, which
they use to define their respective national identities in religio-civilisational terms, i.e. as
(Judeo-)Christian. In doing so, they are able to exclude Muslims from their society, on the
864 Brubaker, “A new ‘Christianist’ secularism in Europe,” 2016.
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grounds that Islam is an alien religion which – unlike Christianity and possibly Judaism – has
not and cannot be secularised into ‘culture.’
Chapter three discussed in detail my method for testing this hypothesis. My method involved
case studies of the National Front and Party for Freedom, and – as part of the case studies –
Critical Discourse Analysis of texts produced by respective party leaders Marine Le Pen and
Geert Wilders in the 2012-2017 period. This method was applied across chapter four to
seven.
Chapters 4 and 6 respectively tested the first part of my hypothesis, by examining Dutch and
French political history to determine the effects of Muslim immigration on French and Dutch
religious self-identity. The purpose of this was to understand whether the presence of Islam in
Europe made Europeans more likely to identify as, in one sense or another, ‘Christian’ or
‘Judeo-Christian.’
Chapters 5 and 7 continued to test my hypothesis. In those two chapters I examined texts
produced by Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders during three important events: 2012 French
and Dutch elections, the 2015 immigration ‘crisis,’ and 2017 Dutch and French elections. The
purpose of this examination was to determine whether the texts contained rhetoric which
might allow us to categorised the parties’ within Brubaker’s Christian identitarian category,
and the discourse used by the parties as Christianist secularism, the most important features
of which include “identitarian Christianism, a secularist posture, a philosemitic stance, and an
ostensibly liberal defence of gender equality, gay rights, and freedom of speech?”865 To
further help understand the parties’ use of Christian identity and the role of Islam in their
discourse, I asked two further questions: How is Islam constructed in the discourse? How is
Christian identity used to exclude Muslims from European society?
I asked these questions in order to understand the Islam – (Judeo-)Christian binary
constructed in the discourse of the National Front and Party for Freedom. The purpose of
asking these questions was to comprehend how Le Pen and Wilders construct their version of
‘Islam,’ and therefore understand why National Front and Party for Freedom advocate for,
and how they justify, Muslims’ exclusion from the public sphere – if not from France and the
Netherlands altogether respectively. Equally I asked these questions in order to uncover who
qualifies as a (Judeo-)Christian in Le Pen’s and Wilders’ respective discourses, and how this
865 Brubaker, “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative
perspective,” 1193, 2017.
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constructed (Judeo-)Christian identity is used to further the political agenda of the two
respective parties.
Chapter eight compared the data produced in my case studies.  This chapter contained the
results of the test of my hypothesis, and ultimately the answer to my thesis question. The
chapter concluded that (1) there is evidence Muslim immigration to Western Europe
engendered a sense among a number of French and Dutch that secularism is non-universal,
but rather a product of Europe’s (Judeo-)Christian heritage and values. (2) Evidence suggests
exposure to Islam and Muslim difference has made visible the secularised Christianity
embedded in French and Dutch culture respectively. Together, these effects have made it
possible for French and Dutch to identify as secular and – in a civilisational sense – Christian.
In other words, the development of Christianist secularism stems from these two factors.
(3) The respective discourses of Dutch Party for Freedom and National Front of France in the
2012-2017 suggest that the two parties are examples of ‘Christian identitarianism’ and
‘Christianist secularism’ in Western European politics. For both parties, Christianity or
Judeo-Christianity is a tool used to differentiate an ingroup from outgroups. The outgroups,
Muslims and ‘globalist elites,’ are categorised as a threat to the secularised Christian culture
the parties’ claim defines and sustains their culture and civilisation. But this Christianity is
not a religion. Rather, it is an identity based on a shared connection to the secularised
Christianity in ‘culture,’ which can be connected to politics, values, ideas, symbols, language,
and behaviour.
(4) In the 2012-2017 period Islam is constructed in the discourse of both the National Front
and Party for Freedom as a monolithic force dominating the lives of its adherents, making
Muslim immigrants unique insofar as they alone cannot secularise by privatising their
religious beliefs and practices. This being so, Islam is constructed as a threat to secular
differentiation of religion and politics, church and state, and moreover to the ‘cultural
Christianity’ which defines contemporary French and Dutch culture, values, and heritage. (5)
Christianist secularism – or Christian identity grafted onto a secular worldview and political
programme – is adopted by the National Front and Party for Freedom throughout 2012-2017
and used discursively to create a Judeo-Christian and Humanist or Christian and secular
ingroup, which they designate as ‘the people,’ and to create two outgroups based upon people
excluded from ‘the people:’ ‘globalists/elites and Muslims/Islamic fundamentalists.’
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Based on these findings, the chapter – and thus this thesis -- argued that populist radical right
parties in Western Europe use religion as a tool to differentiate between ‘the people’ and
‘others’ in their discourse because the secularisation of Christianity into ‘culture’ has made it
possible for secular people to adopt a Christian identity when faced with Muslim difference.
The populist radical right has capitalised on a growing sense of Christian identity among
Europeans by combining a secular political platform with Christian identity, allowing them to
frame themselves as defenders of the authentic identity and culture of their respective
societies and of Western civilisation. Playing on Europeans’ deepest fears, the populist
radical right claims they alone can save ‘the people’ from the fate that awaits them: a loss of
culture due to the twin effects of mass immigration and economic disruption, and – worst of
all – the undoing of secularisation and its replacement with an Islam dominated society.
It is possible that, as Habermas, has observed, Muslim immigration has played a role in
creating a post-secular consciousness of religion.866 The persistence of Muslim religiosity in
secular Europe, and growing dissatisfaction with consumerism, may at times be encouraging
Europeans to re-consider what Christianity and Judaism, as systems of thought and practice,
can offer secular society. Yet the populist radical right do not use religion in a post-secular
manner. Rather, we see two types of populist radical right discourse in Europe, both of which
use Christianity or Judeo-Christianity primarily as a tool to create an ingroup and outgroups.
‘Traditionalist’ Christianists blame the secularist and multiculturalist policies of ‘elites’ for
Europe’s demographic spiral and growing political irrelevance, and seeks to solve these
problems by enforcing a Christian identity upon citizens, and encouraging a return to
conservative or ‘traditional’ social mores. Secular Christianists fear Muslim immigration is
undoing the secular differentiation of religion and politics – which they believe to be the
ultimate product of the Judeo-Christian tradition – and thus seek to stop Muslims arriving in
Europe, and also remove from power ‘elites’ and ‘globalists’ who encourage Muslim
immigration.
For the secular Christianists of the populist radical right in Western Europe, Judeo-
Christianity and Christianity are terms used to describe the secular culture of contemporary
Europe, which itself contains the secularised remains of European Christianity. Thus the
populist radical right in Western Europe can rejects religion’s presence in the public sphere
unless it has been secularised into ‘culture,’ yet still claim to be protectors of the West’s
866 See Habermas, “Notes on post-secular society,” pp.17-29, 2008.
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Christian heritage. Indeed, secular Christianist populist radical right parties are political
movements grounded in a secular worldview, and often hostile towards religion, promising at
times to protect the secular public sphere from religious – particularly Islamic – incursions.
What, then, does the success of the Christianist secular populist right tell us about the
relationship between religion and politics in contemporary Western Europe? It tells us that
religion remains an influence in Western European political life, not despite secularisation,
but because elements of Christianity has been secularised into culture to the degree that it is
now possible for secular Europeans to adopt – in the face of Muslims difference –a Christian
or Judeo-Christian identity.
Equally, it suggests that while the growth of Christianist secular populist radical right parties
at first appears to indicates a growing civilisationalism in Western Europe, the role of (Judeo-
)Christianity in populist radical right discourse serves only to bolster the power of the nation-
state, and to attack internationalism and globalism. Christianist secular parties are in fact
deeply nationalist and nativist, and claim the democratic and free nation-state to be a product
of the Judeo-Christian tradition. Thus globalisation – and the ‘elite’ politicians,
businesspeople, and activists who wish to eliminate borders and reduce the power of national
governments – are framed  by Christianist secular populist radical right parties as a threat to
their nation’s and civilisation’s (Judeo-)Christian culture and identity. Thus (Judeo-)Christian
identity, while most visibly weaponised against Muslim immigrants, can also be used to
‘other’ individuals or groups which appear to or can be framed as threatening (Judeo-
)Christian  and culture in Europe. ‘Elites’ and ‘globalists’ who encourage or allow Muslim
immigration to Europe are thus framed by populist radical right politicians as threats to
national culture, and betrayers of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Finally, the philo-Semitism in Christianist secular populist radical right discourse indicates
the manner in which the Jewish people and Israel have become increasingly perceived by
Europeans as belonging to Western (Judeo-Christian) civilisation. Both the political right and
left often identify Israel as a Western state or outpost in a non-Western region. Yet while left-
wing parties often label Israel a colonialist power, and condemn and/or Israeli policy towards
the Palestinians, the Christianist secular populist radical right supports Israel. The populist
radical right’s philo-Semitisim, however, appears motivated by a perception of the Jewish
state as a welcome outpost of Western Judeo-Christian freedom in the otherwise “totalitarian”
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Muslim world, and not by any genuine sympathy or admiration for Judaic thought, religion,
or culture.
The rise and success of the populist radical right in Western Europe is the product of many
forces. Secular Christianist discourse is an important part of populist radical right discourse,
though by no means the reason behind the success of the Party for Freedom, National Front,
or any other populist radical right party. Yet Christianist secularism plays a number of
important roles in populist radical right politics.  It helps the populist radical right create an
identity which links Western Europe’s religious Christian past with its secular present –
despite the vast gulf in social and particularly sexual mores between the two – allowing
populist radical right parties to other and exclude anyone who does not fit into its religio-
secular Judeo-Christian conception of national and civilisational identity.
It allows populist radical right parties to incorporate Israel and the Jewish people within the
civilisation of the West, despite the violence done to Jews by Christian Europeans,
culminating in the Holocaust.  Furthermore, it helps creates a solid identity and conception of
Western civilisation which can be contrasted with and defended from neoliberal globalism,
and the mass immigration and multiculturalism which results from globalisation. Adopting a
(Judeo-)Christian identity is thus a means of opposing globalisation – and perhaps liquid
modernity – by holding fast to a solid (if imagined and ultimately empty) identity.  The
Christianist secularism of the populist radical right is, then, not really about religion. Rather,
it is created by Western Europeans’ opposition to the presence of religion – especially Islam
– in the public sphere, except when this religion has been safely secularised into culture. It is
sustained by European fears of cultural and economic decline, which the populist radical right
blames upon ‘elites’ and ‘globalists’ who have betrayed ‘the people’ and the Judeo-Christian
tradition by weakening the nation-state, embracing multiculturalism/cultural relativism, and
allowing Muslim immigrants to ‘Islamise’ Western Europe.
The populist radical right capitalise on the fears of Europeans who believe that globalisation
and mass immigration will inevitably destroy their national cultures. Equally, they are
uniquely able to capitalise on growing recognition, stemming from the visibility of Islam in
Europe, that Christianity remains embedded in secular Western European culture, and
secularism is not a totally neutral space between religions, but in the European context
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